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2012 marked the birth of I·CONnect, the blog of the International Journal of Constitutional Law (I·CON), the lead-
??????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????
This new annual series is the latest innovation at I·CONnect: the annual country reports assembled in this volume 
embody its core purposes. Presented in a standardized format, the reports give readers a detailed but relatively brief 
overview of constitutional developments and cases in individual jurisdictions during the past calendar year, in this case 
2016. Coverage includes 44 jurisdictions, including not only canonical ones like the Germany, India and the United 
????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
by both judges and scholars.
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
public law in an easily digestible format, we aim to increase the base of knowledge upon which scholars and judges 
?????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
will grow to an even wider range of countries.
 
??????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??
thank our many distinguished country authors for producing a high-quality and useful product. 
??????????????????????? ?????? ??????????????????????? ?????????????? ???????????? ?????? ??????? ?????????????????-
ed by Vlad Perju, for partnering with us in this project. Since becoming its Director, Vlad Perju has transformed the 
Clough Center into a leading site in the English-speaking world for the study of constitutions and constitutionalism. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????
Michelle Muccini of the Clough Center for marshaling her creativity to design this book from cover to cover. She has 
translated our scholarly content into a beautifully innovative format that has exceeded our every expectation.
????????? ???????? ??????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
outstanding contributions in the journal itself.  
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????
A FIRST-OF-ITS-KIND RESOURCE IN PUBLIC LAW
Richard Albert & David Landau
I·CONnect Founding Co-Editors
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The Clough Center for the Study of Constitutional Democracy at Boston College is delighted to join I·CONnect in 
making this outstanding constitutional law resource available to scholars and practitioners around the world. The 
I·CONnect blog, like its parent International Journal of Constitutional Law (I·CON), have established themselves as 
indispensable references in comparative constitutional law. This volume, which assembles national reports of develop-
ments in constitutional law in 44 jurisdictions, is a new and important step in expanding the horizon of constitutional 
practice and shaping research in comparative constitutional studies. 
The Clough Center’s programs and initiatives aim to reinvigorate and reimagine the study of constitutional democra-
cy. By taking a holistic, global, and interdisciplinary approach to constitutional democracy, we seek to foster original 
research and thoughtful reflection on the promise and challenges of constitutional government in the United States 
and around the world. The Clough Center regularly welcomes some of the world’s most distinguished scholars of 
constitutionalism and provides a venue for the exploration of topical matters in constitutional thought. More informa-
tion about the Center’s activities, including access to the Clough Archive, are available at http://www.bc.edu/centers/
cloughcenter.html. 
I am deeply grateful to Professor Richard Albert, a trusted friend and collaborator of the Clough Center, for this part-
nership with I·CONnect. I am also grateful to Michelle Muccini for her marvelous design work of this e-book. 
A PARTNERSHIP IN SUPPORT OF CONSTITUTIONAL  
DEMOCRACY
Vlad Perju
Director, Clough Center for the Study of Constitutional Democracy  
Professor, Boston College Law School 
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The practical importance of comparative constitutional studies around the world is evident. National high courts 
increasingly turn to foreign case law in rendering decisions, to draw inspiration or test arguments in tackling a consti-
tutional problem. But the accessibility of reliable sources still presents a vexing issue. Only a small number of courts 
regularly publishes translations of their decisions, and it is incredibly time-consuming for scholars or judges unfamil-
iar with a jurisdiction to identify important cases.  
This e-book collects “year-in-review” reports on developments in the constitutional law in the year 2016 from 44 
jurisdictions, on five continents. The reports were prepared by researchers well versed in their legal system, often in 
?????????????? ???????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????
migration of ideas across the community of constitutional interpreters. These national reports present an accessible 
overview of the most notable constitutional events in each jurisdiction. 
Each report starts with an introduction to the constitution and the high court in a given jurisdiction and then continues 
with a narrative exposition of up to two significant controversies. This is not always a case-based account and it may 
examine long-burgeoning constitutional developments that arose prior to 2016. The third section then isolates the year 
2016, for which each report gives an overview of selected judgments. The short case notes are divided into sub-sec-
tions covering subjects that may include the separation of powers, rights and freedom, as well as foreign, international 
and/or multilateral relations. Authors conclude with observations on the path of the constitutional development in their 
jurisdiction or sometimes offer a cautious forecast of the future.  This e-book is primarily descriptive and explanatory, 
although there is inevitably also some critical commentary.
????????????????????·CONnect and the Clough Center for the Study of Constitutional Democracy at Boston College, 
????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????·CON and particularly to Gráinne de Burca and Joseph 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????
scholars who helped with the review of some of the reports in this e-book, among them Marek Antoš, Timea Dri-
noczki, and Mihail Vatsov. 
This e-book would not exist without the enthusiastic encouragement of Marta Cartabia, vice-President of the Italian 
Constitutional Court, who supported the idea of this series since the very first national report published in 2016. After 
this pioneering report, others followed suit, and we soon had ten national reports on developments in constitutional 
law for the year 2015. A few months later, the number had grown to over 40, with commitments from all around the 
??????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????? ???? ?????????????????
start of a long collaboration. The project will generate an exciting and lasting resource as the reports accrue in time. 
Finally, we thank Richard Albert and David Landau for advice and enriching collaboration.
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
ABOUT THIS BOOK: ORIGINS, PURPOSE, AND CONTENTS
Pietro Faraguna and Simon Drugda
Global Review Co-Editors
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COUNTRY REPORTS
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Australia
DEVELOPMENTS IN AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Anne Carter and Anna Dziedzic, Centre for Comparative Constitutional Studies (CCCS), 
Melbourne Law School, with assistance from CCCS researchers Artemis Kirkinis, Kalia 
??????????????????? ?????????????
INTRODUCTION 
2016 witnessed several relatively uncom-
mon political events in Australia, including 
a double dissolution election, a public dis-
pute between the nation’s two highest Law 
Officers, and legal proceedings over elec-
toral eligibility and processes. These politi-
cal developments informed the work of the 
High Court, which heard cases concerning 
changes to voting methods, the validity of 
an Electoral Roll ‘suspension period,’ and 
the eligibility of two Senators. The Court’s 
constitutional jurisprudence in 2016 on these 
and other matters (outlined in Part IV be-
low) confirms that the Court’s approach to 
interpretation remains firmly tied to the text 
and structure of the Constitution. Outside 
the judicial realm, debate over constitutional 
change to recognise Australia’s Indigenous 
peoples continued, but with little consensus 
as to the scope of the proposal to be put to 
referendum.
THE CONSTITUTION AND  
THE COURT
The Australian Constitution was created in 
1901 when the colonies established by Brit-
ish settlers came together in a federation. 
The Constitution provides for a parliamen-
tary system of government, broadly based 
??? ???????????????? ???????? ??? ???????????? ??
federal system in which powers are divided 
between the Commonwealth and six states.
 
1 Constitution ss 80, 51(xxxi).
2 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520.  
3 Constitution ss 75 and 76. 
4 Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) s 354.
5 Constitution s 72; High Court of Australia Act 1979 (Cth) s 5. 
A distinctive feature of the Australian Con-
stitution is that it does not include a Bill of 
Rights. Rights are instead protected by the 
constitutional separation of powers, the 
common law, and the democratic legislative 
??????????????? ???? ????????????? ????????? ??
???? ????????? ?????????????????? ???????????
including trial by jury and compensation on 
just terms for acquisition of property1??????
provisions are not framed or interpreted in 
the same manner as civil and political rights 
in other jurisdictions. Certain rights, such 
as the freedom of political communication, 
have been implied into the Constitution by 
the High Court.2 
The High Court of Australia is the final court 
of appeal from all federal and state courts. 
The High Court also has original jurisdiction 
in constitutional matters3 (but no capacity to 
issue advisory opinions) and special juris-
diction to hear electoral disputes.4 The High 
Court has the power to invalidate laws that 
do not comply with the Constitution. The 
Court comprises seven judges, who are ap-
pointed to serve until the age of 70, subject 
to removal by a special parliamentary proce-
dure.5 Final hearings before the High Court 
involve both detailed written submissions 
and oral argument. Judges may write their 
own separate judgments and may join with 
other judges to write joint reasons. Unani-
mous decisions are relatively rare. 
AUSTRALIA
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DEVELOPMENTS AND  
CONTROVERSIES IN 2016 
High Court Appointments
In 2016, Chief Justice French announced his 
retirement from the High Court, effective in 
January 2017, two months short of the man-
datory retirement age of 70. As a result, in 
November 2016, two new appointments to 
the bench were announced, both of whom 
were sworn in in early 2017. Justice Susan 
Kiefel, who was first appointed to the High 
Court in 2007, was appointed as the Court’s 
13th Chief Justice. She is the first woman 
to serve as Chief Justice of the Court. After 
leaving school at the age of 15, Chief Justice 
Kiefel completed her studies part-time while 
working as a legal secretary. Before being 
appointed to the High Court, she served as a 
judge on the Queensland Supreme Court and 
the Federal Court of Australia.
The other appointment to the Court was Jus-
??????????????????????????????? ?????????-
ern Australia, Justice Edelman was a Pro-
fessor at Oxford University and practised at 
????????? ??????? ??????????????????????????
??????????????? ?????????????????????????-
??????????????????????????? ??????? ?????-
lia and then the Federal Court of Australia. 
Aged just 43, Justice Edelman is one of the 
youngest justices ever to be appointed and he 
could potentially sit on the Court until 2044.
The Solicitor-General’s Role
2016 witnessed a public and protracted dis-
pute between Australia’s first and second 
Law Officers, the Attorney-General, and the 
Solicitor-General, respectively. In Australia, 
the Attorney-General is a member of Parlia-
ment and Cabinet, and so holds a largely po-
litical office. By contrast, the Solicitor-Gen-
eral is a statutory office-holder who provides 
legal advice to the government and rep-
???????? ???? ??????????? ??? ????????????? ????
Solicitor-General has traditionally been con-
sidered to be independent of government, the 
office’s close connection to the government 
creates the potential for tensions between the 
two offices.
6 Constitution s 57 provides that a double dissolution cannot take place in the six months prior to the end of the House of Representatives’ three year-term. 
As such, the latest day in 2016 on which a double dissolution could occur was 11 May 2016.
In 2016, these tensions escalated when the 
Attorney-General issued a Direction to the 
Solicitor-General requiring that all persons 
or bodies seeking an opinion from the So-
licitor-General first obtain written consent 
from the Attorney-General. The Direction 
changed the previous protocol and raised 
concerns that it would restrict access to the 
Solicitor-General’s advice.
The 2016 Direction sparked a public dispute 
between the Solicitor-General, Mr Justin 
Gleeson SC, and the Attorney-General, Sen-
ator George Brandis QC. This led to an inqui-
ry before a Senate Committee into the nature 
and scope of consultations that had occurred 
prior to the making of the Direction. The 
Committee, which reported in November 
2016, recommended that the Senate disallow 
the Direction and that the Attorney-General 
be censured for misleading Parliament. Prior 
to this report, in late October 2016 Mr Glee-
son resigned, citing a breakdown in trust and 
confidence between the two Law Officers. A 
new Solicitor-General was appointed in De-
cember 2016.
Federal Elections
Prorogation and Double Dissolution 
2016 also witnessed a relatively rare double 
dissolution federal election, which was en-
gineered by the government’s utilisation of 
two constitutional provisions. 
Under the Constitution, the House of Repre-
sentatives (lower house) sits for a three-year 
term, whereas Members of the Senate (up-
per house) sit for six-year terms, with elec-
tions for half of the seats every three years. 
As such, at an ordinary election, all House 
of Representative seats, but only half of the 
Senate seats, are vacated. Section 57 of the 
Constitution provides for a double dissolu-
tion election, whereby both Houses of Par-
liament are dissolved and all seats vacated, 
as part of the process to resolve deadlocks 
between the two Houses on proposed laws.
The 44th Parliament of Australia was elected 
in 2013. The Liberal-National Coalition held 
a majority of seats in the House of Repre-
sentatives but did not command a majority 
in the Senate. In 2015, the government intro-
duced industrial relations legislation that was 
passed by the House of Representatives but 
rejected by the Senate. The House of Repre-
sentatives again considered the Bill and re-
turned it to the Senate, but due to the timing 
of the parliamentary sittings and the need to 
pass the budget, there was insufficient time 
for the Senate to reconsider the Bill before 
the deadline for a double dissolution.6 The 
government did not have the numbers in the 
Senate to reschedule the sittings and so the 
Governor-General, acting on the advice of 
the Prime Minister, prorogued Parliament on 
15 April 2016 and summoned it to sit again 
on Monday 18 April 2016. This prorogation, 
while within the Constitution, was unusual. 
Prior to 2016, the Parliament has been pro-
rogued and recalled only 28 times, and not 
once since 1977. 
At the new sittings, the Senate again reject-
ed the Bill and on 9 May 2016, the Gover-
nor-General dissolved both Houses of Parlia-
ment. The election held on 2 July 2016 saw 
the Coalition returned to government with a 
reduced majority in the House of Represen-
tatives and a minority of seats in the Senate, 
meaning that a group of minor parties and 
independents continue to hold the balance of 
power in the Senate. 
Disputes over Eligibility
Following the July 2016, election disputes 
arose over the eligibility of two Senators: 
Senator Bob Day and Senator Rob Culleton. 
In both matters, the Senate referred questions 
to the High Court, sitting as the Court of Dis-
puted Returns. Section 44 of the Constitution 
provides for certain circumstances in which 
a person shall be ‘incapable of being chosen 
or of sitting as a senator or a member of the 
House of Representatives.’ These include a 
person who ‘has been convicted and is under 
sentence, or subject to be sentenced, for any 
offence punishable under a law of the Com-
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monwealth or of a State by imprisonment for 
one year or longer’ (s 44(ii)), and a person 
who ‘has any direct or indirect pecuniary in-
terest in any agreement with the Public Ser-
vice of the Commonwealth…’ (s 44(v)).
The dispute about Mr Culleton’s election 
concerned s 44(ii). At the time of the elec-
tion he had been convicted of larceny in the 
?????? ?????? ??? ???? ????????????? ???? ????
conviction was annulled after the election. 
The High Court heard the matter in Decem-
ber 2016 and in February 2017 held that Mr 
Culleton was incapable of being elected as 
a Senator. 
The dispute about Mr Day’s election con-
cerned s 44(v) and arose out of the arrange-
ments for the lease by the Commonwealth of 
his electoral office at a property in which his 
family trust held an interest. In April 2017, 
the High Court held that Mr Day was inca-
pable of being elected as a Senator because 
of his indirect pecuniary interest arising 
from the lease agreement with the Common-
wealth.
Constitutional Recognition of Indigenous 
Australians 
The Australian Constitution currently in-
cludes no reference to the Indigenous peo-
ples of Australia. Express references to 
‘aboriginal people’ were removed from the 
original text of the Constitution in 1967, but 
provisions that permit the Commonwealth 
Parliament to ‘make laws for the people of 
any race’ (s 51(xxvi)) and a defunct provi-
sion that contemplates disqualification from 
voting on the basis of race (s 25) remain.
  
There is a long history of advocacy for 
constitutional change to recognise Indige-
nous peoples and to better protect and pro-
mote Indigenous rights. Unlike other settler 
states, Australia has no treaty arrangements 
with Indigenous peoples and no substantive 
equality provision in the Constitution itself. 
7 E.g. Damien Freeman and Julian Leeser, ‘The Australian Declaration of Recognition: A new proposal for recognising Indigenous Australians’ (2014).    
8 Joint Select Committee on Constitutional Recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples, Final Report, June 2015.
9 Constitution s 128 provides that a constitutional amendment requires the support of a majority of voters in a majority of states at a referendum.
10 See Indigenous Law Bulletin (2016) vol 8(24), special edition on Constitutional Recognition http://www.ilc.unsw.edu.au/publications/indigenous-law-bulle-
tin-824.
The current process for constitutional change 
began in 2010 when the leaders of the two 
major political parties made commitments 
to work towards recognition. 2016 saw de-
velopments around the process for, and sub-
stance of, any constitutional amendment. Al-
though there is notional cross-party support 
for recognition there has to-date been little 
consensus on the detail.
In relation to process, political leaders had 
initially proposed a referendum for May 
2017, the 50th anniversary of the landmark 
1967 referendum. In 2016, this timeframe 
was extended to permit greater discussions, 
including the first of 12 Indigenous-only di-
alogues. A date for the referendum is yet to 
be settled. 
Also yet to be settled is the substance of 
the proposed amendments. Two distinct ap-
proaches to recognition have emerged. The 
first approach is largely symbolic.7 It would 
insert references to Indigenous peoples and 
their culture and history in the preamble 
(which is not legally binding), repeal the de-
funct s 25 of the Constitution, and reword the 
‘races’ power in s 51(xxvi). The second ap-
proach supplements symbolic constitutional 
statements with new substantive rights and 
procedures, such as a constitutional prohi-
bition on racial discrimination; a represen-
tative Indigenous advisory body; protection 
for Indigenous land rights; and entrenched 
treaty-making powers.8 
The Australian Constitution is notoriously 
difficult to amend.9 As such, the challenge 
is to develop proposed amendments which 
meet the needs and aspirations of Indigenous 
peoples and are likely to attract the required 
support at referendum. Frustrated by the lim-
itations of constitutional recognition, there 
were renewed calls in 2016 among Indige-
????????????? ???? ???????????????? ????????? ???
not necessarily involve formal amendments 
to the text of the Constitution, they are seen 
as a powerful expression of Indigenous sov-
ereignty and self-determination and a form 
of constitutional recognition that acknowl-
edges Indigenous peoples as peoples or na-
tions.10
MAJOR CASES 
In 2016, the High Court handed down 53 
judgments covering criminal appeals; tax-
ation, migration, and competition cases un-
der federal legislation; and a range of civil 
matters arising under federal and state juris-
dictions. The focus of this report is the six 
judgments that raised constitutional issues. 
Legislative Power
Plaintiff M68/2015 v Minister for Immigra-
tion and Border Protection [2016] HCA 1 (3 
February 2016)
This case challenged the lawfulness of Aus-
tralia’s arrangements for dealing with asy-
lum seekers. These include offshore pro-
cessing arrangements, under which people 
who arrive in Australia by boat without a 
valid visa and seek asylum are transferred to 
detention centres in Nauru and Papua New 
Guinea. Australia’s asylum seeker policies, 
which have included mandatory detention 
on- and offshore, have been the subject of 
considerable political controversy over the 
last 15 years and the High Court has exam-
ined these policies on a number of occasions. 
Due to the absence of a constitutional Bill 
of Rights, the Court approaches these issues 
through the lens of limitations on Common-
wealth legislative power and the separation 
of powers.
The plaintiff was a woman from Bangladesh 
whose boat was intercepted in Australian 
waters, and she was transferred to Nauru. 
?????????????????????????????????????? ?????-
ment for her pregnancy, she commenced 
proceedings in the High Court, seeking or-
ders to prevent the government from return-
ing her to Nauru. The plaintiff argued that 
10 | I•CONnect-Clough Center 
her detention was unlawful because it was 
not authorised by a valid Commonwealth 
law. The case focused first on  whether there 
was a head of federal legislative power to 
support the legislation authorising her deten-
tion, and secondly, whether the law infringed 
the principle that detention requires an exer-
cise of judicial (rather than executive) pow-
er, except in specific circumstances (called 
the ‘Lim principle’ after the case in which it 
was established11). 
By a majority of 6:1, the High Court upheld 
the validity of the legislation. The majority 
held that the detention legislation was sup-
ported by the Commonwealth’s power to 
make laws with respect to aliens12 and/or 
the external affairs power.13 On the issue of 
executive detention, four judges held that 
the plaintiff was not detained by the Aus-
tralian government but rather by the Nauru 
government, meaning that the Lim principle 
????????????????? ?????????????????????????
judges held that the plaintiff was, as a matter 
of substance, detained on Nauru by Austra-
lia, two of these judges (Bell and Gageler JJ) 
concluded that the detention in this case did 
not require an exercise of judicial rather than 
executive power. 
Justice Gordon was the sole dissenting judge, 
holding that the detention was unlawful. She 
held that the separation of judicial power 
under the Constitution requires exceptional 
reasons to justify a law that permits exec-
utive detention without judicial order, and 
that there were no such exceptional reasons 
in this case. 
Following this decision, the Australian gov-
ernment resumed transferring asylum seek-
ers to Nauru, where 380 people, including 
45 children, were detained as of December 
2016.14
11 ???????????? ??? ????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????? (1992) 176 CLR 1.
12 Constitution, s 51(xxix). 
13 Constitution, s 51(xix). 
14 Australian Government Department of Immigration and Border Security, Immigration Detention and Community Statistics (31 December 2016) https://
www.border.gov.au/about/reports-publications/research-statistics/statistics/live-in-australia/immigration-detention, p 4. 
15 McCloy v New South Wales (2015) 257 CLR 178.
Rights and Freedoms
Right to vote: Murphy v Electoral Commis-
sioner [2016] HCA 36 (5 September 2016)
This case concerned the validity of provi-
sions of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 
1918, which prevented the Electoral Com-
missioner from amending or updating the 
Electoral Roll during a ‘suspension period’ 
before the polling date. The plaintiffs argued 
that the suspension period was contrary to 
the requirement in ss 7 and 24 of the Con-
stitution that Members of Parliament be ‘di-
rectly chosen by the people’. In particular, 
the plaintiffs argued that the law was invalid 
unless the disqualification was for a ‘sub-
stantial reason’. Underpinning the plaintiffs’ 
case was the argument that technological 
advances and the availability of resources 
meant there was no substantial reason to sus-
pend the rolls from seven days after the date 
of the issue of the writs for the election.
All judges of the Court rejected the chal-
lenge and held that the impugned provisions 
were valid. A majority of the Court (French 
CJ and Bell J, Keane J, and Gordon J) held 
that the plaintiffs had not established that the 
provisions amounted to a ‘burden’ on the 
constitutional mandate of popular choice. 
All members of the Court agreed that even if 
there was a relevant burden, that burden was 
justified by a substantial reason: the orderly 
conduct of elections, which would produce 
efficiency and certainty. Various judgments 
emphasised that limitations on voting prior 
to an election were longstanding and so did 
not diminish the constitutional requirement 
of popular choice.
The major division in the Court’s reason-
ing concerned the test to determine whether 
a burden could be justified by a substantial 
reason. Justice Kiefel followed the approach 
that had been developed in the 2015 case of 
??????????????????? ????15 and applied a 
proportionality test to determine the valid-
ity of the impugned provisions. The other 
six members of the Court rejected a Mc-
Cloy-style structured proportionality test in 
the present context. For instance, French CJ 
and Bell J considered that proportionality 
testing would invite the Court to undertake 
a ‘hypothetical exercise of improved legisla-
tive design’, and that this was ‘inapposite in 
this case’. Most forcefully, Gageler J rejected 
the use of a ‘structured and prescriptive’ 
form of proportionality reasoning in the 
Australian context.
Right to vote: Day v Australian Elector Offi-
cer (SA) [2016] HCA 20 (13 May 2016)
This case was a different challenge to elec-
toral legislation, this time to amendments to 
the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 that 
changed the voting requirements for mem-
bers of the Senate. The new law provid-
ed that an elector could vote either ‘above 
the line’, by numbering at least six party or 
group tickets in order of preference, or ‘be-
low the line’, by numbering at least 12 in-
dividual candidates in order of preference. 
(Previously there had been a requirement to 
number all of the candidates if voting ‘below 
the line’.)
The plaintiffs made three principal argu-
ments: 
?? The amendments provided for two 
different voting methods and so were 
contrary to the requirement in s 9 of 
the Constitution that there be only one 
method.
?? The method of voting above the line 
for a party or group contravened the re-
quirement in s 7 that senators be ‘direct-
ly chosen by the people’.
?? The new ballot paper was misleading, 
and was therefore a burden on the im-
plied freedom of political communica-
tion.
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The High Court unanimously dismissed the 
application. The Court held that the purpose 
of s 9 is to provide for a uniform method of 
electing Senators, and that the term ‘method’ 
can accommodate multiple ways of voting. 
The Court further held that s 7 prohibits the 
election of senators by an intermediary, such 
as an electoral college, but that this was not 
the effect of the new law. Finally, the Court 
held that the ballot paper was not misleading 
and it correctly stated the requirements of the 
Electoral Act.
Trial by jury: Alqudsi v The Queen [2016] 
HCA 24 (15 June 2016)
Section 80 of the Constitution requires that 
‘trial on indictment of any offence against 
any law of the Commonwealth shall be by 
jury’. 
The accused was standing trial for Com-
monwealth offences relating to supporting 
persons to enter Syria with intent to engage 
in armed hostilities. The trial was being con-
ducted by the Supreme Court of the State of 
???? ????????????????????? ??????? ????? ????
trial be heard by judge alone, as is permitted 
???????????????? ?????????????????16 
A majority of six judges of the High Court 
(French CJ dissenting) followed previous 
authority in holding that where Common-
wealth legislation determines that there is a 
trial on indictment, the accused cannot waive 
trial by jury. The majority rejected the argu-
ment, put by the Commonwealth and sev-
eral States, that the purpose of s 80 of the 
Constitution is to preserve the public inter-
est, which in this case required the trial to 
be heard by a judge alone. In doing so, the 
judges upheld the clear terms of s 80 while 
emphasising that there are mechanisms to 
ensure that jury trials are conducted fairly 
and in the public interest. 
Acquisition of property on just terms: Cun-
ningham v Commonwealth [2016] HCA 39 
(12 October 2016) 
In 2012, the Commonwealth Parliament 
amended parliamentary entitlements for 
16 Criminal Procedure Act 1986????????????????????????
17 Brown v Tasmania is set down for hearing in May 2017. 
former Members of Parliament (MPs), re-
ducing their superannuation and travel en-
titlements. Four former MPs challenged the 
amendments in the High Court, arguing that 
the amendments amounted to an acquisition 
of property by the Commonwealth otherwise 
than on just terms contrary to s 51(xxxi) of 
the Constitution. The High Court upheld the 
amendments, with a majority holding that 
the entitlements were statutory rights that 
were inherently liable to variations, and as 
such the amendments should not be regarded 
as an acquisition of property.   
Federal Division of Powers
Bell Group NV (in liq) v Western Australia 
[2016] HCA 21 (16 May 2016)
Section 109 of the Constitution provides that 
in the event of an inconsistency between 
Commonwealth and State laws, the Com-
monwealth law will prevail. 
??? ????? ?????? ??????????????????????? ??????-
ment had enacted the Bell Group Companies 
(Finalisation of Matters and Distribution of 
Proceeds) Act 2015 (‘Bell Act’) to establish 
an authority to deal with the dissolution and 
administration of the property of a group of 
related companies, all in liquidation. The 
authority was given absolute discretion to 
determine the property and liabilities of the 
companies. 
The High Court held that the Bell Act was 
invalid because it was inconsistent with 
provisions of Commonwealth taxation leg-
islation. In purporting to give power to the 
authority to pool property and deal with it at 
‘its absolute discretion’, the Bell Act detract-
ed from the rights of the Commonwealth 
Commissioner for Taxation under Common-
wealth tax legislation to have an assessment 
of the existence, quantification, and recov-
ery of taxation liabilities. The Court declared 
the Bell Act invalid in its entirety, because 
it presented a package of interrelated provi-
sions, making severance of only those parts 
inconsistent with Commonwealth legislation 
difficult and likely ineffective. 
CONCLUSION
Looking forward to 2017, it is likely that 
the repercussions of the constitutional de-
velopments of 2016 will continue to be felt. 
The Court’s reasoning in the Day case may 
provide grounds to challenge the eligibility 
of other MPs, which may potentially lead to 
changes in the composition of Parliament. 
In terms of the High Court’s constitutional 
jurisprudence, one of the major issues to be 
resolved in 2017 is the status of proportion-
ality review. Following the 2016 decision in 
Murphy v Electoral Commissioner there is 
a question mark over the future of propor-
tionality in Australian constitutional law, and 
this issue will be squarely before the Court 
in an upcoming challenge to Tasmania’s 
anti-protest laws.17 Finally, 2017 will see 
continued debate about constitutional recog-
nition of Indigenous peoples, including the 
prospect of treaties, as Australians rethink 
the political and legal relationships between 
governments and Indigenous peoples. 
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Austria
DEVELOPMENTS IN AUSTRIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Konrad Lachmayer, Professor of Public and European Law at the Sigmund Freud Univer-
sity in Vienna; Ingrid Siess-Scherz, Judge at the Austrian Constitutional Court
INTRODUCTION
The year 2016 was dominated by the Aus-
trian presidential elections, which were clos-
er than ever before. The drama levels were 
increased when the Constitutional Court 
annulled the result of the run-off election 
(the first time this had happened in Austrian 
constitutional history). In the end, the (rel-
atively) clear majority achieved against the 
Freedom Party candidate in the rescheduled 
election in December 2016 concluded an 
eventful year in politics.
Besides these core constitutional develop-
ments, it is worth mentioning that the role of 
the Constitutional Court is changing, with the 
Court´s competences having been extend-
ed in the last few years. In 2014, it gained 
the competence to review the procedures of 
the parliamentary investigative committee,1 
which led to important case law in 2015. 
Meanwhile, since it had not been possible in 
the traditional Austrian constitutional frame-
work for an individual to file a constitutional 
complaint against a judgment of an ordinary 
court, a new kind of legal protection was 
introduced in 2013,2 giving parties in civil 
or criminal law cases at ordinary courts the 
possibility to file a constitutional complaint 
against the statutory provisions applied by 
the ordinary court of first instance; the Con-
stitutional Court can now review the consti-
1 See the new Article 138b Austrian Constitution (Federal Law Gazette I 2014/101). 
2 See the amended Article 139 and 140 Austrian Constitution (Federal Law Gazette I 2013/114). 
3 See Part V.
4 This part is based on the following paper: Konrad Lachmayer, ‘The Austrian Constitutional Court’, 
in: András Jakab / Arthur Dyevre / Giulio Itzcovich (eds.), Comparative Constitutional Reasoning (CUP, 
Cambridge 2017) 75-114. 
5 Manfred Stelzer, The Constitution of the Republic of Austria. A Contextual Analysis (Hart Publishing, 
2011) 190-205.
6?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
tutionality of the respective provisions at the 
request of a party and not only at the request 
of the court. The scope of this access to the 
Constitutional Court was significantly in-
creased by the Constitutional Court in 2016.3
THE CONSTITUTION AND  
THE COURT4
The Austrian Constitution provides three 
supreme courts which are in theory equal, 
though distinguishable from one another in 
their functions: the Constitutional Court, 
the Administrative Court and the Supreme 
Court.5 The Constitutional Court deals with 
abstract and concrete judicial review of stat-
utes and all other constitutional questions. 
The Administrative Court considers the con-
formity of administrative acts with regard to 
the statutory provisions, while the Supreme 
Court is the highest court of appeal within 
the system of ordinary courts. The equality 
between the courts is demonstrated by the 
lack of the provision of a constitution com-
plaint (Verfassungsbeschwerde) for individ-
uals. An individual does not have the possi-
bility to file a complaint against the decisions 
of the Administrative Court or the Supreme 
Court at the Constitutional Court.6 
The Austrian Constitutional Court consists 
of a President, a Vice-president and 12 ad-
AUSTRIA
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ditional judges.7 All judges are appointed 
by the Federal President of Austria, who is 
bound in his appointments by the propos-
als of different bodies. The President, the 
Vice-president and six members of the Court 
are proposed by the Federal Government. 
The appointment of the other six members is 
based on proposals of Parliament (three from 
each chamber).8 The term of office lasts until 
the judges reach the age of 70.9 The current 
12 members come from the fields of ad-
ministration, the courts, the universities and 
solicitors’ practices. Judges, lawyers, and 
university professors continue to exercise 
their professions, whereas civil servants in 
the public administration have to be granted 
leave. 
In the deliberation process of the Court, the 
President is not entitled to vote except in cas-
es of tie votes, when the President has the 
decisive vote. Regarding gender diversity, 
the Constitutional Court is still male-dom-
inated; so far, there have only been male. 
Since 2003, the Constitutional Court has had 
its first female Vice-president.10 Currently, 4 
(out of 12) judges at the Court are female. 
The Austrian Court system has to be seen 
in the context of the European justice sys-
tem, especially the Court of Justice of the 
EU (CJEU) and the European Court of Hu-
man Rights (ECtHR). The Austrian Consti-
7 Art. 147 para. 1 Austrian Constitution. 
8???????????????????????????????????????????Nationalrat); the second chamber is the Federal Council (Bundesrat). The political importance of the second chamber 
is quite minor in Austria. Although under Austrian law hearings are not mandatory, it has become a practice that both chambers hold hearings before they propose 
a candidate.
9 Art. 147 para. 6 Austrian Constitution.
10 https://www.vfgh.gv.at/verfassungsgerichtshof/verfassungsrichter/brigitte_bierlein.en.html. 
11 VfSlg 14.390/1995; VfSlg 14.863/1997; VfSlg 14.886/1997; VfSlg 15.427/2000; VfSlg 17.967/2006; VfSlg 19.499/2011; VfSlg 19.632/2012. 
12 See the recent decision taken by the Constitutional Court on 28 November 2012, G-47/12 et al (questions for a preliminary ruling with regard to the data 
retention directive) – see in English: https://www.vfgh.gv.at/downloads/vorabentscheidungsvorlagen/Vorlage_VRDspeicherung_G_47-12_EN_4.4.2017.pdf.
13 See VfGH 14.03.2013, U 466/11, U 1836/11 – available in English at https://www.vfgh.gv.at/downloads/grundrechtecharta_english_u466-11.pdf. 
14 See e.g. Konrad Lachmayer, ‘The Austrian approach towards European human rights’, VfGH 14 March 2012, U 466/11 et al (2013) Vienna Journal on Inter-
national Constitutional Law 105-107. 
15 See Ronald Faber, ‘The Austrian Constitutional Court – An Overview’ (2008) 2 ICL-Journal 49-53; Christoph Bezemek, ‘A Kelsenian model of constitutional 
????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Austria. A Contextual Analysis (Hart Publishing, 2011) 197-204.
16 Art. 138 Austrian Constitution.
17 Art. 140 Austrian Constitution.
18 Art. 144 Austrian Constitution.
19 See the annual report of the Constitutional Court, available at www.vfgh.gv.at. 
20 www.vfgh.gv.at/.
21 www.ris.bka.gv.at/vfgh/.
22??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
were provided: VfGH 13.12.2016, G 494/2015 (no right to a judicial determination of paternity), 15.10.2016, G 7/2016 (hunt on private landholdings), 15.03.2016, 
E 1477/2015 (assisted suicide); see also the Bulletin of Constitutional Case-Law, published by the Venice Commission (http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/
tutional Court engaged in EU law from the 
moment Austria joined the EU in 1995 and 
has a very open attitude towards EU law.11 
This includes its willingness to refer ques-
tions to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling12 
and the recent decision of the Constitutional 
Court including the EU’s Charter of Funda-
mental Rights in the human rights review 
procedure.13 The European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) is formally part of 
Austrian constitutional law since 1958, al-
though it was only elevated to constitutional 
rank by the constitutional legislator in 1964. 
This formal constitutional framework led to 
case law of the Constitutional Court which 
is heavily involved with the ECHR and the 
case law of the ECtHR.14 
The Austrian Constitutional Court has a 
broad variety of competences, and these 
have increased over the decades.15 The 
most important competences are the deci-
sion-making power in competence conflict,16 
the review of acts of Parliament17 and the 
review of judgments of the administrative 
courts of first instance with regard to human 
rights violations.18 Further competences in-
clude rulings in financial conflicts with the 
federation or state entities, the review of the 
legality of administrative ordinances, the 
review of elections or the decision on the 
constitutional responsibility of the highest 
authorities of the state. 
The workload of the Court has increased 
?????????? ????????????????????????????????-
cided 694 cases in 1981, it decided 3,898 cas-
es in 2016.19 These 3,898 decisions included 
184 positive and 233 negative judgments, 
338 refusals on formal grounds, 1,318 re-
jections (because no constitutional question 
was concerned) and a further 1,825 decisions 
(regarding legal aid, cessations of the proce-
????????????? ???????????????????????????????-
petences of the Constitutional Court, 3,144 
cases involved the review of human rights 
violations, including 1,670 asylum cases. 
The number of conflict of competence cases 
was very small in comparison (3 cases). The 
average length of proceedings was 143 days, 
or 78 days in asylum cases. 
The Court has its own website,20 which not 
only provides information about the judges 
but also publishes upcoming oral hearings, 
recent judgments and an annual report of 
the Court. It provides legal texts, gives in-
formation on court procedures and answers 
frequently asked questions, including those 
concerning legal aid. All judgments since the 
1980s are available in German on the web-
site of the Austrian Legal Informatics Sys-
tem (Rechtsinformationssystem).21 English 
translations of Constitutional Court cases are 
still very rare.22
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The Austrian Constitutional Court has gained 
new review functions in recent years. In the 
case law of 2016, the new constitutional 
complaint after a judgment of first instance 
by an ordinary court played a crucial role. 
On the one hand, the Constitutional Court 
was confronted with the statutory limita-
tions in certain areas of law to access to the 
Constitutional Court. On the other hand, the 
Constitutional Court itself had to concretise 
the procedural conditions which the appli-
cants have to fulfill before filing a constitu-
tional complaint. 
Parliament concretised in the Constitution-
al Court Act the concept of a constitutional 
complaint from parties in ordinary courts 
against statutory provisions. Based on the 
possibility laid down in the relevant pro-
vision of the Austrian Constitution to ex-
clude a review of certain areas of law, the 
Constitutional Court Act prohibited for ex-
ample insolvency proceedings, proceedings 
regarding lease cancellations, etc., primarily 
for reasons of procedural efficiency.23 The 
Constitutional Court declared such excep-
tions to the access to constitutional justice in 
most of the cases to be unconstitutional.24 In 
the case about rental agreements,25 the Court 
argued that procedural efficiency is in itself 
not a sufficient justification for an exception 
to access to constitutional justice. The Con-
stitutional Court emphasised that the legal 
dispute is of existential importance for some 
tenants. Only in the case of the Austrian 
Enforcement Regulation26 did the Constitu-
tional Court accept that the urgency of the 
proceedings of the ordinary court is crucial. 
In another case, the Constitutional Court 
stated that the restriction of the constitution-
al complaints with regard to the party which 
appeals before the ordinary court is uncon-
stitutional and this has to be opened up to 
other parties of the court proceedings.27 
pages/?p=02_02_Bulletins). The Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law also regularly provides summaries of judgments of the Austrian Constitutional 
Court in English. See http://icl-journal.com/. 
23 See Section 62a para. 1 Constitutional Court Act. 
24 See VfGH 14.06.2016, G 72/2016; 14.06.2016, G 645/2015; 26.09.2016, G 244/2016; 29.11.2016, G 370/2016 et al. 
25 VfGH 25.02.2016, G 541/2015.
26 VfGH 08.03.2016, G 537/2015 et al. 
27 VfGH 02.07.2016, G 95/2016; 03.10.2016, G 254/2016 et al.
28 VfGH 05.10.2016, G 435/2015 et al. 
29 VfGH 12.10.2016, G 673/2015. 
30 VfGH 09.03.2016, G 447-449/2015. 
Although in these cases the Constitutional 
Court reduced the obstacles to access to the 
Constitutional Court with regard to substan-
tive and formal limitations, the Court itself 
created major formal requirements which 
have to be considered by the complainant. 
As the Constitutional Court is bound by the 
complaint, the constitutional complaint has 
to apply which words of a statutory provi-
sion have to be eliminated. This application 
has to be appropriate to eliminate the uncon-
???????????????? ???????????????????????????????
statutory provision has to have a comprehen-
sible content, other provisions with an in-
separable link have to be considered and the 
application should not be too narrow.28 Thus, 
it is quite a challenge to file an adequate con-
stitutional complaint. 
The consequence of the new competences 
of the Constitutional Court is that the Court 
will review civil and criminal law to a much 
greater extent than has so far been the case. 
Many new constitutional complaints can be 
expected. Most of them will be rejected be-
cause of the strict formal requirements of the 
Constitutional Court. Moreover, many of the 
permitted appeals are dismissed on substan-
tive grounds. This, however, does not reduce 
the importance of this new form of constitu-
tional complaint. 
A prominent example of the relevance of 
the new proceedings involves tenancy law.29 
The Austrian concept of tenancy law is very 
complex and includes various particularities. 
The concrete case in question concerned the 
limitations of the possibility for a higher rent 
because of the advantageous location of the 
rented property. This concept was consid-
ered in legal literature as a clear example of a 
violation of the right to equal treatment and a 
violation of the principle of reasonableness. 
The Constitutional Court, however, accepted 
the governmental justification for reasons of 
social justice and clarified that the tenancy 
law cannot be considered as unconstitutional 
in that regard. 
To conclude the introductory overview of 
the Austrian Constitutional Court activity, it 
may be noted that a significant case load of 
the Constitutional Court is related to asylum 
cases. The reason is not only to be found in 
the increased number of migrants (related 
to the migration crisis in 2015) but is also 
linked to the organisational framework of 
legal protection in asylum cases. In the last 
few years, the Constitutional Court has in 
particular had to deal with many asylum cas-
es with regard to a constitutional amendment 
in the year 2008, which restricted the access 
of asylum seekers to the (supreme) Adminis-
?????????????????????????????????????????????
administrative court of first instance in the 
year 2014 and the possibility to address – 
again – the (supreme) Administrative Court, 
the extraordinarily high workload was re-
duced, at least to a certain extent: in 2012, 
2,770 incoming cases out of 4,643 concerned 
asylum seekers; in 2016, the total number of 
incoming cases was 3,920 and 1,726 con-
cerned asylum seekers. This reduction is sig-
nificantly related to the new organisational 
framework. 
The Constitutional Court especially reviews 
asylum cases in the context of Art. 8 ECHR, 
Art. 3 ECHR or with regard to arbitrariness 
in the asylum proceedings. A concrete exam-
ple of a relevant judgment in asylum relates 
to the concept of so-called legal advisors in 
asylum proceedings.30 The Constitutional 
Court declared that the limitation of the in-
volvement of these legal advisors to certain 
asylum proceedings violates the principle of 
equal treatment of foreigners. 
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DEVELOPMENTS AND  
CONTROVERSIES IN 2016
Annulment of the run-off election for the 
federal presidency (VfGH 1.07.2016, W I 
6/2016)31
Politically speaking, the most significant 
judgment concerned the run-off election for 
the federal presidency. The Austrian presi-
dential election was annulled by the Austrian 
Constitutional Court on July 1, 2016. The 
run-off vote revealed new political dimen-
sions: the candidates of the two traditional 
parties (Conservatives and Social Demo-
crats) did not even reach the run-off ballot, 
with the political candidates from the oppo-
sition parties32 succeeding in the first round. 
The run-off vote was held on May 22, 2016. 
No result had ever been so close in a pres-
idential run-off election: only 30,863 votes 
separated the two candidates out of a total 
of 4.4 million votes cast. Until then, a mem-
ber of the Green Party had never won the 
presidential elections in Austria, or had a 
presidential election ever been annulled. 
The Austrian Constitutional Court annulled 
the result primarily due to the violation of 
formal rules of the Federal Presidential Elec-
tions Act. The formal rules are intended to 
prevent violations of the principles of dem-
ocratic elections. The Constitutional Court 
recalled that legal provisions on elections 
aiming at preventing abuse or manipulation 
must be applied strictly in accordance with 
their wording. Therefore, the opening of the 
ballots and the counting of votes must be 
performed by the election board as a colle-
giate body, i.e., in the presence of all mem-
bers of the board duly invited to take part in 
the board meeting. The Constitutional Court 
traditionally applies a very restrictive ap-
proach when election results are being con-
tested with regard to the violation of these 
principles. However, the Court only takes vi-
olations into consideration if they could have 
had an influence on the election result. To 
clarify this criterion, the Court looks at the 
 
31 The following part is based on Konrad Lachmayer, ‘The Austrian Presidential Crisis 2016’, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Dec. 9, 2016, at: http://www.iconnectblog.
com/2016/12/the-austrian-presidential-crisis. 
32 Candidate supported by the Green Party and candidate nominated by the Freedom Party.
33 ECtHR 29.42002, Pretty, Appl. 2346/02. 
overall number of votes which might have 
been affected by the violation and at the dif-
ference between the numbers of votes gained 
by the two candidates. 
The Court held an extended hearing involv-
ing many heads of District Election Boards 
in a way that had never occurred before in 
any procedures of the Constitutional Court. 
The hearing included 90 witnesses. The 
Court identified formal violations and reject-
ed the argument that it is necessary to find 
concrete manipulations, maintaining that it is 
only necessary to identify formal violations 
which create the potential for manipulation. 
The re-vote in the election should have tak-
en place on October 2, 2016. Due to dam-
aged envelopes for the postal votes (caused 
by a production error that led to improperly 
sealed envelopes), the re-vote had to be post-
poned. As the parliamentary statute concern-
ing the election of the Federal President did 
not consider the possibility of postponing 
the elections and it was already clear that the 
damaged envelopes would lead to an annul-
ment of the re-vote, Parliament amended the 
relevant Act of Parliament to postpone the 
elections to December 4, 2016. The Austrian 
presidential crisis of 2016, which had never 
been perceived as such, was finally over. 
MAJOR CASES 
The core activity of the Constitutional Court 
involves case law in the context of rights and 
freedoms. Fundamental rights protection cre-
ates the greatest workload of the Court. The 
dynamics in rights case law is high. Three 
judgments from 2016 can be used to illus-
trate current themes of discussion both at the 
Court and, more generally, in the Austrian 
public debate. The first case refers to assisted 
suicide (1.), the second to paternity suits (2.) 
and the third to the prohibition of begging 
(3.). Although in all three cases the Consti-
tutional Court did not declare any provision 
to be unconstitutional, they characterise 
 
how the Court approaches sensitive cases in 
human rights (broad political leeway) and 
how the Court differentiates its case law. 
Prohibition of the association ‘Last resource 
– Association for self-determined death’ 
does not violate constitutional rights (VfGH 
15.03.2016, E 1477/2015)
The State Police Directorate of Vienna 
prohibited the establishment of an associa-
tion called “Last resource – Association for 
self-determined death”. The police authori-
ty assumed a violation of Section 78 of the 
Criminal Code, which prohibits assisted sui-
cide. Based on Section 12 of the Association 
Act, it is possible to ban unlawful associa-
tions. The founders of the association finally 
filed a constitutional complaint at the Consti-
tutional Court with regard to Art. 11 ECHR. 
Moreover, they claimed that Section 78 of 
the Criminal Code was unconstitutional. 
The Court dismissed the claim by arguing 
that the legislator has a wide margin of ap-
preciation to define criminal acts or the un-
????????????????????????? ?????????????? ??????
and 14 ECHR, the Court referred to the case 
law of the ECtHR,33 which does not raise 
any concerns as for the prohibition of as-
sisted suicide. The Court concluded that the 
banning of the association, which potentially 
supports assisted suicide, is therefore lawful 
and does not violate Art. 11 ECHR. 
No (automatic) right to a (judicial) deter-
mination of paternity (VfGH 13.12.2016, G 
494/2015) 
The applicant was an alleged biological fa-
ther who tried to gain judicial determination 
of paternity to establish contact with the 
child. The mother of the child had left the 
applicant before the birth of the baby and 
married another man. As the child was born 
in a marriage, the husband became the legal 
father of the child by presumption of the 
Civil Code, even though both the applicant 
and the mother assumed that the applicant is 
the biological father of the child. The request 
to determine paternity might, however, only 
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be promoted by the child itself. The biolog-
ical father tried to establish contact with the 
child by a court judgment. Although it was 
quite clear that the applicant was the biologi-
cal father, the ordinary court denied the right 
of the father to contact the child because the 
determination of paternity was not clarified 
and the father was understood as a third per-
son according to Section 188 para. 2 of the 
Civil Code. The father tried to challenge this 
section at the Constitutional Court according 
to Art. 8 ECHR and Art. 7 and 24 CFR. 
The Constitutional Court dismissed the ap-
??????????? ????? ?????????? ??? ???? ?????34 
case law, the Court argued that Art. 8 ECHR 
was applicable, but that the Austrian limita-
tions (with regard to Section 188 para. 2 of 
the Civil Code) were justified. The Court re-
ferred again to the case law of the ECtHR35 
and stated that the ordinary courts first have 
to clarify if the contact with the biological 
father would serve the child’s well-being; 
only as a second step would the court address 
the question of judicial determination of the 
paternity. The Court concluded that Art. 8 
ECHR does not go so far as to allow the (al-
leged) biological father to interfere with an 
intact family in any case.36 The legislator did 
not exceed its margin of appreciation. 
Constitutional Limitations of the Prohibition 
of Begging (VfGH 14.10.2016, E 552/2016)
A recurring theme in the case law of the 
Constitutional Court concerns the constitu-
tional limitation of begging.37 Statutory acts 
of state parliaments (Landtage) prohibit beg-
ging in local communities. In a leading case, 
the Constitutional Court annulled a provi-
sion of the state of Salzburg in 2012,38 which 
 
34 See ECtHR 15.9.2011, Schneider, Appl. 17080/07; 25.11.2003, Pini, Appl. 78028/01 and 78030/01; EGMR 29.6.1999, Nylund, Appl. 27110/95; 1.6.2004, 
Lebbink, Appl. 45582/99.
35 See ECtHR 21.12.2010, Anayo, Appl 20578/07; 15.9.2011, Schneider, Appl. 17080/07; 2.12.2014, Adebowale, Appl. 546/10.
36 Again with reference to the ECtHR 22.3.2012, Kautzor, Appl.23338/09; 22.3.2012, Ahrens, Appl. 45071/09.
37 The case law started in 2007: VfGH 05.12.2007, V 41/07. 
38 VfGH 30.06.2012, G 155/10.
39 VfGH 30.06.2012, G 118/11; 06.12.2012, G 64/11; 01.10.2013, B 1208/2012.
40 VfGH 14.10.2016, E 552/2016.
41 VfGH 14.3.2017, G 164/2017. 
42 VfGH 23.02.2017, E 70/2017. 
43 VfGH 15.03.2017, G 394/2016. 
44 VfGH 2.03.2017, G 364/2016. 
45 The Constitutional Court already decided on certain questions of tenancy law in 2016 (VfGH 12.10.2016, G 673/2015), but will have to deal with further, even 
more fundamental questions of tenancy law in 2017. 
established an absolute prohibition of beg-
ging in public places, thus also including 
“silent” begging (in contrast to aggressive 
begging). The Court decided that in respect 
of begging, Art. 8 ECHR is not applicable, 
but that an absolute prohibition of begging 
violates Art. 10 ECHR. Since then, the Court 
has decided various cases on the prohibition 
of begging in different states (Länder).39 
In 2016, the Constitutional Court was also 
engaged in a “prohibition of begging” case.40 
The town of Dornbirn (in the state of Vorarl-
berg) issued an administrative ordinance 
that prohibited begging at a local Christmas 
market. The Constitutional Court dismissed 
the constitutional complaints as the state 
provision considered the case law of the 
Constitutional Court. In an important part 
of the judgment, the Court stated, however, 
that even silent begging could be prohibit-
ed under certain circumstances (involving 
expected concrete and disruptive effects on 
community life). The local community had 
to prove in each case that such a disruptive 
effect was present and this had to be accept-
ed by the Constitutional Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Setting aside the case of the presidential 
election, the year 2016 can be considered as 
a rather typical year for the Constitutional 
Court. The Court embraced its new compe-
tences concerning the constitutional com-
plaint against statutory provisions applied by 
ordinary courts in civil and criminal law pro-
ceedings. The Court is still busy with asy-
lum cases, although the overall case load has 
 
????? ?????????????? ??????? ????????? ???????
cases, the Court has continued its established 
case law. 
The year 2017 already promises interest-
ing case law in the context of the principle 
of equal treatment regarding e-cigarettes,41 
electronic cars42 and private schools.43 De-
mocracy will be concerned when it comes to 
the funding of political parties44 and tax priv-
ileges for political parties. Important judg-
ments will be made regarding the authori-
sation of important infrastructural projects, 
especially in the context of the extension 
of Vienna International Airport. Moreover, 
the Constitutional Court will be further con-
cerned with questions of social justice in the 
context of tenancy law.45 
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INTRODUCTION
In Bangladesh, the year 2016 was a signifi-
cant year of judicial activities, with the high-
er judiciary playing an active role against 
arbitrary executive decisions. At times, how-
ever, the court remained conservative or reti-
cent on issues like the freedom of religion or 
the secular identity of the nation. The High 
Court Division declared the 16th constitu-
tional amendment unconstitutional. This and 
a few other decisions received mixed reac-
tions from civil society, rights-activists, and 
politicians. This paper reviews three most 
significant 2016 decisions in some detail 
while briefly covering a few other decisions 
on human rights that might prove impactful 
and consequential. The paper begins with a 
short introduction to Bangladesh’s Constitu-
tion and the Supreme Court and then turns 
to some remarkable constitutional decisions 
that may broadly be categorized into the 
clusters of separation of powers and rights 
and freedoms. 
THE CONSTITUTION AND  
THE COURT
The Constitution of the People’s Republic of 
Bangladesh (‘the Constitution’) was adopted 
on November 4, 1972 and came into effect on 
December 16, 1972. The Constitution stands 
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ism, democracy, socialism, and nationalism. 
These fundamental cores had been subjected 
to changes many times. Curiously, alongside 
the principle of secularism, the Constitution 
currently recognizes ‘Islam’ as the state re-
ligion, albeit guaranteeing the ‘peaceful en-
joyment’ of other religions (art. 2A). The 
Constitution entrenches the principle of 
constitutional supremacy (art. 7), recognises 
the value of the rule of law, human dignity 
and human rights, and sets out the goal of 
social justice. It contains a set of state policy 
principles which are in effect an index of so-
cial rights. Declared to be judicially non-en-
forceable, these principles are nevertheless 
‘fundamental’ in the governance of the State, 
lawmaking, and legal/constitutional interpre-
tations (art. 8). Importantly, the Constitution 
has entrenched an enforceable bill of rights 
that are called ‘fundamental rights’. 
The Constitution establishes a parliamenta-
ry form of responsible government headed 
by the Prime Minister, establishes the sepa-
ration of powers that is based on the notion 
of checks and balances, and incorporates the 
basic principles of judicial independence. 
The higher judiciary is composed of the Su-
preme Court of Bangladesh, which has two 
divisions, the High Court Division and the 
Appellate Division. The eleven-member Ap-
pellate Division hears appeals from any or-
der, judgment, and decree of the High Court 
Division (HCD). The Chief Justice of Ban-
gladesh, with a wide range of constitutional 
administrative powers over the management 
of the Supreme Court, sits in the Appellate 
Division and is appointed by the President. 
In case of the appointment of associate jus-
tices, the President has to act upon the advice 
of the Prime Minister and to consult the Su-
preme Court. In practice, however, it is the 
executive or, to be more precise, the Prime 
Minister who appoints all judges of the Su-
preme Court including the Chief Justice. 
Judges have a secure tenure, serving on the 
court until the age of sixty-seven.   
The Constitution uniquely places the Su-
preme Court as its guardian, ensuring its 
functional independence and the authority 
to enforce the Constitution. Specifically, the 
BANGLADESH
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HCD has jurisdiction to enforce fundamen-
tal rights through appropriate ‘directions or 
orders’ as well to enforce legal obligations 
and remedy legal breaches (arts. 44 & 102). 
The Court’s judicial review power extends 
not only over administrative actions but also 
over legislations and constitutional amend-
ments. Before the 16th amendment decision 
of the HCD that is now subject to an appeal, 
the Appellate Division invalidated 5th, 7th, 
8th, and 13th amendments with finality, and 
urged for the restoration of core features of 
the founding constitution of 1972.
DEVELOPMENTS AND  
CONTROVERSIES IN 2016
Two decisions, detailed below, were particu-
larly controversial: first was the case in which 
the HCD declared unlawful the restoration 
of the old parliamentary process of removal 
of judges, and second was the instance when 
it abruptly dismissed a challenge to Islam’s 
state religion status. Moreover, throughout 
2016, there remained a tension between the 
top judiciary and the executive with particu-
lar regard to the Supreme Court’s insistence 
that the government issue regulations for the 
control, disciplining, and terms of conditions 
of services of judges in the junior judiciary in 
line with principles of judicial independence. 
In a rolling review,1 the Appellate Division 
is extending off-and-on the timeframe for 
the government to notify such regulations. 
Earlier, the Appellate Division recommend-
ed certain amendments to the proposed by-
law to regulate the conduct and discipline of 
officials of the junior judiciary. In a tactical 
defiance, the government let the court know 
that the President did not think that such a 
notification was necessary. The controversy 
and the tug-of-war between the top court and 
the government on the independence of the 
lower judiciary are not yet over.2
1 Rooted in the so-called judicial intendance case, Secretary, Ministry of Finance v. Md. Masdar Hossain (1999) 52 DLR (AD) 82. 
2 Details are available at: http://www.thedailystar.net/frontpage/rules-lower-court-judges-sc-says-president-misinformed-1329352/.
3 8 SCOB [2016] AD 1 (judgment of May 24, 2016). SCOB= Supreme Court Online Bulletin.  
4 BLAST v. Bangladesh (2003) 55 DLR (HCD) 363.
5??????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????
6 Above note 3, para. 114.
MAJOR CASES
In this part, we focus on three important de-
cisions of the Supreme Court from the year 
2016. The first case is a landmark decision 
by the Appellate Division concerning arbi-
trary arrests and abusive remand of suspects. 
The other two decisions are by the HCD, 
which are controversial decisions in a sense 
and have high political implications. 
Bangladesh v. Bangladesh Legal Aid and 
Services Trust (BLAST)3 
This appeal by the government arose from 
HCD’s judgment of April 2003,4 in which 
that court issued a set of guidelines to be fol-
lowed by the police and magistrates with re-
gard to arrests without warrant, detention in 
police custody, and interrogation of suspects. 
On May 24, 2016, the Appellate Division re-
jected the appeal and largely endorsed the 
guidelines earlier issued by the HCD. 
Arbitrary arrests or detention and the use of 
torture in police custody for the extraction 
of confessions or for other unlawful gains 
have been rampant in Bangladesh, despite 
that the Constitution guarantees procedural 
and substantive safeguards for the arrestees 
or suspects of crimes and prohibits torture. 
The history of this liberty-protective deci-
sion dates to July 1998 when a young uni-
versity student, Rubel, died in police custo-
dy within hours after his arrest by police on 
the suspicion of committing crimes. Rubel’s 
death was caused by severe torture while in 
custody. Section 54 of the Criminal Proce-
dure Code of 1898 authorizes the police to 
arrest any person without warrant if the po-
lice-officer reasonably suspects that person 
to be involved in any cognizable offence.5 
Following the most shocking death of Rubel 
in police custody, a legal rights organization, 
BLAST, brought a public interest litigation 
seeking court directives with a view to pre-
venting arbitrary arrests and custodial torture 
in the future. Eventually, the HCD issued a 
15-point guideline in 2003, clearly delimit-
ing the power of the police to arrest without 
warrant and the discretion and authority of 
the magistrates to remand an arrestee to po-
lice custody. 
On appeal, the Appellate Division largely 
upheld the HCD’s guidelines, which can be 
termed as Bangladesh’s Miranda-safeguards, 
and asked the relevant authorities to comply. 
Most notable of the guidelines are that the 
police are now required to disclose identi-
ty when making an arrest, prepare a mem-
orandum of arrest, inform the relatives or 
friends of the arrest, and to take the arrestee 
to a medical doctor in the event of any inju-
ry during arrest. The guidelines also require 
the magistrates to initiate legal proceedings 
against the concerned police-officer in case 
she or he is found to have breached the law.  
It goes without saying that the rationale of 
this decision is embroiled in the principle 
of the rule of law. The court thought that 
being the ‘guardian’ of the Constitution, it 
could not keep quiet in the face of rampant 
violation of fundamental rights of citizens by 
law-enforcing agencies. Moreover, it placed 
special focus on the constitutional right to 
life and the notion of due process, and reaf-
firmed that the right to life includes a right to 
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its reasoning, the court also revealed a sen-
sitization about the disadvantaged citizens’ 
inability to seek remedies against police 
brutalities and abusive arrests. Appreciably, 
it relied on comparative decisions and cited 
Bangladesh’s international obligations to de-
rive and buttress decisional reasoning when 
issuing the binding guidelines. In the context 
of ever-escalating international terrorism and 
the State’s need to suppress it, the court held 
that if the need to preserve the state securi-
ty can be fulfilled by any other reasonable 
means, a law restrictive of personal liberty 
would be unreasonable within the meaning 
of constitutional rights and principles.6
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It is hoped that the Appellate Division’s 
guidelines vis-à-vis arrests and detention in 
police custody will contribute towards end-
ing the vice of impunity for torture and abus-
es by law enforcement agencies. 
Sirajul Islam Chowdhury and others v 
Bangladesh, Writ Petition No. 1834 of 1988 
(State Religion Challenge)
On March 28, 2016, the High Court Division 
summarily dismissed a 28-year-old constitu-
tional petition challenging Islam as the state 
religion. The court said that the petitioners 
lacked any standing to litigate, but it did not 
hold any hearing at all.7 Things, however, are 
not as simple as they might appear. The chal-
lenge goes much deeper into the question of 
ever ‘contested’ national identity as well as 
the core of the judicial role discourse vis-à-
vis moral, political, and religious disputes in 
a transitioning or divided society.  
Bangladesh’s Independence Constitution ad-
opted the principle of secularism as a con-
notational core. In the late 1970s, the first 
military regime abandoned secularism and 
installed into the Constitution the principle 
of absolute faith in Allah. The second mil-
itary regime introduced Islam as the state 
religion. Relinquishment of secularism and 
the embracement of political Islam by the 
military regimes were challenged by some 
eminent citizens and civil society organi-
zations. Moreover, the lawyers too began 
a movement against the demolition of the 
State’s secular identity. They feared dis-
crimination against minorities and women, 
and lodged in 1988 three challenges against 
the state religion provision, article 2A of the 
Constitution, incorporated through the 8th 
amendment to the Constitution.8 The 8th 
amendment brought forth another change; 
it decentralized the HCD into six regional 
benches, which too was challenged at the 
same time. The challenge to the judicial-de-
centralization part of the 8th amendment 
was successful in 1989 and gave birth to the 
7 Maher Sattar and Ellen Barry, ‘In 2 Minutes, Bangladesh Rejects 28-Year-Old Challenge to Islam’s Role’, New York Times, March 28, 2016. Available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/29/world/asia/bangladesh-court-islam-state-religion.html. 
8 Writ Petition No. 1834 of 1988. The other two challenges were WP No. 1330 of 1988 and WP No. 1177 of 1988.
9 Anwar Hossain Chowdhury v. Bangladesh (1989) BLD (Special) 1 (decision of the Appellate Division). 
10 For a commentary on this decision, see Hoque, Ridwanul (2016), Constitutional Challenge to the State Religion Status of Islam in Bangladesh: Back to 
Square One?, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, May 27, 2016, at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/2016/05/islam-in-bangladesh.
11 Advocate Asaduzzaman Siddiqui v. Bangladesh, Writ Petition No. 9989 of 2014, judgment May 5, 2016.
doctrine of an unconstitutional constitutional 
amendment in Bangladesh.9 In contrast, the 
challenge to the state religion part of the 8th 
amendment remained undecided, partially 
due to an unfavorable political environment 
despite the country’s transition to democracy 
in 1991. 
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pendence movement came to power for the 
second time in the post-democratic transition 
era and promised the revival of the lost secu-
lar identity, the surviving petitioners thought 
?????????????????????????????????????? ????????
15th amendment (2011) revived the principle 
of secularism but did not strike out the state 
religion clause, the petitioners added a sup-
plementary challenge to the 15th amendment 
too. The HCD showed initial willingness to 
hear the challenge and appointed amici cur-
iae. As the petitioners’ counsels were prepar-
ing to argue the case, the court on March 28, 
2016 rather abruptly dismissed the petition 
reasoning that the petitioners lacked a stand-
ing. This argument of the lack of locus standi 
gave a shock and sheer surprise to the legal 
community, because the notion of public in-
terest litigation that allows any public-inter-
ested citizen to challenge any gross breach of 
the Constitution became firmly established. 
As such, although a detailed judgment has 
not yet become available, it would not be 
unfair to critique the court’s rejection of the 
state religion challenge as somewhat unprin-
cipled and incompatible with its own juris-
prudence of abstract ‘public interest judicial 
review’. 
Undoubtedly, whether state religion and sec-
ularism can go hand in hand under a consti-
tutional order is a novel issue. In the wake 
of Parliament’s deliberate choice for such a 
curious solution in a Muslim-majority coun-
try and given the local political specificities, 
especially the fact that the incumbent gov-
ernment’s opposition introduced Islam to the 
Constitution, the petition seemingly posed 
some challenges for the court. In addition 
to the jurisprudential challenges noted, there 
was another political problem of an acute 
nature. The time announced for the hearing 
of the petition turned out to be extremely po-
litically sensitive. Militancy, terrorism, and 
religious intolerance began to rise sharply. 
Several secular-minded intellectuals and In-
ternet blog writers had already been killed 
by extremists. In such a background context, 
several religious groups commenced demon-
strations against the case challenging Islam 
as the state religion, condemning the peti-
tioners as atheists. They also threatened that 
the case would trigger disturbances. Another 
Islamist group ‘requested’ the Court to reject 
the petition and met with the Chief Justice in 
the morning of the day of the hearing. 
A question remains whether these events 
influenced the court’s decision. The court 
certainly did not endorse, nor did it reject, 
Islam’s constitutional status. It indeed decid-
ed not to decide the case involving the status 
of Islam under the Constitution. For this, the 
technical ground of locus standi might have 
appealed to the court as a tool. The approach, 
however, is not that simple and it begs cer-
tain questions. To what extent was the court 
free to make its own value judgment? Or, did 
the court skirt its jurisdictional inability to 
deal with a hard issue such as the legality of 
Islam’s constitutional status?10 
Asaduzzaman Siddiqui v. Bangladesh (par-
liamentary removal of judges)11 
On 25 May 2016, the HCD in a 2 to 1 deci-
sion invalidated the 16th amendment (2014) 
that restored verbatim an original constitu-
tional provision regarding the removal of the 
Supreme Court judges, a system that was ab-
sent from 1974 to 2014.  
Bangladesh’s original Constitution provided 
for the removal of Supreme Court judges by 
an order of the President pursuant to a reso-
lution of Parliament passed by a two-thirds 
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majority and only on the ground of proved 
misbehavior or incapacity (art 96(2)). Be-
fore this provision was ever tested, the 4th 
amendment; (1975) had done away with this 
system, making the judges removable with-
out any legal process that is, merely by an 
order of the President. In August 1975, the 
Constitution itself was thwarted, and a lin-
gering period of extra-constitutional regimes 
installed. The first military regime extra-con-
stitutionally amended the judicial removal 
clause to introduce a peer-driven removal 
process, which was later affirmed by the 5th 
amendment (1979). The new system made 
the judges removable by the President upon 
the recommendation of the Supreme Judicial 
Council (hereafter SJC), composed of the 
Chief Justice and the two most senior judges 
of the Appellate Division. In the meantime, 
the court also invalidated the 5th amend-
ment but initially kept intact the system of 
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acted reviving the system of parliamentary 
removal of the judges, it was challenged on 
the principle ground that the removal system 
was incompatible with the notions of judicial 
independence and separation of powers. 
The HCD proceeded with the undisputed 
premise that the independence of the judicia-
ry is an essential feature of the Bangladeshi 
Constitution (‘basic structure’) impervious 
to a constitutional amendment. The main 
rationale for the invalidation of the 16th 
amendment was that it created an opportu-
nity for Parliament to exert pressure on the 
judges. The court took into consideration the 
existing political culture in Bangladesh and 
the fact that, because of the anti-defection 
rule in art. 70 of the Constitution, members 
of Parliament would be unable to freely ex-
ercise their minds when deciding on a pro-
posal to remove a judge.  
It seems that the court took too seriously the 
possibility of abuse of the restored original 
constitutional provisions regarding the re-
moval of judges. In doing so, it lost sight of 
the fact that Parliament cannot in fact resolve 
to remove a judge unless there is a positive 
12 Ibid., at pp. 144-145.
13 Ibid., argument of Mr. Amir-Ul Islam, at p. 135.
14 For details, visit: http://www.thedailystar.net/city/sc-upholds-hc-injunction-eviction-dwellers-210625 (retrieved on April 10, 2017).
finding of proved incapacity or misconduct 
of the concerned judge. It was for an act of 
Parliament to detail the legal mechanism to 
investigate and prove the allegations of mis-
behaviour by any judge. For this purpose, a 
peer-trial process can be installed, and in fact 
a law to that effect was in the making when 
the HCD was hearing the case.  
Undeniably, independence of the judiciary 
is a basic structural norm of the Constitution 
of Bangladesh, and the judicial removal pro-
cess is what lies at the core of this normative 
concept. There is, however, no set formula 
for maintaining judicial independence when 
establishing the judges’ removal procedure. 
In contrast, means and processes of ensur-
ing judicial independence are indeed soci-
ety-specific and so is the judicial removal 
process, provided that the basics of judicial 
independence are kept intact. In this case, 
the HCD engaged in an exercise of choosing 
which mode of judicial removal is more suit-
able for Bangladesh, a political choice that 
belongs to the people through their elected 
representatives. Both the system of Supreme 
Judicial Council and the parliamentary pro-
cess of judicial removal are constitutional if 
there is an objective legal standard to mea-
sure and prove allegations of misconduct or 
incapacity of the concerned judge. 
Eventually, the 16th amendment decision by 
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founding people of Bangladesh who chose 
the parliamentary model of judicial remov-
al. Least attractive was the court’s rebuttal 
of the argument that they lacked power to 
invalidate a provision of the Constitution 
originally enacted, arguing that the re-intro-
duction of the original form of art. 96(2) was 
an exercise of ‘derivative’ constituent power 
which it had power to assess and pronounce 
unconstitutional. That this was a folly is 
clear from the court’s apprehension of the 
probable abuse of the parliamentary removal 
of Supreme Court judges. A glimpse of this 
fallacy can be seen in the court’s own po-
lemic statement that ‘the poking of the nose 
of the Parliament into the removal process 
of the Judges’ is violative of the doctrine of 
separation of powers and that ‘[t]he rule of 
law will certainly get a serious jolt by the 
Sixteenth Amendment [that] [i]n fact […] is 
hanging like a Sword of Damocles over the 
heads of the Judges of the Supreme Court of 
Bangladesh’.12
In effect, the court’s 16th amendment ver-
dict is an affront to the separation of pow-
ers. Despite the firm footing of the doctrine 
of basic structure in Bangladesh, the court 
clearly lacks, it is argued, power to invali-
date an original provision of the Constitution 
even if that is what an amicus curiae termed 
‘unsuitable, outdated, [and] obsolete’ in the 
Bangladeshi context.13 How can an origi-
nal provision of the Constitution, restored 
verbatim after some years of abeyance, be 
unconstitutional merely because the judges 
‘think’ the provision might in the future be 
abused? In the background history of the 
16th amendment as well as in the challenge 
thereof loomed a relationship chasm, some 
three years before this verdict, between Par-
liament and the executive on the one hand 
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the political motive behind a constitutional 
amendment, a clearly lawful amendment 
cannot be struck out by a judicial decision 
based on extremely feeble, shallow reasons.  
Other significant cases: Slum dwellers’ 
right to housing & the safe environment
In the old tradition of issuing proactive de-
cisions in the protection of slum dwellers in 
Dhaka (Bangladesh’s homeless community), 
the Appellate Division on January 31, 2016 
upheld the HCD’s prohibitive injunction on 
eviction of dwellers from Kalyanpur slum in 
Dhaka. Following a petition filed by Ain o 
Salish Kendra, Coalition for Urban Poor, and 
two slum dwellers, the HCD on January 21 
issued the injunction restraining the govern-
ment from evicting this suffering community 
from their ghettos for three months.14? ?????
judicial orders such as this could not earli-
er protect the slum dwellers in the long run, 
judicial activism of this sort provides some 
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measure of temporary relief to the slum 
dwellers who have no place to call home.  
In another lingering proceeding lodged by 
an environmental organization, the HCD 
on June 16 ordered the relocation of some 
154 tanneries from the City of Dhaka to a 
nearby suburb, Savar. Both divisions of the 
Supreme Court were quite tough on the need 
to move these polluting industries out, and 
saddled a heavy compensation in the event 
of default. The industry owners resorted to 
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the government in compliance with the court 
order cut off utility services to the tanneries, 
they finally moved to the designated subur-
ban industrial zone. This instance of judicial 
activism was surely for the preservation of 
the environment and public health. An un-
intended consequence, however, was that 
some 50,000 workers lost their jobs at least 
for months. The court, however, had the is-
sue of their protection in mind, though. It 
first lessened and then waived the amount 
of fine for the default of the tannery owners, 
and ordered redirecting of such amounts to 
the welfare and rehabilitation of the workers 
instead.15
CONCLUSION 
As the above judgments of the Bangladeshi 
Supreme Court in 2016 show, the court re-
mained an important institution of constitu-
tional politics and governance. The kind of 
tension that was seen between the organs of 
the State is in fact inevitable in a democracy. 
It however remains to be seen how the apex 
court of the country manages to negotiate, 
shape, and decide the unresolved issues in 
the future in regard to the principle of judi-
cial independence and the process of remov-
ing judges. Accordingly, a challenging time 
seems to lie ahead for the court vis-à-vis the 
issue of legality of an original provision of 
the Constitution concerning the removal of 
judges. It will have to strike a delicate bal-
ance between institutional legitimacy and 
capacity and the higher normativity of the 
founding constitutional principles. 
15 A report is available at: http://www.theindependentbd.com/arcprint/details/83525/2017-03-03, and http://www.thedailystar.net/city/doe-col-
lect-tk-1cr-14-industries-damaging-buriganga-1277317 (retrieved on April 10, 2017).
In 2016, the Bangladeshi higher judiciary 
dealt with the extremely complex issue of 
the constitutionality of Islam’s state religion 
status. As said, the court’s decision to not de-
cide such issues as state religion or the prin-
ciple of secularism was unprincipled, and 
arguably reveals its institutional fragility to 
an external volatile environment. And, when 
judged in the backdrop of current unstable 
constitutionalism, the court’s decisions in 
the areas of personal liberty, rights of the 
most hapless sections of the people in soci-
ety, and multi-pronged environmental issues, 
its activism and the role in 2016 seem prag-
matic and promising. 
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Belgian Constitutional Court
INTRODUCTION
First, this contribution presents the Belgian 
Constitutional Court and its activities in 
2016. Second, it discusses two constitution-
al controversies that were at the center of 
much political and media attention, namely 
the separation of powers and the refugee cri-
sis as well as the Comprehensive Economic 
and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the 
European Union and Canada. Finally, we de-
liver an overview of the main cases before 
the Constitutional Court for the past year 
that can be of interest to an international au-
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ing categories: the Belgian Constitution in 
Europe and the world; separation of powers; 
justice and order; and ethical issues and hot 
topics.
THE CONSTITUTION AND  
THE COURT
Belgium has embarked on a process of feder-
alisation since the 1970s. The transformation 
of the unitary Belgian state into a federal state 
led to a multiplication of legislative bodies. 
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with the same legal effect as acts of Federal 
Parliament resulted in the possibility of con-
flicts between legislative acts. Therefore, the 
original mission of the Constitutional Court 
was to supervise the observance of the consti-
tutional division of powers between the fed-
eral state, the communities and the regions. 
In the following decades, the competence of 
the Court gradually extended to constitutional 
rights and freedoms.
Now that the division of powers between the 
federated entities and the federal state is well 
established, competence conflicts only rep-
resent a small portion of the case law (4% 
of the judgments in 2016). The majority of 
cases in 2016 concerned infringements of the 
principle of equality and non-discrimination, 
for historical reasons still the most invoked 
principle before the Court (52%), followed 
by review of compliance with the fundamen-
tal socioeconomic rights in Article 23 of the 
Constitution (11%), the tax guarantees in Ar-
ticles 170 and 172 (8%), the property rights 
of Article 16 (5%), the legality principle in 
criminal matters of Articles 12 and 14 (4%) 
and the right to private and family life of Ar-
ticle 22 (4%).
The Court assumes that the fundamental 
rights under Title II of the Constitution and 
those enshrined in international conventions 
are inextricably linked. It is, therefore, un-
avoidable that the provisions under Title II 
are interpreted in conjunction with the provi-
sions concerning similar fundamental rights 
in international treaties. As a result, the case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) has a considerable influence on the 
case law of the Constitutional Court, which 
considers itself to be bound by the provi-
sions of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) as interpreted by the ECtHR. 
Moreover, the case law of the Court of Jus-
tice of the European Union (CJEU) is also 
regularly reflected in the jurisprudence of the 
Constitutional Court. 
BELGIUM
2016 Global Review of Constitutional Law | 23
A case may be brought before the Constitu-
tional Court by an action for annulment or 
a reference for a preliminary ruling. A party 
may demand suspension of the challenged 
legislative act along with the action for an-
nulment, or in the course of the proceedings.
An action for annulment may be brought 
by the various governments, presidents of 
parliaments (at the request of two-thirds of 
MPs) and any natural or legal person who 
has a justifiable interest in the annulment. 
In 2016, two institutional parties and 72 
individual applicants brought a case before 
the Court. An action for annulment must, as 
a rule, be brought within six months of the 
official publication of the challenged act. 
If an action for annulment is well founded, 
the Court will annul all or part of the chal-
lenged provisions (29 times in 2016) while 
(provisionally) maintaining the effects of the 
act (three times) if necessary. If an action 
for annulment is dismissed (on 19 occasions 
in 2016), the judgment shall be binding on 
the courts with respect to the points of law 
settled by the judgment. The Court declared 
annulment appeals inadmissible in four other 
judgments (out of a total of 52).
An action for annulment does not suspend 
the effect of the challenged act. To prevent 
the challenged norm from causing irrevoca-
ble prejudice in the period between the intro-
duction of the action and the judgment of the 
??????????? ????? ???????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????
suspension of the challenged norm pending 
a meritorious decision. In 2016, the Court 
ordered suspension in three cases. Such an 
action for suspension must be brought within 
three months following the official publica-
tion of the challenged norm. 
If a party to a dispute invokes the infringe-
ment of its fundamental rights guaranteed 
in Title II “The Belgians and Their Rights” 
or by the Articles 143 (1), 170, 172 and 191 
of the Constitution by a legislative act, low-
er courts must in principle refer a question 
1 Judgment no. 175.973 of 7 October 2016 
2 Judgments no. 176.363 of 14 October 2016 and no. 176.577 of 20 October 2016
3 Judgment no. 16/3438/B of 25 October 2015
4 Judgment no. 179.108 of 8 December 2016
for a preliminary ruling to the Constitution-
al Court. Most of the preliminary questions 
were referred by the Courts of First Instance 
(51), followed by the Courts of Appeal (25), 
the Labour Courts (10) and the Labour Tri-
bunals (10). Incidentally, the highest courts 
also referred some questions, namely eight 
times for the Council of State and on six 
occasions for the Court of Cassation. In-
fringement was found in 36% of these cases, 
whereas no infringement was found on 64 
occasions (58% of the cases). In other judg-
ments, the Court held that the question does 
not need an answer, referred the case back to 
the court of law, declared itself incompetent 
or declared the question inadmissible.
In 2016, the Court delivered 170 judgments 
and handled 207 cases in total. The discrep-
ancy between the number of treated and com-
pleted cases and the number of judgments is 
due to joined cases. Moreover, proceedings 
are sometimes terminated by a court order 
that, for example, grants the discontinuance 
of the action. Conversely, it occurs that the 
Court gives an interlocutory ruling or a pro-
visional ruling while the case is still pending. 
This takes place when the Court refers a case 
to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling.
The Constitutional Court ruled six times 
on a request for suspension, 52 judgments 
concerned actions for annulment, 110 judg-
ments concerned references for preliminary 
rulings and there were two requests for inter-
pretation. Therefore, most judgments were 
preliminary rulings (65%) while actions for 
annulment represented 31% and requests for 
suspension represented 4% in 2016.
DEVELOPMENTS AND  
CONTROVERSIES IN 2016
The separation of powers and the  
refugee crisis
Since October 2016, Belgium has had a 
fierce debate about the separation of powers 
related to the “refugee crisis.” The contro-
versy started when a Syrian family asked for 
a humanitarian visa via the Belgian embassy 
in Beirut for a short stay in Belgium to be 
able to seek asylum. The applicants invoked 
Article 3 ECHR, which prohibits inhuman or 
degrading treatment. The Belgian Immigra-
tion Service, which falls under the authority 
of the Secretary of State for Asylum and Mi-
gration, Theo Francken, denied the request, 
but was faced with a suspension of its de-
cision by the Council for Alien Law Litiga-
tion (CALL)1 and with the injunction to take 
a new decision within 48 hours due to an 
insufficient reasoning regarding the risk of 
inhuman or degrading treatment. This judg-
ment was followed by two other suspensions 
by the CALL2 due to insufficient reasoning, 
as the rejection decision was three times al-
most identical. The third time, even though 
issuing a visa is a discretionary decision of 
the competent administrative authority, the 
judge imposed the Secretary of State to is-
sue a visa. This judgment elicited Francken 
and his party N-VA to launch an advertising 
campaign attacking the “unworldly judges” 
for their alleged judicial activism. He filed 
an appeal in cassation before the Council of 
State, as well as an appeal of the judgment 
of the President of the Francophone Brussels 
Court of First Instance3 that imposed a co-
ercive fine related to the obligation to issue 
the visa. Francken firmly refused to issue the 
visa and to pay the fine.
These actions led to severe criticism, amongst 
others of the High Council of Justice, stating 
that the Secretary of State refused to comply 
with the separation of powers and under-
mined the rule of law. In another case,4 the 
CALL referred for a preliminary ruling to 
the CJEU concerning the request for a hu-
manitarian visa through an embassy. Several 
other countries and the European Commis-
sion joined the case. The Advocate-General 
advised the CJEU to hold that a EU Member 
State is obliged to issue a visa on humanitari-
an grounds if, given the circumstances, there 
are serious motives to believe that a refusal 
would directly lead to the applicant being 
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subjected to torture or inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment by withholding a legal action 
to exercise the right to request international 
protection in that Member State.5
CETA
In October 2016, the world was wondering 
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Region, on his own, was able to postpone 
the signing of the Comprehensive Economic 
and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the 
European Union and Canada. Treaty-making 
power in Belgium is allocated according to 
the principle in foro interno, in foro exter-
no, established by Article 167 of the Con-
stitution. Community and Region Govern-
ments have the power to enter treaties that 
exclusively relate to matters falling within 
their jurisdiction. As regards “mixed trea-
ties” such as CETA, treaty-making power is 
shared with the federal authorities. After a 
period of power-play and some minor adjust-
??????? ??????????????????????? ??????????
which allowed CETA to be signed. 
MAJOR CASES
The Belgian Constitution in Europe  
???????? ????
In 2016, the Constitutional Court continued 
to show great openness towards international 
and European law; in particular, the ECHR 
and EU Law. References were made to the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR in 46 cases and 
the case law of the CJEU in 19 cases. Ref-
erences to other sources of international law 
can be found in 29 cases. Based on the CIL-
FIT case law, the Court ruled in 5 cases that 
there was no need to refer for a preliminary 
ruling to the CJEU.
Judgment No. 62/2016 – Treaty on Stability 
– Demand for Annulment – Admissibility – 
Primacy of EU Law – National Identity
The 2012 Treaty on Stability, Coordina-
tion and Governance in the Economic and 
Monetary Union is an intergovernmental 
agreement between 25 EU Member States 
to reinforce budget discipline of euro area 
governments following the sovereign debt 
crisis in 2010. The Constitutional Court had 
5 C-638/16 PPU
6 See English version at http://www.const-court.be/public/e/2015/2015-103e.pdf
to decide on the admissibility of a demand 
for annulment of various acts of the Federal 
and the Flemish Parliaments approving the 
Treaty and implementing its Article 3 (1). A 
number of citizens and non-profit organiza-
tions asserted that the strict budgetary objec-
tives established in the fiscal compact would 
lead to the authorities no longer being able 
to fulfill their constitutional obligations in 
terms of fundamental social rights (Article 
23 of the Constitution).
The fact that austerity measures can be im-
posed on the basis of the Treaty is, according 
to the judgment, not sufficient to demon-
strate a proper individualized connection be-
tween the personal situation of the applicants 
and the disputed provisions. They could only 
be affected directly and unfavorably by 
measures intended to achieve those budget-
ary objectives. In the Court’s view, having 
an interest as a citizen or a person who has 
the right to vote is likewise not sufficient 
because the challenged acts have no direct 
effect on the right to vote. Nonetheless, the 
Court considered whether the challenged 
acts interfered with any other aspect of the 
democratic rule of law which would be so 
essential that its protection is in the interest 
of all citizens. Parliament is indeed the only 
constitutional body empowered to not only 
approve the annual budgets but also to set 
medium-term budgetary objectives. It can 
enter into such commitments by way of a 
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treaty, however, they may not violate consti-
tutional guarantees. Although the Stability 
Pact makes provision for detailed targets and 
deficit reduction, it leaves national parlia-
ments entirely at liberty as to how they draw 
up and approve budgets.
 
The Stability Pact does not merely create an 
inflexible budgetary framework; it also en-
trusts certain powers to the EU institutions, 
which is permitted by the Constitution (Ar-
ticle 34). However, for the first time, the 
Court asserted that “under no circumstances 
can there be any discriminatory violation of 
the national identity contained in the basic 
political and constitutional structures or of 
the fundamental values of protection that the 
Constitution affords to any person.” The dis-
puted acts, however, do not interfere with any 
aspect of the democratic rule of law which 
would be so essential that its protection is in 
the interest of all citizens. Consequently, none 
of the applicants had an interest to the degree 
required for them to seek the annulment of the 
challenged acts and the annulment appeals 
were declared inadmissible.
Separation of Powers
Judgment No. 153/2016 – Administrative 
Courts – Administrative Loop – Indepen-
dence and impartiality of the judiciary
In judgments no. 103/2015,6 74/2014 and 
152/2015, the Constitutional Court reviewed 
the constitutionality of the so-called “admin-
istrative loops” of the (federal) Council of 
State and the (Flemish) Council for Permit 
Disputes and the High Enforcement Council 
for the Environment. This legal instrument 
enables the administrative judge to give an 
administrative authority in an interim judg-
ment the possibility to rectify an irregularity 
in the contested administrative act. It aims to 
contribute to the timely final adjudication of 
disputes. According to the Court, the initial 
design of the loop provided the administra-
tive judges the possibility to express their 
viewpoint regarding the outcome of the dis-
pute while the application of the loop could 
not lead to a (rectified) decision with an al-
tered content. As a result, the administrative 
loop puts pressure on the separation of pow-
ers and in a discriminatory way violates the 
principle of impartiality and independence 
of the judiciary. According to the Court, the 
administrative judge intervenes in the deter-
mination of the content of a discretionary 
administrative act, which is a task of the ad-
ministrative authorities.
On 1 December 2016, however, the Consti-
tutional Court dismissed the appeal against 
the Decree of 3 July 2015, which granted 
the above-mentioned two Flemish admin-
istrative courts a redesigned administrative 
loop for formal and substantive illegalities. 
The judge can now offer the defending party 
the possibility to rectify the unlawfulness by 
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adopting a new rectified administrative act of 
which the content can be altered. In contrast 
to the previous loops, the judge only holds 
whether the unlawfulness could be rectified 
and no longer needs to rule on the content 
of the administrative act. The Constitutional 
Court rejected all arguments of the applicant 
and held that the contested provision is con-
stitutional. The Court, inter alia, ruled that 
there is no longer a violation of the indepen-
dence and impartiality of the judge.
Justice and Order
Judgment No. 83/2016 – Criminal Procedure 
Code – Out of Court Settlement – Insufficient 
Judicial Review
Article 216bis, § 2 of the Criminal Procedure 
Code, as introduced by the Act of 14 April 
2011 and modified by the Acts of 11 July 
2011 and 5 February 2016, considerably en-
larged the possibility for public prosecutors 
to settle criminal cases out of court. Such a 
settlement also became possible when the 
case was already pending before the crimi-
nal court or was already judged in the first 
instance, as long as there was no final judg-
ment on appeal, and provided that the vic-
tims have been compensated properly. The 
Constitutional Court judged that insofar as 
the public prosecutor can settle a case that 
is under instruction of an investigating judge 
without an effective judicial review of the 
proposed settlement, the provision is incom-
patible with Articles 10 and 11 of the Con-
stitution in conjunction with the right to a 
fair trial and the principle of independence 
of the judiciary, guaranteed by Article 151 
of the Constitution, Article 6 (1) ECHR and 
Article 14 (1) ICCPR. As the settlements 
concerned cases pending before the criminal 
(trial) judge in the first instance or appeal, 
the judicial review limited to the formal con-
ditions of the settlement was insufficient and 
thus violated the same provisions and princi-
ples. The Court decided to uphold the legal 
effects of the unconstitutional provision until 
the date of publication of the judgment in the 
official journal.
Judgment No. 108/2016 – Police Databases 
– Privacy – Supervision
The Act of 18 March 2014 provides a com-
prehensive legal framework for the various 
databases of the federal and local police 
in Belgium. The Act identifies the various 
databases, the data that they may or must 
contain in view of administrative or judicial 
policing, their management, the use of these 
data, the measures taken to protect privacy 
and abuse, their access and supervision, and 
their interaction with the judiciary and other 
law enforcement bodies. In a lengthy judg-
ment counting 141 pages, the Court came to 
the conclusion that, considered as a whole, 
sufficient measures have been taken to avoid 
any non-justified interference in the right to 
privacy guaranteed by Article 22 of the Con-
stitution, Article 8 ECHR, Article 17 ICCPR 
and Articles 7 and 8 EU Charter of Funda-
mental Rights, after a detailed analysis of the 
relevant ECtHR case law. Nonetheless, the 
Court imposed a restrictive interpretation of 
several provisions. Only one provision was 
partially annulled, namely concerning the 
composition of the body supervising the ob-
servance of the law by the various police de-
partments. As the number of police members 
can exceed the number of independent exter-
nal experts and members of the judiciary or 
members representing the Privacy Commis-
sion, the Court opined that the Act does not 
offer sufficient guarantees for effective and 
independent supervision. The legislator has 
been ordered to amend this provision before 
the end of 2017.
Ethical Issues and Hot Topics
Judgment No. 2/2016 – Freedom of Choice 
Regarding a Child’s Surname – Equality be-
tween Men and Women
In 2014, the federal legislature amended 
the Civil Code to establish the autonomy of 
choice and equality between men and wom-
en regarding the way in which surnames are 
passed on to children. The new provision 
enabled parents to choose between the fa-
ther’s surname, the mother’s surname or a 
double-barrelled surname made up of these 
two surnames in the order determined by the 
couple. It also stated that if the parents dis-
agreed on the choice of the child’s surname 
or if they do not make a choice, the father’s 
surname would be assigned to the child. The 
latter provision was challenged before the 
Constitutional Court.
The Court first held that the right to pass 
on one’s surname cannot be regarded as a 
fundamental right. It noted the legislature’s 
choice to give preference to the parents’ 
freedom of choice and considered it justi-
fied for Parliament to determine the surname 
in cases of disagreement or the absence of 
choice, as it is important to establish a child’s 
surname at birth in a simple, swift and uni-
form way. However, the reasons for giving 
precedence to the father’s surname in these 
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treatment between the parents solely on the 
basis of their sex. Indeed, the disputed pro-
vision gave the father a veto right when de-
ciding on the child’s surname. Therefore, the 
Court found a violation of the principle of 
equality (Article 10 of the Constitution) and 
annulled the disputed provision.
Judgment No. 18/2016 – Filiation – Right to 
Challenge Paternity – Right to Know One’s 
Descent
In a controversial case involving the former 
King of Belgium, the Constitutional Court 
confirmed, once more, with reference to the 
case law of the ECtHR, that in legal proceed-
ings to determine filiation, the universal right 
to know one’s descent must in principle take 
precedence over the interests of family peace 
and legal certainty of family ties. Therefore, 
Article 318 of the Civil Code is incompatible 
with the right to respect for private life (Ar-
ticle 22 of the Constitution, read in conjunc-
tion with Article 8 ECHR) insofar as it bars 
a challenge to paternity when the child has 
been treated as the child of his legal father, a 
situation known as “de facto status” (posses-
sion d’état), and insofar as it forbids a child 
over the age of 22 to challenge the paternity 
of his mother’s husband more than one year 
after he discovered that the man is not his 
father. Any other ruling would prevent the 
courts from taking the interests of all parties 
concerned into account. The lift of this dou-
ble bar permitted Delphine Boël to challenge 
the paternity of her mother’s husband before 
the Court of First Instance in excess of both 
limits and to bring a paternity suit against her 
supposed biological father, the former King 
of Belgium.
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Judgment No. 72/20167 – Combat of Dis-
crimination – Sexism – Clear Definition – 
Freedom of Expression
In 2014, Belgium became the only country in 
the world to introduce a criminal provision 
prohibiting sexism in the public space. The 
provision was challenged before the Consti-
tutional Court for violating the principle of 
legality in criminal matters, as it allegedly 
did not define the offense of “sexism” in suf-
ficiently clear and accurate terms. It alleged-
ly also violated the freedom of expression 
(Article 19 of the Constitution). The Court 
held that even if the definition of sexism is 
not sufficiently precise in scope or in con-
tent, the requirement that the criminalized 
acts and gestures must have resulted in a se-
rious infringement of the dignity of the per-
son leaves the courts sufficient indications 
as to the scope of the contested provision. 
Indeed, it is inherent to the criminal court’s 
mission to determine whether particular be-
havior falls within the scope of criminal law 
on a case by case basis.
The Court further acknowledged that the 
contested Act interfered with a person’s 
right to freedom of expression. However, as 
equality between men and women is one of 
the fundamental values of a democratic so-
ciety, the Act serves a legitimate aim. More-
over, the necessity of the Act in a democratic 
society does not depend on its effectiveness, 
measured in terms of its application by the 
courts and sentences passed. Indeed, the Act 
may also have an educational and preventive 
effect. Lastly, given the fact that the Act re-
quires a special intent and a serious infringe-
ment of the dignity of specific persons, it 
cannot be considered disproportionate. The 
Court, therefore, upheld the “Sexism Act.” 
CONCLUSION
The success rate of appeals before the Con-
stitutional Court was quite high in 2016. 
From the Court’s foundation in 1985 until 
2015, actions for annulment were success-
ful in 28% of the cases in the sense that they 
7 See English version http://www.const-court.be/public/e/2016/2016-072e.pdf
8 See L. Lavrysen, J. Theunis, J. Goossens, P. Cannoot and V. Meerschaert, Developments in Belgian Constitutional Law: The Year 2015 in Review, Int’l J. 
Const. L. Blog, October 12, 2016, http://www.iconnectblog.com/2016/10/developments-in-belgian-constitutional-law-the-year-2015-in-review 
resulted in a total or partial annulment.8 In 
2016, the Court annulled the challenged pro-
visions in 56% of the cases. Until 2015, pre-
liminary rulings had an average success rate 
of 32%; the rate was 36% in 2016. Last year, 
the Court ordered three suspensions (50%), 
which is considerably more than the 10% 
average from the past. The cases discussed 
in section IV of course only show a partial 
picture of the Court’s case law.
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INTRODUCTION
Developments in Brazilian Constitution-
al Law in the year 2016 were shaped by 
deepening economic, political, and social 
turmoil, and by the repercussions of investi-
gations into widespread corruption implicat-
ing high-profile political actors and leading 
companies. 
In politics, we went through a traumatic 
impeachment trial against President Rous-
seff; the speaker of the Lower House was 
removed from office and later arrested on 
corruption charges; and the speaker of the 
Senate has been indicted on charges of em-
bezzlement and removed from the presiden-
tial line of succession. Hundreds of political 
figures from diverse political parties are cur-
rently under investigation for graft, money 
laundering, and other crimes, mostly within 
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In the economic field, Brazil has been facing 
a severe recession, with a shrinking GDP, ris-
ing unemployment, and the hemorrhaging of 
public finances. The fiscal crisis has had a 
major impact on the member states’ econo-
mies, many of which have been struggling 
to meet their payrolls and maintain essential 
public services. In the social realm, the wide-
spread popular discontent with and cynicism 
toward the political class, coupled with the 
fear of impending setbacks to the protection 
of social rights, gave rise to people’s protests 
and to the “Occupy Schools” movement led 
by students nationwide. 
It would be naive to assume that the storm 
would not hit the Supreme Court. If, in Bra-
zil, there was already a tendency toward the 
judicialization of politics, in times of crisis 
this inclination has become even more clear. 
Throughout the year, the Court was called 
upon to intervene in several core political, 
economic, and social controversies. Taking 
the position as arbiter of national disputes, 
it was nonetheless thrust into the heart of the 
crisis.
THE CONSTITUTION AND  
THE COURT  
The Brazilian Supreme Federal Court (STF), 
the apex court of the country’s judiciary, 
comprises 11 justices, appointed by the Pres-
ident of the Republic and confirmed by the 
absolute majority of the Federal Senate. The 
justices have life tenure and are subject to 
mandatory retirement at age 75. 
The STF has primary responsibility for safe-
guarding the Constitution. Brazil’s 1988 
Constitution adopts a hybrid or mixed system 
of judicial review, which combines aspects 
of both the American and European models. 
From America, we derived a concrete and 
diffuse form of review: every judge or court 
has the authority to adjudicate on claims 
of constitutional violation in a case. The 
constitutional issues raised in the various 
courts can ultimately be brought before the 
STF through “extraordinary appeals” (RE), 
whereby the Court examines if the appealed 
decision violates the Constitution. Extraordi-
BRAZIL
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nary appeals account for the vast majority of 
cases heard by the STF (in 2016, about 82% 
of the total number of decisions).
From Europe, we adopted abstract and con-
centrated control, allowing for the possibili-
ty of bringing direct constitutional lawsuits 
before the Supreme Court, in which the con-
stitutionality of a statute is discussed in the 
abstract (i.e. regardless of a pending case). 
There are multiple instruments of abstract re-
view in Brazil, such as the direct action of un-
constitutionality (ADI), the declaratory action 
of constitutionality (ADC), and the claim of 
non-compliance with a fundamental precept 
(ADPF), with ample legal standing (e.g. these 
actions may be initiated by the President, 
the Head of the Federal Prosecutor’s Office, 
any political party, the Bar Association, etc.). 
Nonetheless, direct actions represent a very 
small fraction of the Court’s decisions (in 
2016, less than 0.5% of the rulings).
The STF also enjoys broad jurisdiction to 
review other appeals and direct proceed-
ings not necessarily involving constitution-
al matters. For example, the Court is com-
petent to try the President of the Republic, 
the Vice-President, members of the National 
Congress, the Tribunal’s own justices, and 
the Head of the Federal Prosecutor’s Office 
on charges of common criminal offenses; to 
settle federal conflicts; and to decide extra-
dition requests from foreign States. Regard-
ing the President’s impeachment process, the 
Supreme Court’s Chief Justice presides over 
the trial session at the Senate.
The cases brought before the STF are ran-
domly assigned to justices by lot through an 
automated system. The Tribunal ordinarily 
convenes in plenary sessions (with full atten-
dance) twice a week, and in panel sessions 
(there are two panels of five justices each, 
excepting the Chief Justice) once a week. 
The plenary sessions are presided over by 
the Chief Justice, who has the power to set 
the Court’s agenda. 
The decision-making process is external and 
aggregative. The justices deliberate and vote 
in public plenary sessions that are broadcast 
1 Only more recently, in the most prominent cases, did the STF begin to formulate a statement that represents the majority opinion.
on live TV, without any previous in-cam-
era conference among them. Decisions are 
reached by an aggregative procedure in 
which the justices sequentially read their 
own opinions during the Court’s sessions; all 
of the opinions are later published, adopting 
the seriatim model. Thus, generally, there is 
no “opinion of the court”.1 This is why the 
Court’s justices are commonly identified as 
“11 islands”, who operate in a rather indi-
vidualistic manner and with low levels of 
cooperation. The “11 islands” are also iden-
tified by the number of unilateral/monocrat-
ic decisions. In 2016, only 12% of all cases 
were decided collectively, either in plenary 
or panel sessions, while 88% of the decisions 
were issued by a single justice.
DEVELOPMENTS AND  
CONTROVERSIES IN 2016
The increased role of the STF in matters of 
strong political impact gained momentum in 
2016. This is most notably exemplified by 
the Court’s role during the impeachment of 
then President Dilma Rousseff. In December 
2015, it established some central procedural 
rules Congress needed to follow (ADPF 378). 
That decision was confirmed by the Court 
in March 2016 when the last appeal was 
rejected, thereby annulling the deliberations 
taken thus far in the Lower House. 
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precedent based on the impeachment case of 
former President Collor judged in 1992 (MS 
21564), it did not wade into the discussion of 
whether President Rousseff’s alleged crime 
of fiscal irresponsibility could be interpreted 
as a crime of malversation, a condition for 
impeachment according to the Constitution. 
Three main reactions have emerged 
therefrom. First, by limiting its consideration 
mostly to the procedural rules, some argued 
that the STF washed its hands of the 
situation and let the political arena decide, 
solely on political grounds, the destiny of 
an elected president, thus deviating from its 
constitutional duty to protect the presidential 
regime and contributing to a sophisticated 
form of coup d’état. For others, conversely, 
by annulling the deliberations taken so far 
in Congress based on a claimed breach of 
the constitutional rules of impeachment, 
the STF overstepped the boundaries of its 
constitutional role and thereby entered a 
dispute that was inherently political and 
protected by the interna corporis doctrine. 
Finally, some have agreed with the STF’s 
behavior, arguing that its role was merely to 
mediate the conflict and guarantee procedural 
fairness; in their view, the STF rightfully left 
the merits to be decided by Congress.
During the impeachment trial, despite being 
continuously challenged, the STF held fast 
to its position of safeguarding the procedural 
rules, and did not wade into the merits of the 
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self-restraint, though, would be contradicted 
by some unilateral decisions with substantial 
political impact, which raised doubts as to 
whether they were politically motivated. 
For example, in March, one of the justices, 
in a unilateral decision, barred former 
President Lula from becoming President 
Rousseff’s Chief of Staff on grounds that the 
appointment simply sought to circumvent the 
lower court judge’s issuance of a preventive 
arrest warrant against him (MS 34070). This 
decision was never scrutinized by the Court, 
but it was considerably influential on the 
course of the impeachment trial.
Another controversy arose from the “Car 
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players in Congress. Due to its deep political 
impact, the timing of decision-making 
raised several debates on how it could 
have influenced the impeachment trial. For 
instance, the Head of the Federal Prosecutor’s 
Office filed a lawsuit on graft charges against 
Eduardo Cunha, then Speaker of the Lower 
House, in December 2015 (AC 4070). Since 
Mr. Cunha was a decisive player in launching 
the impeachment trial in Congress, some 
have argued that if the STF had decided the 
case immediately after charges were filed 
against him, things would have unfolded 
differently. Yet, the STF only decided to 
oust him from office in May 2016, after the 
Lower House had already authorized the 
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this was a politically biased strategy, for 
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others, ousting the House Speaker signified 
a serious encroachment on the powers of 
Congress.
In December, another justice would further 
test the boundaries of law and politics 
when he, also through a unilateral decision, 
issued a preliminary order to remove Senate 
President Renan Calheiros from office based 
on embezzlement charges (ADPF 402). This 
decision was overturned by the Court the 
next week, but it could not help but reveal 
how the STF had transformed itself in 2016. 
Challenged by all sides of the political 
spectrum, it became a prominent example 
of what Hirschl calls “the judicialization 
of mega-politics”.2 After all, it was at 
best unexpected to have a Supreme Court 
involved in such sensitive political matters 
as the fate of the heads of the Executive, 
Lower House, and Senate in one single year.
MAJOR CASES 
Separation of powers
Proceedings in the impeachment trial of 
President Rousseff (ADPF 378-ED, decided 
03/16/2016)
In March, the STF rejected the final appeal 
on a case originating from a Claim of Non-
Compliance with a Fundamental Precept, 
which discussed how the impeachment 
proceedings should take place in Congress. 
There were many doubts about this 
proceeding, because the 1988 Constitution 
regulates it only very briefly and Law 1079, 
which defines the crimes of malversation and 
the procedural rules for the impeachment trial, 
was enacted in 1950. Moreover, although 
there was already a Supreme Court precedent 
regarding President Collor’s impeachment 
in 1992, some relevant issues remained 
unanswered and the political and legal context 
had changed a great deal since then. 
The plenary session to decide the merits of 
the case took place in December of 2015. 
Following Justice Luís Roberto Barroso’s 
opinion, the majority of the Court reaffirmed 
the precedent set during President Collor’s 
impeachment. The decision focused on 
 
2 Ran Hirschl, “The Judicialization of Mega-Politics and the Rise of Political Courts” (2008) 11 ARPS 93.
the following rules: (i) every deliberation 
in impeachment proceedings should 
be based on openly-cast votes; (ii) the 
special impeachment committee should 
be proportionally composed in accordance 
with the party leadership; and (iii) the 
Senate has the final say on the impeachment 
proceedings, while the Lower House has 
only the power to authorize the impeachment 
trial by the Senate. As a result, the STF 
invalidated the previous election of the 
special impeachment committee that was 
established by secret ballot.
From this trial on, the Court acted with in-
creasing self-restraint. On April 15, in an 
extraordinary hearing held just two days 
before the Lower House was to vote to au-
thorize Rousseff’s impeachment trial before 
the Senate, the 11 Justices gathered to decide 
claims filed by the government and other 
parties that attempted to suspend the im-
peachment proceedings. The motions ques-
tioned the congressional voting procedures 
and the scope and validity of the impeach-
ment bid. During the session, which lasted 
more than seven hours, the STF rejected all 
claims and studiously avoided the merits of 
the impeachment, emphasizing that it lacked 
jurisdiction over interna corporis acts and 
that it was the sole responsibility of Con-
gress to decide whether President Rousseff 
had committed the alleged crime of malver-
sation.
Annulment of the appointment of minister 
by President Rousseff (MS 34.070, interim 
measure granted 03/18/2016) 
In March, an interim ruling issued by a single 
Justice suspended former President Lula’s 
appointment as Rousseff’s Chief of Staff. 
The rapporteur, Justice Gilmar Mendes, con-
sidered that Lula’s appointment was aimed 
solely at preventing lower court judge Sérgio 
Moro from issuing a preventive arrest war-
rant against him, as ministers are tried di-
rectly by the STF per the 1988 Constitution. 
Justice Mendes based his decision on a wire-
tapped private conversation between Presi-
dent Rousseff and Lula, leaked to the press 
by the lower court judge, which allegedly 
 
provided proof of the misuse of the cabinet 
appointment to avoid prosecution. Later, the 
STF ruled that both the wiretap and its re-
lease to the press were illegal. However, Jus-
tice Mendes’s unilateral decision was never 
examined by the Plenary.
Lower House speaker suspended from office 
(AC 4070,  decided 05/05/2016)
In May, the STF voted unanimously to ap-
prove a request by the Head of the Federal 
Prosecutor’s Office to suspend the speaker 
of the Lower House, Mr. Eduardo Cunha, 
from his duties as deputy and house speak-
er for obstructing a criminal investigation 
against him. The justices upheld an injunc-
tion issued hours before by Mr. Teori Za-
vascki, the justice presiding over the “Car 
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a tragic plane crash. To justify the decision to 
remove Cunha from speakership, Justice Za-
vascki also considered that the congressman 
was indicted by the Court on graft charges in 
March and, therefore, could not hold office 
in the line of presidential succession.
Defendants in criminal proceedings shall 
not occupy posts in the presidential line of 
succession (ADPF 402, injunction order 
decided 12/07/2016) 
Brazil’s 1988 Constitution provides that the 
speakers of the Lower House and the Sen-
ate are the first and second authorities in the 
line of succession to exercise presidential 
authority in the event of a dual (temporary or 
permanent) vacancy of the presidential and 
the vice-presidential offices. In the Claim of 
Non-Compliance with a Fundamental Pre-
cept 402, it was argued that, if the authori-
ties in the presidential line of succession are 
indicted by the STF, they must be removed 
from the post, given that the Constitution 
provides that the President shall be suspend-
ed from his duties if a criminal complaint 
against him or her is received by the STF. 
As the trial got underway, six justices voiced 
their opinions in favor of the claim, stating 
that defendants in criminal proceedings be-
fore the Court should step down from their 
positions in the line of succession. The trial 
was suspended at a request for further exam-
ination of the case.
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Based on that majority opinion, the rappor-
teur of the case, Justice Marco Aurélio, in 
a unilateral decision, issued a preliminary 
order to remove Senate President Renan 
Calheiros from his post, just after he was in-
dicted by the Court on charges of misusing 
public funds. However, the Senate resisted 
the ruling. Two days later, the STF, by a 6-3 
vote, overturned the injunction, deciding 
that, although Senator Calheiros should be 
removed from the presidential line of suc-
cession, he could remain Senate President.
Rights and freedoms
Enforcement of criminal sentences after 
first appellate ruling (HC 126.292, decided 
02/17/2016)
In a decision on a writ of habeas corpus, the 
STF held that defendants who have their 
prison sentence affirmed on appeal can serve 
time before all appeals have been exhaust-
ed and a final decision is issued. This rul-
ing overturned the Court’s precedent, set in 
2009, which stated that the constitutional 
principle of the presumption of innocence 
prevented anyone from being arrested until 
an unappealable criminal sentence is issued. 
The previous understanding was considered 
by most justices to be an impunity loophole, 
as the Brazilian criminal system is fraught 
with statutes of limitations and an excessive 
number of appeals.
According to Justice Teori Zavascki’s opin-
ion, joined by six other justices, a criminal 
conviction may be enforced provisionally 
even if an appeal to superior courts is still 
pending, since such courts are not allowed 
to revisit matters of fact and evidence, and 
such extraordinary appeals do not suspend 
the enforcement of sentences. Other mem-
bers of the Court also adopted pragmatic 
arguments. Justice Luís Roberto Barroso, 
for instance, stated that the enforcement of 
criminal sentences after the first appellate 
ruling is necessary to ensure the credibility 
of the criminal justice system, as it not only 
helps put an end to lawyers’ dilatory tactics 
but also reduces selectivity (since white-col-
lar criminals were seldom arrested) and the 
sense of impunity in society. The dissenting 
 
3 See STF, ADC 43-MC; ARE 964246-RG.
opinions argued, however, that this shift 
would disrupt the guarantee of the presump-
tion of innocence and raised concerns about 
the already overcrowded prisons. Shortly 
thereafter, the Plenary of the Court twice re-
affirmed the habeas decision, which is now 
binding upon every court.3
Unconstitutionality of the incidence of 
the crime of abortion in cases of abortion 
during the first trimester of pregnancy (HC 
124.306, decided 11/29/2016)
The First Panel of the Court ordered the 
release from pretrial detention of a doctor 
and employees of a clandestine abortion 
clinic who had been arrested for the prac-
tice of the crimes of abortion and conspir-
acy to commit crimes. The order of habeas 
corpus was granted on two grounds. First, 
the original pre-trial detention did not meet 
the legal requirements. Second, as per Jus-
tice Luís Roberto Barroso’s opinion, which 
was joined by the majority of the members 
of the First Panel, the criminalization of the 
voluntary termination of pregnancy carried 
out during the first trimester violates several 
fundamental rights of women (such as their 
reproductive rights, autonomy, physical and 
psychological integrity, and right to gen-
der equality), as well as disproportionately 
harms poor women, who are forced to resort 
to precarious clandestine clinics, which offer 
high risks of injury, mutilation, and death. 
Moreover, Justice Barroso stated that the 
treatment of abortion as a crime also violates 
the principle of proportionality since: (i) it 
constitutes an unsuitable measure by which 
to protect the life of the unborn, as crimi-
nalization does not have a relevant impact 
on the number of abortions practiced in the 
country; (ii) it is possible for the State to 
avoid the occurrence of abortions by more 
effective and less harmful measures than 
criminalization, such as sexual education, 
distribution of contraceptives, and support 
for women who wish to carry the pregnan-
cy to term; and (iii) the measure is dispro-
portional in the narrow sense, as it produc-
es social costs (public health problems and 
deaths) that clearly outweigh its benefits.
 
Despite not decriminalizing abortion nor 
setting a binding legal precedent, the ruling 
does indicate that at least some of the Court 
justices are ready take a further step to guar-
antee women’s reproductive rights.
Rodeo sport of “vaquejada” and animal 
rights (ADI 4983, decided 10/06/2016)
The Court’s Plenary, by a close vote of 6-5, 
struck down as unconstitutional a law aimed 
at acknowledging “vaquejada”, in which 
cowboys on horseback chase a bull across 
an arena and attempt to pull it to the ground 
by twisting and pulling its tail as a rodeo 
sport and cultural practice. Based on sever-
al technical reports, the majority opined that 
“vaquejada” inflicts needless suffering on 
animals in violation of the Constitution’s 
prohibition of animal cruelty. Although the 
STF has not explicitly recognized that ani-
mals are entitled to fundamental rights, it has 
certainly granted animals “a peculiar digni-
ty” and “the moral right not to be subjected 
to cruelty”. The dissenting justices argued 
that “vaquejada” is a constitutionally protec-
ted cultural practice that does not necessa-
rily impose cruel treatment on the bull. The 
ruling sparked angry reactions among prac-
titioners and supporters, and a backlash has 
begun, as Congress already passed a law that 
recognized “vaquejada” as part of Brazil’s 
intangible cultural heritage, and is making 
every effort to approve a constitutional 
amendment overruling the decision.
Health rights litigation (ADI 5501-MC, 
decided 05/19/2016)
Health rights litigation was a recurring issue 
on the Court’s agenda in 2016. In May, the 
STF examined the constitutionality of a law 
that authorized the production and distribu-
tion of a compound that is hailed by some as 
a miracle cancer cure, despite both a dearth 
of clinical tests proving its safety and effica-
cy as well as a lack of regulatory approval 
by the Brazilian Health Surveillance Agency 
(ANVISA). The “cancer pill” was first de-
veloped by a chemist at the University of São 
Paulo and illegally distributed to patients. 
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and shut down the lab, lower courts began 
granting orders for the university administra-
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tion to provide the pill to hundreds of per-
sons with terminal cancer. Next, responding 
to popular pressure, Congress passed a bill 
to legalize use of the untested pill. Less than 
a month later, however, the STF’s majority 
granted an injunction to suspend the effec-
tiveness of the law. The Court held that the 
legalization of the untested compound vio-
lates the constitutional duty to safeguard the 
people’s health and the separation of powers.
In September, the STF has begun to review 
two extraordinary appeals (REs 566471 and 
657718) which generate a broader debate on 
the impacts of strong individual litigation 
of health rights on frustrating inequities in 
health service delivery and disrupting pub-
lic policies. In these cases, the Court will 
decide whether the courts can compel the 
State to provide access to high-cost drugs 
that are not listed on the public health sys-
tem and to drugs not approved by ANVISA. 
The rapporteur, Mr. Marco Aurélio, consid-
ered that the State has a duty to supply high-
cost medicines for patients who are unable 
to pay for them, regardless of their cost, but 
voted against providing access to unregis-
tered drugs. The other two justices who had 
already cast their votes, Justices Barroso and 
Fachin, dissented. They opined that the judi-
cial distribution of drugs not covered by the 
official list exacerbates inequities within the 
healthcare system, and thus proposed criteria 
to make this case the exception.
Public servants’ pay cuts during strikes (RE 
693456-RG, decided 10/27/2016)
The 1988 Constitution provides for the right 
of public servants to strike, but it left the 
matter to be enacted into law by the Legisla-
ture. Almost 30 years after the Constitution 
took effect, the law had still not been passed. 
In 2007, the Court itself addressed the matter 
and ordered that the law dealing with private 
sector strikes be extended to public servants, 
by analogy, until Congress decides to pass 
a law for public servants. Up to the present 
day, however, the Congress has failed to pass 
such a law.
In view of the multiplications of strikes 
during 2016, the Court discussed the consti-
tutionality of pay cuts during public servant 
strikes. By a 6-4 vote, the Plenary decided 
that the public administration should reduce 
the strikers’ salaries unless the strike is mo-
tivated by the illegal conduct of the State. 
The Court accepted, however, an agreement 
to compensate the days off during the strike 
by working extra hours. The four dissenting 
justices understood that the pay cuts cannot 
be unilaterally determined by the public ad-
ministration; rather, they must depend on a 
previous court ruling declaring the illegality 
of the strike. 
Foreign, international, and/or multilateral 
relations
Statute of limitation for crimes against hu-
manity (Ext 1362, decided 11/09/2016)
The STF, by a narrow 6-5 vote, rejected Ar-
gentina’s request to extradite an Argentinian 
citizen accused of kidnapping and murdering 
leftist political activists during the military 
regime. Although the Tribunal agreed with 
the applicant State that those acts were crimes 
against humanity, the majority opinion held 
that they are subject to statutes of limitation 
under Brazilian law, as the country has not 
signed the Convention on the Non-Applica-
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and Crimes Against Humanity.
CONCLUSION
In 2016, the STF was thrust into the political 
turmoil that has engulfed the country, and 
one conclusion is inevitable: the Court has 
found itself in a starring role, one that is pos-
sibly unparalleled by any other democratic 
period in Brazil’s history. Matters of sub-
stantial political impact, moral disagreement, 
and social rights, for instance, have increas-
ingly been subject to its scrutiny. Naturally, 
the Court’s skyrocketing influence has led to 
more clashes with the political realm. More-
over, the Court’s increasing purview has also 
highlighted some of the STF’s longstanding 
flaws, such as its justices’ unbalanced pow-
ers and inability to deliver an “opinion of 
the Court”. Much work still remains for the 
STF to engineer an optimal design for deci-
sion-making, but, if there is one lesson to be 
learned from 2016, it is that the comparative 
constitutional law field should pay more at-
tention to the developments of the Brazilian 
Supreme Court.
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INTRODUCTION 
Background and Creation of the Court
The Bulgarian Constitutional Court (BCC) 
was established under the Constitution of 
13 July 1991, which was adopted after the 
fall of the communist regime.1 The previous 
?????????????????? ?????????????????????????
the 1879 Constitution adopted after the lib-
eration from the Ottoman Empire and the 
two communist constitutions from 1947 and 
???????????????????????????????????????????-
tutional tribunal or any form of extra-parlia-
mentary constitutional control. The drafters 
of the 1991 constitution almost unanimously 
decided to introduce a Kelsenian model of 
centralised judicial review, exercised exclu-
sively by a specialised tribunal. The new in-
stitution was modeled after its German, Aus-
trian, Italian and Spanish counterparts.
Characteristics of the Court
The Court consists of 12 judges who are 
appointed, for a non-renewable period of 
nine years, in equal parts by the National 
Assembly, the President, and at a meeting 
of the judges of the Supreme Court of Cas-
sation (SCC) and the Supreme Administra-
tive Court (SAC). All types of rulings of the 
Court require a majority of more than half, 
i.e. seven or more, of the votes of all judges.2 
The Court has the competence to provide 
binding interpretations of the Constitution to 
1 A Constitutional Court Act was passed on 16 August 1991 and the Court was constituted on 3 Octo-
ber 1991. 
2 This provision has stirred controversies in cases where judges were split in 6:6 or even in 6:5 votes 
in favour of a constitutionality challenge. In such cases, the challenge would fail due to the lack of a 
seventh vote, despite the fact that a simple majority of the judges supported the challenge. 
3 Most of the fundamental rights of citizens are listed in Chapter 2 of the Constitution.
4 The only instance where the Court exercises a priori judicial review is when ruling on the constitution-
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adjudicate upon disputes between the main 
state institutions; to rule on the congruence 
between domestic law (including the Con-
stitution) and international law and treaties, 
to which Bulgaria is party; and to exercise 
constitutional control (judicial review) of 
legislation and acts of the President. The lat-
ter function encompasses the protection of 
the constitutional rights and liberties of citi-
zens against encroachments on the part of the 
Legislator and the President.3 
The Court exercises a posteriori concentrat-
ed review, which is abstract in nature since it 
concerns the constitutionality of the legisla-
tive or presidential act in general and not its 
concrete application.4 Unconstitutionality 
decisions of the Court invalidate such acts 
with ex nunc binding force. All decisions of 
the Court are final and binding on all pub-
lic bodies and persons. The Court does not 
have the competence to review acts by the 
other branches of the executive apart from 
the President, such as, for example, minis-
terial orders and regulations, and administra-
tive acts. The constitutional review of such 
non-legislative normative acts is entrusted 
upon the SAC. 
Seizing Subjects 
The abstract referral procedure can be trig-
gered by one-fifth of all deputies of the Na-
tional Assembly, the President, the Council 
BULGARIA
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of Ministers, the SCC, the SAC, or the Pros-
ecutor General. Lower courts cannot invoke 
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ed with the unconstitutionality of an applica-
ble norm in concrete cases, they may notify 
the corresponding Supreme Court, which, 
in turn, may request the BCC to rule on the 
constitutionality of the norm.
There is no individual constitutional com-
plaint mechanism or actio popularis and the 
BCC cannot act ex officio. In light of the 
restricted individual access to constitutional 
adjudication in 2006, the Office of the Na-
tional Ombudsman, which was established 
in 2004, was included in the list of seizing 
subjects. Since 2015, the Supreme Attorneys 
Council can also challenge the constitution-
ality of formal statutes which infringe on hu-
man rights and freedoms.
Until the end of 2016, the BCC was seized 
490 times and delivered 363 judgments. 
Most referrals were filed by deputies of 
the National Assembly. The Office of the 
Ombudsman filed 26 applications and the 
Supreme Attorneys Council has not yet ex-
ercised its newly introduced referral right. 
Since the beginning of the 2000s, the output 
of the Court has visibly decreased and now 
stands at around 10 decisions per year. 
Brief Overview of the Court’s History
The BCC played a key role in the Bulgari-
an political discourse in the first decade of 
the democratic transition. The 1990s were 
marked by the antagonism between the two 
main political forces in the country, the Bul-
garian Socialist Party (BSP) and the Union of 
the Democratic Forces (UDF). BSP attempt-
ed to retain control over the state apparatus 
whilst the UDF, founded by rehabilitated 
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ti-Soviet agenda. Against this binary parlia-
mentary setting, the BCC was often instru-
mentalised by the parliamentary minority as 
a tool for exerting constitutional checks and 
balances over the majority and the govern-
ment, and for challenging legislation. Due to 
 
 
5 Decision 4/1992, case number 1/1991. It must be noted, however, that the unconstitutionality challenge failed only due to the lack of a 7th vote. 6:5 judges 
voted for the unconstitutionality of the party. 
6 Decision 14/92, case number 14/92.
the fact that UDF and BSP were alternating 
in assuming the minoritarian position in the 
Parliament, the Court managed to remain 
largely untainted by political affiliation and 
to defend its independence.
In its first decision, the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of a highly contested po-
litical party, established soon after the end 
of communism to represent the interests of 
the previously persecuted Bulgarian ethnic 
Turkish minority.5 The judgment played a 
crucial role in the reconciliation of the dif-
ferent constitutional interests present in Bul-
garia’s multiethnic society and thus sent a 
clear sign of departure from totalitarianism. 
This decision of the Court was followed by a 
number of judgments dedicated to the polit-
ical process and to the separation of powers. 
This helped establish the democratic, parlia-
mentary character of the new Bulgarian Re-
public, and contributed to the demarcation 
of the responsibilities of the President, the 
Parliament, and the Executive. 
Moreover, the Court hindered a number of 
governmental attempts to tamper with the 
independence of the judiciary. These played 
out against the background of the lingering 
legal tradition of the authoritarian regime, 
which used to subject the exercise of judicial 
power to the unadulterated and arbitrary will 
of the communist party.
The BCC also upheld a number of laws relat-
ed to the restitution of property expropriated 
and nationalised by the totalitarian govern-
ment. Many lustration laws which attempt-
ed to ostracise ex-communists from polit-
ical and public life, however, were struck 
down by the Court on equality grounds. The 
Court’s jurisprudence of the court has been 
ambiguous to the issue of opening the files 
of the communist State Security Agency.
Although mainly preoccupied with politi-
cal disputes, the Court delivered a number 
of important judgments in the area of con-
stitutional rights and liberties. Most of them 
concerned freedom of speech and the media, 
 
 
as well as property rights in the context of 
restitution. The jurisprudence of the Court 
on other human rights issues has been rather 
scarce. Although the Bulgarian government 
has been widely criticised for its discrimi-
natory practices against certain minorities 
(such as Roma) and socially vulnerable 
groups (such as persons with disabilities and 
delinquent youth), very few cases before the 
BCC have dealt with such issues. The Court 
also upheld the limitations of what can be 
considered the Bulgarian affirmative action 
provision, which allows for the privileged 
treatment of certain social groups, such as 
disabled persons, but explicitly prohibits 
“positive” or “reversed” discrimination on 
the ground of race and gender.6
The Court’s popularity and activism, howev-
er, seems to have waned in the 2000s. A pos-
sible explanation might lie in the dilution of 
the binary character of Bulgarian parliamen-
tarism, incurred by the emergence of new 
centrist political actors. Since the beginning 
of the 2000s, the most important decisions of 
the BCC have been in the area of judicial re-
form: the Court has blocked efforts to make 
the prosecutorial office a part of the execu-
tive branch (at present it is part of the judi-
ciary) by arguing that this would require a 
very cumbersome constitutional amendment 
procedure through a Grand National Assem-
bly (GNA). According to this procedure, in 
order to amend some essential parts of the 
Constitution (as the form of government, for 
instance), it is necessary to gather qualified 
majorities of at least two-thirds in an “ordi-
nary” Parliament, and then dissolve it and 
call new elections for GNA with the purpose 
of adopting the suggested amendment. The 
BCC read the “form of government” pro-
vision of the constitution very broadly and 
included in its meaning the positioning of 
the prosecutorial office as well. At present, 
many see the lack of accountability of the 
Prosecutor General as a main problem of the 
judicial system. Critics argue that the BCC 
has contributed to this situation.    
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DEVELOPMENTS AND CONTRO-
VERSIES IN 2016
A constitutional controversy from the first 
years of the Court’s existence concerned the 
judicial review of legislation adopted before 
the creation of the Court. According to para-
graph 3 of the Transitional and Concluding 
Provisions to the Constitution, only laws 
passed after the entry into force of the 1991 
Constitution are subjected to the jurisdiction 
of the Court. The Court ascertained that it 
had no jurisdiction over pre-existing legisla-
tion which was no longer in force after 13 
July 1991.7 There was ambiguity, however, 
with regard to its jurisdiction over legisla-
tion which remained in force after that date. 
Initially, the Court proclaimed that it would 
not exercise constitutionality control in such 
cases and that the ordinary judiciary could 
disapply such unconstitutional legislation in 
concrete cases with inter partes binding force 
(admissibility definitions in cases 1/1991 
and 11/1992). Moreover, the Court found 
that only the National Assembly had the 
competence to repeal such legislation with 
erga omnes binding force within three years 
after the adoption of the new Constitution. 
This regulation, however, stirred legal un-
certainty in light of the potential scenario of 
regular courts not ascertaining their compe-
tence to define whether a persisting law was 
unconstitutional. In recognition of this un-
certainty and the failure of the National As-
sembly to address the constitutionality of a 
number of controversial laws inherited from 
the communist regime within the three-year 
period, the Court changed its jurisprudence 
on the matter, proclaiming that the scope 
of its review powers would also encompass 
pre-existing laws (admissibility definition in 
case 31/1995). The controversy was thus re-
solved by the BCC.
7 Decision 12/1992, case number 7/1994.This practice of the Court constituted a problem with regard to state acts in application of such expired laws, 
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the communist regime after it took power in 1944. The so called “People’s Court” is notorious for its arbitrary mass trials, which were aimed at eradicating 
the political opposition after the communist coup d’etat. The Constitutional Court found that it had no temporal jurisdiction over the law which created 
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trumped-up crimes.
An unresolved constitutional controversy 
stems from a provision (Art 5.2) stipulating 
that the Constitution shall apply directly. Art 
150 of the Constitution states that only the 
BCC can invalidate legislation. However, it is 
unclear whether ordinary courts can disapply 
unconstitutional laws with inter partes bind-
ing force. The Statute on the Normative Acts 
seems to imply that ordinary courts might 
have such competence. Several BCC judges 
have also expressed the view that all courts 
can and should disapply unconstitutional laws 
in concrete cases. This, however, often fails to 
happen in practice due to the lack of explicit 
procedural regulation.   
Another constitutional ambiguity is related to 
the ex nunc binding force of the Court’s de-
cisions. This raises questions with regard to 
the status and applicability of legislation for 
the period between its entry into force (or the 
entry into force of the 1991 Constitution in 
the case of pre-existing laws) and the uncon-
stitutionality decision of the Court, which an-
nuls this legislation. A situation in which only 
an amendment of an already existing norm 
is declared unconstitutional can prove to be 
particularly problematic. The constitutional 
provision seems to suggest two possible in-
terpretations in such cases. On the one hand, 
it could be argued that an unconstitutionality 
ruling of the amendment automatically re-
stores the validity of the original norm in its 
pre-amendment form. An alternative line of 
argumentation, however, would be that such 
an unconstitutionality ruling would create 
a lacuna in the legal order by virtue of the 
fact that the legislator repealed the old norm 
and the BCC invalidated the one intended 
to replace it. In its jurisprudence (Decision 
22/1995), the CC opted for the former prop-
osition and held that an unconstitutionality 
finding restores the original norm. This, how-
ever, has been a matter of academic debate. 
MAJOR DECISIONS
In 2016, the Court was seized 17 times. It 
delivered a total of 10 judgments. The most 
important ones are considered below.
Political System and Separation of Powers
Decision 9/2016, case number 8/2016 (filed 
by the President)
In this case, the BCC declared three of the 
six questions for a referendum scheduled by 
the National Assembly to be unconstitution-
al. The referendum was a popular initiative 
which was started by a TV talk show and 
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number by Bulgarian standards. The Presi-
dent challenged the decision of Parliament to 
hold the referendum. The most important of 
the three questions deemed to be unconsti-
tutional was the reduction of the number of 
MPs in the National Assembly from 240 to 
120. The BCC argued that such a reduction 
would substantially affect the powers of the 
Parliament and could therefore be consid-
ered a change of the “form of government”. 
In Bulgaria, such a change, however, would 
require a Grand National Assembly (GNA). 
Since referendums by law cannot be held 
on questions within the competence of the 
GNA, the challenged referendum could not 
lead to the reduction of the number of MPs. 
In its decision, the BCC used a very expan-
sive notion of “form of government”. In the 
Bulgarian constitutional doctrine, the con-
cept of “form of government” traditionally 
refers to whether the republic is parliamen-
tary, presidential, semi-presidential, etc. In 
its jurisprudence on judicial independence, 
however, the BCC has started to interpret 
this notion more broadly by including con-
crete features of the current form of govern-
ment, such as the exact balance of preroga-
tives among the state powers. In this case, 
the Court went as far as to include the num-
ber of MPs within this definition.
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Following a similar logic, the BCC invali-
dated a question on whether the regional 
directors of police should be directly elect-
ed. The judges held that the appointment of 
directors is a prerogative of the Executive, 
insofar as direct election has the capacity to 
affect the balance of powers and therefore 
requires a GNA.   
The third invalidated question related to the 
possibility of electronic voting. A referen-
dum on this question had already been car-
ried out and although its turnout failed to pass 
the legal threshold for binding referendums, 
the Parliament deliberated to introduce elec-
tronic voting once the technical possibilities 
had been explored. Mainly because of that, 
the BCC held that another referendum on the 
same issue would undermine the principle of 
legal certainty and thus the rule of law. Also, 
it would force the Parliament to disrespect 
its own lawful decisions, which would con-
stitute a violation of the constitutional status 
of the legislature.
The referendum was ultimately carried out 
on the three other questions which were up-
held by the BCC. These dealt with the char-
acter of the electoral system and mandatory 
voting. The organisers of the referendum bit-
terly attacked the BCC and the President for 
trying to “obstruct the will of the people”.   
Decision 6/2016 from 14 June 2016, case 
number 1/2016 
This case stemmed from the biggest banking 
??????? ??? ???? ???????? ?????? ????????? ?????
bankruptcy of the Corporate Commercial 
Bank, the fourth biggest bank in the country. 
The closure of the bank ultimately led to the 
resignation of the government and pre-term 
elections. In this case, the BCC was asked 
to assess the constitutionality of the law on 
bankruptcy, according to which only the 
Prosecutors and the bank syndics (officials 
appointed by public bodies to be in charge of 
the insolvent bank) are entitled to judicially 
challenge the decision to declare the bank 
insolvent. Shareholders and the owners of 
the bank were not entitled to appeal this de-
??????????????????????????????????????????? 
8 See decision 8/2016, case 9/2015.
9 ECtHR, A. and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 51776/08, 29 November 2011.
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lated their rights and the principle of the rule 
of law.  
The BCC rejected these claims by stating 
that the declaration of a bank in insolvency 
is a very specialised procedure in which the 
interests of depositors are paramount. The 
Court held that its power to review decisions 
of specialised bodies is limited in such cas-
es, and although the judges saw flaws in the 
law, they deferred to the judgment of the leg-
islature. The challengers’ claims of lack of 
legal protection and violation of the equality 
of arms principle were also rejected on these 
grounds. All in all, the BCC declined to pro-
tect the rights of the owners and shareholders 
in this controversial judgment on the basis of 
the extraordinary character of the situation, 
which implied greater deference to the dis-
cretion of political and expert bodies.
Decision 3/2016 from 8 March 2016, case 
number 6/2015
In the area of healthcare rights, the BCC has 
been traditionally deferential to the legisla-
ture. In this case, however, the judges over-
ruled a relatively central element of a health-
care reform proposed by the government. The 
reform aimed at introducing two distinct tiers 
of public medical services. Under the first tier, 
supposed to cover the most common and most 
serious medical conditions, all citizens would 
have instant access to services as guaranteed 
by their standard healthcare insurance. For the 
second tier, they would either have to enter 
a waiting list or pay an additional amount of 
money in order to gain immediate access to 
healthcare. The judges agreed that the Parlia-
ment had the right to introduce such a reform. 
The BCC found, however, that it was for the 
Minister of Healthcare to define the services 
under the two tiers. The Court argued that 
the Constitution required that such decisions 
needed to be taken only through the passage 
of parliamentary legislation and not by an ad-
ministrative normative act because they affect 
inalienable rights. As to other aspects of the 
healthcare reform, the Court again showed a 
considerable deference to the will of the leg-
islator.8 
Rights and Freedoms 
Decision 11/2016 from 4 October 2016, 
case number 7/2016
In a concrete referral from 28 April 2016, the 
SAC challenged the procedural lack of an 
appeal mechanism against juvenile detention 
orders. This constituted a possible violation 
of the Constitution, which requires judicial 
control to be exercised over the legality of 
any detention. In support of its application, 
the SAC invoked the judgment in the A and 
others v. Bulgaria case where the ECtHR 
held Bulgaria in violation of the ECHR for 
not providing a legal remedy for detainees to 
judicially appeal juvenile detention orders.9 
The BCC proclaimed that the Prosecutor’s 
Office, which authorises juvenile detentions, 
belonged to the judiciary so that, strictly 
speaking, a judicial body was involved in 
the detention process. Notwithstanding this 
finding, the Court qualified detention orders 
by the Prosecution as individual adminis-
trative acts which are challengeable before 
the regular courts. Although the challenged 
norm did not explicitly mention an appeal 
mechanism, the Court ruled that such reme-
dy was implied in the constitutional order on 
the grounds mentioned above. The contested 
norm was thus declared not to be unconsti-
tutional. The Court explained that ECtHR’s 
opposite finding was related to the fact that 
the Bulgarian Government, in its role as de-
fendant in the A. and others v. Bulgaria case, 
had argued mistakenly that detentions could 
not be judicially appealed, while in fact, the 
constitutional order implicitly allowed such 
challenges before the ordinary courts.
This decision raises several concerns with 
regard to the legal regime of juvenile deten-
tion in Bulgaria. On the one hand, the Prose-
cutor’s Office, when exercising its detention 
authority, is considered part of the judiciary 
and thus exempted from additional judicial 
scrutiny under article 30.3 of the Constitu-
tion. At the same time, however, juvenile 
detention acts of the Prosecutor are consid-
ered ordinary administrative acts, which are 
individually challengeable under Art 120. 
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The Office of the Prosecutor thus seems 
to act in a twofold capacity, both as part of 
the judiciary and as a regular administrative 
body. This not only raises concerns with re-
gard to the separation of powers doctrine but 
also creates legal uncertainty for individuals 
confronting detention orders in light of the 
lack of an explicitly regulated procedure for 
???????? ?????????? ????????????????????????
the presence of sufficient guarantees for the 
judicial review of juvenile detention and the 
constitutional conformity of its legal regula-
tion, regular courts seem to continue to in-
correctly reject such challenges. In January 
2017, the ECtHR once again found Bulgaria 
in violation of the ECHR for the lack of ap-
peal mechanisms in juvenile detention pro-
cedures in a case almost identical to A and 
others v. Bulgaria.10 There also seems to be a 
striking divergence between the BCC’s posi-
tion and the Ministry of Justice. The latter, in 
clear contradiction to the BCC’s ruling, ad-
mitted in both ECtHR cases that juvenile de-
tention acts of the Prosecutor are not admin-
istrative acts and thus cannot be challenged 
in the courts. 
Decision 10/2016 from 29 September 2016, 
case number 3/2016 
Later in 2016, the Office of the Ombudsman 
challenged a law which ordered the losing 
party of a judicial trial to compensate the le-
gal representation expenses of the winning lit-
igant. According to the contested norms, state 
institutions, tradespersons, and legal persons 
could claim expenses for legal counselors, 
notwithstanding the fact that legal counselors 
are not paid on an ad hoc basis but within an 
employment contract. The Office of the Om-
budsman argued that this arrangement priv-
ileged legal persons and state institutions to 
the detriment of private citizens, since only 
the former would regularly have employed 
legal counselors. Therefore, private citizens 
would be less likely to claim such expenses 
and benefit from the challenged provision. 
The Ombudsman thus claimed a violation of 
the rule of law principle.
The BCC, however, proclaimed that this 
principle should be interpreted narrowly in 
order to prevent its use as a sweeping clause. 
10 ECtHR, I.P. v. Bulgaria, no. 72936/14, 19 January 2017.
Moreover, the Court justified the differen-
tial treatment of private and legal persons 
by claiming that the latter would be put at 
a disadvantage if they were not allowed to 
claim legal counseling expenses simply due 
to their separate contractual relationship 
with the counselor. Therefore, the challenge 
failed.
Decision 7/2016 from 21 June 2016, case 
number 8/2015
On 21 June 2016, the President challenged 
the constitutionality of two norms, which 
regulated the eligibility criteria for obtaining 
a license to access and deal with classified 
information. Such license is issued by the 
National Information Security Commission 
(NISC), a State agency, and must be ob-
tained by civil servants as a condition for 
exercising jobs dealing with classified in-
formation, such as certain jobs related to the 
military or public service. The challenged 
norms stipulated that the issuance of such a 
license had to be denied by the NISC if the 
applicants in the procedure of issuing this 
document were involved in criminal pro-
ceedings. Such license rejection would bar 
the concerned person from accessing classi-
fied information and would thus effectively 
prevent her from exercising a job which re-
quires such access. The law allowed for the 
rejection to be appealed within seven days, 
otherwise the concerned person would be 
barred from holding a position related to 
classified information for a period of one to 
three years. The President’s Office argued 
that these provisions treated accused persons 
as convicted criminals and were thus in vi-
olation of the constitutional presumption of 
innocence. Moreover, the Office challenged 
the constitutionality of the seven-day preclu-
sion period, since no verdict on the guilt or 
innocence of the accused could be expected 
in such a short time.
The Court held that the opening of a criminal 
investigation manifested sufficient probabil-
ity of the criminal liability of the applicants 
concerned. Therefore, the restriction of their 
access to sensitive classified information 
was found to be proportionate to the legit-
imate aim of the protection of national se-
curity. However, the Court agreed with the 
President’s argument that the seven-day pre-
clusion period was disproportionate. There-
fore, it upheld the norm but nullified the pre-
clusion provision. 
Decision 5/2016 from 12 May 2016, case 
number 2/2016
Several months later, a similar provision was 
to be challenged by the SAC. The contested 
norm ordered that civil servants be suspend-
ed from their occupation and prohibited to 
work if accused of criminal malpractice. The 
latter were also excluded from the social se-
curity system until the delivery of the ver-
dict. The SAC judges held this norm in vio-
lation of both the constitutionally guaranteed 
right to work and the presumption of inno-
cence. They argued that such treatment was 
disproportionate given that even convicted 
criminals were allowed to deliver paid work 
while civil servants were denied this right 
without a verdict. The Court agreed with 
the SAC’s arguments and declared the norm 
unconstitutional. However, the BCC did not 
engage with the alleged violation of the in-
voked concrete constitutional rights. Instead, 
it referred to the sweeping clause of a gener-
al violation of the rule of law principle. 
In a somewhat contradictory fashion, later in 
the year (in decision 10/2016 on case 3/2016, 
discussed above) the Court advocated for a 
narrow interpretation of the rule of law princi-
ple in order to discourage its use as a sweep-
ing clause in constitutionality challenges.
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Cameroon
DEVELOPMENTS IN CAMEROONIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Charles Manga Fombad, Professor of Law, Institute for International and Comparative 
Law in Africa, Faculty of Law, University of Pretoria, South Africa
INTRODUCTION
The most significant constitutional event in 
Cameroon in 2016 was the peaceful protests, 
demonstrations, and sit-in strikes which 
were initiated by Common Law Lawyers 
and Teachers’ Trade Unions which has par-
alysed all official activities in the two An-
glophone regions of Cameroon since Octo-
ber 2016 and led to a military intervention 
which has resulted in many deaths, injuries, 
and the detention of numerous citizens. The 
present crisis is no surprise to even the most 
casual observer of the Cameroonian political 
scene. In fact, Cameroon’s apparent political 
stability belies deep-seated centrifugal forc-
es of fragmentation which have only been 
kept dormant by repressive authoritarian 
governmental structures and systems which 
successfully defied the so-called ‘third wave 
of democratisation’ that swept through Af-
????? ??? ?????????????????????????????????????
countries underwent substantial constitution-
al reforms, the token reforms that took place 
in Cameroon in 1996 hardly provided any 
foundation for constitutionalism to take root.
This report mainly focuses on the political 
and constitutional crisis that exploded in 
2016. However, to understand this crisis, it 
is necessary to briefly look at the complex 
constitutional history of Cameroon. In fact, 
the 1996 Constitution which operates today 
in Cameroon is a paradox that in many re-
spects reflects the history of the country. The 
second part of this report will briefly pro-
vide a background constitutional history of 
the country, the third part will highlight the 
1 See generally, HR Rudin, Germans in the Cameroons 1884–1914: A Case Study in Modern Imperialism 
(New Haven, Yale University Press, 1938) and SG Ardener, Eye-Witnesses to the Annexation of 
Cameroon, 1883–1887 (Buea, Government Press, 1968).
present constitutional crisis and the final part 
will reflect on how the present challenges 
can be overcome.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM
Although Cameroon is a German creation, it 
is the Portuguese who are considered to be 
the first Europeans who arrived on the coun-
try’s coast in the 1500s. Germany established 
a colony in Cameroon in July 1884 and this 
was confirmed at the Congress of Berlin in 
1884–1885.1
Generally speaking, Cameroon’s consti-
tutional history can be said to have gone 
through three main periods. 
The first period is that of the German protec-
torate that lasted from 1884 until 1916. The 
German period ended when their military 
forces in Cameroon were finally defeated 
??????? ???? ???????????????? ??? ?? ?????????
British and French expeditionary force. The 
second period is marked by the French and 
British rule that lasted until independence in 
1961. The third period covers all develop-
ments that have taken place since independ-
ence and the reunification of the British and 
French administered portions of the country 
to form what is now known as the Republic 
of Cameroon. 
Germany practically lost its control over 
?????????????????????????? ????? ????????
its last stronghold on the territory at Mora fell 
on 20 February 1916. On 4 March 1916, the 
two victors finally initialled an agreement 
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that formally partitioned Cameroon into two 
unequal parts, with the French taking almost 
four-fifths of the territory. This was confirmed 
in Article 119 of the Treaty of Versailles and 
under Articles 22 and 23 of the League of Na-
tions Covenant. The division of Cameroon 
between Britain and France provided the ba-
sis for the establishment of two distinct and 
often conflicting cultural, political, and legal 
traditions that have had and continue to have a 
profound effect on the country today, particu-
larly its constitutional law. 
The British sector consisted of two narrow 
non-contiguous strips of territory (called 
Northern Cameroons and Southern Cam-
eroons), which they administered as an in-
tegral part of its Nigerian colony. After the 
British Government announced in 1958 that 
Nigeria would become independent on 1 Oc-
tober 1960 and the French Government also 
announced that French Cameroon would 
become independent on 1 January 1960, it 
became necessary to determine the future 
of Southern Cameroons and Northern Cam-
eroons. Under the supervision of the Unit-
ed Nations, plebiscites were organised in 
Southern and Northern Cameroons in which 
the people of both territories were given 
the option of gaining independence by ei-
ther staying with Nigeria or re-uniting with 
the Republic of Cameroon. Northern Cam-
eroons voted in favour of remaining with 
Nigeria whilst Southern Cameroons voted 
in favour of re-uniting with the Republic of 
Cameroon, which had already gained inde-
pendence on 1 October 1960.
After the plebiscite in Southern Cameroons, 
its leaders tried to negotiate a new constitu-
tional arrangement with President Ahidjo of 
the Republic of Cameroon, based on a rela-
tively loose and decentralised federation in 
which they hoped to protect their language, 
culture, and legal and educational systems. 
However, since they were now fully com-
mitted to reunification with an already in-
2 See, for example, Charles Manga Fombad, ‘Post 1990 Constitutional Reforms in Africa: A Preliminary Assessment of the Prospects for Constitutional 
Governance and Constitutionalism’, in AG Nhema and PT Zeleza, ?????????????????????????????????? (OSSREA & James Currey, Oxford, 2008) 179–199; 
Charles Manga Fombad, ‘Cameroon’s Constitutional Conundrum: Reconciling Unity with Diversity’, in Kenyan Section of the International Commission of 
Jurists; and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Ethnicity, Human Rights and Constitutionalism in Africa (Kenyan Section of the International Commission of Jurists, 
Nairobi, 2008) 121–156.
dependent Republic of Cameroon, the nego-
tiating position of the Southern Cameroons 
representatives was quite weak. Ahidjo was 
under no pressure to make anything more 
than token concessions and only felt obliged 
to amend the 1960 Constitution by an annex-
ure called ‘transitional and special disposi-
????????????? ??????? ???? ???????? ????????-
tion of the Federal Republic of Cameroon 
was nothing more than a law revising the 
Republic of Cameroon’s Constitution of 4 
March 1960 and provided for a two state fed-
eration. However, it was a highly centralised 
system in which most of the powers were re-
tained by the federal government. The seeds 
for a perception of a design to eliminate An-
glophone peculiarities were sown.
The threats to the elimination of the Anglo-
phone identity within the country were rein-
forced when on 2 June 1972 a new Consti-
tution was introduced, and without regard to 
article 47 of the 1961 Federal Constitution 
which prohibited this, the federal system was 
abolished and replaced with a unitary system 
that was officially known as the ‘United Re-
public of Cameroon’. This marked the end 
of the highly centralised federal system of 
government that bore a resemblance to a 
????????????????????????? ??????????????????
President by Law No 84/001 abolished the 
appellation ‘United Republic of Cameroon’ 
and replaced it with ‘Republic of Came-
roon’, this was seen by many Anglophone 
Cameroonians as removing one of the last 
symbolic vestiges of the 1961 reunification 
of the two distinct communities.
After pressure brought to bear by the Social 
Democratic Front (SDF), a party formed by 
an Anglophone, John Fru Ndi, the Came-
roon Government reluctantly followed the 
post–1990 wave of constitutional renewals 
on the African continent by revising its 1972 
Constitution in 1996. The expectation was 
that it would provide a solid foundation for 
promoting constitutionalism by enhancing 
democracy, good governance, and respect 
for human rights. Unlike most post-1990 
African constitutions, the 1996 Constitution 
did nothing more than reinforce much of the 
underlying philosophy of the original 1972 
Constitution as well as many of its underly-
ing principles.2 There are a number of factors 
that attest to this.
First, the pre-1996 highly centralised auto-
cratic state system, under which the President 
had extensive powers, was reinforced while 
the normally limited powers of the legisla-
ture were further curtailed. The dominance 
of the President was strengthened, with ex-
tensive powers that enable him to appoint 
and dismiss at his pleasure the Prime Min-
ister and cabinet members, judges, generals, 
provincial governors, prefects, and the heads 
of parastatals. He can also approve or veto 
newly enacted laws, declare a state of emer-
gency, and authorise public expenditure. Al-
though there were many innovations, these 
have been largely ineffective in promoting 
democratic and accountable governance. For 
example, the introduction of bicameralism, 
with a Senate to act as a second chamber to 
the National Assembly, is significantly com-
promised by the fact that these bodies are 
largely subservient to the executive and have 
little power to initiate or influence the con-
tent of legislation.
Second, although the amended Constitution 
purported to introduce, for the first time, 
what it terms ‘judicial power’, this is largely 
ineffective because of the President’s unlim-
ited powers to appoint and dismiss judges. 
The contemplated Constitutional Council, 
which is supposed to have some powers of 
judicial review, has never been established 
and in any case can hardly operate effec-
tively because it is supposed to be composed 
essentially of government nominees, has 
mainly powers of abstract review, and can 
only entertain matters referred to it by the 
government and other political elites. 
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Third, on the very critical issue of accom-
modating the diverse ethnic, language and 
cultural groups, a form of decentralisation 
was provided which essentially concentrates 
powers in the centre, with the possibility 
for some sort of de-concentration of powers 
through the creation of regional and local 
authorities, but the obscure language used 
leaves the implementation of these provi-
sions entirely at the discretion of the Presi-
dent of the Republic. Not only does he have 
the right to decide when, if at all, the regional 
and local authorities will be created, but also 
has the power to determine their powers and 
can dissolve them and dismiss their officials 
when he deems it proper.
Cameroon’s bilingual and bi-cultural nature, 
one of its greatest sources of pride, has turned 
out to be its most enduring contradiction. 
The Anglophone community, who make up 
about 20 percent of the total population and 
occupy about 9 percent of the total land sur-
face, have since reunification in 1961 been 
suspicious of Francophone domination. A 
perception of Anglophone marginalisation 
and a deliberate government policy of ab-
sorption and assimilation combined with the 
elimination of Anglophone particularities 
looms large and goes deep. To many of them, 
the straw that broke the camel’s back came 
in 1992 when a skeptical Supreme Court, 
whilst acknowledging gross irregularities in 
the presidential elections, still proceeded to 
declare Biya the winner in an election which 
many, including international observers, 
felt Ni Fru Ndi, an Anglophone, had won. 
This, more than anything else, reinforced 
the long-standing Anglophone feelings that 
3 See generally, JF  Bayart, ‘The Neutralisation of Anglophone Cameroon,’ in R Joseph (ed.) Gaullist Africa: Cameroon under Ahmadou Ahidjo (1968); J 
Benjamin, Les Camerounais Occidentaux: La Minorité dans un état Bicommunitaire (1972); A Mukong (ed.), The Case for Southern Cameroons (1990); P 
Konings & B Nyamjoh, ‘The Anglophone Problem in Cameroon’ (1997) 35 Journal of Modern African Studies; E Lyombe, ‘The English-Language Press and 
the “Anglophone Problem” in Cameroon: Group Identity, Culture and the Politics of Nostalgia’, ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
print
4 J Derrick, ‘Cameroon: One Party, Many Parties and the State’ (1992) 22 African Insight 165.
5 In his book, Communal Liberalism (1987) 26-30. VJ Ngoh, ‘The Origin of the Marginalization of Former Southern Cameroonians (Anglophones), 1961-1966: 
An Historical Analysis’ (1999) accessible at ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????; FB Nyamnjoh, ‘Cameroon: A Country 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
6 See, Kofele-Kale ‘Ethnicity, Regionalism, and Political Power: A Post-mortem of Ahidjo’s Cameroon’ in M Shatzberg & I Zartman (eds.), The Political 
Economy of Cameroon (1986).
7?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Studies 249; J Derrick “Cameroon: One Party, Many Parties and the State’ (1992) 22 African Insight 165; J Takougang, ‘The Post-Ahidjo Era in Cameroon: 
Continuity and Change’ (1996) 10 Journal of Third World Studies 268-302; and A Mbembe,  ‘Epilogue. Crise de Légitimité, Restoration Autoritaire et 
Déliquescence de L’Etat’ in P Geschière & P Konings (eds.) Pathways to Accumulation in Cameroon (1993). 
8Azevedo (ed.), Cameroon and Chad in Historical Contemporary Perspectives (1988), at p. 48.
no matter their merits, they are destined to 
play second fiddle to Francophones. Many 
analysts agree that Anglophones have had 
a pretty hard time being both Anglophones 
and Cameroonians.
Most analysis summarises the so-called An-
glophone communities’ grievances under 
three main themes.3 The first is economic. 
Anglophones point to the relative econom-
ic underdevelopment of their two provinces 
as compared to the other eight since 1961. 
The case is particularly poignant for the An-
??????????????? ????????????????????? ????
respects is not only the country’s breadbas-
ket in terms of agricultural produce but is the 
main source of the country’s oil wealth. This 
has led to a feeling that the two regions are 
a mere appendage, useful for their resources 
but not for its people.4
The second contentious issue centers 
around what is seen as a deliberate policy 
of “de-identification” of Anglophones from 
their separate and distinct heritage and “per-
sona” through a careful process of “Galli-
cising” all aspects of social, economic, and 
educational life to conform to French mod-
els. Both President Ahidjo and his succes-
sor, Paul Biya (who has been in power since 
1982) in resolutely pursuing their policies of 
“national unity and integration”, have seen 
the persistence of Anglophone “particular-
isms” as an obstacle to national unity and 
development. Thus, Biya has firmly rejected 
what he terms as the “collection and juxta-
position of our diversities”.5 It has come as 
a shock to Anglophones that having agreed 
to join a bilingual union in which inherited 
colonial differences in language and insti-
tutions were to be respected and creative-
ly integrated into a new collective national 
experience, their way of life has now been 
suppressed and they are being compelled to 
adopt the dominant Francophone way of life.6 
Thus, the cynical aphorism, “bilingualism in 
French”. The intensity of this “de-culturali-
sation” has made it hard for an Anglophone 
to confidently assert himself, especially be-
cause this has been marked by derogatory 
references to them as “les Biafrais” (that is, 
Biafrans, evoking memories of the Nigerian 
civil war) and “les ennémis dans la maison” 
(the enemies within the house),7 and their de-
mands for federalism has consistently been 
dismissed as evidence of lack of patriotism 
and a smokescreen for secession. 
Finally, the loss of the very limited regional 
autonomy in 1972 has been followed by the 
relegation of Anglophone leaders to inferior 
and inconsequential roles in the national de-
cision-making process (Kofele-Kale,1986). 
Various studies have shown that Anglo-
phones have been consistently under-repre-
sented in ministerial as well as senior and 
middle level positions in the administration, 
the military, and parastatals. The elevation of 
an Anglophone to the essentially honorific 
position of Prime Minister in 1992 has been 
seen as a ploy to neutralise the popular SDF. 
Analysts may well debate the extent of these 
grievances but their existence is a palpable 
fact. The uneasy co-existence of the Anglo-
phones and Francophones has led one writ-
er to posit that Cameroon is “two different 
countries in one”.8 Frustrated by the intran-
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sigence of the regime and galvanised by the 
generalised hardship in which most analysts 
agree Anglophones have suffered more than 
any other group, an alarming number of pres-
sure groups have sprang up since the First 
All Anglophone Conference (AAC 1) was 
held in Buea in 1993.  Moderate demands 
pursued by some of them, such as the Cam-
eroon Anglophone Movement (CAM), now 
Southern Cameroons Restoration Movement 
(SCARM), and the Southern Cameroons 
National Council (SCNC), for a return to the 
federation have now been brushed aside by 
emerging radical factions such as the Amba-
zonia, the Southern Cameroons Liberation 
??????????? ???????????????????????????-
ment, which advocate outright secession by 
use of arms if necessary.
An opportunity was missed to lay this long 
festering Anglophone problem to rest during 
the 1996 constitutional amendment process. 
????? ??????? ?????????? ??? ???? ???????????
community, President Paul Biya, in Janu-
ary 1999, for the first time admitted, albeit 
in dismissive fashion, that an Anglophone 
problem existed, and was only prepared to 
say that it was promoted by a handful of hot-
heads and vandals. 
On the whole, the 1996 Constitution remains 
a controversial document, not only because 
of the perception that it was imposed, but 
also because it is technically an inferior doc-
ument to the one it purports to amend, and is 
less liberal and progressive. There was lack 
of adequate consultation, especially of the 
Anglophone community. Even the limited 
form of decentralisation that it espouses has 
hardly been implemented with any convic-
tion. It is against this background of years of 
frustration that the Anglophone communities 
??? ??????????????? ???? ??????????? ????????
took to the streets in October 2016.
9 A ‘Position statement of the SDF members of the National Assembly of Anglophone extraction,’ signed by 15 members of the SDF in Yaoundé on 16 
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system: i) 58 of the 148 magistrates (39.2%) are Francophones trained in the civil law, ii) 54 of the 89 lawyers (60.7%) in the legal department in the South 
West Region are Francophones, iii) 20 of the 50 magistrates (40%) working in the Buea bench and legal department are Francophones, iv) 28 of the 30 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????
64 of the 97 (65.9%) magistrates working in the legal department of the North West Region are Francophones.
10 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
to suppress the demonstrations is driving many moderate Anglophones into the extremist camp of those who think the only way to solve the problem is 
by secession. Some of these pro-secession groups, such as the Southern Cameroons Youth League, the Southern Cameroons National Council, and the 
Ambazonia Movement, are gaining supporters and becoming more militant by the day.
THE POLITICAL AND CONSTITU-
TIONAL CRISIS OF 2016
The protests started in mid-October 2016 
when the lawyers in the two Anglophone 
regions started a protest action against the 
domination of the judiciary by Francophones 
whom they allege have little or no knowledge 
or training in the common law. In a docu-
ment prepared by the SDF, which since the 
1990s has been the main opposition party in 
the country, and was the party that initiated 
the street protests of the 1990s which forced 
the government to reintroduce multi-party-
ism, the extent of Francophone domination 
of the judiciary was laid bare.9 This was fol-
lowed a few weeks later by a strike led by 
the Confederation of Anglophone Teachers’ 
Trade Unions and the Teachers’ Association 
of Cameroon. This has led to the closure of 
all schools in the two Anglophone regions. 
The teachers complain that French speaking 
and trained teachers had been deployed into 
the two Anglophone regions to teach subjects 
in French to children who do not understand 
the language. They also complain that com-
petitive public examinations to gain admis-
sion into professional schools in the country 
are poorly translated from French to English 
and make it difficult for Anglophones to 
gain admission into these schools. They also 
allege that many of the lecturers and heads 
of departments in the two universities in the 
region were Francophones. The other popu-
lation came out in support because most of 
the senior administrative positions in the two 
regions were held by Francophones.
By December 2016, daily activities in the 
Anglophone regions had come to a halt be-
cause of the general strike and demonstra-
tions demanding a return to the two-state 
federation. The government’s response 
was to immediately deploy troops all over 
the two regions and in many places street 
demonstrations were violently suppressed 
resulting in the deaths of many demonstra-
tors and the detention of many more. In his 
traditional 31 December New Year speech, 
President Biya, as in the past, pretended 
that there is no ‘Anglophone problem’, and 
argued that the strikes and demonstrations 
were promoted by the ‘acts of a group of ma-
nipulated and exploited extremist rioters’.10 
He reiterated his determination to defend the 
unity of the country. The protests have con-
tinued into 2017 and the government’s reac-
tion has been to send in more armed troops 
against the unarmed protesters. Many have 
lost their lives, and most of their leaders, in-
cluding parliamentarians, have been arrested 
and transferred to detention centres outside 
the two regions. Many of those arrested 
are now being tried by a military tribunal 
for treason and a myriad of other offences 
against the state. The international media has 
been barred from reporting on the violence 
and in January 2017 telephone and internet 
links within and from the two regions were 
blocked.
LOOKING BEYOND THE CRISIS 
AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN 
CAMEROON
It is clear from the preceding discussion that 
the constitutional and political crisis that 
started in Cameroon was predictable. In spite 
of the complex nature of the problem, and in 
the light of post-1990 constitutional devel-
opments in Africa, three observations can be 
made.
First, a return to a two-state federation or 
even secession, which most of the strikers 
and demonstrators are now advocating for, 
will not solve the deep-seated problems that 
Anglophones face in Cameroon. An effec-
tive asymmetrical decentralisation of pow-
ers which recognises and protects the spe-
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cial interests of the Anglophone community 
seems to be the only way forward. Second, 
the resort to violent suppression of unarmed 
demonstrators in order to impose the will of 
the ruling elites will certainly restore some 
order but can, at best, only provide an uneasy 
peace. As the number of unarmed demon-
strators killed by the army increases and the 
government continues to deny that there is a 
problem, the real risk of anger and frustra-
tion forcing people to resort to terrorism will 
increase. A respected former Francophone 
minister, who had worked as a governor in 
the Anglophone regions, has warned of this 
turning into a ‘new Boko Haram.’11 Finally, 
the current crisis is an excellent illustration 
of a defective decentralisation design that 
has done nothing more than hand over abso-
lute power to a small clique.
Cameroon has reached a critical cross-road. 
The bi-cultural character of the country is 
not only a historical fact but a daily real-
ity that cannot be ignored or wished away. 
As Robert Robertson rightly points out, 
‘the creation of effective strategies to han-
dle the reality of human diversity is one of 
humanity’s most pressing challenges, as re-
cent wars, ethnic cleansing, genocides and 
the restless tides of refugees and displaced 
persons demonstrate’.12 Solving Cameroon’s 
present predicament needs an urgent solu-
tion at the heart of which is a new credible 
decentralised framework in which all citi-
zens of the country have a stake. There is the 
need to make the Anglophone community 
feel Anglophone and Cameroonian. There is 
no longer any sense in pretending that there 
is no Anglophone problem. Nor can it be 
simplified further as an Anglophone versus 
Francophone problem. It is more of a politi-
cal problem created by the ruling elites with 
entrenched interest in preserving a ‘divide 
and rule’ policy.
It can be argued that a credible decentrali-
sation design can address these problems. 
This will, however, need a fundamental re-
vision of the present obsolete and dysfunc-
tional Constitution. In doing this, a leaf can 
11 See, David Abouem à Tchoyi, ‘Cameroun – Opinion: Le problème Anglophone pourrait devenir le noveau Boko Haram,’ http://www.cameroon-info.net/
article/cameroun-opinion-le-probleme-anglophone-pourrait-devenir-le-nouveau-boko-haram-278841.html (accessed in February 2017). In fact, the Boko 
Haram insurgency in the northern part of Cameroon and Nigeria is a reminder of the dangers of exclusion and marginalisation, whether perceived or actual. 
12 In, The Three Waves of Globalization: A History of a Developing Global Consciousness (Fernwood Publishing and Zed Books 2003), 13.
be borrowed from the Canadian experience 
where the French-speaking Quebec province 
that had been agitating for secession from 
the rest of Canada signed the Meech Lake 
Agreement, which could have paved the way 
for a major amendment to the Canadian con-
stitution until it failed to be ratified. Section 
2(1)(b) of this Constitutional Amendment 
Act proposed to recognise, inter alia, ‘that 
Quebec constitutes within Canada a distinct 
society’. This provision also proposed to rec-
ognise ‘that the existence of French-speak-
ing Canadians…and English speaking Ca-
nadians…constitute a fundamental charac-
teristic of Canada.’ An even closer example 
to emulate is the Nigerian ‘federal character’ 
principle, which was first constitutionally 
entrenched in the 1979 constitution and is 
backed by the Federal Character Commis-
sion (FCC). This Federal Executive body 
established by the Federal Character Es-
tablishment Act No 34 of 1996 implements 
and enforces the federal character principle 
which ensures fairness and equity in the dis-
tribution of public posts and socio-economic 
infrastructures among the various federating 
units of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
This body also ensures that appointments to 
public service institutions fairly reflect the 
linguistic, ethnic, religious, and geographic 
diversity of the country. 
In the light of the above, it is contended 
that the only way to resolve the present po-
litical crisis in Cameroon in a peaceful and 
sustainable manner that addresses the per-
ception of Anglophone marginalisation and 
exclusion from the benefits of the nations’ 
resources and accommodate the secessionist 
threats is to design an asymmetrical decen-
tralised system which recognises the two 
distinct cultures in the country. One of the 
critical features of such a framework is the 
constitutional entrenchment and protection 
of a bi-cultural principle which recognises 
the two inherited cultures based on dynamic 
equity. A fundamental aspect of the bi-cul-
tural principle must be a requirement that 
all institutions, laws, policies, practices, and 
appointments to public posts must comply 
with the bi-cultural character of the coun-
try. A national commission must be estab-
lished under the Constitution to supervise 
the implementation and enforcement of this 
principle. There is thus need for a constitu-
tionally entrenched and legally enforceable 
framework that recognises and protects the 
two distinct cultures on an equitable basis. 
A constitutionally entrenched ‘regional char-
acter principle’ is needed to ensure equity 
and prevent nepotism and any feelings of 
exclusion and marginalisation. Ultimately, 
as in many conflict situations, a carefully de-
signed decentralisation framework offers the 
best way to deal with the Cameroonian crisis 
than the militarily imposed peace sought by 
the ruling political elites.
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DEVELOPMENTS IN CARIBBEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Derek O’Brien, Oxford Brookes University
INTRODUCTION
Elections in the Commonwealth Caribbean 
are often held up as a vital sign of the re-
gion’s commitment to democracy. In the 50 
odd years since Jamaica and Trinidad and To-
bago became the first countries in the region 
to attain independence, successive govern-
ments across the region have respected the 
outcomes of elections, peacefully surrender-
ing power to their successors and, in the pro-
cess, satisfying Huffington’s ‘two-turnover 
test’ for democracy.1 2016 was no exception, 
witnessing the orderly transfer of power in 
Jamaica and St Lucia, following general 
elections in February and May 2016, respec-
tively. In both cases, the respective Prime 
Ministers exercised the discretion vested in 
them to recommend the dissolution of Par-
liament2 and called a general election before 
it was constitutionally due (one year early in 
the case of Jamaica and 10 months early in 
the case of St. Lucia), presumably because 
they reckoned that this was their best chance 
of securing electoral victory. However, both 
Prime Ministers badly misjudged the mood 
of their voters as they were both swept from 
power by the opposition.3  
 
2016 also witnessed one of the most signif-
icant constitutional referendums to be held 
in the region since independence as voters 
in Grenada were asked to vote on seven 
separate Constitution (Amendment) Bills, 
1 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1991).
2 Though, formally, it is the Governor General as the Queen’s representative who dissolves Parliament, 
the convention is that the Governor General must act in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minis-
ter. See, for example, section 31(1) Constitution Jamaica.
3 See http://jamaica-elections.com/general/2016/results/resultsummary.php  accessed 15 February 2017 
and http://www.electoral.gov.lc/past-results/election-night-results-2016 accessed 15 February 2017.
4 For further information about the Bills see http://grenadaconstitutionreform.com/#Bills accessed 15 
February 2017.
5 http://nowgrenada.com/2016/11/results-grenada-constitution-referendum/ accessed 15 February 2017.
6 http://antiguaobserver.com/government-keeping-its-term-limit-promise/ accessed 15 February 2017.
which sought variously to: limit the num-
ber of terms of office a Prime Minister can 
serve; enhance the integrity of the electoral 
process; guarantee gender equality; and vest 
ultimate legal sovereignty in a regional ap-
pellate court, the Caribbean Court of Justice 
(CCJ), to replace the Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council (JCPC).4 In an outcome 
that surprised many in the region, including 
the Government of Grenada, which had been 
carefully laying the groundwork for this ref-
erendum for many years beforehand, not one 
of the seven Constitution (Amendment) Bills 
attracted the two-thirds majority of voters 
that was needed to amend the Constitution.5
Indeed, not one of the seven Bills managed 
to secure even a simple majority of the vot-
ers in the referendum. The Government of St 
Kitts was, however, more successful in im-
plementing reform of its constitution by se-
curing the successful passage of legislation 
to limit the maximum number of terms of 
office that a Prime Minister can serve to two 
(one less than the number of terms that had 
been proposed and rejected in the Grenada 
referendum).6  
Elsewhere in the region, Barbados and Guy-
ana celebrated the 50th anniversary of their 
attainment of independence from the former 
colonial power, Britain. Constitutional links 
to Britain within the region, however, remain 
strong for the reasons discussed in more de-
tail below. 
COMMONWEALTH 
CARIBBEAN
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THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
COURT
The Commonwealth Caribbean is in the 
highly unusual position of having not one, 
but two Constitutional Courts; the JCPC, 
which is the final appellate court for the ma-
jority of countries in the region; and the CCJ, 
which is the final appellate court for four 
?????????? ??? ???? ????????????????? ????????
Dominica and Guyana. This is a major dis-
?????????????????????????????????????? ????
it was originally conceived, it was intended 
that the CCJ would serve as the final appel-
late court for the entire region. This would 
not only increase access to justice for the 
region’s citizens by making it cheaper and 
more convenient to bring an appeal before 
a local court rather than a court located 4000 
miles away in London, but would also, it was 
hoped, enable the judges of the CCJ, being 
citizens of the communities in which they 
served, to develop a distinctively Caribbean 
constitutional jurisprudence.7
As noted above, these arguments were not, 
however, enough to convince the voters in 
Grenada to support a Constitution Amend-
ment Bill, which would have given effect to 
the appellate jurisdiction of the CCJ. In the 
event, just over 40% of those voting sup-
ported the amendment.8 This is a major blow 
for the CCJ since several other countries in 
the region require the support of a majority 
of voters in a referendum in order to amend 
their Constitution to give effect to its appellate 
jurisdiction of the CCJ.9 Since independence, 
only one Government has managed to secure 
the support of a majority of voters in a refer-
endum for constitutional reform, and that was 
7 See, for example, D Simmons, ‘The Caribbean Court of Justice’ (2005)  29 Nova Law Review  169.
8 (n5).
9 These include, in addition to Grenada, Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, St Kitts and Nevis, St Vincent and The Grenadines and, arguably, Jamaica. 
See D O’Brien, Constitutional Law Systems of the Commonwealth Caribbean (Hart Publishing 2014) 219. 
10 See RW James and HA Lutchman, Law and the Political Environment in Guyana, (Institute of Development Studies University of Guyana, 1984) 61.
11 http://today.caricom.org/2016/08/31/antigua-and-barbuda-ccj-referendum-set-for-next-year/ accessed 15 February 2017.
12 See judgment of Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court of Appeal In the Matter of the Attorney General’s Reference SLUHCVAP2012/0018, 26 May 2013.
13 R Crilly, ‘Jamaica Unveils Plans to Ditch Queen as Head of State’ The Telegraph (16 April 2016).
14 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-16449969 accessed 15 February 2017.
15 Constitution of Jamaica, section 49(3).
16 T Brooks-Pollock, ‘Barbados Wants to Ditch the Queen on the 50th Anniversary of its Independence’ The Independent. http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/world/americas/barbados-wants-to-ditch-the-queen-on-the-50th-anniversary-of-its-independence-a6772571.html accessed 15 February 2017.
17 (n4).
18 In the Supreme Court of Belize, Claim No. 668 of 2010. Judgment 10 August 2016 (unreported).
19 Caribbean Court of Justice CCJ Application No. OA 1 of 2013 and CCJ Application No. OA 2 of 2013. Judgment 10 June 2016 (unreported).
the Government of Guyana in 1980 in a refer-
endum that was widely believed to have been 
rigged.10 It is notable that the Government of 
Antigua and Barbuda postponed a planned 
referendum on whether to ratify the appellate 
jurisdiction of the CCJ to this year to allow for 
greater public education on the issue,11 while 
the Government of St Lucia recently sought 
and succeeded in obtaining an order of the 
Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal correcting 
a draftsman’s error in the Constitution to en-
able the amendment of the Constitution to re-
place the JCPC with the CCJ without the need 
for a referendum on the issue.12 
DEVELOPMENTS AND CONTRO-
VERSIES IN 2016
Apart from the issue of abolishing the right 
of appeal to the CCJ and the criminalisation 
of homosexuality (discussed further below), 
the other main constitutional controversy in 
the region in 2016 concerned the question of 
whether to abandon constitutional monarchy 
in favour of a non-executive presidential re-
publicanism. 
The new Prime Minister of Jamaica, Andrew 
Holness of the Jamaica Labour Party, for ex-
ample, has vowed to introduce legislation in 
the current session of Parliament to amend 
the Constitution by replacing the Queen 
with a non-executive President as the head 
of state.13 In this he can reasonably expect 
to enjoy the support of the opposition Peo-
ple’s National Party (PNP) as the Bill passes 
through Parliament since this is exactly what 
the PNP had themselves promised to do 
when taking office back in 2011.14  Howev-
er, the support of the opposition, though vital 
if the Government is to secure the two-thirds 
majority it needs in both Houses of Parlia-
ment, will not be enough in and of itself; 
removing the Queen will involve an amend-
ment of one of the Constitution’s ‘specially 
entrenched’ provisions and will, therefore, 
require, in addition, the approval of a major-
ity of Jamaica’s citizens in a referendum.15 
In Barbados, the ruling Democratic Labour 
Party announced plans to introduce legisla-
tion to replace the Queen to coincide with 
the 50th anniversary of Barbados’s indepen-
dence in November 2016,16 but that date 
passed without the necessary legislation be-
ing enacted by Parliament. 
Though the Constitutional reform Commis-
sion of Grenada originally recommended 
asking voters in the referendum to support 
an amendment of the Constitution to replace 
the Queen with a non-executive President, 
the recommendation was not accepted by 
the Government. Instead voters were asked 
to support a Constitution (Amendment) Bill 
which would have entitled public officials to 
swear allegiance to the state of Grenada in-
stead of the Crown, but even this relatively 
modest reform was rejected by a majority of 
voters in the referendum.17 
MAJOR CASES
Two of the most significant cases in the re-
gion in 2016, touching upon rights and free-
doms, involved challenge to laws governing 
homosexuality: Orozco v AG Belize18 and 
Tomlinson v State of Belize and Tomlinson v 
State of Trinidad and Tobago.19
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How homosexuality is treated by the law 
is an issue which has aroused huge contro-
versy across the region ever since it became 
apparent, following the judgment of the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), in 
Dudgeon v UK,20 that laws which criminalise 
homosexual acts between consenting adults 
are repugnant to international human rights 
norms. Since, with one exception (Trinidad 
and Tobago), the Bills of Rights to be found 
in the region’s constitutions were modelled 
on the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR),21 Dudgeon opened up the 
possibility that local laws which criminal-
ised homosexuality could equally be liable 
to constitutional challenge and, worse still, 
that the recognition of equal constitutional 
status for homosexuals could lead, eventual-
ly, to the legalisation of ‘gay marriage.’ 
Criminal Law; Sexual Orientation
The first case which I will consider is Oroz-
co v AG Belize, which involved a challenge 
to the constitutionality of s.53 of the Belize 
Criminal Code, which made ‘carnal inter-
course against the order of nature with any 
person or animal’ a criminal offence liable 
to ten years imprisonment. Though there 
was no known statutory or clear judicial 
definition of the terms ‘carnal intercourse’ or 
‘against the order of nature’, it was agreed 
on both sides that it included intercourse be-
tween consenting adult males.
The constitutional significance of the case 
locally, regionally, and internationally, is 
highlighted by the interested parties that 
were given leave to join in the proceedings. 
On behalf of the Claimant, these included: 
the Commonwealth Lawyers Association, 
the Human Dignity Trust, the Internation-
al Commission of Jurists and UNIBAM, a 
regional NGO campaigning on behalf of 
LGBT rights. On behalf of the Defendant, 
these included: the Roman Catholic Church 
of Belize, the Belize Church of England 
and the Belize Evangelical Association of 
20 (App No 7525/76) (1982) 4 EHRR 149.
21 See C Parkinson, Bills of Rights and Decolonization: The Emergence of Domestic Human Rights Instruments in Britain’s Overseas Territories (Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2007).
22 [1999] 1 SCR 497.
23 [1999] (1) SA 6.
24 Communication No. 488/1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/448/1992.
Churches. The stage was thus set for a con-
stitutional showdown between various local 
and international NGOs determined to erad-
icate discrimination against homosexuals, 
and religious organisations in Belize equally 
determined to maintain the criminalisation 
of homosexuality.
The principal issues in the case that fell to be 
decided were as follows: whether the claim-
ant had standing to bring these proceedings; 
whether section 53 violated his right to hu-
man dignity pursuant to section 3 of the 
Constitution, his right to privacy pursuant to 
section 14(1) and his right to non-discrimi-
nation pursuant to s16; and, finally, whether 
the limitations of these rights provided for by 
section 9(2) of the Constitution, such as the 
protection of public health or morality, justi-
fied the retention of section 53. 
On the issue of standing it was argued on 
behalf of the defendants that because the 
Claimant had never been prosecuted for an 
offence under section 53 he did not possess 
the necessary standing to bring the claim 
pursuant to section 20(1) of the Constitu-
tion, which requires that those who seek a 
constitutional remedy must show that one 
of the provisions of sections 3 to 19 of the 
Constitution ‘has been or is likely to be con-
travened in relation to him.’ Referring to the 
judgment of the ECtHR  in Dudgeon on the 
self-same issue, the Court was, however, sat-
isfied that on the basis of the evidence pre-
sented to the Court that prosecutions under 
section 53, though rare, were still brought 
from time to time. The claimant was thus 
perpetually at risk of being prosecuted and, 
therefore, had the requisite standing to bring 
the proceedings.
In searching for the meaning of human dig-
nity under section 3 (c) of the Constitution, 
which the Court regarded as a concept which 
was central to the fundamental rights and 
freedoms set out elsewhere in Chapter II of 
the Constitution, the Court had regard to the 
definition offered by the Canadian Supreme 
Court in Law v Canada (Minister of Em-
ployment and Immigration,22 which held that 
human dignity means that ‘an individual or 
group feels self-respect and self-worth’: this 
is harmed ‘when individuals and groups are 
marginalized, ignored or devalued, but is en-
hanced ‘when laws recognise the full pace of 
all individuals and groups within society.’ The 
Court also had regard to the jurisprudence 
of the Constitutional Court of South Africa 
which, in National Coalition for Gay and 
Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice,23 had 
held that the common law offence of sodomy 
was unconstitutional because it was a palpa-
ble invasion of the right of gay men to dignity 
which requires: ‘us to acknowledge the value 
and work of all individuals as members of so-
ciety.’ Finding itself in agreement with these 
decisions, the Court concluded that section 53 
violated the Claimant’s right to recognition of 
his human dignity.
Following the decision of the ECtHR in 
Dudgeon, the Court also had no hesitation 
in holding that section 53 violated the right 
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neutral on its face, it was discriminatory in its 
effect upon homosexuals and, therefore, vio-
lated the Claimant’s right to equal protection 
of the law pursuant to section 6(1), and not to 
be subject to laws that were discriminatory 
either in themselves or in their effect pursu-
ant to section 16(1). In the case of the latter, 
the Court extended the meaning of ‘sex’, as 
one of the protected categories under sec-
tion 16(3), to include sexual orientation.  In 
support of this expansion of the protected 
categories under section 16(3), the Court 
invoked the decision of the United Nations 
Human Rights Council (UNHRC), which 
had held in Toonen v Australia that the word 
‘sex’ in Articles 2 and 26 of the International 
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (IC-
CPR) included ‘sexual orientation’.24 Since 
Belize had acceded to the ICCPR two years 
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subsequent to Toonen it was presumed that it 
‘tacitly embraced the interpretation rendered 
by the UNHCR’.25 
Like the ECHR, the Constitution of Belize 
permits the limitation by the State of the 
rights it guarantees if the limitation can be 
shown to be for the purpose of some legit-
imate aim, such as public health or public 
morality. Since the Court was persuaded that 
the existence of section 53 was damaging 
the fight against HIV/AIDS, the Defendants 
were obliged to fall back on the argument 
that section 53 was justified in the interest 
of public morality. However, while the Court 
accepted that the views expressed by the var-
ious religious organisations with regard to 
the immorality of homosexuality were rep-
resentative of the majority of the Christian 
community ‘and perhaps the population of 
Belize’, the Court determined that this was 
not enough in itself to justify the limitation. 
From the perspective of legal principle, the 
Court held that it could not act upon the 
prevailing majority views. There must be 
demonstrated that some harm will be caused 
should the proscribed conduct be rendered 
unregulated. Since no evidence had been 
presented as to the likelihood of such harm, 
the limitations imposed by section 53 could 
not be justified.
In concluding that section 53 violated the 
claimant’s rights dignity, equality, privacy 
and non-discrimination, the Court proceeded 
to apply the modifications clause to be found 
in section 134(1), which provided for laws 
existing at the time of independence, such 
as section 53, to continue in force subject to 
‘such modifications as may be necessary to 
bring them into conformity with this Con-
stitution.’ This meant reading down section 
53 to exclude consensual private sexual acts 
between adults by adding the following sen-
tence: ‘This section shall not apply to con-
sensual acts between adults in private.’
In a compendium of decisions of Constitu-
tional Courts and international human rights 
tribunals regarding the incompatibility with 
human rights norms of laws that criminal-
25 [94].
26 Similar clauses are to be found in the Constitutions of Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados and the Bahamas.
ise homosexuality, the judgment of the Be-
lize Supreme Court in Orozco would appear 
fairly unremarkable. However, in the con-
text of the Commonwealth Caribbean it is 
groundbreaking, not only because it is the 
first judgment of a national court at any level 
anywhere in the region to recognise that the 
criminalisation of homosexuality is repug-
nant to human right norms, but also because 
the judgment flies in the face of widespread 
opposition across the entire region to the 
decriminalisation of homosexuality. The im-
pact of the judgment elsewhere in the region 
is, however, limited by the fact that several 
constitutions in the region include savings 
clauses that immunise pre-independence 
laws, such as laws that criminalise homo-
sexuality, from constitutional challenge on 
the grounds that such laws violate the fun-
damental rights and freedoms guaranteed by 
the constitution. For example, section 26(8) 
of the Constitution of Jamaica, which is typ-
ical of such clauses, provides that:
Nothing contained in any law in force 
immediately before the appointed day 
shall be held to be inconsistent with any 
of the provisions of this Chapter, and 
nothing done under the authority of any 
such law shall be held to be done in con-
travention of any of these provisions.26 
The decision in Orozoco could not, as a con-
sequence of these savings clauses, have been 
delivered by the Supreme Courts of Jamai-
ca, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados or the 
Bahamas. Notwithstanding the existence of 
such savings clauses, however, an alternative 
means of challenging laws that discriminate 
against homosexuals was essayed by the 
Claimant in the second case to consider. 
Immigration; Sexual Orientation
In Tomlinson v State of Belize and Tomlinson 
v State of Trinidad and Tobago, the Claim-
ant mounted a challenge to immigrations 
laws in Belize and Trinidad and Tobago in 
proceedings before the CCJ, exercising its 
original jurisdiction to interpret and apply 
the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (RTC), 
which is the governing treaty of the Caribbe-
an Community and Common market (CAR-
ICOM) and the Caribbean Single Market 
and Economy.
By Article 46 RTC, ‘skilled’ Community na-
tionals have the right to seek employment in 
another Member State. This right is ampli-
fied by a 2007 Decision of the Conference 
of the Heads of Government of CARICOM, 
which grants CARICOM nationals an auto-
matic right to enter another Member State 
for up to six months, subject to the rights of 
Member States to refuse entry to ‘undesir-
able persons.’ By Article 7 RTC, discrimina-
tion on the grounds of nationality only shall 
be prohibited. 
The claimant, an LGTB activist, in which ca-
pacity he regularly travelled throughout the 
Caribbean region seeking to eliminate stig-
ma and discrimination based on sexual ori-
entation, contended that his rights under Ar-
ticles 7 and 46 together with his right under 
the 2007 Conference Decision were being 
violated by the Immigration Acts of Belize 
and Trinidad and Tobago, respectively.  Sec-
tion 5 of the Immigration Act of Belize pro-
hibits entry to ‘any prostitute or homosexual 
or any person who may be living or receiv-
ing or may have been living on or receiving 
the proceeds of prostitution or homosexual 
behaviour. Section 8 of the Immigration Act 
of Trinidad and Tobago is in almost identical 
terms, prohibiting entry to ‘prostitutes, ho-
mosexuals or persons living on the earnings 
of prostitutes or homosexuals.’ 
In determining whether or not the existence 
of such laws breached the States’ obligations 
under the RTC, the CCJ was guided by the 
following four principles derived from the 
jurisprudence of international tribunals. 
First, there is no general rule that the en-
actment of legislation which conflicts with 
a State’s treaty obligations necessarily con-
stitutes a breach of that obligation: much 
depends on whether and how the legislation, 
however interpreted, is applied. Second, in 
construing domestic legislation, an interna-
tional is engaged in establishing the meaning 
of national law ‘as factual elements of state 
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practice’ in order to check whether these 
factual elements constitute a breach by the 
State. This meant that other relevant aspects 
of State practice, such as administrative acts 
of the State, must also be taken into account. 
Third, while an international tribunal will 
give considerable deference to views of do-
mestic courts on the meaning of its own laws 
it may itself, in appropriate circumstances, 
select the interpretation that it considers most 
in conformity with the law. Fourth, the bur-
den of proving that the legislation breaches 
the State’s obligation lies upon the Claimant. 
This was always going to be a heavy burden 
for the Claimant to discharge since he had 
entered both Belize and Trinidad and Tobago 
on a number of occasion and had never been 
denied entry because of his homosexuality.
So far as Belize was concerned, the CCJ ac-
cepted the Government’s contention that a 
literal interpretation of section 5 of the Immi-
gration Act should be avoided and that section 
5 should instead be interpreted as targeting 
not homosexuals generally, but rather those 
persons who ‘may be living on or receiving 
or may have been living on or receiving the 
proceeds of prostitution or homosexual be-
haviour.’ In the CCJ’s view, this was the most 
plausible interpretation, and was support-
ed by evidence of administrative practice in 
Belize, which was not to refuse entry to per-
sons based solely on their sexual orientation. 
Such an interpretation was also in accordance 
with Belize’s obligations under s64(1) of the 
Interpretation Act, which provides that in as-
certaining the meaning of any provision of 
an Act, regard must be had inter alia to ‘any 
provision’ of the RTC and ‘community in-
struments issued under the RTC’, such as the 
2007 Conference Decision.
So far as Trinidad and Tobago was con-
cerned, the position was slightly different in-
sofar it was conceded by the Government’s 
lawyers that section 8 of the Immigration 
Act classified homosexuals as prohibited 
persons and, therefore, on its face prohibited 
the Claimant’s entry. However, in the CCJ’s 
view this was not definitive. The domestic 
27 Salomon v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1967] 2 QB 116.
28 Toonen (n24).
29 See D O’Brien, ‘Formal Amendment Rules and Constitutional Endurance: the Strange Case of the Commonwealth Caribbean’ in Richard Albert, Xenophon 
Contiades an Alkmene Fotiadou (eds) The Foundations and Traditions of Constitutional Amendment (Hart Publishing, forthcoming 2017). 
courts of Trinidad and Tobago had never 
pronounced on the meaning of section 8(1) 
and there was a sacrosanct rule that in com-
mon law jurisdictions such as Trinidad and 
Tobago statutory provisions should, if at all 
possible, be interpreted as compliant with 
the State’s treaty obligations.27 In this respect 
there were a host of human rights materials 
which would support the domestic courts of 
Trinidad and Tobago to take a more liberal 
approach to the interpretation of section 8 
than the one conceded by the Government’s 
lawyers. These included the United Nations 
Human Rights Covenant and the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 
both of which recognise the human dignity 
of every person, as well as the ICCPR, which 
by Article 2 prohibits discrimination based 
on sexual orientation and which by Article 
26 guarantees equality before the law.28 The 
preamble to the Constitution of Trinidad and 
Tobago also affirms that the country is found-
ed on the dignity of the human persons, while 
section 4 of the Constitution guarantees the 
right of the individual to equality before the 
law, and the right of the individual to respect 
for his private and family life. In addition, 
the CCJ had regard to the actual practice and 
policy of the Immigration Division of Trin-
idad and Tobago, which does not bar entry 
to homosexuals. In all these circumstances 
the CCJ concluded that the Claimant had not 
been able to demonstrate that he had been 
prejudiced in respect of the enjoyment of his 
right to free movement to the extent required 
under the RTC.
It is disappointing that the CCJ effectively 
condoned the existence of laws which, on 
their face at least, not only permit, but ac-
tively mandate discrimination on the basis 
of homosexuality. However, the CCJ’s ac-
knowledgment that such laws were in breach 
of Trinidad and Tobago’s international obli-
gations as well as its domestic constitution-
al obligations will be welcomed by LGBT 
campaigners in the region as a further step 
along their arduous journey towards achiev-
ing equal rights for gays and lesbians in the 
region.
CONCLUSION
If there is one theme which links the various 
constitutional events that have taken place in 
the region in 2016 it is the struggle of these 
former British colonies to reconcile their 
status as sovereign independent states with 
their colonial past. This is present in the con-
troversy surrounding the replacement of the 
Queen as head of state by a non-executive 
President and in the controversy surrounding 
the replacement of the JCPC with the CCJ. 
It is also present in the failure of the Gov-
ernment of Grenada to secure the necessary 
two-thirds majority in a referendum required 
to amend its Constitution. The inclusion of 
such an impossibly high threshold was a co-
lonial legacy included in the independence 
Constitution with the intention of preserv-
ing in perpetuity the system of government 
inherited from the former colonial power.29 
Even the laws which criminalise homosex-
uality that were the subject of constitutional 
challenge in Orozco were based on a Crim-
inal Code introduced in Belize (then British 
Honduras) in 1888. The survival of such laws 
elsewhere in the region owes much to the 
saving clauses included in a number of the 
region’s independence constitutions which 
immunise existing laws against constitution-
al challenge even if they violate the funda-
mental rights and freedoms which these con-
stitutions purport to guarantee. Some fifty 
odd years after independence, the region’s 
struggle against colonialism continues.
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INTRODUCTION
This report aims to introduce the Chilean 
Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucio-
nal de Chile – hereinafter, the “CC”) and 
to identify the landmark cases it decided in 
???????????????? ?????? ??????? ?????????????-
sions. Instead, we focus on cases that were 
politically salient or were landmark cases 
from a doctrinal perspective, and which in-
volved the CC’s constitutional review power 
to strike down legislation, or deny the ap-
????????????? ??????????????? ??????????? ??
legal provision in a concrete case. Because 
we need to be brief, we focus on the main 
aspects of the majority decisions, and we ig-
nore dissenting opinions and concurrences. 
The selected cases that we show in this re-
port are examples of a broader trend of judi-
cial empowerment, that has situated the CC 
as a key actor in the Chilean constitutional 
system. 
The relevant literature typically assumes 
that the CC’s power has increased because 
of the 2005 constitutional amendment. That 
amendment gave the CC important new ju-
dicial review powers and changed the CC’s 
justices’ appointment mechanisms. After 
the implementation of these modifications, 
scholars have noticed that the CC’s dissent-
ing opinion rate has increased,1 that there 
was a shift from a judicial career profile to an 
academic profile of the justices,2 and that the 
CC became less deferential to the legislator.3 
1 Lydia B Tiede, ‘The Political Determinants of Judicial Dissent. Evidence from the Chilean Constitution-
al Tribunal’ [2015] European Political Science Review 1.
2 Diego Pardow and Sergio Verdugo, ‘El Tribunal Constitucional Chileno Y La Reforma de 2005. Un 
Enroque Entre Jueces de Carrera Y Académicos’ (2015) XXVIII Revista de Derecho (Valdivia) 123.
3 Royce Carroll and Lydia Tiede, ‘Judicial Behavior on the Chilean Constitutional Tribunal’ (2011) 8 
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 856.
It is thus uncontroversial to say that the CC 
has notably increased its influence in the past 
few years.
Although the main purpose of this report is 
to introduce the CC and to describe these se-
lected cases of 2016, we also use the selected 
cases as examples that illustrate the fact that 
the CC is becoming an increasingly conse-
quential actor. Its influence is not only ex-
plained by the importance of its decisions in 
specific cases, but also because of the impact 
those decisions produce among legislators, 
importing to Chile the idea of “constitutional 
dialogue” to reaffirm the CC’s authority in 
interpreting the Constitution, and the power 
of the legislative branch to reform the Con-
stitution as a reaction to the CC’s decisions. 
Even though we cannot fully demonstrate 
this claim by only examining a selection of 
2016 cases, we show examples that support 
the CC’s consequential character, and we ex-
plore one case that illustrates how the CC un-
derstands the “constitutional dialogue” idea. 
Although this is not the place to comment 
on the future of the CC, the reader should be 
aware that the CC is currently functioning 
in a politically complex context. A group of 
people has been demanding a constitution-
al replacement since 2011, and President 
Bachelet has consequently initiated a con-
stitution-making process that will not come 
??? ??? ???? ??????? ???? ????????????????????-
in the numerous topics that are part of this 
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constitution-making debate, the CC’s pre-
ventive (ex-ante) judicial power and the 
CC’s justices’ appointment mechanisms 
have been put into question.
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
COURT
The Chilean CC was first created in 1970 
through a reform to the 1925 Constitution in-
tended to establish an arbiter who could pro-
tect the legislative powers of the President.4 
The CC closed its doors after the events 
??? ?????? ???? ????? ?????????????????????
??????? ???? ????????? ?????????????????????
the CC with a new institutional design.
In addition to a few ancillary powers, the 
?????????????????????????????????????????
??? ???????????????????? ??????? ?????? ?????
legislation. At the same time, the Supreme 
Court had a weak ex-post judicial review 
power, which allowed the Court to deny the 
applicability (inaplicabilidad) of specific 
pieces of legislation that conflicted with the 
Constitution. The Supreme Court’s decisions 
in this matter lacked formal precedential ef-
fect, so judges could still use and apply the 
unconstitutional legal provision in other cas-
es. The CC was not authorized to review leg-
islative norms after their promulgation. The 
CC could review legislation when the Presi-
dent, either House of the Congress, the Sen-
ate, or a fourth of the members of the House 
4 About the creation of the CC, and particularly about its power to declare the inapplicability of legal provisions, see the explanation by Iván Aróstica, ‘San-
ciones Y Restricciones Administrativas En Un Entorno de Leyes Compendiosas’ (2016) 9 Derecho Público Iberoamericano 13, 20–26. About the 1970 CC, 
see Enrique Silva C., El Tribunal Constitucional de Chile (1971-1973), vol 38 (second edition (2008), Cuadernos del Tribunal Constitucional 1977); Sergio 
Verdugo, ‘Birth and Decay of the Chilean Constitutional Tribunal (1970–1973). The Irony of a Wrong Electoral Prediction’ (2017) 15 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law.
5 Javier Couso, ‘The Politics of Judicial Review in Chile in the Era of Democratic Transition, 1990-2001’ (2003) 10 Democratization 70, 76. Javier Couso, 
‘Models of Democracy and Models of Constitutionalism: The Case of Chile’s Constitutional Court, 1970-2010’ (2011) 89 Texas Law Review 1517, 1533–
1534.
6 See, for example, the CC decisions regarding the implementation of a competitive plebiscite and the establishment of the Electoral Court. See, for in-
stance, Eugenio Valenzuela, Contribución Del Tribunal Constitucional a La Institucionalización Democrática, vol 30 (Tribunal Constitucional 2003).
7 Druscilla L Scribner, ‘Distributing Political Power: The Constitutional Tribunal in Post-Authoritarian Chile’ in Diana Kapiszewski, Gordon Silverstein, and 
Robert A Kagan (eds), Consequential Courts. Judicial Roles in Global Perspective (Cambridge University Press 2013).
8 We took all the statistics quoted here and below from http://www.tribunalconstitucional.cl/estadisticas [accessed in March 2017].
9 There was a relative scholarly consensus regarding the Supreme Court’s performance in using the inaplicabilidad. Scholars found that the Supreme Court 
formalism and deferential attitude prevented it from developing a relevant jurisprudence, failing in its function. See, for instance, Gastón Gómez, ‘La Jurisdic-
ción Constitucional: Funcionamiento de La Acción O Recurso de Inaplicabilidad, Crónica de Un Fracaso’ (2003) 3 Foro Constitucional Iberoamericano. 
10 An examination of this topic is provided by Marisol Peña, ‘Inaplicabilidad por inconstitucionalidad: reciente jurisprudencia del tribunal constitucional chile-
no’ (2008) Estudios en homenaje a Héctor Fix-Zamudio, 727-731.
11 The ???????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
case where she is supposed to apply a legal provision that could be contrary to the Constitution. Within the inaplicabilidad, the CC’s jurisdiction consists of 
reviewing whether an application of the contested legal provision violates the Constitution or not. If the CC declares that the legal provision should be used, 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
ruled unconstitutional.
or the Senate submitted a petition to the CC 
before its promulgation. The CC could also 
review legislation in an ex-ante procedure 
when the subject matter of the specific leg-
?????????????????????????????????????????????
provides a list of “organic” matters, generally 
associated with the regulation of key institu-
tions such as the Congress and the Electoral 
Court. The CC could also review administra-
tive regulations enacted by the President, but 
the deadline to submit the case to the CC was 
only for thirty days after the official gazette 
(Diario Oficial) published the regulation.
The 1981-2005 CC played a modest role in 
the constitutional system, and it was con-
ceived as a deferential court,5 although there 
were exceptional rulings with important con-
sequences.6 Also, the CC decided interbranch 
conflicts that helped to define the President’s 
regulatory powers.7 Between 1981 and 2005, 
the CC ruled, on average, nearly 18 decisions 
per year.8 This number changed drastically 
after the 2005 constitutional reform. Between 
2005 and 2014, the CC released an average of 
109 decisions per year.
The 2005 reform was the result of a broad 
political agreement between President La-
gos’s administration and the opposition. It 
was intended to put an end to the transition 
to democracy by eliminating the so-called 
“authoritarian enclaves,” such as the pow-
ers of the National Security Council and the 
existence of non-elected Senators. The 2005 
reform was also an opportunity to modify 
many of the 1980 Constitution’s institutional 
arrangements. Regarding the CC, the 2005 
reform changed the appointment mecha-
nisms and the tenure of the justices, who 
now serve for a non-renewable nine-year 
term. The President appoints three judges to 
the CC, each House of the Congress appoints 
two judges, and the Supreme Court appoints 
three judges, for a total of ten CC judges. 
Following the 2005 reform, the CC kept 
the powers that the original 1980 Constitu-
tion established, and was granted new ones. 
Among the new powers, the reform trans-
ferred the Supreme Court’s ex-post judicial 
review power (inaplicabilidad) to the CC,9 
and added an abstract power to eliminate 
specific legislative provisions when the CC 
justices achieve a supermajority of eight 
(out of ten) judicial votes.10? ?????? ??????
practitioners broadly use the inaplicabilidad 
mechanism, the ex-post abstract judicial re-
view power is rarely used, arguably because 
the ex-post abstract review power requires a 
high judicial supermajority.11
In 2016, the CC released 91 decisions and 
dismissed 103 cases by enacting inadmisib-
ilidad resolutions. The CC enacts inadmis-
ibilidad resolutions when the claim has a 
procedural or formal flaw that prevents the 
CC from processing the case. 58 out of the 
91 decisions were inaplicabilidad cases, and 
there was only one ruling about an ex-post 
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abstract judicial review claim (STC 2800). 
That ruling rejected the claim. The rest of the 
docket consisted of rulings regarding ex-an-
te review of organic laws (29), two cases 
of conflicts of jurisdiction, and one claim 
against a legislative bill. 
It is important to take into account that the 
CC and the Supreme Court have respected 
each others’ powers of interpretation. None-
theless, we should keep in mind that the CC 
recently released a statement declaring that 
the CC is the only court with the power to 
declare the unconstitutionality of a legal pro-
vision, including the legal provisions that 
were promulgated before the enactment of 
the Constitution (leyes preconstituciona-
les).12
DEVELOPMENTS AND CONTRO-
VERSIES IN 2016
The “Labor Reform” case (STC 3016)
The “Labor Reform” case is arguably the 
most politically salient case of 2016. The 
case involved a labor reform promoted by 
President Bachelet. The reform aimed at 
strengthening the powers of the unions. Pres-
ident Bachelet presented the legislative bill 
and, during the legislative debates, a group 
of legislators from the opposition opposed 
Bachelet’s project on constitutional grounds. 
This group of legislators asked the CC to de-
clare the unconstitutionality of parts of the 
legislative project.
The CC, using its ex-ante power of judicial 
review, partially accepted the legislators’ 
claim, and struck down specific provisions 
of the bill. The CC stated that labor negoti-
ating between employers and unions are, of 
course, legally allowed. However, those ne-
gotiations should proceed without violating 
the constitutional right of individual work-
ers to negotiate separately, contained in the 
freedoms of association (Article 19, Nº 15) 
and labor (Article 19, Nº 16). The most con-
troversial rule that the CC struck down using 
 
12 This is relevant, because in the past some scholars argued that any court could recognize that a legal rule enacted before the Constitution was derogat-
ed by the Constitution. However, because the derogation of these kinds of legal rules requires an examination of their compatibility with the Constitution, 
the CC is the only court that can execute this power. See the CC’s statement here: http://www.tribunalconstitucional.cl/wp/wp-content/uploads/Conclu-
??????????????????????????? ????????????? [accessed in April 2017]. Notice that the CC’s statement was not a formal judicial decision but a special 
document enacted by the CC and authored by the unanimity of the CC.
this rationale was the prohibition for em-
ployees and groups of employees to directly 
bargain the terms of their contracts with em-
ployers, forcing them to engage in the labor 
negotiation only within the representation of 
the respective union.
 
Per the CC, the unions’ monopoly over col-
lective labor bargaining violated the em-
ployees’ labor freedom (Article 19, Nº 16) 
and freedom of association (Article 15, Nº 
????? ?????????????? ??????????? ???? ????
mere existence of a union would prevent the 
employees from bargaining with their corre-
sponding employer directly. The rule also vi-
olated the right to create a union (Article 19, 
Nº 19), which the CC considers as a negative 
liberty that protects individual employees’ 
autonomy, and the right not to be discrimi-
nated (Article 19, Nº 2).
It is worth noticing that, in the decision, the 
CC included normative justifications for its 
ex-ante judicial review power. It pointed out 
that the CC exercised that power in several 
occasions under different presidential ad-
ministrations, that the power dates from the 
1970 constitutional amendment to the 1925 
Constitution, that legislators can reform the 
Constitution when they achieve the pertinent 
supermajority, and that there is no such thing 
as a neutral constitution. 
The CC as a key actor of constitutional 
dialogue (STC 2907)
The CC has not only influenced legislators’ 
actions within the cases that motivate its de-
cisions. Sometimes the consequences of the 
CC’s decisions go beyond the case and serve 
as a key reason for legislators to initiate a bill 
or to reinforce an existing statute, creating a 
dialogue between the CC and the legislative 
branch. The following case is an example of 
this dialogue.
A salmon company called “Salmones Mul-
tiexport S.A.” asked the CC to order the 
Supreme Court not to apply a rule that im 
 
 
posed a duty to release information regard-
ing the company’s use of antibiotics in their 
????????????????????????????????????????-
leased a final decision on this case. Under 
the specific statute, the company was re-
quired to give the information to the Chilean 
administrative regulator (SERNAPESCA), 
but the company disagreed with the rule that 
allowed SERNAPESCA to give the infor-
mation to other parties or even share the in-
formation publicly. “Salmones Multiexport” 
argued that the information had a commer-
cial value and that the company’s industrial 
property rights protected its secrecy.
The CC declared that the challenged legal 
provisions should be inapplicable to the case 
because of the limits that Article 8 of the 
Constitution impose against rules of trans-
parency and publicity. In its decision, the CC 
invoked prior decisions that interpreted Arti-
cle 8 in a similar way, and explicitly invoked 
the idea of “constitutional dialogue” to claim 
that its constitutional interpretation can be 
?????????? ??? ??????????????? ?????????????
in Chile requires a legislative supermajority 
of 3/5 or 2/3 of both chambers of Congress, 
depending on the chapter of the Constitu-
tion to be amended. The CC elaborated the 
idea of “constitutional dialogue” by quoting 
a legislative bill that Congress is currently 
discussing (Boletín 8805-07), which aims to 
reform the Constitution by recognizing and 
including an explicit right to access public 
information. The project intended to re-
form the Constitution as a reaction to a set 
of past CC decisions that recognize the lim-
its of Article 8 (STC 634/2007, 1990/2012, 
2246/2012, 2153/2013, and 2379/2013). 
According to the CC: “Even though the Tri-
bunal has a relevant say in matters of con-
stitutionality, the Congress always has the 
last word, in the sense that the Congress can 
reform the Constitution to incorporate what 
it believes right. The only way to overrule 
the CC’s interpretation is by reforming the 
Constitution.” (STC 2907, consideration 
XXVIII).
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The idea of constitutional dialogue has been 
discussed before among some Chilean ac-
ademics,13 and other cases in the past also 
connect to this idea. However, this is the first 
time that a court explicitly invokes it. This 
idea is consistent with the Congress’ legis-
lative practices (in this case, the constitu-
tional reform that the Congress is currently 
discussing), and reaffirms the interpretative 
authority of the CC over the Constitution and 
the consequential character of the CC itself.
MAJOR CASES
The “Emilia Law” case (STC 2983)
The “Emilia Law” case was an inaplicabili-
dad case. The questioned legal provision is 
part of the “Emilia Law,” a statute that se-
verely punishes with jail all impaired drivers 
(under the influence of alcohol) who crash 
and, as a result, kill or injure a person. The 
name of the statute is due to Emilia Silva, 
who died because of a car crash by an im-
paired driver. Her death was publicly used 
to push for bipartisan approval of the Emilia 
Law in 2014. Under the Emilia Law, prose-
cutors and criminal judges have investigated 
and punished many infractions and crimes 
with severity, sometimes under high media 
attention. This severity triggered a number of 
due process and proportionality allegations 
against the Emilia Law. In the CC’s decision 
(STC 2983), the CC signaled its doctrine in a 
landmark ruling.
The criminal court (the Tribunal Oral en lo 
Penal de San Antonio) found that Mr. Rojas, 
the defendant in the criminal case, was guilty 
of crashing and killing the victim after disre-
garding a “stop signal.” Moreover, Mr. Rojas 
did not help the victim, avoided informing 
the authorities, and refused to take a medical 
exam to determine if he was under the influ-
ence of alcohol. 
During the process before the Valparaíso’s 
Court of Appeals (Corte de Apelaciones de 
Valparaíso), Mr. Rojas’s defender filed a pe-
tition to the CC and challenged a set of rules 
that, taken together, would result in a severe 
13 One of us has promoted it in: Sergio Verdugo, ‘La Discusión Democrática Sobre La Revisión Judicial de Las Leyes. Diseño Institucional Y Modelos Consti-
tucionales’ (2013) 40 Revista Chilena de Derecho 181. 
14 During the Valparaíso Court of Appeals process, the defender asked the Court to void the criminal court’s decision (recurso de nulidad). The Valparaíso 
Court decided the case in January 2017.
punishment for Mr. Rojas.14 One of these 
rules (Article 196 ter) stated that an impaired 
driver who crashes and kills the victim should 
spend at least a year in prison. According to 
this rule, all pertinent benefits or alternative 
?????????????????? ?? ????????? ??????????????
??? ?????? ??????? ??????? ??????????????? ???
postponed and cannot be applied before the 
driver has spent a year in jail.
 
The CC decided to partially grant Mr. Rojas’s 
petition by rejecting the challenge against 
most of the rules except that of Article 196 
ter. The CC declared that that provision was 
disproportionate and unequal. To postpone 
the application of an alternative punishment 
to Mr. Rojas, and to make him stay in pris-
on for a year, deviates from the goal of the 
state’s power to punish, which is to help the 
individual to be reincorporated to society. 
The decision was politically incorrect, and it 
attracted the attention of the media, public 
opinion and politicians, all of which expect-
ed the CC to reaffirm that impaired drivers 
should be treated severely. However, it is 
important to point out that the case’s issue 
was not to evaluate Mr. Rojas’ behavior or 
to judge the severity of the punishment. In-
stead, the legal issue was whether a person 
should be prevented from pursuing an alter-
native punishment for at least a year, even if 
that person fulfills the general requirements. 
Thus, the CC did not criticize the new legis-
lative penalization in abstract terms. 
Consequently, the Valparaíso’s Court of Ap-
peals followed the CC’s ruling and allowed 
Mr. Rojas not to fulfill its punishment in 
prison. From a legal perspective, the case 
contributed to a better understanding of the 
application of constitutional standards in 
criminal law cases.
The “Cascadas” case (STC 2922)
According to the Chilean financial regulator 
(the SVS), the “Cascadas case” dealt with a 
high-profile financial scandal that took place 
in Chile in 2014. The case is still pending a 
decision from the corresponding civil judge 
(Santiago’s 16th Civil Court). The SVS de-
clared that a group of people used a form of 
pyramid scheme to illicitly trade companies’ 
shares to acquire the control of a group of 
corporations. The SVS penalized the infrac-
tions using a rule that allows the agency to 
establish a fine that could get to 30% of the 
value of the irregular operation. One of the 
businessmen involved filed a legal action 
against the agency and, within that proce-
dure, brought the case to the CC.
The CC declared the inapplicability of the 
rule allowing the agency to establish such 
a fine. The CC did not question legal viola-
tions that supposedly took place (that is part 
of the civil judge’s jurisdiction, and the CC 
cannot address that issue), but evaluated the 
constitutionality of the possible application 
of the rule that establishes the fine. The CC 
argued that said rule violated the principle of 
proportionality, as it did not establish suffi-
cient standards to calculate the amount of the 
fine in an objective way, in practice allowing 
the agency to establish an unreasonable, un-
justifiable, and unfair punishment. The rule 
infringed equality (Article 19, Nº 2) and the 
right to a fair and rational administrative pro-
cedure (Article 19, Nº 3). If the civil judge 
decides that there were legal violations (that 
judge has not yet released a final decision), 
that judge would not be able to use the rule 
that was declared inapplicable to sanction 
the businessmen involved.
This case, along with the next one, confirms 
a consistent jurisprudence that aims to limit 
the power of administrative agencies to pe-
nalize private actors.
The “Colhue 2” case (STC 2946)
A Chilean environmental agency (the so-
called Comisión de Evaluación del Medio 
Ambiente de la Región del Libertador Gen-
eral Bernardo O’Higgins) sanctioned Col-
hue S.A., a company that was operating an 
organic waste management center, for five 
infractions against environmental regula-
tions. Colhue filed an administrative petition 
to get the fine reversed and later submitted 
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the case to the corresponding court. Both the 
administrative and judicial actions were re-
jected. Colhue appealed to the Rancagua’s 
Court of Appeals (Corte de Apelaciones de 
Rancagua) and, during the appeal process, 
asked the CC to declare that the rules gov-
erning the administrative procedure that led 
to the fine be inapplicable because they vio-
lated the Constitution. If the rules regulating 
the procedure were declared unconstitutional 
by the CC, then the Rancagua Court of Ap-
peals would not be able to use those rules to 
decide the case against Colhue.
The CC declared that the challenged legal 
provision did not sufficiently describe the be-
havior to be penalized by the administrative 
agency. This lack of precision allowed the 
agency to qualify as an infraction a behav-
ior Colhue could not predict that was illegal. 
Moreover, the challenged rule authorized the 
agency to establish a fine without provid-
ing a criterion for calculating the amount of 
?????? ??????????????? ????????????????????
a maximum. Thus, the agency could use its 
power to establish fines in an unpredictable 
and disproportionate way. The challenged 
rule violated the due process elements of 
tipicidad and proportionality. Tipicidad is a 
constitutional requirement (Article 19, Nº 3) 
that requires legislative statutes to describe 
the illegal behavior and the penalty with 
precision, so that individuals can effective-
ly avoid committing an infraction. Tipicidad 
is traditionally considered to be a require-
ment for criminal statutes, but the CC has 
extended this requirement for administrative 
regulations that aim to penalize individuals 
with fines. The Constitution’s purpose is to 
protect individuals against the state’s power 
to punish (potestas puniendi or ius puniendi) 
and, in this regard, the distinction between 
criminal law and administrative law is not 
relevant.
Although the Rancagua Court of Appeals 
has not yet released a final decision on this 
case, its jurisdiction would be limited by the 
CC’s ruling because it would not be able to 
use the legal provision declared inapplicable 
to justify its final decision. The CC’s inappli-
cability decision is important because it con-
firms that administrative regulations should 
follow the requirements that the Constitution 
establishes for criminal law, and provides 
some specific criteria regarding the tipicidad 
and proportionality principles. 
CONCLUSION
In this report, we have shown five selected 
cases that illustrate how the CC is becoming 
an increasingly consequential actor in the 
Chilean constitutional system. The first case 
shows how the CC can affect an important 
legislative reform in a politically complex 
scenario while the second is an example 
of “constitutional dialogue” in its Chilean 
version, and how that idea (which includes 
legislative practices) reaffirms the CC’s in-
terpretative authority. The case regarding 
constitutional dialogue is probably the most 
interesting case for scholars working on 
comparative constitutional law. 
In the other three cases, the CC challenges 
legal provisions and orders not to apply them 
to the specific case. In the three cases, the 
state tries to punish an individual (or a firm) 
using its ius puniendi (the power to punish) 
in a way that violates the Constitution. Ac-
cording to the CC’s doctrine, the constitu-
tional limits of the ius puniendi do not only 
operate against the state in criminal cases but 
also against administrative agencies impos-
ing fines.
52 | I•CONnect-Clough Center 
Cyprus
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INTRODUCTION
Cypriot constitutional law1 has been simul-
taneously reflective of and respondive to the 
structural uneasiness2 in our constitutional 
arrangements after the collapse3 of the po-
litical compromise between the Greek and 
Turkish Cypriot communities.4 Since 1964, 
the Supreme Court has provided a leeway for 
the continuing existence of a functional State 
on the basis of the law of necessity.5 Con-
stitutional adjudication in Cyprus, therefore, 
must be considered in terms unique to the 
anomalous situation that emerged after 1964. 
The Supreme Court has offered scholars 
some paramount examples of the application 
of the law of necessity over the years; for 
example, as a device to enable the creation 
of constitutional organs.6 The retort to law 
of necessity remains the underlying theme of 
much constitutional adjudication concerning 
both the functioning of State organs and the 
content of constitutional norms.
The year 2016 was no exception. The Su-
preme Court has revisited such fundamental 
structural issues as the form of the establish-
ment of the administrative court. At the same 
time, the Court examined issues relating to 
the content of constitutional norms on the 
1 A. Loizou, The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus (Nicosia, Cyprus, 2001); C. Kombos, The Doc-
trine of Necessity in Constitutional Law (Sakkoulas, 2015); C. Tornaritis, Cyprus and Its Constitutional 
and Other Problems (Nicosia, 2nd ed., 1980); S. Papasavvas, La justice constitutionnelle à Chypre 
(Economica, 1998); C. Paraskeva, Cypriot Constitutional Law: Fundamental Rights and Freedoms 
(Nomiki Vivliothiki, 2015).
2 Described by De Smith as being conceived “by a constitutionalist and a mathematician in nightmarish 
dialogue”: S.A. De Smith, The New Commonwealth and Its Constitutions (London, Stevens, 1964), p. 284.
3 P. Polyviou, Cyprus on the Edge. A Study in Constitutional Survival (Nicosia, 2013), pp. 5-26.
4 On the historical aspect see S. Kyriakides, Cyprus: Constitutionalism and Crisis Government (Universi-
ty of Pennsylvania Press, 1969); P. Polyviou, Cyprus: The Tragedy and the Challenge (Washington, D.C.: 
American Hellenic Institute, 1975).
5 See The A-G of the Republic v. Mustafa Ibrahim [1964] CLR 195. See P. Polyviou, Ibrahim: The Doc-
trine of Necessity and the Republic of Cyprus (Nicosia, 2015).
6 Kombos, supra n.1, pp. 173-238.
7 See Kombos, supra n.1, pp. 216-228; Polyviou, supra n. 6.
right to privacy and separation of powers. 
The Court for a time examined the applica-
tion of constitutional provisions enabling the 
dismissal of an independent officer of the 
Republic, the Deputy Attorney-General, who 
has the same status and protection as judges 
of the Supreme Court itself.      
This report argues that issues of constitution-
al law remain directly connected to the appli-
cation of the law of necessity when it comes 
to State organs, procedure, and content of. 
The key to understanding this idiosyncrasy 
of Cypriot constitutional law is to realize the 
deep and continuous presence of the Rule of 
Law and the judicial commitment in safe-
guarding constitutional law as it is formulat-
ed under the law of necessity. That is a diffi-
cult balancing exercise given the broadness 
and the potential force of the law of necessi-
ty that has nonetheless been placed within a 
constitutional State rather than outside.7  
THE CONSTITUTION AND  
THE COURT
It is useful to first undertake a brief exegesis 
of the development of the legal order of the 
Republic of Cyprus. The classic distinction 
between “Constitution” and “constitutional 
CYPRUS
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law” is especially relevant to Cyprus because 
the 1960 Constitution must be read in the 
light of the law of necessity for a full picture. 
The law of necessity offers the pillar that has 
sustained the Constitution since 1964. 
The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus 
was at one time the source of problems that 
paralyzed the State.8 The process of decolo-
nization and the transfer of power to a newly 
formed independent State were wholly de-
cided by Greece and Turkey in the absence 
of the people and in the physical absence 
of the legally responsible entity, which was 
at that moment the colonial power (United 
Kingdom). The right of self-determination 
and more importantly the right to exercise 
primary constitutive power found no expres-
sion in the case of Cyprus. This pathology 
removed from the Constitution one of its 
fundamental functional attributes: its sym-
bolic status. 
The Cypriot Constitution was designed to 
serve as a compromise between the two com-
munities. It created  an independent State, 
where the rights of the minority were en-
trenched in a manner and scale that would 
ensure their effective participation in gover-
nance at all levels and in every instance. To 
attain this objective, the three interested States 
(Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain) were giv-
en extraordinary powers of intervention in 
case of an arrant constitutional anomaly. 
Moreover, the formation of the independent 
State was designed with a dangerous under-
estimation about the stability of its nature and 
functionality (or lack of it). The result of the 
Constitution-making process was a lengthy, 
detailed, rigid, and permanent Constitution 
that has two principles at its epicenter: pro-
tected bi-communalism and an encumbered 
system of multiple checks and balances to 
ensure that the status quo remains intact. The 
8 Tornaritis, supra n.1, pp. 54-66.
9 M. Stavsky, “The Doctrine of State Necessity in Pakistan” (1983) 16 Cornell Int’l L.J. 341, p. 356.
10 S.A. De Smith, The New Commonwealth and Its Constitutions (London, Stevens, 1964), p. 284.
11 C. Kombos, “The Judiciary in Federal Systems,” in A. Krispi and A. Constantinides, The Cypriot Problem in Evolution (Athens: Sakkoulas 2010), pp. 81-
113.
12 Emphasis added. Note that the amendment proposals were just invitation to negotiation and were not a unilateral act of imposed amendment. See Tor-
naritis, supra n. 1, pp. 67-73.
13 The A-G of the Republic v. Mustafa Ibrahim [1964] CLR 195.
14 See articles 133-165 Constitution.
Constitution “attempted to ensure that both 
communities would participate fully in the 
political decision-making process of the is-
land,”9 yet “a communal distrust permeates 
the constitutional arrangements”10 that take 
the form of a rigid bi-communalism that un-
derpins the vast majority of the provisions 
of the Constitution ranging from the actual 
division of competences to the structure of 
the State. 
In terms of the judiciary, the Supreme Con-
stitutional Court was to be composed of 
three members, a Turkish Cypriot, a Greek 
Cypriot, and a presiding non-Cypriot (article 
133(1)) that would cast the deciding vote.11 
The same institutional “logic” also applied 
to the High Court entrusted with the appel-
late jurisdiction over civil and criminal mat-
ters (articles 155 and 156), composed of two 
Greek Cypriots, a Turkish Cypriot, and a 
presiding non-Cypriot judge with two votes 
in cases of deadlock (article 153(1)). 
From the very beginning, the Republic of 
Cyprus faced the danger of constitutional 
paralysis. The apogee of the difficulties was 
reached when the State budget was in effect 
vetoed by the required separate Turkish-Cy-
priot majority in the House of Representa-
tives for reasons other than the intended pro-
tection from discriminatory taxation of the 
minority. A perfect constitutional storm had 
formed: the Constitution became a tool to 
paralyze the State; the amendment process 
was severely restricted, since there could be 
no recourse to the people with the majori-
ty rule excluded; and there was always the 
permanency of the system that the three for-
eign guarantor States were tasked to ensure. 
Specifically, constitutional amendment was 
possible through a separate community 2/3 
majority in the House of Representatives 
pursuant to article 182 of the Constitution, 
but in Annex III there is a list of 48 articles 
that cannot be amended (out of 199 in to-
tal; only article 23 relates to a fundamental 
human right, that of property). These pro-
visions, of a crucial bulk, are essentially 
eternal clauses; they include every article 
embedded in bi-communalism. The dead-
lock led President Makarios to propose 13 
amendments to the Constitution that were 
rejected by Turkey.12 
After a period of tension and armed con-
frontation between the two communities, 
the Turkish-Cypriots withdrew from the 
government, thus rendering the executive, 
legislative, and judicial branch incapable of 
taking any decision whatsoever. The emerg-
ing cul-de-sac finally made any constitu-
tional amendment impossible and excluded 
resorting to the people’s pouvoir constituent 
since the majority rule could not apply. An 
existential dilemma was created, as a corol-
lary: to follow the letter of the Constitution 
or to resort to the only constitutional alter-
native that would enable the functioning of 
the State until a political compromise was 
reached. This development, dangerous for 
the survival of the Republic, led to the intro-
duction of legislation (Law 33/64) adopted 
by the House of Representatives in the ab-
sence of Turkish-Cypriots members.
The decision in Mustafa Ibrahim then had as 
its backdrop the constitutionality of the Ad-
ministration of Justice (Miscellaneous Pro-
visions) Law 1964 (Law 33/64).13 The legis-
lation merged two constitutionally provided 
for appellate courts (Supreme Constitutional 
Court and High Court) into a new five-mem-
ber Court, the Supreme Court.14 Their merg-
ing of competences was accompanied by an 
alteration of the composition formula. The 
new Supreme Court was to consist of only 
Cypriot judges, given the withdrawal of the 
foreign judges and a vast majority of Turk-
ish-Cypriot judges. 
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The three Greek Cypriot members of the Su-
preme Constitutional Court invoked in the 
Ibrahim judgment the doctrine of necessity 
to justify the establishment of the new court. 
In their separate concurring opinions, the 
judges highlighted the extant emergency in 
Cyprus and the threat to the survival of the 
State.15 In an attempt to summarize the three 
opinions, the broader findings converged on 
the following points: the Constitution did 
not expect a constitutional crisis that could 
endangered the existence of the State, thus 
lacking any provisions to effectively deal 
with the situation; a declaration of a state 
of emergency provided for in article 183 of 
the Constitution would not have sufficed to 
address the problematic situation, yet the de-
ployment of the law of necessity was a prod-
uct of the imposed and rigid Constitution; 
the law of necessity was thereby integral to 
the Constitution, implied in article 179 that 
designates the Constitution as the supreme 
source of law; the law of necessity was of 
an intra-constitutional nature; and the Court 
was, therefore, obliged to give a ruling and 
could not deny exercise of its jurisdiction.16
The decision in Ibrahim had established 
that the requirements for the law of neces-
sity include: the existence of an urgent and 
unavoidable need or exceptional threat to 
the existence of the State that can be objec-
tively established; no other alternative; the 
measures adopted are proportionate to the 
need; the deployed measures are temporary 
and apply for as long as the emergency ex-
ists; the legality of such measures is subject 
to judicial scrutiny; and the burden of proof 
is placed on the side invoking the doctrine 
of necessity. Therefore, the doctrine is to be 
 
15 The A-G of the Republic v. Mustafa Ibrahim [1964] CLR 195, pp. 201-2.
16 For full analysis see Kombos, supra n.1, pp. 151-72.
17 Application by Attorney-General for the Dismissal of Deputy Attorney-General, Application 1/2015, 24th September 2015; Application by Andreas Tryfwn-
os, Application 1/2016, 30th January 2017.
18 Articles 112 & 153, Constitution. Note that these provisions refer to the High Court that was substituted, as was the Supreme Constitutional Court, by the 
new Supreme Court through The Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Law 1964 (Law 33/64).
19 The conduct suspect of corruption was found by an independent criminal investigator.
20??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Papasavvas v. Attorney-General (2003) 3 CLR 115.
21 There was a previous instance where a judge of the Industrial Disputes Tribunal had been dismissed (Case Kamenou, 19/9/2006) where the Court applied 
Procedural Regulation no.3 of 2003 that related to the dismissal proceedings against judges of the lower courts.
22 Procedural Regulation regarding the jurisdiction of the Supreme Council of 20/5/2015???????????????????????????????????????????????
23 Application by Attorney-General for the Dismissal of Deputy Attorney-General, Application 1/2015, 27th May 2015 (intermediate decision).
24 Ibid.  
used as a measure of last constitutional resort 
and as such only in extreme circumstances. 
The doctrine demands a narrow judicial ap-
proach, but intense scrutiny.
It is within this context that any analysis of 
constitutional developments in Cyprus must 
take place, considering that the law of neces-
sity is present every time that the Supreme 
Court exercises its jurisdiction and can be 
further inherent in the nature of a case. 
DEVELOPMENTS AND CONTRO-
VERSIES IN 2016
The Supreme Court for the first time ex-
amined the application of the constitutional 
provisions enabling the dismissal of an inde-
pendent officer of the Republic, namely the 
Deputy Attorney-General.17 Such an official 
enjoys the status and constitutional protec-
tion identical to that afforded to judges of the 
Supreme Court.18 The provisions relevant to 
this case required that a “judge of the High 
Court may be dismissed on the ground of 
misconduct” by a special composition of “a 
Council consisting of the President of the 
Supreme Constitutional Court as Chairman 
and the Greek and the Turkish judge of the 
Supreme Constitutional Court as members.” 
It became apparent that the law of necessity 
applied to reformulate the relevant Coun-
cil, which had been impossible to function 
since 1964. The application for the dismissal 
from office was filed by the Attorney-Gen-
eral against the Deputy after his statements 
in a press conference. The Deputy, in his 
remarks, dismissed the initiation of a crim-
inal investigation into alleged corruption.19 
Moreover, he made accusations to the effect 
that it was the Attorney-General who acted 
in a corrupt manner, without producing ev-
idence. This saga provided the background 
for a constitutional crisis that was unprece-
dented in Cyprus.
It was the first time that an application for the 
dismissal of a public official enjoying consti-
tutional protection identical to that afforded 
to judges of the High Court was brought be-
fore the Court by the Attorney-General,20 al-
though there was a procedural regulation for 
the dismissal of lower court judges, which 
had been applied in at least one case in the 
past.21 The Court issued a procedural regu-
lation just after the application for dismissal 
against the Deputy Attorney-General, which 
was also to regulate all pending applications 
for the dismissal of public officials.22 The 
Court held that retroactivity in this instance 
was for the benefit of the Deputy Attor-
ney-General since his legal rights were not 
affected, and the Court could have regulated 
the matter in an ad hoc manner even in the 
absence of the regulation.23 It also held that 
the lack of compliance of the filed applica-
tion with the now established procedure in 
terms of relevant documentation could not 
be fatal to the process. The discrepancies 
were not deemed to be substantive procedur-
al defects.24 
Second, the Court had to provide a definition 
of the key term “misconduct” and decide on 
the burden of proof and the required legal 
prerequisites for such a procedure. Namely, 
whether a procedure for dismissal followed 
criminal or administrative law burden of 
proof. The Court held that misconduct in-
cludes actions outside the exercise of the 
public office and it means “behavior that is 
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so bad, so reprehensible that is, as to make 
the person who is accountable for this, un-
able to continue to perform the duties of his 
office or creates reasonable doubts to others, 
objectively judging, as to the suitability of 
the person to exercise the duties of the office 
with honesty, fairness and for the public in-
terest.”25 The burden of proof was found to 
be on the person filing the application and 
the criterion for establishing misconduct was 
objective. The procedure is disciplinary in 
nature and not within the realm of criminal 
law, therefore the element of mens rea does 
not apply.26 
Third, the Court could only approve or dis-
miss the application. The only available 
sanction in the event of approval was an im-
mediate dismissal from office, which limits 
the discretion available to the Court. It held 
that any finding of misconduct must be the 
result of intense judicial scrutiny and subject 
to the principle of proportionality. The Court 
concluded the Deputy Attorney-General 
acted in a totally inappropriate manner that 
amounted to misconduct under article 153 of 
the Constitution. The Court ordered an im-
mediate dismissal of the Deputy office, and 
subsequently and in separate criminal pro-
ceedings, a criminal court found him guilty 
of corruption and imposed a custodial sen-
tence that is now a matter of appeal before 
the Supreme Court.27   
As an aside, there was also a Supreme Court 
decision in 2016 in a case of a private indi-
vidual who filed an application for the dis-
missal of the Attorney-General from office 
on the basis of the newly introduced proce-
dural regulation of 2015.28 The Court held 
that the applicant did not have locus standi 
as the Constitution does not provide for pri-
vate applications and any interpretation to 
that effect would amount to an introduction 
of actio popularis. The Court stated in obi-
25 Application by Attorney-General for the Dismissal of Deputy Attorney-General, Application 1/2015, 24th September 2015 (decision on the merits).
26 Ibid. 
27 Case Number 9208/15, Erotokritou et al. 8th February 2017.
28 Application by Andreas Tryfwnos, Application 1/2016, 30th January 2017.
29 8th Amendment of the Constitution (Law 130(I)/2015).
30 Charalambides et al. v. Republic (Case 1814/12), 8th October 2016 (Administrative Court). 
31 President of the Republic v. House of Representatives, Case 1695/2015, 28th March 2016.
32 President of the Republic v. House of Representatives, Reference 01/2015, 3rd December 2015.
33 Law on the Regulation of the Shops (amending) (no.4) of 2015. 
ter dictum that the President of the Republic 
could have standing to file such an applica-
tion so that the Attorney-General is legally 
accountable.             
MAJOR CASES
The Supreme Court exercised administrative 
jurisdiction on the basis of the law of necessi-
ty and through Law 33/64 that was preserved 
under article 146 of the Constitution for the 
Supreme Constitutional Court, until the es-
tablishment of the Administrative Court.29 
But the latter Court caused concerns: whether 
the new specialized court is constitutional;30 
whether the law of necessity ceased to exist; 
and whether the Supreme and Administra-
tive Courts are compatible. The Adminis-
trative Court held that the law of necessity 
continues to apply. But the heavy workload 
of the Supreme Court, delays in the admin-
istration of justice, and binding EU law obli-
gations necessitated the establishment of the 
new Court. Needless to say, this reasoning 
is suspect because there were arguably other 
solutions available to a backlog. The deci-
sion also impacts the rationale of the law of 
necessity.
Separation of Powers
The Supreme Court also considered two 
of separation of powers cases in 2016 con-
cerning a challenge to primary and second-
ary legislation regulating Sunday trading 
hours.31 In the first case,32 the House of 
Representatives passed into law a private 
member’s Bill33 that amended existing legis-
lation on the matter of Sunday trading hours 
(????? ????????????? ???????????? ???????????
??????????????). The effect of the Law was 
that shops remained closed on Sundays un-
less they could satisfy requirements on the 
basis of location, the size of a shop, and 
type of commercial activity. The President 
of the Republic referred the Law in question 
to the Supreme Court for a review pursuant 
to article 140 of the Constitution. The Court 
considered the case in relation to the princi-
ple of separation of powers and articles 25 
and 28 of the Constitution that guarantee the 
right to practice any profession or to carry 
on any occupation, trade, and business and 
the principle of equality, respectively. The 
Supreme Court held that although the legis-
lature has the exclusive authority to legislate 
on all matters under article 61 of the Consti-
tution, legislation must be compatible with 
the principle of separation of powers that 
is diffused and implied in the Constitution. 
The Court focused on the nature of the mat-
ter regulated by the relevant Law and found 
that its content has its center of gravity in the 
executive branch rather than in the legisla-
tive. The reason was that the nature of the 
regulated activity was akin to administrative 
action applicable in individualized cases and 
as such pertained exclusively to the execu-
tive branch. The Court, therefore, found the 
Law unconstitutional. 
Immediately afterward, the House of Repre-
sentatives rejected regulations, in the form 
of secondary legislation issued by the execu-
tive, which enabled the opening of shops on 
Sundays. The President made use of article 
139 of the Constitution relating to the re-
course in any matter relating to a conflict or 
contest of power or competence between the 
House of Representatives and the President. 
The regulations do not require Presidential 
signature, therefore the use of the primary 
procedure that is a reference for examination 
of constitutionality under article 140 of the 
Constitution was not a constitutionally avail-
able option. The argument was that since 
the Supreme Court had ruled on the matter 
in Reference 1/2015 and found that the leg-
islature acted in breach of the principle of 
separation of powers, then as a corollary, 
the legislature was preempted from rejecting 
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secondary legislation in which the will of the 
executive on the same matter. Put differently, 
the legislature was preempted from interfer-
ing with the exercise of the executive power 
on the matter of shopping hours on Sundays. 
Nonetheless, the Court rejected the applica-
tion by the President because it was submit-
ted after the deadline of the thirty days that 
the Constitution requires in article 139 (4). 
The outcome is that the issue of Sunday trad-
ing remains to date without regulation given 
the fact that the legislature has no compe-
tence and the executive can only intervene 
through secondary legislation that the legis-
lature rejects.  
Human Rights
The Supreme Court further examined a 
criminal appeal involving the right to priva-
cy. The right to privacy is protected in Cy-
prus under article 15 of the Constitution and 
article 8 of the ECHR. The case concerned 
an alleged entrapment of the accused by the 
prosecuting authority in criminal proceed-
ings for exercising the profession of real 
estate agent without a license, in violation 
of ??????????????. 34 A representative of the 
prosecuting authority was standing outside 
the offices of the accused and looking at 
window advertisements of properties when 
an employee approached him and asked if 
he could offer him assistance. The repre-
sentative indicated that he was interested in 
purchasing an apartment, gave a false name, 
did not disclose his identity, and only sub-
sequently revealed that he was there to in-
vestigate complaints against the accused 
for violation of the relevant legislation. The 
Court held that such actions did not amount 
to entrapment given the fact that the criminal 
offense was already adequately proved by 
the maintenance of a professional establish-
ment that advertised the offering of services 
of real estate agency. The right to privacy 
includes professional premises but is limited 
by the public interest to prevent crime pro-
vided that any such action is proportionate. 
34 Cyprus Real Estate Agents Association v. Berriman Properties et al. Criminal Appeal 127/14, 8th July 2016.
35 Eight decisions of the ECtHR and English Courts as well as two references to academic writings: Teixeira de Castro v. Portugal (1998) 4 BHRC 533; Saun-
ders v. United Kingdom [1997] 23 EHRR 313; Niemietz v. Germany, Appl. No. 13710/88, 16.12.1992; R. v. Loosely (2001) 4 All E.R. 897; Edwards and oth-
ers v. The UK, Application No. 39647/98 ??? 40461/98, 27.10.2004; Gammon (Hong Kong) Ltd v. A.G. (1984) 1 All E.R. 347;??he Statue of Liberty (1968) 
2 All E.R. 195.
36???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Hamlyn Lecture 27/11/2013, available at 
http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/hrlc/documents/specialevents/laws-lj-speech-hamlyn-lecture-2013.pdf, p. 2.
37 C. Kombos, The Impact of EU Law on Cypriot Public Law (Sakkoulas, 2015), pp. 1-6, 33-46.
????? ??? ???????????? ??? ????? ????? ??? ????? ????
Court reached the preceding conclusions af-
ter discussing in detail numerous decisions 
from other jurisdictions,35 thus confirming 
the long tradition of openness and “catholic-
ity”36 of the Cypriot legal system especial-
ly as regards the definition of the content of 
fundamental rights.37       
CONCLUSION
Before 2016, the Supreme Court examined 
numerous issues directly related to the eco-
nomic crisis, including pay cuts and the 
bail-in for all unsecured deposits in the two 
main Cypriot commercial banks. In 2016, 
constitutional adjudication in Cyprus seems 
to have returned to normality with the Court 
having to examine constitutional matters that 
primarily concerned general application of 
the Constitution in economically “neutral” 
issues. This return to normality is, howev-
er, subject to the qualification that Cypriot 
constitutional law remains either directly or 
indirectly the product of a constitutionally 
abnormal context due to the doctrine of ne-
cessity. But adherence to the rule of law and 
the strict interpretation of the conditions gov-
erning the application of the law of necessity 
remain important. The Supreme Court will 
soon deliver judgment in 12 references con-
cerning the principle of separation of powers 
in the year 2017. The framework for consti-
tutional adjudication has been defined, and it 
remains to be seen how the Courts will react. 
2016 Global Review of Constitutional Law | 57
Czech Republic
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INTRODUCTION
Last year was constitutionally rich in the 
Czech Republic. The process of gradual 
replacement of Justices of the Constitution-
al Court (hereinafter “the Court”), which 
lasted for several years, was completed and 
thus all current Justices have been appoint-
ed by President Zeman. Both constitutional 
scholars and the general public impatiently 
??????????????????????? ?????????????????? ??
analyze four of them below. But it was not 
just the case-law of the Court that mattered. 
There were controversies of constitution-
al relevance which became points of wide 
??????? ???????? ??? ?????? ???? ??? ????? ????
further analysis in part III of this report: a 
draft bill to constitutionally acknowledge 
the people’s right to bear arms.
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
COURT 
?????? ??? ???? ?????? ????? ????? ????????????
????????? ??????????????? ?????? ??? ?? ????? ???-
cialized judicial institution to review laws 
vis-à-vis their conformity with the consti-
tution? There is a dispute on the correct an-
swer to this question between Austria and 
countries of the former Czechoslovakia. 
Both Austrians and Czechs like to argue 
????? ?????? ??????????????? ?????????? ???? ?????
one. Both are right in a way. Czechs were 
?????????????????? ??????? ???????????? ??-
stitution of 29 February 1920 which, as the 
1 See English excerpts from Tomáš Langášek, ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
letech 1920-1948 (Constitutional Court of the Czechoslovak Republic and its fortunes in years 1920-
1948)???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the Czechoslovak republic and its fortunes in years 1920-1948” (Usoud.cz, 2015) http://www.usoud.cz/
en/constitutional-court-of-the-czechoslovak-republic-and-its-fortunes-in-years-1920-1948/ accessed 8 
January 2017.
??????????????????????????????????????????????
constitutional court in the meaning speci-
???????????????????????????????????????????
Court founded by the Austrian Constitution 
of 1 October 1920 started working earlier 
than the Czechoslovak one.1
Sadly, the work of the Czechoslovak Consti-
tutional Court had been interrupted during 
the Nazi occupation of our country and sub-
?????????????????????????? ??????????????
until 1992, when the Federal Constitutional 
Court started working again. But it did not 
last long because, at the end of that year, 
it was clear that Czechs and Slovaks would 
“get divorced” peacefully. The Czech Con-
stitution, which came into force on 1 Janu-
ary 1993, is regarded as a follow-up to the 
1920 Czechoslovak Constitution in terms of 
values and constitutional traditions. There-
fore, it came as no surprise that it included a 
strong constitutional court.
The Court has the power to review the con-
stitutionality of statutes. It also reviews 
sub-statutory regulations. The Court’s third 
important review-of-constitutionality com-
petence concerns treaties before their rat-
???????????????????? ???? ??? ???????????? ???
exercise this competence twice in the past. 
Both cases concerned the Lisbon Treaty.
Does the Court have the power to annul 
constitutional statutes? Constitutional 
scholars are not in total agreement on this 
CZECH REPUBLIC
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topic. It is the classic dilemma of what to 
do in case of unconstitutional constitution-
al amendments. The Court had to address 
this issue only once so far. In the ?????? 
case (judgment no. Pl. ÚS 27/09 of 10. 9. 
2009), it derogated a statute which was, in 
its form, a constitutional one. It was an ad 
hoc constitutional statute on shortening the 
??????????????????????????????????????????-
ties. The Parliament did not intend to follow 
the constitutionally foreseen mechanism on 
the dissolution of the House. And it enacted 
a constitutional statute by which it shortened 
?????????????????????????????????????????????-
????????????????????????????????????????????-
plaint. The Court observed, simply put, that 
this statute did not satisfy the necessary cri-
teria to qualify as a statute, not setting a gen-
erally applicable rule of law. In the Court’s 
view, this “statute” amounted to a one-time 
“rupture” in the Constitution, circumvent-
ing the provisions contained in the Consti-
tution appropriate for the situation at hand. 
For these reasons, the Court, whose task is 
to protect constitutionality, had to annul it. 
The absolute majority of the Court’s work 
covers decision-making on individual con-
stitutional complaints. On average, the Court 
receives 4.000 of them every year. More-
over, the 15-member Court had managed to 
decide nearly the same number of cases in 
the past two years. In 2016, the Court found 
a constitutional violation in nearly 200 cases. 
In these cases, the Court had to annul deci-
sions of ordinary courts and return the case 
to them for a new decision. 
In addition to these oft-used competences, 
the Court has several others, e.g. to protect 
the self-governing regions against unlawful 
interferences of the state with its right to 
self-government; to resolve certain elector-
al matters; or to decide on the impeachment 
of the President. The Czech Constitution 
counts on the Court to be an effective pro-
tector of constitutionality. For that reason, 
the Constitution entrusted the Court with 
necessary competences, making it a key 
constitutional actor.
2???????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
President and Its Dangers in Czech Setting)” (Pithart.cz, 20 February 2012) http://www.pithart.cz/archiv_textu_detail.pp?id=518 accessed 27 January 2017.
3????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????
case is pending before the Supreme Court.
The Constitution originally established a 
rather typical parliamentary form of gov-
ernment with the slightly stronger role of 
????????????????????????????????????????????
executive used to be fully dependent on the 
Parliament. The Government can only exist 
??? ????? ??? ??? ???????? ???? ?????????? ??? ????
Parliament’s House of Deputies. And both 
houses of the Parliament (i.e. including 
members of the Parliament’s Senate) used 
to elect the President. But in 2012, the Con-
stitution was amended, introducing direct 
election of the President. Since there was 
no persuasive constitutional reason for such 
a change, it was most likely a result of con-
troversies linked to the way the presidential 
election was carried out in the Parliament.
This change was criticized by many consti-
tutional lawyers as non-systemic and desta-
bilizing for the constitutional system. For-
mer Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia and 
former President of the Parliament’s Senate 
Petr Pithart once wrote that the direct elec-
tion of the President is like “semtex” put in 
the bedrock of our Constitution.2 Given the 
fact that the Czech Republic is a parliamen-
tary republic, providing the President with 
strong legitimacy deriving from the people 
creates tensions (similar to so-called co-
habitation known from other constitutional 
systems) between the President on the one 
hand and Parliament and Government on 
the other. The Constitution itself says that 
the Government is the highest body of the 
executive power. That is why most import-
ant President’s actions within the executive 
power must be countersigned by the Prime 
Minister or a member of the Government 
designated by him. This, however, does 
??????????????????????????????????????????????
elected President, who needs to appeal to 
voters and to achieve political goals set by 
electoral agenda.
The presidency of Miloš Zeman proves 
Petr Pithart was right. The current Presi-
dent “stretches” his competences in con-
tradiction with their meaning and purpose 
in our constitutional system. This resulted 
??? ???????? ?????????? ????????? ?????????????
of Prime Minister Rusnok against a count-
er-majority in the Parliament which led to 
his Government’s failure in a vote of con-
???????? ?????????? ??? ???????? ???????????
nominated by their universities for pro-
fessorship, etc.). Despite the “scratches” 
it has suffered lately, the Constitution has 
not “exploded,” yet. And luckily, it keeps 
?????????????????????????????????????????-
enced by Poland and Hungary.
DEVELOPMENTS AND  
CONTROVERSIES IN 2016
One certainly cannot argue that there was 
no constitutional controversy to speak of 
in 2016. The absolute majority of them 
concerned the executive. One might even 
argue that the executive has been in the 
form of constitutional transition since the 
2012 changes concerning the position of 
the President. Many of the controversies 
demonstrated this “off-stage transition,” re-
???????????????????????????????????????????
Government and the President. 
Just to name some of the controversies, the 
President became a defendant in a civil def-
amation case because he said publicly that 
the late Ferdinand Peroutka, one of the most 
prominent Czech writers and publicists of 
the 20th century, wrote an article admiring 
Adolf Hitler, calling him “a gentleman.” 
This case led to many questions concerning 
the liability of the President for false state-
??????? ???????????????????????????????????
the President himself or the state?3 There 
was another controversy closely related to 
the President. More than 60 deputies came 
up with a draft bill to re-criminalize defa-
mation of the President. One might ques-
tion whether this draft bill goes against our 
constitutional traditions in the protection of 
free speech or not. 
One more controversy we would like to 
???????? ??????? ????????? ???? ????????? ???
Finance Andrej Babiš. He happens to be a 
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multimillionaire. And he owns several of 
the most prominent Czech media and one 
of the major business corporations. In 2016, 
?????????????????????????????????????????-
terest (labeled as “Lex Babiš”) which pro-
hibits active politicians from owning media 
and limits their ability to engage in business 
activities (for example, their companies are 
not eligible for state subsidies). It will be an 
often-raised question even in 2017 whether 
such a regulation conforms to the constitu-
tion or not.
From all the possible options, we chose 
one particular 2016 controversy for further 
analysis – the idea to constitutionally en-
trench the right to possess and bear arms to 
protect the country. In accordance with the 
draft bill, there should be a new provision 
in the Constitutional Act on State’s Secu-
rity reading: The Citizens of the Czech Re-
public have a right to obtain, possess and 
bear arms and ammunition in order to pro-
tect lives, health, and property, and to take 
part in securing domestic order, security 
and protection of territorial integrity, sov-
ereignty and democratic foundations of the 
Czech Republic. Conditions and details are 
set by a statute. 
This draft bill left many startled. It is not easy 
to grasp what led the Ministry of Interior to 
come up with such a piece of legislation. 
???? ?????? ???? ??????????????? ?????? ?????
a new constitutional right resembling the 
2nd Amendment to the U.S. Constitution? 
 
And why have it in the Constitutional Act 
on State’s Security? There are no other 
constitutional rights in this act whatsoever. 
Ministry of Interior noted that in the wake 
of terrorist attacks in Europe, it is much 
more effective for the ordinary citizens who 
have a gun permit to act and protect them-
selves and fellow citizens against terror. 
The Ministry observed that the possibility 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
if there is an active and timely defense, not 
necessarily carried out by security forces.
4 The full text of the judgment in English is available here: http://www.usoud.cz/en/decisions/20160614-pl-us-715-civil-partnership-as-preclusion-to-individ-
ual-adoption-of-a-child/.
5 ???????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the Judgment *Really* Good News for LGBTQ?” (Int’l J. Const L. Blog, 29 July 2016) http://www.iconnectblog.com/2016/07/czech-constitutional-court-
czech-law-forbidding-registered-partners-to-adopt-children-is-unconstitutional-but-is-the-judgment-really-good-news-for-lgbtq accessed 27 January 2017.
The problem with this draft bill is that it 
does not seem to be legally necessary. The 
sub-constitutional law already allows what 
the Ministry of Interior would like the Par-
liament to legislate. Classic criminal law 
concepts of self-defense and emergency 
???????? ?????????? ??????????? ???? ???? ??????
the Ministry of Interior intends to address. 
???? ?????? ????? ?? ??????????????? ?????-
ment in a pretty peaceful “heart of Europe,” 
then? Some argue that it might be a reaction 
to the EU’s intentions to limit gun rights. Or 
that it might be an easy attempt by the In-
terior Minister to gain political points. One 
way or the other, we do not think that this 
draft bill is consistent with European con-
stitutional traditions. There is no “pressing 
social need” to introduce such a constitu-
tionally protected right. It is already, in sub-
??????????????????????????????????????????????
law. Nevertheless, the draft bill remains in 
the legislative process. And despite heavy 
criticism, the Czech Republic may become 
???????????????????????????????????????????-
ognize its own version of the “right to bear 
arms.”
     
IV. MAJOR CASES
??????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????? ????????
these four because, in our opinion, they 
are the most relevant from the comparative 
point of view. Two of them are plenary 
judgments. In these two, the Court re-
viewed the constitutionality of an enacted 
law. The remaining two are judgments 
on individual constitutional complaints. 
Discussion of the selected cases follows in 
their chronological order.
 
LGBTQ Rights (judgment no. Pl. ÚS 7/15 
of 14. 6. 2016)
In this judgment,4 the Court granted the mo-
tion of the Prague Municipal Court for the 
annulment of Section 13 (2) of the Act on 
Registered Partnership (“the Act”). This pro-
vision precluded the adoption of a child to 
persons living in a registered partnership. 
The crux of the case was that the Civil Code 
allows adoption by a single person. But the 
Act explicitly precluded that such a person 
lives in a registered partnership. The law 
took the possibility to adopt a child away 
for those who entered registered partnership. 
The Court came to the conclusion that the 
law violated the right to human dignity. It 
held in the judgment that the Act excluded 
??????????????????????????????? ????????????
registered partnership, from the enjoyment 
of a right. And it made them de facto “second 
class citizens.” In the Court’s view, the law 
implied registered partners’ inferiority. And 
apparently, even an inability to take care of 
children properly.
As we wrote elsewhere,5 we endorse the ver-
dict. But the Court’s reasoning is not con-
vincing. Initially, the Court worked with the 
right to private and family life in conjunction 
with the prohibition of discrimination. But 
this line of argumentation was unexpectedly 
left out. The Court surprisingly twisted the 
reasoning to the protection of human dignity. 
This U-turn was probably motivated by the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
the Court’s view, the family is not a social 
construct. It is primarily a biological one 
covering only the cohabitation of parents 
with their children, and other forms of co-
habitation emulating the biological parental 
ties (e.g. adoption, foster care, etc.). These 
passages of the judgment are in sharp con-
tradiction with the understanding of family 
life in the case-law of the European Court 
of Human Rights (hereinafter “ECtHR”). 
It accepts that stable relationships of same-
sex couples fall within the notion of “family 
life.” The Court made no attempt to make a 
distinction of the case from the Strasbourg 
case-law. It probably did not intend to pro-
vide any foundations for future cases con-
cerning LGBTQ rights (such as second-par-
ent adoption). For these reasons, we are 
afraid that the judgment is actually more of a 
loss for the LGBTQ community than a win.
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IV. 2. Freedom of Expression of Judges and 
Their Political Activities (case no. I. ÚS 
2617/15 of 5. 9. 2016) 
The applicant is a judge. He owns a cottage 
in a little village. There were municipal elec-
tions, and he entered the pre-election cam-
paign. He personally made and distributed 
???????????????????????????????????????? ????
elections, the political parties taking part in 
them, and their individual candidates. After 
the elections, he wrote an article in a local 
magazine to address the election results and 
possible coalition alternatives. He also spec-
ulated who could become the village’s may-
or. The President of the Prague Municipal 
Court, where the applicant served as a judge, 
????????????????????????????????????????????
the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme 
Administrative Court found that he had en-
dangered judicial dignity and abused his 
judicial position to pursue his private inter-
ests. But the Disciplinary Chamber did not 
impose any disciplinary sanction.
?????????????? ???????????????????????????????
against this decision. He argued that his free-
dom of expression had been breached. The 
Court made it clear that judges do enjoy the 
freedom of expression, but it referred to the 
case-law of ECtHR to stress that judges have 
special duties of loyalty and discretion. They 
are necessary prerequisites for the proper 
and effective functioning of the independent 
and impartial judiciary which enjoys public 
trust.
The Court observed that the duty of discre-
tion is important because of our historical 
experience with the communist regime. It is 
vital for the judges to stay as far away from 
the political competition as possible. Judges 
should comment on politics with restraint. It 
is always necessary to determine whether the 
judge’s expression contradicted the values of 
a democratic legal order. Or whether it vi-
olated the public trust in the independence 
and impartiality of the judiciary. Judges must 
abide by these rules even in private life. But 
???????? ?????????????? ??? ?????? ???????????
matter. One needs to be stricter if a judge 
???????????? ??????? ???? ????? ??? ??? ???? ??? ??
judge. The same applies if the expression is 
made to a group of people who know that the 
person talking to them is a judge. On the oth-
er hand, expressions of judges concerning 
administration and organization of the judi-
ciary enjoy a high level of protection. In this 
particular case, the Court concluded that the 
applicant failed to observe his duty of discre-
????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????
political party. He strongly entered the pub-
lic debate by publishing an article in local 
media which was linked to his judicial posi-
tion. Therefore, he actively, openly, and ex-
cessively entered the political competition. 
The Court considered that wrong. It found 
no violation of the applicant’s freedom of 
expression. 
IV. 3. Admission of Legal Trainees with 
Foreign Legal Education to the Bar (case 
no. II. ÚS 443/16 of 25. 10. 2016)
The applicant obtained his law degree from 
Jagiellonian University in Krakow. But he 
wanted to practice law in the Czech Repub-
lic. He requested the Czech Bar Associa-
tion (hereinafter “CBA”) to register him in 
the register of legal trainees. But the CBA 
declined to do so. Czech law provides that 
graduates of foreign law schools may be reg-
istered if 1) their law degree is recognized 
as equivalent to the Czech one by the Minis-
try of Education, and 2) the contents and the 
scope of their law degree corresponds to a 
Czech law degree. In the CBA’s view, the ap-
plicant did not satisfy the second condition, 
because he only knew Polish law. 
The applicant sued CBA. He requested the 
Court to order CBA to register him. But even 
the ordinary courts thought that he had no 
right to be registered. Courts did not agree 
with the applicant that his right to be admitted 
to the Czech Bar results from EU law. They 
argued that the case-law of the Court of Jus-
tice of the EU (hereinafter “ECJ”) provides 
member states with a large room to maneuver 
in recognition of foreign law degrees.
???? ?????????? ????? ?? ??????????????? ???-
plaint. The Court ruled in his favor. It found 
a violation of the freedom to choose an occu-
pation. It is not only theoretical knowledge 
?????????????????????????????????????????
Lawyers also need to possess practical ex-
perience and skills. In the Court’s interpre-
tation of the ECJ’s case-law, domestic au-
thorities should not take account of only the 
???????????? ??????????????????????????????-
tion they should also consider their practical 
experience. In addition, the Court observed 
that Jagiellonian is the no. 1 law school in 
Poland. And generally, Polish legal educa-
tion, including the development of clinical 
legal education there, serves as a “golden 
standard” for legal education in Europe. 
The Court found the perspective of CBA 
to be too narrow. Despite not having been 
formally admitted to the Czech Bar, the ap-
plicant had practiced law for many years. 
His law degree was a high-quality one. The 
Court added that it was the business of a le-
gal trainee’s supervisor, whom she hires as 
a trainee. It is the Bar exam where a trainee 
must prove his knowledge and skills. There-
fore it was not proportionate to reject the ap-
plicant’s registration. The Court found that 
the rejection did not meet the criterion of ne-
cessity as the second stage of proportionali-
ty assessment. There was one option which 
?????? ??????? ???? ???? ???????? ??? ???? ????
(safeguarding the quality of legal services), 
and at the same time, it would be less restric-
tive to the applicant’s right: to register him 
and let him practice under the supervision of 
an attorney-trainer, who would be responsi-
ble for everything the trainee does.        
IV. 4. The Right to Privacy and Access to 
Information in Communist Secret Service 
Archives (case no. Pl. ÚS 3/14 of 20. 12. 
2016)
It is an important part of the transition to 
democracy to allow the public access to the 
documents produced by law enforcement of 
the former totalitarian regime. In the Czech 
Republic, this access is granted by Act on 
Archives (hereinafter “Archive Law”). It 
provides that, unlike other archive docu-
ments, the access to archives of totalitarian 
police cannot be prevented by the people 
whose personal data are contained in those 
materials. One such person sued the Czech 
Republic for compensation of immaterial 
harm caused by granting access to archive 
materials to a journalist. The case arrived 
before the Supreme Court, which came to a 
conclusion that the relevant provision of Ar-
chive Law is a disproportionate limitation to 
privacy. And it referred the case to the Court.
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The Court decided that the law at hand was 
fully compatible with the Constitution. Ac-
???????? ??? ???? ??????? ?????? ??? ?? ???????????
difference between granting access to per-
sonal data contained in archive documents 
???? ?????? ?????????????????? ???? ???????????
public access to the archive documents, it 
does not automatically allow their publica-
tion. Even repeated individual access by dif-
ferent people to archive documents is not the 
same as their publication since it represents 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????
privacy of persons whose personal data are 
at stake. According to the Court, this differ-
ence was clear also in the case decided by 
the Supreme Court, where the publication of 
the information gathered in the archives was 
stopped after the affected person refused to 
give their consent to it. Mere access of the 
journalist to the archive documents could not 
cause defamation since the information was 
not made public and thus could not affect the 
reputation of the affected person.
The decision of the Court is very important 
for drawing a clear line between individual 
access to information and their publication. 
In this way, the public is guaranteed “the 
right to know” without automatic destruction 
of one’s reputation. This principle is appli-
cable in several areas besides archives, like 
freedom of information, investigative jour-
nalism, and others.
Seven judges concurred with the majority 
reasoning, stating that the unlimited access 
to archives of the Communist Secret Service, 
although in the form of individual requests, 
would be a disproportionate limitation of 
privacy. However, according to the minority 
opinion, there is a special provision in Act 
on Access to Archives of the Communist Se-
cret Service which is applicable and grants 
at least a moderate level of protection to in-
dividuals whose personal information is con-
tained in the archives.
CONCLUSION
The two mentioned cases reviewing the con-
stitutionality of legislation serve as evidence 
of the growing importance of ordinary courts 
in judicial review. Both cases were referred 
to the Court by other courts. In 2015 and 
2016 combined, ordinary courts asked the 
Court to review the constitutionality of ap-
plied law in 20 cases, many of which have 
not been decided yet. 
In all four discussed cases, the Court has 
protected the constituent values of the Czech 
???????????????????????????????????????-
???? ???????????????????????????????????????-
lap with other situations, especially based 
on more general considerations made by the 
Court. 
Considering the latest developments in Po-
land and Hungary, we appreciate that the 
Court retained its independence and a mod-
erate level of activism, preserving its posi-
tion as the most important safeguard of de-
mocracy and the rule of law in the Czech 
Republic. Even though many acts of the 
current president Miloš Zeman were very 
controversial, the timely and balanced ap-
pointment of judges of the Court was one of 
his most positive achievements.
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DEVELOPMENTS IN FINNISH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Laura Kirvesniemi, Ph.D. student, University of Helsinki; Milka Sormunen, Ph.D. student, 
University of Helsinki; and Tuomas Ojanen, Professor of Constitutional Law, University 
of Helsinki
INTRODUCTION
The year 2016 was unprecedented, even 
tumultuous, in terms of constitutional law 
and human rights in Finland. Several rea-
??????????????????? ???????????????????????
applications,1 the country’s economic prob-
lems and problems related to the quality of 
law-making and the desire by the sitting 
Government to catch up with the ‘reform 
debt’ as much as possible in the current 
?????????? ??????????????? ??? ???????? ???-
stitutional turbulence during 2016.
In addition, some legislative proposals by 
the Government deliberately tested the ex-
treme limits of the Constitution and human 
??????? ?????????? ????????????? ??? ???? ????? ???
asylum legislation, where the Government 
wanted to diminish Finland’s (alleged) ap-
peal to asylum seekers. Such a ‘race-to-the-
bottom’ is in contrast to an earlier approach 
by the Finnish legislature that has even 
involved efforts to bend the domestic im-
plementation of EU law to secure the effec-
tive protection of fundamental and human 
rights.2
This report provides an overview of practice 
by the Constitutional Law Committee of 
Parliament and the case law of the highest 
courts: the Supreme Court and the Supreme 
1 A total of 5,657 persons (2015: 32,476) applied for asylum in Finland in 2016. However, appeals against 
negative asylum decisions by the Immigration Service started really pending before courts – the Ad-
ministrative Court of Helsinki and the Supreme Administrative Court – in 2016. For statistics regarding 
asylum applications, see ??????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????.
2 Tuomas Ojanen, ‘The European Arrest Warrant in the Midnight Sun. The Implementation and Appli-
cation of the EAW in Finland.’ In: Guild E, Marin L (eds) Still Not Resolved? Constitutional Issues of the 
European Arrest Warrant, (2009), Wolf Legal Publishers, 143.
3??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
in English at ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
4 Juha Lavapuro, Tuomas Ojanen and Martin Scheinin, ‘Rights-Based Constitutionalism in Finland and 
the Development of Pluralist Constitutional Review’ [2011] 9 Intl J Cons L 505.
Administrative Court. The necessity to take 
notice of the Constitutional Law Committee 
alongside the Courts owes to the existence 
of a pluralist system of constitutional re-
view in which the primary role is played by 
abstract ex ante review of legislation by the 
Committee whereas concrete ex post review 
by the Courts assumes a secondary role.
    
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
PLURALIST MODEL OF CON-
STITUTIONAL REVIEW WITH A 
LIMITED ROLE FOR COURTS
The Constitution of Finland (Act No. 
731/1999)3 entered into force on 1 March 
2000. The contemporary state of Finnish 
constitutionalism is characterized by multi-
faceted interplay and tension between con-
stitutional tradition revolving around legis-
lative supremacy and the understanding of 
democracy as majority rule, on the one hand, 
and tendencies towards rights-based review 
of legislation and commitments to European-
ization and internationalism, on the other.4
For a long time, courts had a marginal role 
on the Finnish scene of constitutionalism, 
including the prohibition of judicial review 
of the Acts of Parliament for their compati-
bility with the Constitution. Such traditional 
features have increasingly been challenged 
FINLAND
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since the late 1980s by the incorporation of 
the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) in 1990, the accession to the Euro-
pean Union (EU) in 1995, as well as sever-
al constitutional reforms between 1995 and 
2011, most notably the reform of the domes-
tic system for the protection of constitutional 
rights  in 1995.5 As a result of the reform, the 
catalogue of fundamental rights in Chapter 2 
of the Constitution is comprehensive, setting 
out a range of economic, social, cultural and 
‘third-generation’ rights alongside more tra-
ditional civil and political rights. Rights are 
granted to everyone, with an exception only 
with regard to freedom of movement (Sect. 9) 
and certain electoral rights (Sect. 14). The do-
mestic standard of rights protection is intend-
ed to ascend to a high level as international 
human rights treaties are ‘only’ supposed to 
set out the minimum standard of protection. 
This doctrinal premise has even compro-
mised the maximal implementation of certain 
EU legal measures in the 2000s.6
 
The constitutional tradition emphasizing the 
sovereignty of Parliament resulted already 
????????????????????????????????????????????-
pendency in 1917 in abstract ex ante constitu-
tional review of legislation by a political body 
consisting of members of Parliament, the 
Constitutional Law Committee. Currently, 
the mandate of the Committee is prescribed 
by Section 74 of the Constitution as follows: 
‘The Constitutional Law Committee shall is-
sue statements on the constitutionality of leg-
islative proposals and other matters brought 
for its consideration, as well as on their re-
lation to international human rights treaties.’
In 2016, the Committee issued 67 Opinions 
on legislative proposals or other matters, 
including proposals for EU measures. The 
Opinions by the Committee are regarded as 
de facto binding and they essentially deter-
5 Tuomas Ojanen, ‘From Constitutional Periphery Toward the Center-Transformation of Judicial Review in Finland’ [2009] Nordisk tidsskrift for mennesker-
ettigheter 194. For an early account, see Martin Scheinin, Ihmisoikeudet Suomen oikeudessa (Human Rights in Finnish Law) (Suomalainen Lakimiesyhdistys 
1991).
6 Tuomas Ojanen, ‘The European Arrest Warrant in the Midnight Sun. The Implementation and Application of the EAW in Finland’ in Guild E, Marin L (eds), Still 
Not Resolved? Constitutional Issues of the European Arrest Warrant (Wolf Legal Publishers 2009).
7 See e.g. Constitutional Law Committee Opinion 2/1990.
8 ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????. 
9 E.g. Constitutional Law Committee Opinions 20/2016, 22/2016 and 37/2016.
10 Constitutional Law Committee Opinions 58/2016 and 59/2016.
11 Constitutional Law Committee Opinions 13/2016, 28/2016, 29/2016, 33/3016 and 34/2016.
mine the proper legislative procedure of a 
given legislative proposal, i.e. whether the 
proposal may be enacted in accordance with 
the ordinary legislative procedure through a 
majority of the votes cast or whether it should 
????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????? ??????????? ???? ??? ???? ????????
with the Constitution. As the attempt is to 
avoid the use of exceptive enactments and 
to guarantee the effective protection of fun-
damental and human rights, the Committee 
often demands changes to legislative propos-
als so as to achieve harmony with the Consti-
tution and human rights obligations binding 
upon Finland.
Up until the entry into force of the current 
Constitution in 2000, courts were not allowed 
to review the constitutionality of parliamen-
tary legislation although the Constitutional 
Law Committee had well earlier started em-
phasizing the obligation of courts and author-
ities to interpret legislation in harmony with 
the Constitution and human rights treaties.7 
Moreover, international human rights treaties 
and EU membership empowered all courts to 
review the harmony of Finnish law, including 
the Constitution in the case of EU law, with 
human rights and EU law. 
Hence, the time was ripe to abandon the pro-
hibition of constitutional review by courts in 
2000 by enacting Section 106 of the Constitu-
tion that obliges courts to give primacy to the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????
the application of an Act of Parliament to be in 
evident ???????? ???????? ?????????????????????
106 is not intended to tilt the constitutional 
scale from the Constitutional Law Committee 
towards courts. Instead, Section 106 amounts 
to a form of weak judicial review that com-
bines the abstract ex ante constitutional re-
view of legislation by the Committee with the 
concrete ex post judicial review by the courts. 
In this model, the ex ante constitutional re-
view by the Committee is still supposed to 
remain the primary form of review, whereas 
judicial review under Section 106 is designed 
to plug loopholes left in the abstract ex ante 
review of the constitutionality of Government 
bills, inasmuch as unforeseen constitution-
al problems would arise in applying the law 
by the courts in particular cases. Therefore, 
the Opinions of the Committee are of great 
???????????? ???? ???? ????????? ??? ????? ???????
alongside the case law of the courts.
DEVELOPMENTS AND  
CONTROVERSIES IN 2016 
During year 2016, the Government gave to 
Parliament several bills that aroused spirit-
ed constitutional and political debate in Par-
liament, the media and civil society.8 Some 
bills pertaining to asylum and immigration 
legislation even tested deliberately the lim-
its of constitutional law and human rights as 
the Government expressly wanted to dimin-
ish the country’s appeal for asylum seekers 
by its bills. Beyond immigration, other out-
standing themes before the Constitutional 
Law Committee were legislative proposals 
or other matters pertaining to security,9 retro-
gression of economic and social rights,10 as 
well as privacy and data protection rights.11
The outcome was that several bills ran into 
????????????????????????????????????????????-
tutional Law Committee. The Committee 
presented various critical constitutional re-
marks on several bills and, in a smaller num-
ber of cases, required changes to be made to 
achieve harmony between the Constitution 
and human rights obligations and the bill to 
be considered in accordance with the ordi-
nary legislative procedure. The Commit-
tee also criticised on various occasions the 
quality of drafting, the lack of fundamental 
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rights impact assessments12 and the consti-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????
For instance, the Committee stressed that the 
aim of trying to make Finland less attractive 
for asylum seekers was not a constitutionally 
legitimate aim for weakening the rights of 
?????????????????? ????????????????????????-
cial security of immigrants.13
In December, the Chancellor of Justice 
stirred up public debate over the quality of 
drafting by estimating that an unusually high 
number of legislative proposals with consti-
tutional problems had been presented to the 
Parliament.14 He also revealed that in some 
cases his recommendations for addressing 
the constitutional problems had been ig-
????????????? ??????????? ????? ???? ??????-
ment that the resources of ministries had be-
come scarce, the Chancellor of Justice stated 
that referring to time constraints and polit-
????? ????????? ??? ?????????????? ???? ??????????
the principles of good law-making is illegit-
imate. The Government promised to address 
the problems of law-making and the Prime 
Minister presented an announcement to Par-
liament on law-making by the Government 
in February 2017.
Opinion of 55/2016 by the Constitutional 
Law Committee – discriminatory nature of 
unemployed immigrants’ integration assis-
tance
In Government Bill 169/2016, it was pro-
posed that an unemployed immigrant would, 
instead of receiving unemployment assis-
tance, be entitled to an integration assistance 
amounting to 90 percent of unemployment 
assistance. The Committee considered the 
proposal from the point of view of the prin-
ciple of equality and prohibition of discrim-
ination as well as the right to basic subsis-
tence in the event of unemployment, both 
protected by the Constitution. In its Opinion 
55/2016, the Committee found that creating 
12 E.g. Constitutional Law Committee Opinions 34/2016 and 43/2016.
13 E.g. Constitutional Law Committee Opinion 55/2016.
14 E.g. ????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????. 
15 Government action plan on asylum policy (8 December 2015), available in English at ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
turvapaikkapoliittinen_toimenpideohjelma_08122015+EN.pdf/3e555cc4-ab01-46af-9cd4-138b2ac5bad0.
16 Government Bill 2/2016.
17 Government Bill 32/2016.
18 Government Bill 43/2016.
19 Government Bill 133/2016.
a parallel system for immigrants would not 
????????????????????????????????????????????????
discrimination (Sect. 6 of the Constitution). 
However, the Committee considered the 
proposal to be discriminatory since the lev-
el of integration assistance would have been 
lower than assistance provided for other un-
employed persons. Unemployed immigrants 
would consequently be treated differently on 
the grounds of their origin, i.e. immigration 
status, which Sect 6 expressly prohibits.
The Committee noted that austerity measures 
???? ??? ????????? ??? ?????? ??? ????????? ???-
tress. However, the aim of providing savings 
for the public sector could not in this case 
justify limiting equality before the law. Fur-
thermore, the Committee did not deem cred-
ible the suggestion of the Government bill 
that lowering basic subsistence would con-
tribute to the integration of immigrants. The 
means were thus not suitable for achieving 
the aim. Following the Opinion of the Com-
mittee, the Government bill was withdrawn. 
The case raised considerable attention and 
criticism about the quality of law-making.
Opinions 24/2016, PeVL 43/2016 and PeVL 
48/2016 of the Constitutional Law Commit-
tee – weakening legal protection of asylum 
seekers
The Aliens Act of 2004 (Act No. 301/2004) 
was amended several times in 2016. The 
amendments were based on the Government 
action plan on asylum policy, the central 
aims of which include stopping the ‘uncon-
???????????????????????????????????????????-
????????????????????????????????????????????
additional category guaranteeing protection 
for those who do not qualify as refugees or 
?????????? ??? ??????????? ??????????????? ??-
moved.16 Second, protection under the law 
was weakened in several ways.17 Third, cri-
?????????????????????????????????????????????
by broadening the application of the require-
ment for means of support.18 This amend-
ment affects especially children and other 
persons in a vulnerable position. Fourthly, a 
new interim measure, designated residence, 
was introduced.19 
The Committee proposed several changes 
that improved asylum seekers’ legal status, 
especially that of unaccompanied minor asy-
lum seekers. Concerning protection under 
the law, the Committee required in its Opin-
ion 24/2016 that an unaccompanied minor 
asylum seeker be automatically offered le-
gal aid; originally, it was proposed that legal 
aid for asylum seekers, even for children, 
be provided in the asylum interview only if 
exceptionally weighty reasons existed. Re-
garding designated residence of children, the 
Committee required in its Opinion 48/2016 
that the maximum duration be shortened, 
conditions for deciding how many times a 
day the person has to report be added and the 
last resort nature of detention be underlined.
Even though the Committee accepted the 
legislative amendments and many of the 
improvements proposed by the Committee 
were conducted, the compatibility of some 
of the amendments with human rights obli-
gations still remains questionable, especially 
to the extent that the tightening of the crite-
????????????????????????????????????????????-
gal protection, too, was weakened in many 
ways, and it is questionable whether amend-
ments to legal protection amount to such a 
considerable retrogression that the amend-
?????? ???? ??? ???????? ????? ???? ?????????????
and human rights.
Immigration matters in the Supreme Admin-
istrative Court
Due to the increased number of asylum appli-
cations and the Government’s tightened im-
migration policy, the Supreme Administra-
tive Court adjudicated an exceptionally high 
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number of immigration matters.20 The Court 
referred several cases back to the Immigra-
tion Service. In KHO:2016:53, the Court 
found that the principle of non-refoulement 
prevented the transfer of an asylum seeker 
to Hungary, where he had been registered. 
According to Regulation 604/2013 (Dublin 
III), Hungary was primarily responsible for 
examining the asylum application. The court 
compared the case law of the Court of Justice 
of the EU (CJEU)21 and the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR)22 to national case 
law in other EU member states concerning 
transfers to Hungary under Dublin III and 
to recent country information. The court 
concluded that particularly vulnerable per-
sons cannot be transferred to Hungary due 
to problems in reception conditions. X had 
arrived in Hungary through Serbia, which 
Hungary considered to be a safe country. 
There was a possibility of X being returned 
from Hungary to Serbia and further to Af-
ghanistan without having his asylum appli-
cation examined.
In KHO:2016:81, the Court could not ex-
clude the possibility that an Iranian asylum 
seeker’s apostasy from Islam could cause 
a need for international protection as pre-
scribed in the Aliens Act. In KHO:2016:155, 
the Court assessed whether Z had secure 
means of support, which are required for 
issuing a residence permit unless otherwise 
provided. The Court relied on the Family Re-
????????????????????? ????????????? ???? ????
case law of the CJEU.23 The Court noted that 
?????????????? ??? ??????? ????????????? ??? ????
general rule and the State’s power to require 
evidence of stable and regular resources must 
be applied narrowly. In KHO:2016:194, the 
Court assessed whether the applicant, a Sun-
ni Muslim, should receive subsidiary protec-
tion instead of being returned to Baghdad. 
The Court reviewed several country reports 
20 Immigration matters were the largest type of matter in the Supreme Administrative Court (38% out of all incoming matters).
21 C-394/12 Shamso Abdullahi v Bundesasylamt [2013]; C-695/15 PPU-Mirza [2016].
22 Halimi v Austria and Italy App no 53852/11 (ECtHR 18 June 2013); Mohammed Hussein v Netherlands and Italy App no 27725/10 (ECtHR 2 April 2013); 
Tarakhel v Switzerland App no 29217/12 (ECtHR 4 November 2014); Mohammadi v Austria App no 71932/12 (ECtHR 3 July 2014).
23 C-356/11 and C-357/11 O et al [2012]; C-358/14 Mimoun Khachab [2016].
24??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????
25 J.K. et al v Sweden App no 59166/12 (ECtHR, 23 August 2016); A.A.M. v Sweden App no 68519/10 (ECtHR, 3 April 2014); S.A. v Sweden App no 66523/10 
(ECtHR, 27 June 2013); ?????????? ???????????????????????App nos 8319/07 and 11449/07 (ECtHR, 28 June 2011).
26 C-465/07 Elgafaji [2009]; C-285/12 Diakité [2014].
27 C-293/12 Digital Rights Ireland [2014]; C-362/14 Schrems [2015].
on Iraq24 and referred to the case law of the 
???????????????????????????????????????????-
dividual threat’25 and to the case law of the 
CJEU26????????????????????????????????????-
tive (2011/95/EU). The Court concluded that 
there were substantial grounds for believing 
that the applicant, if returned to Baghdad, 
would face a real risk of being subjected to 
serious harm as a result of indiscriminate vi-
olence.
MAJOR CASES
Opinion 1/2016 of the Constitutional Law 
Committee – State Forest Enterprise and 
Sami land rights
Act on State Forest Enterprise (Act No. 
234/2016) was fully amended in 2016. State 
Forest Enterprise is operating in the admin-
istrative sector of the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Forestry. The Constitutional Law Com-
mittee pointed out in its Opinion 1/2016 that 
Sami rights are not mentioned in the govern-
ment bill even though the proposal affects 
the rights of the Sami. According to Section 
17 of the Constitution, the Sami, as an indig-
enous people, have the right to maintain and 
develop their own language and culture. Sec-
tion 17 guarantees the practice of traditional 
Sami livelihoods such as reindeer herding. 
The Committee noted that the Government 
???? ?????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????
on the Sami domicile area nor a prohibition 
of retrogression of the Sami culture, and that 
international human rights obligations sup-
port the inclusion of such provisions. How-
ever, the Committee concluded that the Act 
can be passed in accordance with the ordi-
nary legislative procedure. The enactment of 
the new Act was criticised for violating Sami 
rights.
Opinions 2/2016, 28/2016 and 33/2016 
of the Constitutional Law Committee – 
non-discrimination, privacy and EUCFR
The Constitutional Law Committee reviewed 
several proposals for EU measures on priva-
cy and referred in this context to the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the EU (EUCFR). 
In its Opinion 2/2016 on Government Com-
munication 1/2016 on the proposal for a Reg-
ulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council amending the Schengen borders 
code, the Committee noted that the proposal 
had an impact on certain rights protected in 
the EUCFR: the respect for private and fam-
ily life (Art 7), protection of personal data 
(Art 8), as well as freedom of movement and 
of residence (Art 45). The Committee found 
that the proposal fundamentally changes 
treatment of EU citizens (and to a certain ex-
tent that of non-EU citizens) on the borders 
of the EU. Border checks as such were not 
considered problematic. However, the Com-
mittee noted the importance of prohibition 
of discrimination (Art 20 and 21 EUCFR) 
????????????????????????????????????????????
should be conducted based on an individual 
risk assessment.
In its Opinion 28/2016 on Government Com-
munication 22/2016 on the proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council (smart borders) and Opinion 
33/2016 on the Government Communica-
tion 30/2016 on the European Commission 
proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council (Eurodac), 
the Committee noted that both systems inter-
fere with the right to privacy and protection 
of personal data. In the Committee’s view, 
attention should be paid to CJEU cases Dig-
ital Rights Ireland and Schrems27 as well as 
future case law of the CJEU. These cases 
indicate that need for safeguards is all the 
greater where personal data is subjected to 
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automatic processing and where there is a 
??????????? ????? ??? ????????? ??????? ??? ?????
data. The Committee held that the most cen-
tral question is related to registering of bio-
??????????????????
Opinion 9/2016 of the Constitutional Law 
Committee???????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????
In Government Bill 1/2016, it was proposed 
????? ?????????????????????????????????????
fees be increased. This, as the Committee 
noted, interferes with the right to property. 
The aim of the amendment was to increase 
revenues of the State. The Committee found 
????? ??????????? ?????????????? ???? ???????????
????????????????????????????????????????????-
damental rights system were not presented 
even though they would have been required, 
especially from the perspective of criminal 
law.
KKO:2016:20 – Compensation for a viola-
tion of human rights and fundamental rights
In KKO:2016:20, the Supreme Court con-
sidered whether the applicant was entitled to 
compensation due to violations of his funda-
mental and human rights. A’s residence per-
mit application had been rejected, and conse-
quently A had been deported. The decisions 
had been based on the opinion of the Finnish 
Security Intelligence Service, the grounds of 
???????????????????????????????????????????-
tion. The Supreme Court noted that the Ad-
ministrative Court should have familiarised 
itself with the grounds of the opinion. The 
Supreme Court referred to the case law of 
the ECtHR on the interpretation of article 13 
of the ECHR and concluded that A’s human 
rights, in particular the right to an effective 
remedy, had been violated. The Supreme 
Court held that A should receive compensa-
tion for the violation of his fundamental and 
human rights.
KKO:2016:24 and KKO:2016:25 – Legality 
of non-medical male circumcision
Finland does not have legislation on 
non-medical male circumcision. In 2016, the 
Supreme Court attempted to draw guidelines 
????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
28??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of male child circumcision. The Court stat-
ed that it was unfortunate that there is no 
legislation governing non-medical male cir-
cumcision in Finland nor explicit guidelines 
emanating from international conventions 
binding on Finland or from the case law of 
the ECtHR. In the Supreme Court’s opinion, 
the question of non-medical male circumci-
sion cannot be covered comprehensively by 
court decisions in individual cases. Instead, 
thorough evaluation in a legislative drafting 
process would be required, taking also into 
account possible penal sanctions.
KHO:2016:180 – Primacy of the Constitu-
tion and applicability of the EUCFR
In KHO:2016:180, the Supreme Administra-
tive Court assessed whether the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(EUCFR) was applicable and whether there 
????????????????????????????????????????? ??-
stitution) between an Act of Parliament and 
the Constitution. A surtax of 6 percent had 
been imposed on C’s pension income above 
45.000 euros. In his appeal, C submitted that 
the applied provisions of the Tax Income 
Act (Act No. 1535/1992) violated the pro-
hibition of discrimination on grounds of age 
under EU law and the Finnish Non-Discrim-
ination Act (Act No. 21/2004) and therefore 
???????????????????????? ?????????????????????
Constitution on equality before the law. The 
Court requested the Court of Justice of the 
EU (ECJ) to give a preliminary ruling on the 
applicability of EU law on non-discrimina-
tion.28 The ECJ found that EU law, including 
the EUCFR, was not applicable in the case. 
The Supreme Administrative Court noted 
that that provisions regarding the surtax on 
pension income were at least partly based on 
person’s age. However, the Court found that 
the provisions had a legitimate aim, namely 
funding of welfare services and economic 
stability, and that imposing a higher tax rate 
???????????????????????????????????????????
in particular in times of economic hardship. 
The provisions of Tax Income Act were thus 
????????????????????????????????????????????.
CONCLUSION
Constitutional turbulence will most like-
ly continue during 2017. Currently, several 
working groups appointed by the Govern-
ment are preparing legislation regarding 
civil and military intelligence, including 
their legal and parliamentary oversight. In 
October 2016, the working group of the 
Ministry of Justice gave its report on the 
necessity to amend the provisions on the se-
?????? ??? ???????????? ??????????????? ?????
down in the Constitution for the purpose of 
allowing legislation on civil and military in-
telligence. The working group assessed that 
the Constitution does not allow to enact by 
ordinary legislation such limitations to the 
???????????????????????????????????????????
would authorize to obtain civil and military 
intelligence on serious threats necessary for 
national security. Hence, the working group 
proposed a constitutional amendment to be 
made. The proposal has raised a great deal 
of debate which will probably amplify when 
????????????????????????????????????????????-
spective work during spring 2017. Constitu-
tionally interesting times ahead. 
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FRANCE
INTRODUCTION
2016 was an important year for the French 
Conseil constitutionnel. From an organic 
viewpoint, one third of its members were 
renewed. From a substantive viewpoint, the 
new bench had to face the consequences of 
the continuing application of the state of 
emergency that has been in force since No-
vember 2015. In the 113 rulings it handed 
down, the Conseil made use of all the juris-
dictional techniques it has developed over 
the years in order to control the activities 
of a Parliament that was, despite a socialist 
majority in the National Assembly, highly 
divided. 
THE CONSTITUTION AND  
THE COURT
The drafters of the 1958 Constitution meant 
to introduce crucial changes regarding the 
way the Constitution was made binding on 
public authorities. According to Michel De-
bré, “The creation of the Conseil constitu-
tionnel manifests the will to subordinate the 
law, that is to say the will of Parliament, to 
the superior rule laid down by the Constitu-
tion. It is neither in the spirit of the parlia-
mentary system, nor in the French tradition, 
to give judges, that is to say to give every 
litigant, the right to question the value of the 
law. The project has therefore devised a spe-
cial institution that can only be set in motion 
by four authorities: the President of the Re-
public, the Prime Minister and the Presidents 
of the Houses of Parliament. To this Conseil 
1 For a general overview, see O Duhamel and G Tusseau, Droit constitutionnel et institutions politiques 
(4th ed Le Seuil 2016)
other assignments were given, including the 
review of Parliament’s standing orders, and 
the litigation related to contested elections, 
in order to avoid the scandal of partisan in-
validations. The Constitution thus created a 
weapon against the deviation of the parlia-
mentary system.”1
The Conseil consists of the former Presi-
dents of the Republic and nine appointed 
members, serving non-renewable terms of 
nine years. One-third of them are appointed 
every three years. Three, among whom is 
the President of the Conseil, are appointed 
by the President of the Republic, three by 
the President of the National Assembly, and 
three by the President of the Senate. The Par-
liament’s commissions are allowed to veto 
a nomination with a supermajority of three-
??????? ????????? ?????? ?????? ????????????
were appointed to the Conseil, among whom 
its President, Laurent Fabius, is the former 
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
???? ????????? ???????????????????????????????
French statute-centred (légicentriste) context 
is that of reviewing the constitutionality of 
legislation. The standard of constitutional re-
view is not limited to the constitutional text 
strictly understood. Since the 70-39 DC and 
the (more famous) 71-44 DC rulings, it has 
grown into a wider “constitutionality block” 
consisting of the Preamble to the Constitu-
tion, the Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and of the Citizen (1789), the Preamble to 
the Constitution of 1946, the Charter for the 
Environment, and several unwritten “fun-
damental principles acknowledged in the 
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laws of the Republic,” principles, and ob-
jectives having constitutional value (eg the 
????? ???????? ???? ????????? ???? ??????????? ???
the public order, and the pluralism of ideas, 
thoughts, and opinions). As a consequence, 
????? ?????? ???? ?????????? ?????? ????????????
rights and social “second generation” rights 
have been constitutionalised.
The constitutionality of organic acts and of 
the standing orders of the two Houses of 
Parliament are mandatorily controlled by the 
Conseil before they come into force. Other, 
ordinary statutes may be referred to the Con-
seil constitutionnel. Until the constitutional 
amendment of 2008, this facultative ex ante 
review was the only procedure to assess the 
validity of a statute. Moreover, only consti-
tutional authorities could require this con-
trol. From 1958 to 1974, the President of the 
Republic, the Prime Minister, the President 
of the National Assembly, and the President 
of the Senate were the only authorities who 
enjoyed this prerogative. In 1974, 60 dep-
uties and 60 senators were also entitled to 
require constitutional review. Granting this 
right to the opposition resulted in more nu-
merous saisines, and considerably devel-
oped constitutional justice. In these cases, 
the Conseil has one month, which can be 
shortened to eight days, to hand down its de-
cision. If the Conseil concludes that the text 
is constitutional, it can be promulgated and 
come into force. If it is declared unconsti-
tutional, in totality or in part, it cannot. In 
the case of a partial invalidity, the provisions 
that can be severed from the unconstitutional 
ones can be promulgated. The Conseil con-
trols that Parliament respects its own compe-
tence and does not encroach on the organic 
legislator’s jurisdiction nor grant too much 
discretionary power to other legal actors, and 
that the procedure following which the text 
has been adopted is the correct one. It also 
controls the content of the text, and mostly 
that human rights are respected.2 In the latter 
case, the Conseil has been adamant that “the 
Constitution does not confer on the Conseil 
Constitutionnel a general or particular dis-
cretion identical to that of Parliament” (74-
54 DC ruling). As a consequence, it mostly 
2 G Drago, Contentieux constitutionnel français (4th edn Presses universitaires de France 2016); D Rousseau, P-Y Gahdoun, and J Bonnet, Droit du conten-
tieux constitutionnel (11th edn LGDJ 2016).
quashes a statute when the balance between 
constitutional concerns results in an irratio-
nal or disproportionate curtailment of one of 
them. This general attitude of self-restraint 
contributes to alleviate possible accusations 
of ‘gouvernement des juges’ (government by 
the judges). 
Although commonly said to be satisfacto-
ry, this system has remained problematic. 
Indeed, ordinary judges are allowed, on the 
request of ordinary litigants, to set aside a 
statute that does not comply with an inter-
national norm, whereas the Conseil con-
stitutionnel, which enjoys a monopoly to 
quash a statute for its incompatibility with 
the Constitution, can only do so before it is 
promulgated and only at the request of a few 
political actors. Once a statute has escaped 
this control, its constitutionality can never 
be questioned. This changed in 2008, when 
the “priority preliminary ruling on the issue 
of constitutionality” (question prioritaire de 
constitutionnalité?????? ???? ?????????????
Concretely, “If, during proceedings in prog-
ress before a court of law, it is claimed that a 
legislative provision infringes the rights and 
freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, the 
matter may be referred by the Conseil d’Etat 
or by the Cour de Cassation to the Conseil 
constitutionnel” (article 61-1 of the Consti-
tution). The litigant who wants to invoke 
the unconstitutionality of a statute needs to 
prove that the statute applies to the suit, that 
it has never been declared constitutional by 
the Conseil constitutionnel (or, if that is the 
case, that the circumstances have changed; 
see eg 2010-14/22 QPC ruling), and that the 
question is not devoid of any seriousness. If 
???? ?????? ??? ????????? ????? ?????? ???????????
conditions are met, they immediately trans-
???? ???? ???? ??? ???? ????????? ???????? ???????
?????????????????????????????????????????????
Once the question has been transferred, the 
Conseil has three months to decide follow-
ing a truly adversarial procedure and after 
a public oral hearing. Consequently, as of 1 
January 2017, 603 QPC decisions had been 
handed down. In this case of ex post review, 
a declaration of unconstitutionality results in 
the derogation of the pre-existing norm. The 
latter is cancelled for the future, and the Con-
seil is allowed to postpone the effects of the 
derogation it pronounces. 
DEVELOPMENTS AND  
CONTROVERSIES IN 2016
Two main constitutional controversies 
emerged from the case law of 2016.
????????? ??? ???????? ??? ???? ????? ???????? ?????
??????????????????????????????????????????????
issued in connection with the state of emer-
gency. These decisions are evidently im-
portant because of the pressure this situa-
tion places on French society, the state, and 
constitutionalism. The state of emergency is 
a measure of exception that can be decided 
by the Council of Ministers, in application 
of an Act of 3rd of April 1955, in situations 
involving imminent danger resulting from 
serious breaches of public order or in cir-
cumstances which, due to their nature and 
seriousness, have the character of public 
disaster. Its initial implementation is limit-
ed to 12 days. It can be extended only by a 
statute. It enables the Minister of the Interior 
and its local representatives (préfets) to limit 
or prohibit circulation in some places, forbid 
public meetings or close public places, au-
thorize administrative searches and seizures, 
??????????????????????????????????????????
or detain someone under house arrest. After 
the terrorist attacks of the 13th of Novem-
ber 2015, a meeting of the Council of Min-
isters the same night decided that the state of 
emergency should immediately be applied. 
?????? ?????? ????????????????????????? ??????
and should remain in force until the 15th of 
July, 2017.
Obviously, as it antedates the current Con-
stitution, the 1955 Act could not be referred 
to the Conseil constitutionnel. Due to the 
broad political consensus between the ma-
jority and the opposition on the necessity 
to implement and extend without delay the 
full effects of the state of emergency, none 
of the acts extending it adopted since No-
vember 2015 were referred to the Conseil. 
As a consequence, it is through applications 
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for priority preliminary ruling on the issue of 
constitutionality, raised by persons subject to 
trial pursuant to article 61-1 of the Constitu-
tion, that the Conseil was asked to rule on 
those matters. 
The Conseil tried to strike a fair balance be-
tween the protection of public order, obvi-
ously threatened by terrorism, and the guar-
antees of individual freedoms, which can be 
infringed by some of the measures enforced 
under the state of emergency. Each of the 
decisions is adamant that “the Constitution 
does not exclude the possibility that the leg-
islator may establish a regime to govern the 
state of emergency […] in this context, it be-
longs to it to ensure that a balance is struck 
between, on the one hand, the prevention of 
public order offences and, on the other hand, 
the respect for the rights and freedoms grant-
ed to all persons resident in the Republic.” 
Several fundamental rights were alleged to 
be imperilled by the state of emergency. 
The 2015-527 QPC ruling related to house 
arrest. As far as the maximum period of time 
during which an individual placed in such a 
position is required to remain at home is set 
at 12 hours per day, the Conseil considered 
that this measure, which can only be decided 
against someone if there are serious grounds 
to think that her behaviour may represent a 
threat for public security and order, should be 
regarded as a restriction of freedom but not as 
a deprivation of freedom which, according to 
article 66 of the Constitution, should be un-
der the supervision of the Judicial Authority. 
However, the Conseil insisted that the order 
placing a person under house arrest, its du-
ration, the conditions governing its applica-
tion, and the supplementary obligations with 
which it may be associated should be under 
the monitoring of the administrative courts, 
charged with ensuring that such a measure 
is suitable, necessary and proportionate to 
the goal pursued. Finally, home arrest should 
cease when the state of emergency ends, and 
in case the legislator decides its extension, 
such measures could not be prolonged with-
out being renewed. Under these reservations, 
the house arrest was considered constitution-
3 See http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/amendements/3623/CION_LOIS/CL330.asp; http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/cr-cloi/15-16/c1516086.asp.
4 Conseil d’Etat, Rapport public, De la sécurité juridique (1991); Rapport public, Sécurité juridique et complexité du droit (2006); Etude annuelle???? ???????????
et qualité du droit (2016)
al. The 2016-535 QPC ruling addresses the 
policing of meetings and public places. The 
Conseil also insisted that such measures, 
placed under the monitoring of the admin-
istrative courts, should be suitable, neces-
sary, and proportionate with the grounds that 
gave cause for them. It also stated that their 
duration should not be excessive, having re-
gard to the imminent danger that led to the 
declaration of a state of emergency. In the 
2016-536 QPC ruling, the Conseil allowed 
administrative searches, even at night and in 
a private residence, as far as they were justi-
??????????????????????????????????????????-
peared impossible to carry them out during 
daytime. It admitted that the administrative 
authority could access all computer data. But 
copying them was considered unconstitu-
tional. This measure was equivalent to a sei-
zure, and data having no link with the person 
whose conduct constituted a threat may also 
be copied. In this respect, the legislator had 
not achieved a reasonable balance between 
the safeguard of public order and the right to 
privacy. The legislator amended the law ac-
cordingly. But the new version was referred 
to the Conseil, which again censored some 
of its provisions regarding delay of conser-
vation of some data (2016-600 QPC ruling). 
The last decision to be mentioned was also 
related to administrative searches conducted 
immediately after the terrorist attacks of No-
????????????????????????????????????????????
the state of emergency had created new guar-
antees to protect rights and freedoms. The 
Conseil decided that since administrative 
searches were submitted to no condition and 
no guarantee was granted, the balance be-
tween the safeguard of public order and the 
right to protect private life was not respected. 
Although it decided to derogate immediate-
ly the questioned norm, the Conseil decided 
that, in order to protect the public order, this 
would have no effect on the validity of the 
penal procedures that had begun before its 
decisions (2016-567/568 QPC ruling). 
The second important controversy that de-
serves attention in 2016 is related to Decision 
2016-741 DC of 8 December 2016, which 
deals with the statute relating to transparen-
???????????????????????????????????????????-
ernisation of economic life. This long ruling 
dealt with a statute that addressed a wide ar-
ray of topics. The Conseil has been seized 
by four of the six authorities that are allowed 
to activate ex ante review: The President of 
the Senate, 60 senators, 60 deputies, and the 
Prime minister. The latter’s referral only tar-
geted article 23 of the statute, which extend-
ed the jurisdiction of the Tribunal of Paris 
??????????????????????????????????????????-
sion did not appear in the initial governmen-
tal bill. It was introduced during the debate 
by a member of the Legislation Committee.3 
??? ??????? ???????? ?????????? ????????????? ????-
cially as this tribunal could hardly face such 
a huge workload immediately. This is why 
the Conseil quashed it. From the viewpoint 
of judicial politics, it is remarkable how the 
Prime Minister was able to obtain before the 
Conseil what he could or would not oppose 
during the process of adoption of the statute. 
The validity of several provisions was tested 
against the objective of constitutional value 
or legislative accessibility and intelligibili-
ty (eg par. 3ff, 11ff, 32ff, and 109ff). It was 
created by the Conseil in 1999 (99-421 DC 
ruling) in order to improve the quality of 
legislative drafting, which has been a major 
problem for more than 25 years.4 Accord-
ingly, the Conseil proprio motu quashed a 
provision that would have implied a prac-
tical contradiction (par. 146). The Conseil 
similarly imposed the principle according to 
which a statute needs to lay down rules and 
to be normative, and not merely declaratory, 
aspirational or hortatory (2005-512 DC rul-
???????????? ????? ????????????????????????????
much used, the Conseil decided to revive 
it by considering that “The provisions of 
Article 134 of the contested law, which are 
limited to conferring on the ordinary general 
assembly of a limited company the power to 
entrust a manager with oversight of techno-
logical advancements, are devoid of any nor-
mative scope. Therefore, this Article should 
be declared unconstitutional” (par. 99). 
Ensuring that no abuses were committed 
during the parliamentary procedure, the 
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Conseil quashed several provisions for hav-
ing been irregularly introduced into the stat-
ute, especially because they resulted from 
amendments that had no connection, even 
indirect, with the original content of the bill, 
???? ????????????? ????????? ??? ????????? ????
par. 50, 82, 107, 120, and 122 to 135). The 
validity of a provision regarding the creation 
of a digital repository to ensure information 
for citizens on the relations between Interest 
Representatives and public powers, shared 
by the parliamentary assemblies, govern-
mental and administrative authorities, and 
territorial collectivities was questioned be-
cause it might infringe on the principle of 
separation of powers. The Conseil rejected 
this argument, but only after clarifying the 
way the said provisions needed to be inter-
preted in order to preserve the autonomy of 
the two houses of Parliament (par. 25, 28, 
and 29).
The respect of several substantive constitu-
tional principles was also guaranteed by the 
Conseil within the framework of its tradi-
tional “proportionality control.” Regarding 
???????????????????????????????????????????-
ment rules, the Conseil reiterated that “Ar-
ticle 61 of the Constitution does not grant 
the Constitutional Council general powers 
of assessment and judgement of the same 
nature of those belonging to the Parliament, 
but only grants it the competence to decide 
on the constitutionality of the contested laws 
under its consideration. If it is necessary to 
??????? ?????????? ???????? ??? ??? ?????????????-
der the legislature’s power of assessment, it 
falls on the Constitutional Council to ensure 
that there is no manifest disproportionali-
ty between the infraction and the penalties 
incurred” (par. 88). In general, no manifest 
disproportion was found because of the gen-
eral interest the legislator had in view and 
the appropriateness of the means it resort-
ed to (eg par. 60). According to this kind of 
self-restrained reasoning, the Conseil con-
trolled the respect of freedom of enterprise 
by underlying that “The legislator is free to 
subject the freedom of enterprise, as result-
ing from Article 4 of the 1789 Declaration, 
to limitations associated with constitutional 
????????????? ??? ?????? ???? ????????? ??? ????
public interest, provided that this does not 
result in harm that is disproportionate to 
the objective pursued” (par. 41). Neverthe-
less, “the obligation of certain companies to 
make public the economic and tax indica-
tors corresponding to their activity country 
by country, allows all of the operators in the 
market or exercising these activities, partic-
ularly their competitors, to identify essential 
elements of their industrial and commercial 
strategies. Such an obligation infringes on 
the freedom of enterprise in a manifestly dis-
proportionate way in terms of the objective 
sought” (par. 103). Regarding this provision, 
the Conseil moreover decided to make use of 
a technique it had devised at the time when 
it was not able to review the constitutional-
ity of statutes after they were promulgated 
(85-187 DC ruling). In the present case, it 
repeats that: “The constitutionality of a law 
already enacted may be examined upon re-
viewing the legislative provisions that mod-
ify it, complete it or affect its scope.” As 
the cancelled provisions are similar to older 
ones resulting from an Act of 2013, the latter 
are simultaneously declared unconstitutional 
(par. 104; see similarly par. 140). 
No manifest or irrational disproportion was 
perceived when the Conseil ensured that the 
principle of equality was respected: “The 
principle of equality does not prevent the 
legislature from regulating different situa-
tions in different ways, nor from departing 
from equality in the public interest, provid-
ed that in both cases the resulting difference 
in treatment is directly related to the subject 
matter of the law providing for the different 
treatment” (par. 38; see also par. 3ff, 93 ff.). 
Neither was it regarding freedom of con-
tract and the stability of contracts (par. 54 
and 60), nor regarding the right of property 
(par. 52ff). Various provisions related to the 
creation of penal offenses were criticised for 
being too imprecise, or for violating the prin-
ciple of the legality of offenses and penalties. 
Although several among them were immune 
from this defect (see eg par. 9, 15, and 91), 
some were declared unconstitutional: “By 
issuing offences regarding the infringement 
upon obligations, the content of which has 
????????????????????????????????????????????
of each parliamentary assembly, the legisla-
ture infringed upon the principle of the legal-
ity of offences and penalties” (par. 36). This 
consequently led the Conseil to quash other 
provisions that were intrinsically connected 
to the quashed one. Similarly, the Conseil 
????????????????????????????????????????????-
cisely enough the offense of false accusa-
tions (par. 139). 
As a representative example of “catch all” 
contemporary legislation under the Fifth Re-
public, this statute led the Conseil constitu-
tionnel to make use of most of the procedural 
tools it has developed since 1958 to ensure 
the primacy of the Grundnorm, both as far as 
legislative procedure, the quality of legisla-
tion, separation of powers, and fundamental 
rights are concerned. 
MAJOR CASES
Other relevant rulings of 2016 include the 
following four: 
Rights and Freedoms
1. Criminal Prosecution of Negationism 
Does Not Violate the Constitution
In Decision 2015-512 QPC, the plaintiff ar-
gued that the contested provisions infringed 
on the principle of equality before the crimi-
nal law, since the negation of crimes against 
humanity other than those mentioned in Ar-
ticle 6 of the Statute of the International Mil-
itary Tribunal annexed to the London Agree-
ment of 8 August 1945 was not punishable, 
as well as on the freedoms of expression 
and opinion. The Conseil consolidated the 
incrimination of negationism by declaring 
the Article 24bis of the Act of 29 July 1881 
to be in conformity with the Constitution. 
It equally held that by prohibiting denying 
crimes against humanity perpetrated by the 
Nazi regime, the freedom of expression is 
not violated.
2. Taxi-drivers’ Freedom of Enterprise 
In Decision 2015-516 QPC, the objection al-
leging a violation of freedom of enterprise 
was brought to the attention of the Conseil 
constitutionnel once again after the Decision 
no. 2015-468/469/472 QPC. In the latter, 
the challenged provisions of the Transport 
Code were found to be in conformity with 
the Constitution. On the contrary, this time 
the contested second part of Article L.3121-
10 of the Transport Code was found to be in 
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violation of the Constitution. The limitations 
to the freedom of enterprise determined by 
???? ??????????? ????? ????????? ???????? ??? ????
objective pursued nor by any other general 
interest. By providing that the exercise of the 
activity of taxi driver is incompatible with 
the exercise of the activity of the driver of 
a chauffeur-driven vehicle, the legislator in-
???????????????????????????????????????????????
of the transport of patients and ensure the full 
exploitation of parking authorizations on the 
public highway. However, the Council point-
ed out that the activity of taxi driver should 
not be regarded as incompatible with that of 
the driver of a chauffeur-driven vehicle since 
the two activities are carried out by means 
of vehicles comprising distinctive signs and 
only light sanitary vehicles may be accredit-
ed by compulsory health insurance schemes 
to ensure the transport service for patients. 
3. Ne Bis in Idem (I-II-III) 
A series of three decisions 2016-545 QPC, 
2016-546 QPC, and 2016-556 QPC, form 
part of the long-running constitutional law 
saga of the ne bis in idem principle. The 
Constitutional Council compared admin-
istrative sanctions to penal ones in order to 
verify whether provisions applicable to the 
same persons and facts, but divergent in 
the quantum of the penalties, were consti-
tutional. By applying the criteria set out in 
its 2014-453/454 QPC and 2015-462 QPC 
rulings, and referring to the constitutional 
????????????????????? ???? ????????? ???? ??????
reached the conclusion that the contested cu-
mulating is constitutional. The Conseil held 
that the sanctions provided by the contested 
provision are both adequate in light of the 
offenses they punish and proportionate. The 
judge proceeded only to a reservation of in-
terpretation specifying that a criminal pen-
alty for tax evasion cannot be applied to a 
???????????????????????????????????????????
found liable for tax. Regarding the combined 
application of the contested provisions of ar-
ticles 1729 and 1741 of the General Taxation 
Code, the Conseil declared the application 
to be in conformity with the Constitution 
and formulated two interpretative reserva-
tions. First, the principle of the necessity 
of offenses and penalties requires that pe-
nal sanctions apply only to the most serious 
cases of fraudulent concealment. The Coun-
???? ????????? ????? ???? ???????? ??? ???? ????????
might be determined by the amount of the 
fraud or the nature and the circumstances of 
the taxpayer’s actions. Second, the Constitu-
tional Council stated that the proportionality 
principle implies that the overall amount of 
the cumulative penalties may not, under any 
circumstances, exceed the maximum tariff 
for any of the penalties imposed.
4. Freedom of the Press
In Decision 2016-738 DC, the Conseil can-
celled Article 4 of the contested law, which 
???????? ???????????? ??????? ???? ??????????-
tion of the secret of journalists’ sources, al-
lowing such secrecy to be breached in case 
an overriding reason of public interest justi-
???????? ????????????????????????????????????-
tor had not ensured a balanced conciliation 
between freedom of expression and commu-
nication and several other constitutional re-
quirements, in particular the right to private 
life, the secrecy of correspondence, the safe-
guarding of the fundamental interests of the 
nation, and the search for perpetrators. The 
Conseil emphasized that the secret of jour-
nalists’ sources may be limited only if two 
cumulative conditions are met: the infringe-
????? ????? ??? ????????? ??? ??? ???????????
public interest and the measures in question 
must be strictly necessary and proportionate 
to the aim pursued by the legislature.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2016, constitutionalism still reigned su-
preme in Germany. As elsewhere, however, 
after almost a decade of protracted crises, 
German institutions began to show signs 
of stress and exhaustion. Populism is at the 
gates and 2017 – a big election year in Ger-
??????????????????????????????????????????-
sensus, which has shaped post-war politics in 
Germany for almost seven decades now, will 
hold. In view of these developments, it is 
an open question whether the constitutional 
moments staged in Karlsruhe will continue 
to be of societal “integration” or whether the 
juridical taming of politics that has earned 
the Court its high reputation in the past will 
become associated with the fuzzy notion of 
“elitism” that populist movements all over 
the globe pretend to attack so violently. 
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
COURT: TRENDS AND CHAL-
LENGES1
So far, the judges seem more or less unim-
pressed by such considerations. Neverthe-
less, observers and judges agree that the 
FCC is under pressure too. This pressure, 
however, is also a consequence of some of 
the Court’s successes in the past. 
Over the years, parallel to Germany’s be-
coming the “reluctant hegemon” of Europe 
(The Economist), the FCC has taken a more 
activist stance towards matters of European 
1 The Federal Constitutional Court is one of the most well-researched courts in the world. Basic infor-
mation on the Court in English, including a documentation of current and past cases, a description of 
the various types of proceedings, a history of the Court and the annual statistics, can be found on the 
Court’s website, http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/EN/Homepage/home_node.html?????????????
statistics for 2016 are not available yet.
and international integration. This outreach 
has opened up an inward-looking constitu-
tional doctrine and has added an important 
voice to the global constitutional discourse. 
But, since the Court’s domestic caseload 
has not decreased, taking up the new glob-
al role has strained the FCC’s resources. In 
2016, the institutional costs were particularly 
visible in the CETA case, where the Second 
Senate of the Court had to decide overnight 
on an application for a preliminary injunc-
tion against the approval of the Treaty by the 
German representative in the Council of the 
European Union (see sub IV.4.). 
?????????????? ???? ?????????? ??????? ????? ????
Court has built over the past 65 years, espe-
cially in the area of fundamental rights law, is 
?????????????????????????????????? ?????????-
stitutional doctrine is famous as an attempt 
to pre-empt and mediate the inherent irratio-
nalities and injustices of democratic power. 
However, this project has also induced a 
massive legalisation of politics, which, in 
turn, has further increased the need and the 
opportunities for constitutional review. In 
reaction to more and more subtly differen-
tiated constitutional requirements, statutory 
law proliferates. Cases brought before the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
tax law frequently involve convoluted stat-
utes. If judges take their case law seriously, 
they must dive deeply into highly technical 
matters and check multidimensional norma-
??????????????????????????????????????????
that again is straining the resources of the 
Court. One example is the 2016 decision on 
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the investigative powers of the Bundeskrim-
inalamt.2 In this decision, the Court had to 
evaluate a statute that was already drafted in 
a very elaborate way in order to comply with 
various previous FCC judgements. The 2016 
decision again partly quashed the new stat-
ute and developed in over 360 paragraphs 
even more precise requirements for govern-
ment surveillance. The rationalizing impetus 
underlying this and other judgements is cer-
tainly laudable.3 However, the Court has to 
be careful not to let its jurisprudence develop 
into a casuistry that makes it impossible even 
for a well-meaning legislator to act constitu-
tionally.
So, apart from the larger political context, 
the current challenges for the FCC include 
bridging the gap between its new global role 
and its domestic responsibilities as well as 
balancing its traditional doctrinal approach 
with its more recent role as an evaluator of 
normative complexity. 
For the report we have chosen from 2016’s 
major decisions those that demonstrate how 
the Court is currently approaching these 
challenges. Cases that are fully translated 
into English on the Court’s website are not 
included in the report.4
DEVELOPMENTS AND  
CONTROVERSIES IN 2016 
Probably the most debated case of the past 
year was the FCC’s judgment from June 21, 
2016, on the constitutionality of the OMT 
Programme of the European Central Bank 
????????? ???????????????????? ?????????????-
ment ends the longest case saga in the histo-
ry of the Court. In the summer of 2012 at the 
height of the Euro crisis, a group of citizens 
and MPs raised constitutional complaints 
and Organstreit proceedings (proceedings 
2 Judgement of 20 April 2016, 1 BvR 966/09 and 1 BvR 1140/09. 
3 Similarly, the Judgment of 6 December 2016, 1 BvR 2821/11, 1 BvR 321/12 and 1 BvR 1456/12, on the phase-out of nuclear energy and the right to property. 
4???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????
which can be found here; and the Judgment of 6 December 2016, 1 BvR 2821/11, 1 BvR 321/12 and 1 BvR 1456/12 (Phase-out of nuclear energy and the 
right to property), which can be found here.
5 FCC, Order of 17 April 2013, 2 BvQ 17/13.
6 FCC, Judgment of 18 March 2014, 2 BvR 1390 et al., ESM-Vertrag, BVerfGE 135, 317.
7 FCC, Order of 14 January 2014, 2 BvR 2728/13 et al., OMT-Vorlage, BVerfGE 134, 366. 
8 CJEU, Judgement of 16 June 2015, C-62/14.
9 FCC, Order of 6 July 2010, 2 BvR 2661/06, Honeywell, BVerfGE 126, 286.
on a dispute between supreme federal bod-
ies) against federal legislation on the intro-
duction of the European Stabilization Mech-
anism (ESM) and the Fiscal Treaty. Only a 
couple of days after the Court had given a 
preliminary decision, in which it held both 
measures, by and large, to be constitutional,5 
Mario Draghi announced the OMT program 
in a famous press conference (“whatever it 
takes...”), promising to the markets that the 
bank would function as a lender of last resort 
in order to stabilize the common currency. In 
a step that is not untypical for the high de-
gree of informality in German constitutional 
procedure, the plaintiffs extended their com-
plaint in the main proceedings by including 
the decision of the ECB into their complaint. 
The Court accepted this and while the oral 
argument about the preliminary injunction 
was mostly concerned with the ESM, the 
oral argument in the main case was a battle 
about the legitimacy of the ECB, and ESM 
and the Fiscal Treaty were barely mentioned. 
????????????? ?????????????????????????????????
ESM and the Fiscal Treaty to be constitu-
tional.6 In a second decision, six of the eight 
justices declared their opinion that the OMT 
program was not covered by the mandate of 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
the Court, the majority referred the case for a 
preliminary ruling to the CJEU.7 As general-
ly expected, the CJEU did not share the Ger-
man concerns and decided that the decision 
of the ECB was legal.8 To formally terminate 
the procedure, the German Court had now to 
react to the decision of the CJEU.
In its reference to the CJEU, the FCC had 
developed two legal arguments to explain its 
doubts regarding the OMT Program. First, 
it saw the distinction between monetary and 
economic politics being undermined by the 
ECB’s decision. Second, the Court interpret-
ed the OMT program as a violation of the 
???????????? ??? ????????????????????????? ???
states through the ECB in Art. 123 and 125 
TFEU. As the FCC is, according to its own 
standard, not entitled to review all violations 
of European law through European organs, 
but only “evident” ones that create a “struc-
tural shift” within the European competence 
order,9 the Court had to establish a manifest 
violation of the ECB. Now, after the deci-
sion of the CJEU, it was confronted with an 
opinion that did not only see no manifest, 
but no violation at all. It seems fair to say 
that both courts have a point. The CJEU, not 
???????????????????????????????????????????-
sentially political decision that still kept the 
form of a central bank action, performed a 
relatively comprehensive and clear review 
of the ECB’s action. The fact that it left the 
interpretation of the facts to an independent 
expertocratic agency does not seem too un-
usual. As far as the German Court is con-
cerned, there were indications that the true 
intention of the ECB’s action was different 
from classical monetary politics. But any-
way, the real challenge for the German Court 
was procedural. Even if the ECB acted with-
out a mandate, which part of the German 
state can be made responsible for the action 
of an independent EU organ? This puzzle 
was never really solved in the case. 
In order to conciliate these starkly contra-
???????? ?????????? ??? ????? ????? ?????????? ????
Court noted that its own interpretation of 
European law was not able to substitute the 
interpretation of the CJEU. Instead, it had to 
check according to a weaker standard if the 
CJEU had rendered a meaningful indepen-
dent review of the legality of ECB action, 
even if this review came to a different re-
sult than the FCC’s assessment (para. 161). 
To square the circle, the FCC interpreted 
???????????????????????????????????????????
an interpretation that can also be read as a 
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warning. The FCC took the CJEU’s factual 
description of the ECB’s program as norma-
tive requirements. In other words, it read the 
ECB’s own description of the OMT program 
as conditions for the legality of the program, 
e.g. with regard to the safeguards that should 
???????? ??????? ????? ??????????? ???????????
directly through the program (paras. 163 et 
seq.). This reading creates something like 
a substantial constitutional standard for ac-
?????????????????? ????????????????????????-
dards will be used some day by the European 
courts or if they will remain just a piece of 
German European constitutional law.
English press release available here.
MAJOR CASES 
Separation of Powers: Global and local 
challenges
Decision of 13 October 2016, 2 BvE 2/15 – 
The rights of the parliamentary committee 
investigating NSA spying
Domestic separation of powers cases can 
????? ?????????? ?????????????? ??????????????
as shown by this case. In the aftermath of the 
Snowden revelations, the German Bundestag 
established the so-called “Committee of In-
quiry into NSA Activities.” The primary pur-
??????????????????????????????????????????
investigate whether the joint signal intelli-
gence activities by the German Federal Intel-
ligence Service (BND) and the U.S. National 
Security Agency (NSA) violate constitution-
al rights. To this end, the Committee request-
ed the Federal Government to hand over a 
documentation of all search terms (so-called 
“selector lists”), which the BND had re-
?????????????????????????????????????????????
at German Internet hubs. The Government 
refused to comply arguing that such a disclo-
???????????????????????????????????????????-
dentiality on behalf of the U.S. government 
and would seriously undermine transatlantic 
intelligence cooperation. Two parliamentary 
groups and members of the Committee chal-
lenged the refusal citing Article 44 of the 
Basic Law, which grants inquiry committees 
the right to collect evidence.
10 Judgment of 21 October 2014, 2 BvE 5/11, Rüstungsexport, BVerfGE 137, 185.
The Second Senate ruled that the application 
was unfounded, further accentuating a 2014 
decision which had recognized limits of the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????
and national security.10 In the 2016 decision, 
the Court again evaluated the Committee’s 
right in light of the Government’s interest 
to effectively organize the intelligence ser-
vices and intelligence cooperation. This in-
terest is of constitutional relevance because 
national security belongs to the Govern-
ment’s “functional” sphere of competence. 
However, the Court stressed that national 
security is not generally off-limits for par-
liamentary inquiries. Rather, a balancing test 
is necessary. In the concrete case, the spe-
?????????????????????????????????????????????
the selector lists were outweighed by the 
potential implications of the collection for 
national security and for the U.S.-German 
relationship, especially considering that the 
Government had already provided the Com-
mittee with detailed information on the co-
operation. The concept of a national security 
exception will ring familiar to constitutional 
lawyers from the U.S. and other jurisdic-
tions. Many German scholars remain highly 
skeptical in this regard.
English press release available here.
Rights and Freedoms  
Judgement of 31 May 2016, 1 BvR 1585/13 
– Sampling and the right to artistic freedom
For German constitutional judges, cases in-
volving the arts are relatively rare, although 
Article 5 sec. 3 of the Basic Law explicitly 
recognizes the right to artistic freedom. So, 
one can assume that the FCC approached the 
case reported here with more than the usual 
excitement, not the least because cases on art 
law give judges the opportunity to prove that 
underneath their robes creative spirits hide. 
Usually, these spirits are then transformed in 
eloquent prose on the importance of art and 
artistic freedom.
The case at hand concerns a highly contro-
versial issue in contemporary art: sampling. 
In 1977, the electronic music band Kraft-
werk released its sixth album Trans Europa 
Express. The album featured a composition 
called “Metall auf Metall.” Twenty years 
later, a German hip hop producer took a 
two-second rhythm sequence from the origi-
nal song and used this “sample” as a loop for 
a new song. Kraftwerk then sued the com-
poser and the production company. The Fed-
eral Court of Justice (FCJ) decided in favour 
of Kraftwerk because the free use exception 
German copyright law gave no right to com-
mercial sampling. 
The First Senate of the FCC ruled that the 
FCJ’s decision had violated the right to ar-
tistic freedom of the claimants. It started 
its legal analysis with the observation that 
copyright law needs to strike a balance be-
tween the property interests of the produc-
???? ???? ???? ??????????? ???????????? ???????
of subsequent users (para. 82). The Court 
then elaborated that in hip hop the direct 
citation of an original sample is considered 
to be an important means for the “‘aesthet-
ic re-formulation of the collective memory 
of cultural communities’ … and as such an 
essential element of an experimentally syn-
thesizing process of creation” (para. 99). If a 
??????????????????? ??????? ??????????????????
strategies involving copying, the constitu-
tion demands that copyright laws and their 
application must take this into account. 
English press release available here.
Judgment of 19 April 2016, 1 BvR 3309/13 
– On the right to determine parentage
The right of an individual to know his or her 
parents is widely recognized as one aspect of 
the general right to private life (Article 8 of 
the European Charter of Human Rights), or 
of the so-called “general right of personali-
ty,” which under German doctrine is derived 
from Article 2 sec. 1 in conjunction with Ar-
ticle 1 sec. 1 of the Basic Law (Allgemeines 
Persönlichkeitsrecht). In 2007, the FCC had 
obliged the legislature to pass regulation that 
made it possible for children to initiate court 
proceedings in order to determine “legal pa-
ternity.” Through such proceedings, a legal 
father-child relationship can be established, 
including all mutual rights and obligations. 
But children do not always seek “legal pa-
ternity.” Some are only concerned with “bi-
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???????????????????????????????????????????????
who is their biological father without neces-
sarily establishing a legal bond to this per-
son. In German civil law, such a claim can be 
based on § 1598a of the Civil Code. Howev-
er, this provision only grants such a right for 
the father, the mother or the child within an 
existing legal family vis-à-vis the other two 
members of that family. People outside this 
small group cannot be forced by legal means 
to consent to a genetic parentage test or to 
providing a genetic sample suitable for such 
a test. 
This legal situation is unsatisfying for those 
who suspect that their legal family is not 
their real family, but who do not necessarily 
want to give up their existing (legal) fami-
ly ties. The complainant in the present case, 
who was born out of wedlock in 1950, was 
in such a situation. Having failed to con-
vince the civil courts that § 1598a of the 
Civil Code should be interpreted broadly as 
to give a claim also towards the “putative bi-
ological, but not legal father”, the claimant 
turned to the FCC and argued that such an 
interpretation was mandated by its constitu-
tional “right of personality.”
The FCC, however, held that the constitu-
tional complaint was unfounded because in 
?????? ??? ???? ????? ??????????? ????????????
rights claims at stake, the legislature has a 
wide “margin of appreciation” when weigh-
???? ?????????????????????????????????????? ????
“right to respect for one’s private and inti-
mate sphere” (Recht auf Achtung der Privat- 
und Intimsphäre) derived from Art. 2 sec. 1 
in conjunction with Art. 1 sec. 1 of the Basic 
Law has to be taken into account, which pro-
tects both the mother and the potential bio-
logical father from disclosing information on 
sexual relationships against their will (paras. 
53–54). Moreover, a man whose biological 
paternity is determined against his will is af-
fected in his right to informational self-de-
termination (Recht auf informationelle Selb-
stbestimmung) (Art.  2 sec. 1 in conjunction 
with Art. 1 sec. 1 of the Basic Law) and in 
11 Case 2/15 on the Request for an opinion submitted by the European Commission pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU.
12 On this type of proceedings see  http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/EN/Verfahren/Wichtige-Verfahrensarten/Organstreitverfahren/organstreitver-
fahren_node.html. 
13 See Judgment of 30 June 2009, 2 BvE 2/08 et al., Lissabon, BVerfG 123, 267 <353, 400>; Order of 6 July 2010, Honeywell, BVerfGE 126, 286 <304>; 
Order of 14 January 2014, 2 BvR 2728/13 et al., OMT, BVerfGE 134, 366 <392 para. 37>; Judgement of 21 June 2016, 2 BvR 2728/13 et al., para. 148.
his right to physical integrity (Art. 2 sec. 2 of 
the Basic Law) (paras. 55–58). Finally, the 
members of the child’s existing legal fami-
ly have a right to family life protected under 
Art. 6 sec. 1 GG are affected (paras. 59, 63).
In such a complex normative situation, the 
legislature’s decision not to provide the 
means for determining parentage in isolated 
proceedings vis-à-vis the putative biological 
father is not impermissible, even though a 
different legislative decision might also be 
compatible with the Basic Law (para. 72). 
English press release available here.
Foreign, International and/or Multilateral 
Relations 
Decision of 13 October 2016, 2 BvR 1368/16 
et al. (Applications for a Preliminary Injunc-
tion) – The EU – Canada Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) be-
fore the FCC
The legal battle over multilateral trade agree-
ments is currently fought on many grounds. 
In the European Union, the Court of Justice 
will soon decide on the division of powers 
between the Union and the Member States.11 
But opponents of the trade deals also take 
recourse to national courts, including the 
FCC. In what was promoted as the “biggest 
constitutional complaint in the history of the 
Court,” over 200,000 applicants joined forc-
es to challenge Germany’s participation in 
the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic 
and Trade Agreement (CETA) and thus ul-
timately the ability of the EU to close the 
deal. In a parallel Organstreit proceeding, 
the parliamentary group of the Left Party in 
the Bundestag pursued the same objectives.12 
The claimants relied on a now well-known 
doctrinal construct that the Court had ini-
tially invented to let citizens challenge the 
constitutionality of EU acts by means of 
an individual constitutional complaint (Ver-
fassungsbeschwerde). The core of the argu-
ment is that the individual right to vote (Arti-
cle 38 of the Basic Law) in conjunction with 
the constitutional principle of democracy 
(Article 79 sec. 3 and Article 20 secs. 1 and 
2 of the Basic Law) not only guarantees for-
mal participation in an election but meaning-
ful representation.13 In other words, German 
voters can claim that the competences of the 
democratically elected German parliament 
must not be undermined (ultra vires control) 
or hollowed out (identity control). 
The claimants argued that several parts of 
CETA did not fall within the scope of the 
competences of the European Union. Addi-
tionally, CETA would empower democrati-
cally unaccountable institutions – so-called 
???????? ??????????? ????????????? ??????
hollow out the political process and the rep-
resentative institutions in the Member States 
and thus violate the “constitutional identity” 
of the Basic Law. The petitioners urged the 
Court to take immediate action and to issue 
a preliminary injunction in order to prevent 
the Council of the European Union from au-
thorizing the signing of CETA and its provi-
sional application.
The Court acted swiftly. In an unusual move, 
it ordered a public hearing on the question 
whether a preliminary injunction should be 
issued. After a day of debate and a night of 
deliberation, the Court declined to issue the 
preliminary injunction. 
The lengthy opinion on the preliminary in-
junction leaves much room for interpreta-
tion on how the case will be decided on the 
merits. Nevertheless, it is already clear from 
the decision that the FCC takes the constitu-
????????????????????????????? ???????????????
emphasizes the importance of external trade 
relations the broad discretion of the Federal 
??????????? ??? ??????????????????????? ???-
eign and foreign economic policy as well 
as the “reliability on the part of the Federal 
Republic of Germany” as a pre-condition for 
?????????????????????????????????????????-
?????????????? ??????????????????????????????
that are crucial for the plaintiffs’ challenge; 
namely, the distinction between foreign di-
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rect investment and foreign portfolio invest-
ment (no EU competence for the latter, ac-
cording to the Court, para. 53), the existence 
of additional limits to EU competences in 
several areas covered by CETA (paras. 54–
58) and, most importantly, the need to ensure 
democratic accountability of all institutions 
created by CETA (paras. 59–65). These stan-
???????????????? ?????????? ??? ??????? ???? ???
?????????????????????????????????????????????
the ability of Germany, and consequently of 
the EU, to participate in ambitious multilat-
eral trade projects. How the standards will 
relate to the CJEU’s Singapore decision will 
be one of the more interesting questions in 
the following years. 
English press release available here.
5. Decision of 15 December 2016, BvL 1/12 
– Treaty Override 
Technically a case from 2015 (the decision 
dates from December 15 but was published 
only in February 2016), the Treaty Override 
decision addresses one of the central ques-
tions of international law: when and how can 
states in dualist systems disobey internation-
al treaties?
The case originated from a legal dispute in-
volving the now defunct 1985 Double Taxa-
tion Treaty between Germany and Turkey. In 
this treaty, the two countries had agreed on 
measures to avoid double taxation. Accord-
ing to the German Federal Court of Finance, 
who referred the case to the FCC, a later 
statutory amendment to the German Income 
Tax Act from 2003 directly contravened the 
Treaty. The Federal Court of Finance asked 
the FCC if the enactment of the Income Tax 
Act would not only be a unilateral breach of 
Germany’s international obligations but also 
violate the German Basic Law.
From a doctrinal point of view, it is not im-
mediately clear how the Federal Court of Fi-
nance could arrive at this conclusion. Article 
59 sec. 2 sentence 1 of the Basic Law is com-
monly read as stating that international trea-
ties enjoy the same rank as federal statutory 
law. And as a part of federal statutory law, 
they are subject to the principle “lex posteri-
14 FCC, Order of 14 October 2004, 2 BvR 1481/04, Görgülü, BVerfGE 111, 307.
or derogat legi priori” (a later law supersedes 
????????? ??????????? ?????????????? ???????-
????? ???????? ???? ?????????? ????? ????? ??? ????
issue of constitutionality? 
For the Federal Court of Finance, the an-
swer was Görgülü (para. 14). In this seminal 
case from 2004, the FCC had decided that, 
despite the generally dualist approach of the 
Basic Law, the European Charter of Human 
?????????? ?????????????? ???????????????
an elevated rank amongst German statuto-
ry law.14 Elevated means that all German 
law, including the Basic Law, must be inter-
preted in light of the Convention and of the 
judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights. According to the FCC, a violation 
of this obligation is at the same time also a 
violation of the principle of legality (Article 
20 sec. 3 Basic Law) and can be challenged 
before the FCC. Now, the referring cham-
ber of the Federal Court of Finance, in line 
with many German scholars, derived from 
Görgülü the rule that not only the Conven-
tion but international treaty law in general 
supersedes federal statutory law and that the 
parliament may deviate from international 
treaties only to protect “fundamental consti-
tutional principles” (para. 59). 
However, as the FCC made clear, this inter-
pretation was based on a serious misreading 
of the Court’s previous decisions. The FCC 
???????????????????????????????????????????????-
tus of international treaties equals the status 
of federal statutory law (Article 59 sec. 2 of 
the Basic Law). The Court added that while 
the Basic Law is strongly committed to in-
ternational law, the principle of “openness 
to international law” (Grundsatz der Völker-
rechtsfreundlichkeit) does not translate into 
an absolute constitutional obligation to obey 
all????????????????????????????? ?????????????-
ciple enjoys constitutional rank, it must be 
balanced with the principles of democracy 
and parliamentary discontinuity. The Court 
emphasizes: “Democratic power is always 
temporary power” (para. 53). In order to 
balance its commitment to international law 
with the idea of democratic government, the 
Basic Law itself has created a differentiated 
system, which is not up for judicial re-inven-
tion. Görgülü then, the Court explained, was 
a different matter, because the Constitution 
itself recognizes in Article 1 sec. 2 of the 
Basic Law the protection of human rights as 
one of the central values of German constitu-
tionalism (para. 59).
English press release available here.
CONCLUSION 
2016 was a year with many legally wide-rang-
ing and politically important decisions. All 
in all, the ability of the FCC, a relatively 
small institution, to lead substantial oral ar-
guments and to deliver many thoroughly ar-
gued judgments remains astonishing. Yet the 
danger of an institutional overstretch, both 
as a matter of institutional capacity and of 
political legitimacy, debated since the 1970s, 
seems to become more and more acute. 
Maybe wrongly so: between 1985 and 1999 
???? ?????????????????????????????????????????
collection; and between 2000 and 2014, 36 
volumes. This is only a modest increase. A 
historical perspective may teach us that the 
presence of the Court in virtually all politi-
cally contested questions has been a part of 
the normality of the Federal Republic since 
its beginnings.
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HUNGARY
OVERVIEW 
The Hungarian Constitutional Court (Court, 
CC) finished 355 cases in 2016. Only one-
fourth of them resulted in a decision on the 
merits, and only a fragment ended with an 
annulment of the unconstitutional legal act 
or court decision. 
In this year-in-review, we would like to 
give a short overview of the most important 
decisions of the Court in 2016 and give 
some information about the political and 
legal background where the Court operates. 
??? ????? ?????? ???? ???? ????? important 
controversies that characterize this year’s 
case law and seek some conclusions.
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
The Hungarian Fundamental Law effective 
from 1 January 2012 and Act CLI of 
2011 on the Constitutional Court have 
significantly modified the competencies 
of the Constitutional Court and the role 
of the different institutions in initiating 
constitutional review. Changes implemented 
already by the amendments to the former 
Constitution in 2010 and 2011 stayed in 
force concerning the government coalition 
gaining fundamental influence in nominating 
judges and limiting the competence of the 
Court regarding economic and financial 
constitutionality issues. The president of the 
Court was formerly elected by the judges for 
three years, but with the reform, the president 
became elected by the Parliament for the 
duration of the whole term of his office. 
Finally, an amendment raised the number of 
judges from 11 to 15 without any justifiable 
pressing need.
Among several changes, the Fundamental 
Law introduced three types of constitutional 
complaints and abolished the formerly 
existing actio popularis. The system of actio 
popularis meant that it was a legal possibility 
for everyone to turn to the Constitutional 
Court without personal interest claiming 
that law, a legal provision or regulation 
was contrary to a constitutional provision 
(abstract ex-post facto review).
The solemn aim of the new constitutional 
complaint mechanisms was to protect against 
personal injuries caused by ordinary courts 
and provide a possibility for constitutional 
review also in cases where the complainant 
cannot turn to the ordinary court. Moreover, 
the Constitutional Court may supervise the 
constitutionality of legal provisions when 
applied in certain judicial cases and lead to 
an unconstitutional court decision. Judicial 
referral as it existed before 2012 stayed in 
force, which means that judges in pending 
cases turn to the Constitutional Court in case 
they state that an applicable piece of law is 
unconstitutional.
Originally, besides the ombudsman (who 
initiated almost all procedures of this kind 
after 2012), the Government and a one-
fourth minority of the MPs (from 2010 
the latter would need the cooperation of 
all parliamentary opposition groups) were 
entitled to initiate the abstract ex-post facto 
review procedure of the Constitutional 
Court. From March 2013, with the entering 
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into force of the Fourth Amendment to the 
Fundamental Law, the Head of the Curia and 
the Chief Public Prosecutor can also submit 
a proposal for a review of constitutionality. 
The new regulation can still be qualified 
in this regard as a very restrictive one as 
to the control of legislation especially in 
comparison to the former solutions.
DEVELOPMENTS AND  
CONTROVERSIES IN 2016  
As a result of a constitutional amendment 
in November 2010, a serious limitation 
of the competences of the Constitutional 
Court was introduced. According to this 
amendment, the Constitutional Court may 
assess the constitutionality of acts related 
to the state budget, central taxes, duties and 
contributions, custom duties, and central 
conditions for local taxes exclusively in 
connection with the rights to life and human 
dignity, the protection of personal data, 
the freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion, or with rights related to Hungarian 
citizenship. Also, the Court may only annul 
these acts in cases of violation of the above-
mentioned rights. The restriction of the 
Constitutional Court’s competences was 
the answer of the alliance of the governing 
parties to a CC decision, which annulled a 
law on a certain tax imposed with retroactive 
effect. From 2010 to 2013, the two-thirds 
majority having the competence to adopt 
constitutional amendments overruled other 
decisions of the CC as well.1 As a result of 
the new system, the control of the legislation 
and the government (strictly cooperating with 
each other in this parliamentary democracy) 
became more difficult as the initiatives for 
the constitutional review of the problematic 
pieces of legislation became more frequent 
in procedures attached to concrete judicial 
cases, launched in constitutional complaint 
procedures. The high non-admissibility of 
these constitutional complaints meant a 
severe restriction on the number of cases 
examined on the merits by the Constitutional 
Court.2 
1 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion on the Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental Law of Hungary [CDL-
AD(2013)012] 83. 
2 The Constitutional Court of Hungary, ’Statistics’ <http://hunconcourt.hu/constitutional-court/statistics> accessed 14 February 2017. 
Although the new provisions in the 
Fundamental Law on the competencies of 
the Constitutional Court provide for several 
procedures to initiate the review of a piece 
of legislation, in reality, due to the above-
mentioned “court-packing” and the modified 
ways of the election of the members and 
the president, plus due to the competence 
restrictions, the Constitutional Court has lost 
much of its actual relevance compared to the 
period before 2010.
The changes mentioned in Part II have led 
to a change in understanding the protection 
of the constitution and the protection of 
?????????????????? ????????????? ??? ????????
the result of this different understanding in 
Part IV with the 2016 cases. Interpretation 
of the CC has changed significantly 
towards a more deferential understanding 
of constitutionality. To summarize, not only 
the institutional challenges or the changes 
in the competence of the Court are worth 
mentioning when it comes to the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court but also, partly as a 
result of this, the actual composition of the 
judicial body. The change in the composition 
has led to a change in the understanding of 
constitutionality. The cases below will show 
that the majority of the Court is willing to 
accept political proposals formulated as 
legislative acts and show deference for 
the legislative majority in sensitive cases. 
Sovereignty, democracy or the rule of law 
are understood differently from earlier 
concepts developed by the CC. This process 
is accelerated by the Fundamental Law’s 
closing and miscellaneous provisions where 
it is declared that Constitutional Court 
decisions issued prior to the entry into force 
of the Fundamental Law are repealed. Not 
only has the relation to former case law 
changed significantly in recent years but also 
the relation of the Hungarian constitutional 
order to its European and international 
counterparts. In 2016 the CC made 
reservations in the majority opinion with 
regard to the law of the European Union and 
dissenting opinions questioned the relevance 
of ECtHR decisions in the domestic 
 
constitutional interpretation of fundamental 
rights. It is also a major dilemma of 2016 
how the interpretation of the constitution 
is ruled by the Fundamental Law. The 
Fundamental Law declares in Article R (3) 
that the provisions of the Fundamental Law 
shall be interpreted in accordance with their 
purposes, with the Avowal of National Faith 
(Preamble), and with the achievements of 
our historical constitution. In 2016, the 
Constitutional Court has started to take this 
provision seriously as we will see in Decision 
22/2016 (XII. 5.) below.
MAJOR CASES 
Decisions on elections and direct 
democracy’s impact on political competition
In 2014, for the first time Hungarian 
citizens without residency in Hungary could 
participate in parliamentary elections and 
vote by postal voting. At the same time, postal 
voting is not allowed to Hungarian citizens 
residing in Hungary but who are abroad on 
election day. In Decision 3086/2016 (IV. 
26.), the CC held that this difference in 
treatment did not violate the right to free 
elections (Article XXIII of Fundamental 
Law) and the right to non-discrimination 
(Article XV).
According to the Court, the residence 
requirement expresses that residents have 
a more intensive connection to the political 
community so it can be expected that those 
voters will be at home on election day or go 
to an embassy or a consulate to cast a vote. 
The other argument was that although the 
possibility of voting by post seems to be an 
advantage, it should be regarded together 
with the electoral system, which gives non-
resident voters only one vote for party lists 
(while resident voters can vote both for 
single member candidates and party lists), 
which is a disadvantage for non-resident 
voters. The easier method of voting was 
therefore considered by the Court to be 
a form of compensation for them. In our 
opinion, this raises serious concerns as to the 
principle of effective citizenship: that while 
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ensuring an advantage for the non-resident 
voters, the law brought the resident voters 
into a relatively disadvantageous position.3
In Decision 3130/2016 (VI. 29.), the 
CC upheld the resolution of Parliament 
that ordered a national referendum on 
the question ‘Do you want the European 
Union to be able to mandate the obligatory 
resettlement of non-Hungarian citizens 
into Hungary even without the approval 
of the Parliament?’ The Court held that 
according to the Constitutional Court Act, 
it can only examine the formal procedure of 
the Parliament (which was constitutional) 
but cannot review the constitutionality of 
the subject of the referendum approved by 
the National Election Commission and the 
Supreme Court (Curia). However, the CC 
also rejected the constitutional complaints 
challenging the Curia’s decision approving 
the referendum question.4 According to 
the CC, the petitioners had no standing to 
challenge the decision of the Curia because 
as simple voters their fundamental rights 
??????????????????????????????????? ????????
in line with many constitutional scholars that 
the decision of the CC was far too deferential 
because the question asked on the referendum 
was unconstitutional. The Fundamental Law 
does not allow voting on questions that do not 
belong to the competence of the parliament. 
Among other constitutional problems, this 
question can hardly be regarded as a purely 
Hungarian legislative issue.5
 
Increasing restrictions on political 
communication rights 
The freedom of assembly is regulated in 
Hungary by an act adopted in 1989 as a huge 
step in the democratic transition process. 
According to the very liberal regulation, an 
ex-ante ban on assembly is possible only 
in two cases: if according to the police it 
seriously endangers the proper functioning 
of the representative state institutions or 
courts, or if the circulation of traffic cannot 
be secured by another route. Any other 
problem that might emerge during the event 
(like the violation of rights of others or the 
3 Eszter Bodnár, ‘All Voters are Equal but…Two Case Studies on the Voting Rights of Hungarians Living Abroad’ (2016) ICL 4.
4 Decisions 3130/2016. (VI. 29.), 3150/2016. (VII. 22.), 3151/2016. (VII. 22.).
5????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????
(2016) Jogesetek Magyarázata 1-2.
risk of a crime) can result in the dispersing 
of the event. In Decision 13/2016 (VII. 
18.), the CC, however, held that the police 
acted lawfully and constitutionally when it 
used a new, non-codified reason to enact a 
prior restraint on a demonstration in front of 
the home of the prime minister (the reason 
was the assumed violation of the privacy 
of the inhabitants in the neighbouring 
district). The CC also argued that there was 
an unconstitutional omission, meaning that 
the Parliament should amend the act on the 
freedom of assembly in order to regulate the 
cases when the freedom of assembly and the 
right to privacy are in collision.  
On the contrary, in Decision 14/2016 
(VII. 18.), the CC annulled the decisions 
of the police and the court supervising 
it that forbade a demonstration based on 
hypothetical grounds (assuming that it 
would be dangerous and would violate 
others’ rights). However, the CC affirmed 
that there is an unconstitutional omission and 
prescribed that the Parliament implement 
safeguards to ensure the peaceful character 
of demonstrations and resolve the collision 
of the freedom of assembly with other 
fundamental rights, primarily by restricting 
the first more.
The Hungarian Media Act states that a 
reporter cannot add an opinion to the news. 
In Decision 3264/2016 (XII. 14.), the CC 
held this provision is not against the right 
to free expression and freedom of the press 
unless it makes clear that this is not a fact 
but an opinion of someone. So it upheld 
the decision of the Curia that decided that a 
political party cannot be tagged as “far-right” 
in the news report because this adjective 
constitutes an opinion and not a fact.
It would seem that the CC expanded the 
freedom of the press in Decision 19/2016 
(X. 28.) by stating that the media has a right 
to broadcast ‘public service advertisements’ 
(not-for-profit advertisements with a public 
purpose). However, in the concrete case, 
the CC annulled a Curia decision where the 
Curia found that the advertisements of the 
Government on campaigning to encourage 
voters to participate in the above-mentioned 
migration quota referendum initiated by the 
Government were illegal. The Curia held 
that public service advertisements were just 
a means to circumvent the strict campaign 
regulation and to ensure an illegal advantage 
for the Government in the campaign. The CC 
annulled this important Curia decision.
Wrestling with other state institutions for 
the protection of informational rights
In two consecutive decisions [Decision 
16/2016 (X. 20.) and Decision 17/2016 
(X. 20.)], the CC upheld its position that 
photographs showing police actions shall 
be published without prior permission of the 
police officers concerned. In the two similar 
constitutional complaints, press organs 
initiated the examination of the judgments 
of ordinary courts as these declared that 
the press organs violated the law by 
publishing photographs of police officers 
in action without their prior permission. In 
its reasoning, the CC pointed out that the 
conditions for publishing such photographs, 
as declared by the CC in a previous case 
[Decision 28/2014. (IX. 29.)] should be 
taken into consideration by the ordinary 
courts. As in these cases, the freedom of the 
press was in conflict with human dignity; 
balancing between the conflicting rights 
is unavoidable. Such photographs can 
usually be published if the publishing is 
not arbitrary, so it provides due information 
about contemporary events as public 
information about the exercise of executive 
power. According to the CC, in this case, the 
courts failed to balance properly between the 
conflicting rights. Their interpretations were 
not in accordance with the constitutional 
requirements. Moreover, the CC emphasized 
that while ordinary courts are in the 
position to examine the state of affairs, to 
evaluate the evidence and finally to decide 
in concrete cases, the interpretation of the 
CC on constitutional principles and on 
the scope of constitutional rights must be 
taken into consideration. It is worth adding 
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that the ongoing discussion of the ordinary 
courts and the CC on the legality and the 
constitutionality of publishing photographs 
alike is far from ending.6
In Decision 8/2016 (IV. 6.), the CC 
declared that funds used by the foundations 
established and companies owned by the 
National Bank of Hungary are public funds; 
therefore the information regarding their 
expenditure shall be qualified as information 
in the public interest. The case was initiated 
by the president of Hungary (the head of the 
state) as an ex-ante review of the amendment 
to the Act on the National Bank of Hungary, 
which stipulated certain restrictions on 
public information. According to the 
amendment, data regarding the functioning 
of the companies owned by the National 
Bank were considered part of a decision-
making process and therefore secret for 
30 years while information regarding the 
functioning of the foundations established 
by the National Bank were deemed similarly. 
According to the CC, companies owned by 
the National Bank are indirectly owned by 
the state; therefore the information regarding 
their activity is by definition data of public 
interest. Concerning the foundations 
established by the National Bank, taking 
into consideration the source of their assets 
and their activity, the CC declared that their 
funds are public funds and are performing 
public tasks. The CC finally declared that the 
challenged provisions were unconstitutional, 
as there was no legitimate aim to limit the 
freedom of public information. Overall the 
decisions on the right to information show 
that the CC is often up to fight against the 
restrictive interpretation of ordinary courts 
or ready to challenge government attempts.
Selectivity in the protection of the rule of law 
Decision 7/2016 (IV. 6.) examined the 
retroactive effect of certain provisions of 
the amendment to the Act on the Hungarian 
Post Office. The case was initiated by the 
president of Hungary as an ex-ante review. 
The new regulation introduced a limitation 
6???????????????? ???????????????? ???????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
7 Decisions 3103/2016. (V. 24.), 3098/2016. (V. 24.), 3167/2016. (VII. 1.), 3222/2016. (XI. 14.), 3272/2016. (XII. 20.).
8 Act XXXVIII of 2014 on the Resolution of Questions Relating to the Uniformity Decision of the Curia Regarding Consumer Loan Agreements of Financial 
Institutions.
9 See also Act XL on the Rules of Settlement Provided for in Act XXXVIII of 2014 on the Resolution of Questions Relating to the Uniformity Decision of 
on the publicity of data regarding the business 
activity of the Hungarian Post Office and its 
companies in order to protect their business 
interests from other competitors present 
on the market. The constitutional dilemma 
could have been quite similar to the case of 
the amendment to the Act on the National 
Bank of Hungary: the president here did 
not object to the limitation of the public 
access to these data. The petition claimed 
simply that the retroactive introduction of 
the new provisions was unconstitutional. 
According to CC case law, a piece of 
legislation with retroactive effect is not 
always unconstitutional, but only when it has 
a punitive or more burdening effect. The CC 
argued in this 2016 case that the examined 
provisions have no punitive or burdening 
effect. As they are only of a clarifying nature 
to the conditions for exercising the freedom 
of information, the retroactive effect of the 
law was found constitutional.
In Decision 23/2016 (XII.12.) the CC 
examined the constitutionality of the Act 
on the special reimbursement program open 
for capital market investors. Those investors 
who lost property due to the bankruptcy of 
big brokerage companies could take part 
in the reimbursement program. The loss 
was caused by systemic irregularities in 
brokerage activities. Due to the fact that the 
examined regulation contained limitations 
of the access to reimbursement in many 
aspects, dozens of constitutional complaints 
were submitted, claiming that the act in 
question limited the fundamental rights of 
the complainants (equal treatment, the right 
to property, the rule of law and the right to 
fair trial). The CC declared that the system 
of reimbursement established by the law is 
of an ex gratia nature based on equity, which 
constitutes no ground for such right-based 
claims. In other aspects, the CC found the 
regulation reasonable and based on public 
interest. The constitutional complaints were 
therefore rejected. The Constitutional Court 
in this decision also rejected the constitutional 
complaints of financial institutions as the ex 
gratia remedy for the loss investors were to 
be offered by all financial institutions. The 
institutions are to be compensated for this 
actual violation of their property rights only 
in a later stage, according to the Act CXXIV 
of 2015 on the stability of the capital market. 
Some financial institutions claimed that the 
measures implemented by the act were not 
proportionate concerning the limitation of 
their right to property, but the CC declared 
the constitutionality of the related, highly 
problematic provisions as well.
In several constitutional complaint decisions 
in 2016, the CC further declined to overturn 
the decisions of ordinary courts in cases 
concerning foreign currency loan contracts.7 
The economic crisis of 2008 and especially 
the rapid exchange rate depreciation of the 
Hungarian forint resulted in a significantly 
worsened situation of debtors. Legislative 
acts aiming to help the situation and 
related judicial decisions were reviewed 
by the Constitutional Court continuously. 
Novel constitutional ideas, unconventional 
constitutional measures and new doctrinal 
solutions were born in foreign currency loan-
related decisions. In 2016, in constitutional 
complaint procedures, the CC enhanced 
its position developed already in 2014 and 
2015. In its Decision 34/2014 (XI. 14.), 
it examined the unconstitutionality of the 
legislative act regulating basically two 
questions: whether exchange rate margins 
in foreign currency loan contracts are null 
and void and whether unilateral amendments 
to contracts are unfair.8 According to the 
Constitutional Court, the rules did not attain 
the level of unconstitutionality either in the 
details or as a whole. The act did have a 
restrictive effect on the fundamental rights 
in question, but the restriction itself could 
not be considered unconstitutional under 
a proportionality test. In Decision 2/2015 
(II. 2.), the petitioner judges claimed that 
the principle of separation of powers, right 
to fair trial, the rule of law and the legal 
certainty were breached in credit crunch 
related legislation.9 The Constitutional 
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Court rejected all judicial referrals. Later, 
the Constitutional Court concluded a great 
number of decisions on the subject of foreign 
currency loan crises legislation in 2015 and 
2016 with regard to the various constitutional 
complaints. All claims were rejected,10 
although the CC itself acknowledged that 
the extraordinary emergency solutions were 
problematic from the rule of law point of 
view. They imposed an unreasonable burden 
on financial institutions with retroactive 
effect and furthermore did not allow for a 
fair trial. 
The constitutional identity of Hungary 
defined as making reservations to EU law
In Decision 22/2016 (XII. 5.), the 
interpretation of the Fundamental Law 
had been requested from the Court by the 
ombudsman. As explained in the motion, 
the concrete constitutional issue was related 
to the European Union’s Council Decision 
(EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 on 
migration.
The CC established that the EU provides 
adequate protection for fundamental rights. 
The Constitutional Court, however, cannot 
set aside the protection of fundamental 
rights, and it must grant that the joint exercise 
of competences would not result in violating 
human dignity or the essential content of 
other fundamental rights.
The Court set two main limitations in the 
context of the question on the legal acts of 
the Union that extend beyond the jointly 
exercised competences. First, the joint 
exercise of competence shall not violate 
Hungary’s sovereignty; second, it shall not 
lead to the violation of its constitutional 
identity. The CC emphasized that the 
protection of constitutional identity should 
take the form of a constitutional dialogue 
based on the principles of equality and 
collegiality, implemented with each 
other’s mutual respect. The Constitutional 
the Curia Regarding Consumer Loan Agreements of Financial Institutions and on other related provisions.
10 According to statistics of the Constitutional Court, in 2015 630 motions were submitted to the Constitutional Court in the same subject and 1,300 
constitutional complaints with essentially identical texts were submitted in the same period. 700 foreign currency loan cases were active on 31 December 
2015. Alkotmánybíróság, ‘Statisztika’ http://alkotmanybirosag.hu/dokumentumok/statisztika/2015 accessed 14 February 2017.
11???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Il me semblait que j’étais moi-même ce dont 
parlait l’ouvrage – Liber Amicorum Endre Ferenczy???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
12 Zoltán Szente, ‘The political orientation of the members of the Hungarian constitutional court between 2010 and 2014’ (2016) 1 Constitutional Studies 1.
Court established its competence for the 
examination of whether the joint exercise 
of powers by way of the institutions of the 
EU would violate human dignity, another 
fundamental right, the sovereignty of 
Hungary or its identity based on the country’s 
historical constitution.
The curiosity of the case is that this is the 
first time that the CC has ruled explicitly 
on the relation of EU law and the domestic 
constitution claiming that the Fundamental 
Law has ultimate supremacy in fundamental 
constitutional questions. Furthermore, 
the constitutional identity, the inviolable 
core of the constitution, has never been 
defined as such formerly. The country’s 
historical constitution as an element of 
the unamendable identity also poses new 
questions in the Hungarian constitutional 
order. If the Fundamental Law is amendable 
only up until it does not interfere with 
the historical constitution as a basis, the 
historical constitution not defined so far 
in the positive constitutional law in effect 
might have a new, stronger position at least 
as a tool of the constitutional interpretation.11 
CONCLUSION 
The above cases showed that the CC 
decided important matters in 2016, but 
relevant decisions were carefully designed 
not to impose undesirable constraints on 
the legislature.12 There are considerable 
improvements with regard to the right to 
information, but on the other hand freedom 
of the press is limited. Retroactive effect 
of a piece of legislation is rarely found 
unconstitutional although the CC alludes to 
the rule of law in many decisions. The role 
of participatory democracy is underlined, but 
many decisions justify restrictions on actual 
democratic participation. On the other hand, 
participation is made possible in the form 
of a popular vote when it can have no legal 
consequence. Financial support is given in 
important cases, but the circumstances are 
not clear. Constitutional complaints remain 
the major competencies of the Constitutional 
Court to question the constitutionality of 
government actions. State institutions are 
not active in initiating ex-post facto review 
of legislation. Judges, therefore, remain the 
key actors in initiating important petitions, 
raising fundamental questions together with 
the individual complaints. As we explained, 
constitutional justice is puzzling in 2016 as 
to the evaluation of doctrinal development. 
As to its relevance as a balancing factor 
to governmental powers, it certainly loses 
further points in 2016.
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Iceland
DEVELOPMENTS IN ICELANDIC CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Ragnhildur Helgadóttir, Dean of the School of Law, Reykijavik University
Anna Lísa Ingólfsdóttir
ICELAND
INTRODUCTION 
From a constitutional perspective, the year 
2016 was a tumultuous one in Iceland. How-
ever, the events of the year mostly played 
out in elections and on TV, not in courts. In 
early April, the Prime Minister resigned after 
a scandal concerning his off-shore property 
broke on national television, and parliamen-
tary elections to take place in the fall were 
announced. In June, a new president was 
elected. In the parliamentary elections on 
October 7, parties had representatives elect-
ed to Parliament, which meant that forming 
a government was no easy task and the year 
ended without one. These events will be dis-
cussed in more detail below.
Iceland has, in spite of the financial crisis 
of 2008, which hit the country severely, re-
mained a stable democratic state. To some 
extent, the constitutional drafting process 
begun in 2011 is still underway although it is 
unclear to what extent changes will be made. 
This will also be discussed further below. So 
will seminal court cases decided in 2016.
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
COURTS  
Iceland’s constitutional history from the late 
19th century is characterized by constitu-
tional continuity. In spite of the important 
changes to the constitutional system, which 
have taken place since the first undisputed-
ly Icelandic Constitution of 1874, only three 
Constitutions have entered into force (1874, 
1920 and 1944). 
The current Constitution of Iceland dates 
from 1944 (no. 33/1944). In 1942, it was de-
cided that a republic would be founded once 
it became possible to end the association 
with Denmark after 1943. A constitutional 
committee was set, charged with drafting a 
constitution for the republic, but expressly 
forbidden to make any amendments except 
those directly following the dissolution with 
the Danish monarch and the founding of the 
republic. Consequently, the only changes 
made to the constitution of the monarchy 
at the founding of the Republic were those 
directly related to the head of state and the 
mode of government. The constitution of 
1944 was viewed as provisional. Constitu-
tional committees were at work from 1944 
onwards. That project was abandoned in the 
50s, to be taken up again in the early 1970s 
(a new Constitution draft was introduced in 
1983 but was not adopted) and then again 
in 2009. In 2011, a Constitutional Council 
drafted a new Constitution, but this draft has 
not been adopted either. 
This does not mean, however, that the Con-
stitution has remained unchanged from 1944. 
In 1959, the electoral system was drastically 
changed; in 1968, the rules on eligibility to 
vote were altered; in 1984, the electoral sys-
tem was amended once again; in 1991, Al-
thing (the Icelandic Parliament) was made 
unicameral and the distinction between the 
executive and judicial powers made clearer. 
In 1995, a completely revised chapter on hu-
man rights was adopted and the fiscal con-
trol of Parliament was clarified. In 1999, the 
electoral system was amended once again 
and in 2013, an amendment to simplify the 
amendment procedure entered into force, ad-
opted in order to make it easier to pass any 
amendment based on the constitutional draft-
ing that took place in 2011-2013. 
??????????? ????? ?????? ???????? ???? ?????
??????????????????????????????????????????-
cy with an elected head of state that holds a 
largely ceremonial role, a parliamentary sys-
2016 Global Review of Constitutional Law | 83
tem of government and independent courts. 
However, public trust in institutions is rela-
tively low. 
The court system is (until Jan. 1, 2018, when 
a new Court of Appeals will come into ex-
istence) two-tiered. There are eight district 
courts and one Supreme Court. All courts 
exercise judicial review of parliamentary 
acts as well as executive decisions. Consti-
tutional review is thus vested in all courts. 
Courts in Iceland have been relatively active 
(compared to most of their European neigh-
bours) in finding laws unconstitutional.1 
DEVELOPMENTS AND  
CONTROVERSIES IN 2016  
Presidential Authority and the Dissolution of 
Parliament 
The main constitutional event of 2016 began 
with the publication of the so-called Panama 
Papers.2 Sigmundur Davíð Gunnlaugsson, 
who was then Prime Minister of Iceland, 
walked out of a TV interview with journalists 
from the Swedish and Icelandic state broad-
casters when asked about a company called 
??????????????????????????????????????????????
of the main issues of his career as Prime Min-
ister had been the treatment of foreign credi-
tors after the financial crisis of 2008.3 It later 
became clear that he had sold his half of the 
company to his co-owner (the woman now his 
wife) for $1 on Dec. 31, 2009, the day before 
a law entered into force that would have re-
??????????????????????????????????????? ??-
??????????????????????????????4
Large parts of the public viewed this as 
?? ???????? ??? ????????? ???? ?? ??????? ??? ?????
1???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
2?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????
Panama Papers? A guide to history’s biggest data leak’ The Guardian (London 5 April 2016) https://www.theguardian.com/news/2016/apr/03/what-you-need-
to-know-about-the-panama-papers accessed 17 April 2017.
3 See e.g. Brian Bremner and Omar Valdimarsson, ‘Iceland gets tough with foreign creditors of failed banks’ Bloomberg.com (10 May 2013) https://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-05-09/iceland-gets-tough-with-foreign-creditors-of-failed-banks accessed 17 April 2017.
4 See the full interview at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zx7c8huezqY For English-language commentary, see e.g. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/2016/04/04/icelands-prime-minister-walks-out-of-interview-over-tax-haven-qu/ and http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/panama-
papers-icelands-prime-minister-walks-out-of-interview-over-tax-questions-a6967091.html.
5 Freyr Gígja Gunnarsson, ‘Féllst ekki á ósk Sigmundar Davíðs um þingrof’ ruv.is (Reykjavik, 5 April 2016) http://www.ruv.is/frett/fellst-ekki-a-osk-sigmundar-
davids-um-thingrof  accessed 2 April 2017.
6 Nanna Elísa Jakobsdóttir, ‘Sigmundur Davíð segir forsetann hafa sagt ósatt’ visir.is (Reykjavik, 5 April 2016) http://www.visir.is/g/2016160409279/sigmundur-
david-segir-forsetann-hafa-sagt-osatt accessed 17 April 2017.
7 Ibid.
8 Ragnhildur Helgadóttir, Þingræði á Íslandi: Samtíð og saga (Forlagið 2011).
faith, irrespective of whether the ownership 
????? ???? ???? ????????? ??????? ?????????-
son’s politics. The ensuing scandal led to 
the largest protests in the history of Iceland, 
and a course of events in which consider-
able constitutional uncertainty arose. On 
April 5th, the Prime Minister met with the 
President and (allegedly) requested the dis-
solution of Parliament. In a press conference 
after their meeting, the President stated that 
the Prime Minister had requested a dissolu-
tion of Parliament, but that he, the President, 
had refused to dissolve Parliament, inter alia 
because he wanted to discuss this with the 
other party in the coalition government.5
Shortly after the President’s press confer-
ence, a short press release came from the of-
????????????????? ?????????????????????????????
had in fact not requested dissolution of Par-
liament. It thus seems that the protagonists 
in this drama disagree on whether the Prime 
Minister indeed requested the dissolution of 
Parliament or not. It is clear, however, that 
the Prime Minister was increasingly isolat-
ed politically and that he had not discussed 
the option of dissolving Parliament with his 
coalition partner (the Independence party), 
whose chairman stated in the media that 
the dissolution order from the President had 
been intended as a threat to get the coalition 
to stick together.6 Mr. Gunnlaugsson’s Pro-
gressive Party decided in a party meeting 
that very same day that he would resign as 
Prime Minister while keeping his position as 
Chairman of the party.7
In Icelandic constitutional law, the disso-
lution of Parliament is permissible under 
art. 24 of the Constitution. It provides that 
the President of the Republic may dissolve 
Althing (the Parliament). A new election 
must take place within 45 days from the an-
nouncement of the dissolution. Althing shall 
convene not later than 10 weeks after its 
dissolution. Members of Althing shall retain 
their mandate until Election Day. However, 
according to art. 13 of the Constitution, the 
President shall entrust his authority to Min-
isters, and according to art. 14 of the Con-
stitution, Ministers are accountable for all 
executive acts.
The constitutional question concerning the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
as the crisis was brewing, the question arose 
whether the President could step in and dis-
solve Parliament, thus in effect making the 
electorate the arbiter of the scandal that had 
arisen. The second question was whether the 
President could independently evaluate a re-
quest for the dissolution of Parliament. Be-
cause of the largely ceremonial role played 
by the President, the theory for much of the 
20th century had been that this was not the 
case. But the President did, indeed, refuse to 
sign such an order on April 5, 2016. 
In spite of the limited role of the head of 
state, it had been argued in theory at least 
from 2009 that no dissolution of Parliament 
would take place unless both the Prime Min-
ister and the President agreed on that de-
cision.8 There was therefore no doubt that 
the President could not dissolve Parliament 
unless the Prime Minister agreed. This is 
based mostly on art. 19 of the Constitution, 
which provides that executive acts become 
valid when counter-signed by a Minister. 
The question that remained was whether the 
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President had been within the boundaries 
of his role when he refused to sign an order 
dissolving Parliament when requested to do 
so by the Prime Minister. One of the authors 
of this article (RH) stated in the media that 
such was her opinion already on April 5. 
This was based on the assessment that these 
were the extraordinary circumstances of a 
very isolated and arguably distraught PM 
attempting to use the dissolution of a dem-
ocratically elected Parliament as leverage to 
increase his chances of success in negotiat-
ing how to endure a political scandal. Other 
academics were more hesitant to accept the 
constitutionality of the President’s action.9 
However, the President clearly thought that 
the Prime Minister’s request was arguably a 
misuse of the possibility of dissolving Par-
liament, as he stated at the press conference 
that it wasn’t possible to use the presiden-
cy in a tug-of-war between the leaders of 
political parties.10 The open question that 
remains in Icelandic constitutional law is 
???? ??? ????? ??????????? ?????? ??? ??????-
???????? ????? ????????????????????????? ????
his or her decisions, as it is stated clearly in 
the Constitution’s art. 11 that ‘The President 
of the Republic may not be held accountable 
for executive acts’.  If these events signal a 
more powerful presidency, and not only an 
emergency use of presidential powers, that 
question will be immensely important.
The Fate of the Constitutional Draft of 2011
In 2011, a Constitutional Council was tasked 
by Parliament to draft a new Constitution 
for Iceland. It handed a draft Constitution 
to Parliament later that year after a quite in-
clusive and innovative process.11 Voters ap-
proved enacting a new Constitution ‘based 
9?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????stundin.is (Reykjavik 5 April 2016) http://stundin.is/frett/forseti-aldrei-
hafnad-tillogu-forsaetisradherra-um/  accessed 15 April 2017.
10 Freyr Gígja Gunnarsson, ‘Lygileg atburðarrás 5. apríl’ ruv.is (Reykjavik, 5 April  2016) http://ruv.is/frett/lygileg-atburdaras-5-april accessed 2 April 2017.
11 Stjórnlagaráð, ‘The Constitutional Council – General information’ http://stjornlagarad.is/english/ accessed 17 April 2017.
12? ???????? ???????? ??????????? ?????????????? ?????????? ?????? ????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
accessed 17 April 2017.
13 See e.g. the videos made by Stjórnarskrárfélagið https://www.facebook.com/Stjornarskrarfelagid/videos/1317088394968676/. 
14???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????
eftirlitsnefnd-
?????????????? ????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
15???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????
eftirlitsnefnd-
?????????????? ????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
16???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
17????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????
18 Ibid. 
on the draft’ in a referendum in the fall of 
2012. The draft was discussed in Parliament 
but not adopted before the general elections 
in 2013, in which anti-revisionist parties 
gained a majority in Parliament.12 
Before the elections that were held in Octo-
ber 2016, NGOs and others tried to put the 
constitutional revision back on the agenda.13 
The different standpoints of political parties 
in the 2016 elections can be divided up in 
two: on one hand the parties that wanted to 
hold onto the current Constitution but amend 
it in some ways and update it, and on the oth-
er hand parties that championed a new Con-
stitution and wanted to use the draft that the 
Constitutional Council presented in 2011 at 
least as a starting point. 
It is interesting to note that the parties who 
formed the coalition government which 
took power in January 2017 fundamentally 
disagree on how to go about the changes. 
The Independence Party believes that every 
change to the Constitution should be careful-
ly considered and that it is not desirable ‘to 
overthrow the Constitution and get a com-
pletely new one. That can hardly be recon-
ciled with predictability and legal certain-
ty.’14 However, the party believes that there 
should be a provision on referendum in the 
Constitution and that provisions on the pres-
idential powers should be updated.15
The party Bright Future wants to use the 
draft of the Constitutional Council but act 
on objective and well-founded suggestions 
for improvement. They also mention that it 
is necessary that the explanatory report and 
other travaux preparatoires need to be clear. 
Finally, they think that the nation should get 
time to familiarize itself with the new Con-
stitution.16 
The third coalition party, Viðreisn, believes 
????? ??? ????????????? ????????? ???? ????????????
the Constitution. They want to strengthen di-
rect democracy so that the public can have a 
say on important issues and to sharpen the 
separation of power. 
In the coalition agreement between these 
three parties from January 2017, it is stated 
that the work of revising the Constitution 
will be continued on the basis of the exten-
sive work that has taken place in the past few 
years. The cabinet will invite all political 
parties represented in Parliament to appoint 
representatives to a parliamentary com-
mittee, which will work with specialists in 
constitutional law and agree on amendments 
to the Constitution that will be submitted to 
Parliament no later than 2019.17 
The coalition agreement also notes that it 
is important for the amendments to be dis-
cussed thoroughly in public before being 
discussed in Parliament.18 
Finally, it must be noted that the provisional 
amendment enacted by Act 91/2013, which 
provided for a special amendment process 
in order to facilitate building on the consti-
tutional drafting of the last few years, will 
run its course on April 30, 2017. The regular 
amendment process (two Parliaments with 
a general election in between must adopt a 
constitutional act) will thus be applicable to 
any amendments discussed in 2019. 
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MAJOR CASES 
 
Separation of Powers
Hrd. 268/2016 of June 9, 2016  
In this case, the dispute was between the cap-
ital city of Reykjavik and the state of Iceland 
and centred on whether the state was obligat-
?????????????????????????????????????????????
airport in Reykjavik. In 2013, the Interior 
Minister and representatives of the city of 
Reykjavik had signed an agreement requir-
ing inter alia the state to close one landing 
????? ??? ???? ????????? ???????? ???? ??? ???????
zoning rules for the airport. 
In the case, the state argued that the Minister 
of Interior did not have the authority to make 
such an agreement but the Supreme Court 
noted that arts. 13 and 14 of the Icelandic 
Constitution provide that the President lets 
the Ministers execute his powers, and that 
the Ministers are responsible for all execu-
tive acts. The Court also cited art. 1 of the 
Cabinet Act no. 115/2011 and art. 4 of Pres-
ident Edict no. 71/2013, in which all matters 
assigned to the Ministry of Interior are list-
ed, but this list included affairs concerning 
transportation. Therefore, the Court held that 
the Interior Minister was competent to make 
such an agreement in the name of the Icelan-
dic government. 
The Supreme Court interpreted the agree-
ment and found it clear that by signing this 
agreement, the Minister had obligated the 
state of Iceland to announce the closing of 
???? ??????????????????????? ??? ?????? ??????-
quest that zoning rules be revised to be un-
????????????
Rights and Freedoms
Hrd. 80/2016 of December 1, 2016
The plaintiff, S, is a woman with disabili-
ties who received payments from the city 
of Reykjavik which enabled her to receive 
full service in her own home because of her 
???????????????????????????????????????????
meant that she had to spend every other 
week at a home for people with serious dis-
abilities. In an agreement done in accordance 
with rules thereon, the city of Reykjavik had 
thus agreed to pay inter alia for a certain 
19 Act no. 40/1991 on municipal social services, Act no. 59/1992 on the matters of people with disabilities.
number of hours of help in the house, gen-
eral help and a supporting family, so that she 
could live in her own apartment in her par-
ents’ house every other week. The plaintiff 
requested that the payment be increased so 
that she could live in her apartment full time. 
The city of Reykjavik refused that request. 
In this case, the plaintiff argued that by re-
fusing, the city had contravened several 
provisions of the administrational law; para. 
1 of art. 71 of the Constitution (protecting 
the right to privacy and family life); and art. 
76 of the Constitution (guaranteeing certain 
social rights) and interfered with the rights 
of people with disabilities, guaranteed by 
certain acts19 as well as the UN Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(CRPD). 
The Supreme Court stated that the city’s de-
cision was a refusal to provide the plaintiff 
with services beyond what was required by 
the rules governing agreements such as that 
made with S. It held that neither the provi-
sions of Act no. 40/1991 nor Act no. 59/1992 
placed any further obligations on the city 
than those listed in these rules. The Supreme 
Court also noted clearly that the UN conven-
tion on the rights of persons with disabilities 
had not been incorporated into Icelandic law 
and could therefore not increase the city’s 
obligations towards persons with disabilities 
that were legally imposed on the city. The 
city of Reykjavik was acquitted. 
There are two noteworthy aspects to the 
case. First of all, the Court’s refusal to in-
terpret article 76 of the Constitution in light 
of the state’s obligations under the CRPD. It 
is traditional in Icelandic law (see e.g. Hrd. 
125/2000) to interpret domestic law in light 
of international obligations but that is not 
???????????????????????????????????????????????
city to enable S to live independently. Sec-
ondly, the Court states clearly that the CRPD 
has not been incorporated into Icelandic law. 
This may herald a step back towards the 
hard-line dualism that characterized Icelan-
dic court decisions before 1990. However, 
????????????????????????????????????????????-
ment was added to refute the argument by 
the plaintiff that the CRPD had indeed been 
incorporated by Act no. 59/1992. As amend-
ed in 2010, that Act’s art. 1 states that the 
executing of this Act ‘shall be informed by 
the international obligations that Iceland is 
bound by, especially the CRPD.’ In light of 
this, it seems likely that the Supreme Court 
was just clarifying that this reference was in-
tended to lead to the Convention being used 
in interpretation but was not incorporated so 
as to trump older laws. But this is not clear.
Hrd. 100-108/2016 of December 8, 2013
A group of people were arrested in 2013 
for protesting the building of a new road in 
?? ????? ????? ??????? ???????????? ????? ?????
condemned for violation of art. 19 of the 
Police Act, which states that the public shall 
obey police instructions when the police are 
maintaining law and order in public. A few 
of them sued against the Icelandic state for 
compensation for unlawful arrest. All of the 
cases were alike. The Supreme Court found 
that the road construction had been lawful 
(legal) and that the police had therefore the 
duty to do what was necessary to preserve 
public order and to ensure that the public 
road administration could continue the con-
struction. 
It was undisputed that the people arrested 
had not obeyed police instructions when 
they were repeatedly asked to leave and had 
therefore tried to prevent the construction. 
The Supreme Court had also found (in previ-
ous cases) that the actions of the police had 
been in accordance with the principle of pro-
portionality. 
The plaintiffs argued that art. 19 of the Police 
Act did not provide clear authorisation for 
an arrest, and that arresting people protest-
ing peacefully was a violation of freedom of 
expression, (art. 73 of the Constitution) and 
freedom of assembly (para. 3 of art. 74 of 
the Constitution). They also argued that their 
arrest and placement in a prison cell was a 
violation of art. 67 of the Constitution and 
art. 5 of the ECHR. The Supreme Court dis-
cussed this argument and stated that art. 19 
of the Police Act was a rule of conduct, and 
that a violation of that rule was punishable, 
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as evidenced by a number of earlier cases. 
It was therefore lawful to arrest the plain-
tiffs. The lower court (whose opinion was 
???????? ????? ??????????? ?????????? ??????
that the authorisation for arresting people in 
this case was not art. 19 of the Police Act, 
but para. 1 of art. 90 in Act no. 88/2008 of 
criminal proceedings. 
The Supreme Court thus held that the arrest 
had been in proportionality and that art. 67 
of the Constitution and art. 5 of ECHR had 
not been violated. It noted that the freedoms 
of assembly and expression could be limited 
by law to maintain public order. The arrests 
were therefore held to be lawful and the state 
was acquitted.
Foreign, International and/or Multilateral 
Relations 
Hrd. 80/2016 of December 1, 2016
See above. 
Hrd. 707/2016 of November 9, 2016
?????????????????????????????????????????????
year-old Icelandic boy to the Norwegian 
child protection agency was appealed to the 
Supreme Court. The boy’s mother and grand-
mother had taken the boy illegally to Iceland 
in the summer of 2016 after the mother had 
lost custody of the boy in Norway. The Nor-
wegian child protection agency requested 
that the boy be returned to that country based 
on Act no. 160/1995 on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Decisions on the 
Custody of Children and the Return of Ab-
ducted Children, etc.
The Supreme Court noted that the child 
protection agency had provided a statement 
from Norwegian authorities stating that it 
had been unlawful to leave Norway with the 
boy and keep him elsewhere. The Supreme 
Court also noted that the Norwegian agency 
had custody over the boy according to the 
custody decision in Norway and Norwegian 
law. It held that it was not the Icelandic ju-
diciary’s role to re-evaluate that verdict. The 
mother and the grandmother argued that re-
turning the child would violate para. 2 of art. 
66 of the Icelandic Constitution, which states 
inter alia that no Icelandic citizen shall be 
expelled from the state. The Supreme Court 
stated that return of a child to those that 
have custody of the child is not an expulsion 
within the meaning of para. 2 of art. 66 of 
the Constitution, and that the provision did 
therefore not prevent returning a child with 
Icelandic citizenship based on the Act.  
 
CONCLUSIONS
It is too early to determine what the most 
important developments were in Icelandic 
constitutional law in 2016. 
It is interesting that the role of the Presi-
dent is arguably more unclear than before as 
the traditional view of a strictly ceremonial 
head-of-state role took a beating in the rel-
atively dramatic events concerning the at-
tempt by an embattled Prime Minister to get 
an order to dissolve Parliament. 
The outcome regarding constitutional chang-
es and the continuation of the amendment 
process started in 2010 is quite uncertain.
Arguably the most important Constitutional 
Court case of the year was the case concern-
ing assistance for independent living. The 
decision does not seem unduly progressive 
but whether it actually is a step backwards, 
either for the protection of rights which are 
guaranteed both in domestic and internation-
al law or more generally for international 
law in the Icelandic legal system, remains 
to be seen. Other cases discussed here were 
clearly in accordance with earlier case-law 
and theories.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The Indian Constitution was adopted by 
a Constituent Assembly on 26 November 
1949, came into effect on 26 January 1950, 
and has undergone 101 amendments since 
the adoption. Consisting of a Preamble, 448 
Articles, 12 Schedules, and 5 Appendices, it 
is the longest constitution in the world. The 
Constitution defines fundamental rights of 
the citizens; prescribes their duties; estab-
lishes the structure, procedures, powers, and 
duties of government institutions; and sets 
out directive principles to the state. 
The Preamble to the Constitution is a brief 
introductory statement that sets out the 
guiding purpose and principles of the Con-
stitution. It is based on the Objective Reso-
lution which was drafted and moved in the 
Constituent Assembly by Jawaharlal Nehru 
on 13 December 1946.1 The Supreme Court 
has recognized that the Preamble may be 
used to interpret ambiguous areas of the 
Constitution.2 The Constitution defines the 
Union of India and its Territory,3 Citizen-
ship,4 enumerates the Fundamental Rights in 
Part III of the Constitution which are justi-
ciable, sets forth the Directive Principles of 
State Policy in Part IV which are non-justi-
1 Parliament of India Archives, ????????????????????????????????????????????????????
2 Keshavanand Bharti v. The State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225.
3 Part I of the Constitution of India, 1950.
4 Ibid, Part II.
5 Part IVA.
6 Part V.
7 Part VI.
8 Part VIII.
9 Part X.
10 Part IX.
11 Part IXA.
12 Part IXB.
13 Sudhir Krishnaswamy, “Constitutional Durability” http://www.india-seminar.com/2010/615/615_ 
sudhir_krishnaswamy.htm.
ciable, and contains Fundamental Duties.5 It 
also sets forth the machinery of the Union 
(Centre),6 the States,7 the Union Territories,8
and Tribal Areas.9 The Constitution includes 
provisions on local governing machinery 
like the Panchayats,10 Municipalities,11 and 
Co-operative Societies.12 
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
COURT
The Indian Supreme Court has developed 
the basic structure doctrine as a “novel and 
extensive doctrine of constitutional judicial 
review,”13 and it is chiefly thanks to this de-
velopment that the Constitution of India en-
dures. The use of basic structure review is 
distinct from other forms of judicial review 
that the Court came to exercise. It assesses 
whether a state action “damages or destroys” 
basic features of the Constitution. The dam-
age or destroy standard establishes a high 
threshold of constitutional injury for the 
Court to intervene. 
The Indian Supreme Court has been ex-
tremely progressive in the protection of fun-
damental rights. It has expanded the scope of 
Article 21’s right to life over the years to in-
clude a whole range of social rights from the 
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Directive Principles, which were considered 
not justiciable before. The right to life now 
includes the right to livelihood,14 the right to 
health,15 the right to education,16 the right to 
food,17 adequate housing, and the right to a 
clean environment.18 The Court also devel-
oped a unique form of litigation called pub-
lic interest litigation, relaxing the rules of 
standing to allow any public-spirited person 
or organization to litigate matters that bear 
on groups of people who are unable to ac-
??????????????????????????????????????? ?????
public interest litigation, or PIL as it is re-
ferred to, currently faces backlash it is still 
an important instrument for the protection of 
fundamental rights in the country.
 
DEVELOPMENTS AND  
CONTROVERSIES IN 2016  
One of the biggest constitutional debates of 
2016 concerned the appointment of judges, 
which led to a constitutional crisis and a 
face-off between the executive and the judi-
ciary.
Judges of the higher judiciary, namely High 
Court judges and judges of the Supreme 
Court, had been appointed by a collegium 
of the senior-most judges of the Supreme 
Court. The 99th amendment to the Consti-
tution in 2014, however, introduced the Na-
tional Judicial Appointments Commission 
Act (NJAC Act). The constitutionality of 
the NJAC Act was challenged in the Su-
preme Court. It was contended that the Act 
adversely affected the independence of the 
judiciary and affected the basic structure of 
the Constitution.19 On October 16, 2015, a 
five-judge constitutional bench of the Su-
14 Olga Tellis & Others v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, 1985 SCC (3) 545.
15 Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity v. State of West Bengal, 1996 SCC (4) 37.
16 Unnikrishnan J.P. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others (1993) 1 SCC 645.
17 People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India and Others, 2007 (12) SCC 135.
18 Occupational Health & Safety Assn. v. Union of India, (2014) 3 SCC 547.
19 Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association and Another v. Union of India (W.P.(C) No.13/2015) (2016) 5 SCC 1.
20??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
judges cases. A collegium, consisting of the Chief Justice of India and 4 other senior-most SC judges, made recommendations for persons to be appointed 
as SC and HC judges, to the President.
21 Sudhir Krishnaswamy, “The People’s Court” (India Today, 24 November 2016).
22 Ibid.
23 Article 32 allows the Petitioner to move the Supreme Court to enforce her Fundamental Rights.
24 Criminal proceedings against the petitions had been stayed pending the constitutional challenge.
preme Court headed by Justice J.S. Khehar 
declared the National Judicial Appointments 
Commission along with the 99th Consti-
tutional Amendment Act “unconstitutional 
and void,” thereby restoring the Collegium 
system.20 The Court, however, did recognize 
the lack of transparency in the Collegium 
system and as a step towards improving the 
appointment of judges asked the government 
to submit a draft Memorandum of Procedure 
(MoP) for a reform.
This olive branch could have paved the way 
for genuine institutional reform of the Colle-
gium system with greater transparency and 
executive/public participation.21 Instead, the 
government did not approve any MoP and 
stalled pending appointments of 77 judges to 
???????????????????????????????? ??????? ????
the executive finally cleared the names of 34 
judges after much public wrangling, all 34 
names selected were from the subordinate 
judiciary who, on current evidence, decide 
fewer cases and are less likely to strike down 
legislative/executive action than advocates 
appointed from the Bar.22 Following this, in 
November 2016, the Supreme Court Colle-
gium returned the names of 43 candidates 
for an appointment to various high courts to 
the Union government for reconsideration. 
Under the applicable procedural rules, the 
executive was now bound to appoint these 
judges. But it has not yet appointed them, 
which affirms that the confrontation between 
the executive and the judiciary subsists. 
The Union Government delayed the prepara-
tion of a MoP, as many believe, to dilute the 
primacy of the judiciary in the appointment 
process by tweaking the new Memorandum 
in favor for the executive. Moreover, the 
government has been stalling the appoint-
ment of judges in the face of escalating va-
cancies in the High Courts, and it remains to 
be seen if this conflict is resolved in 2017.
MAJOR CASES
A bulk of the decisions of the Supreme Court 
in 2016 concerned fundamental rights and 
?????????? ?????????????????????????????-
portant cases here.
Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India and 
Others [(2016) 7 SCC 221]
Dr. Subramanian Swamy, a prominent lead-
er of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), made 
allegations of corruption against the Chief 
Minister of Tamil Nadu in 2014. The State 
of Tamil Nadu filed several criminal defama-
tion suits against Dr. Swamy. 
?????? ?????? ???? ?????? ????????? ???? ??????-
tion in India, defamation is also a criminal 
offense under Sections 499 and 500 of the 
Penal Code. In response to these criminal 
complaints, Dr. Swamy challenged the con-
stitutionality of sections 499 and 500 of the 
IPC under Article 32 of the Constitution of 
India,23 which allows any person to directly 
approach the Supreme Court to enforce her 
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Con-
stitution. Politicians Rahul Gandhi, Arvind 
Kejriwal, and a few journalists who had been 
charged with criminal defamation joined 
 
Dr. Swamy in the challenge, arguing that 
sections 499-500 of the Code inhibit the 
freedom of expression.24
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Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution25 pro-
vides the right to freedom of speech and 
expression to every citizen of the country. 
However, this right is subject to reasonable 
restrictions that can be imposed by the State 
in the interests of the “sovereignty and in-
tegrity of India, the security of the State, 
friendly relations with foreign States, public 
order, decency or morality or in relation to 
contempt of court, defamation or incitement 
to an offense.”
To decide whether the criminal offenses of 
defamation amounted to a violation of the 
right to freedom of speech and expression, 
Justice Dipak Mishra of the Supreme Court 
?????????? ?? ?????????????? ????????? ??? ????
term “defamation” and the concept of “repu-
tation.” He relied on the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights 1948 and the ICCPR 
which both protect the right to free speech 
and the right to reputation. The SC further 
built on comparative case law to understand 
the concept of reputation as a part of the 
?????? ?????? ??? ????? ???? ????????? ????????????
referring to the Canadian Supreme Court 
decision Hill v. Church of Scientology of To-
ronto;26 the South African decision Khumalo 
v. Holomissa;27  and on Karako v. Hungary28 
where the European Court of Human Rights 
recognized that the freedom of speech may 
be restricted to protect reputation. 
Interpreting the right to freedom of speech 
and expression, the Supreme Court held that 
notwithstanding the expansive and sweeping 
ambit of freedom of speech it is not absolute 
and may be subject to reasonable restric-
tions, as any other right. On the other hand, 
the Court held that the right to honor, dignity, 
and reputation are constituents of the right 
to life, in line with is previous decisions. 
 
The Court concluded that although freedom 
of speech and expression is inviolable, it is 
subject to reasonable restrictions and held 
that Sections 499 and 500 of the Indian 
 
25 Article 19. (1) (a) All citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression.
26 [1995] 2 SCR 1130 (holding that a good reputation is closely related to the innate worthiness and dignity of an individual and an attribute that must, just as 
much as freedom of expression, be protected).
27 [2002] ZACC 12; 2002 (5) SA 401 (stating that law of defamation seeks to protect the legitimate interest individuals have in their reputation, which supports 
the value of human dignity, but that it needs to be balanced with the protection of free speech).
28 (2011) 52 ECtHR 36.
Penal Code could not be called unreasonable 
for they are neither vague nor excessive nor 
arbitrary. 
The Court emphasized the balance of funda-
mental rights, observing that no right is abso-
lute. Fundamental Rights are equal and one 
cannot be preferred to another, because they 
exist in concord and not in watertight isola-
tion. The Court held that in a case where two 
Fundamental Rights clash, the right which 
better promotes public interest must be up-
held. It held that if a law limits constitutional 
rights, such limitation is constitutional if it is 
proportional.
Shyam Narayan Chouksey v. Union of India 
[Writ Petition(s)(Civil) No(s). 855/2016]
The petitioner in this case was a retired gov-
????????????????? ?????????????????????????
Article 32 to the Supreme Court, advocat-
ing respect to the National Anthem under 
the provisions of the Prevention of Insults 
to National Honour Act, 1971. The petition 
claimed that the National Anthem was often 
sung in impermissible circumstances, that 
necessary respect was not accorded to the 
Anthem when sung, played, or being recited, 
and it is the duty of every person to show 
respect to the National Anthem.
The Supreme Court Bench, consisting of Jus-
tice Dipak Mishra and Justice Roy, passed an 
interim order detailing several controversial 
directions. The Bench held that there shall be 
no commercial exploitation or dramatization 
of the National Anthem. That it should not 
be included as a part of a variety show, shall 
not be printed on any object, and never dis-
played in a manner and such places that are 
?????????????????????????? ?????????????????
Bench also gave unprecedented directions 
to citizens on what they should do when the 
National Anthem is played. Some of the di-
rections read as follows:
a. All cinema halls in India shall play the 
National Anthem before the feature 
???????????????????????????????????????????
obliged to stand up to show respect to 
the National Anthem.
b. Before the National Anthem is played 
or sung in a cinema hall on the screen, 
the entry and exit doors shall remain 
closed so that no one can create any 
disturbance which could disrespect the 
National Anthem. After the National 
Anthem is played or sung, the doors can 
be opened.
c. ????? ???? ????????? ??????? ?????? ???
played in cinema halls, it shall be with 
the National Flag on the screen.
d. The abridged version of the National 
Anthem made by anyone for whatever 
reason shall not be played or displayed.
????? ?????????????????????? ??????????????-
preme Court went on to hold that these di-
rections were issued so that love and respect 
???????????????????????????????????????????
respect to the National Anthem and National 
Flag and to instill in citizens the feeling of 
patriotism and nationalism. The Court relied 
upon clause (a) of Article 51A of the Consti-
tution and held that it is the sacred obligation 
of every citizen to abide by the ideals en-
grafted in the Constitution and that they are 
duty-bound to show respect to the Anthem, 
which is the symbol of constitutional patrio-
tism and inherent national quality.
?????? ?????? ??? ??? ?????? ????? ???????? ??? ????
National Anthem should be showed, the 
mandatory screening of the National Flag 
and playing of the National Anthem in all 
??????? ?????? ??????? ?????? ???? ??? ???????
problematic. This judgment was subsequent-
??? ?????? ????????? ??? ????? ???????????? ?????
disabilities need not stand while the National 
??????????? ????????????? ?????????????????
sought because this judgment was being im-
plemented with such fervor in cinema halls 
that persons unable to stand were seriously 
threatened. It has been subject to substantial 
criticism whether the Supreme Court can 
force feelings of patriotism, and whether en-
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forced display of the National Flag and the 
Anthem is required for the same. 
 Parivartan Kendra v. Union of India 
[(2016) 3 SCC 571]
This decision was passed in a public interest 
?????????????????????? ??????????????? ???-
ra, seeking compensation and redress for two 
Dalit sisters, Chanchal and Sonam, who fell 
victim to a brutal acid attack. The two sisters 
were not given adequate treatment after the 
acid attack and were ill-treated at the hospi-
tal due to their caste. It was only after they 
were taken to Delhi that they received ade-
quate treatment. The PIL sought directions 
from the Supreme Court that would help se-
cure justice, compensation, and dignity for 
all acid attack survivors, including the de-
velopment of a rehabilitation scheme and an 
increase in compensation to victims of acid 
attacks. It also sought that acid attacks be 
included as an offense within the Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of 
Atrocities) Act, 1989.
Allowing the petition, the judges referred to 
directions given by the Supreme Court in a 
previous decision on compensation for vic-
tims of acid attacks in Laxmi v. The Union 
of India,29 in which the Supreme Court, in 
addition to banning the over-the-count-
er sale of acid, had also directed that State 
governments provide a minimum amount of 
Rs. 3 Lakhs as compensation to each acid 
attack victim under Victim Compensation 
??????????????? ???? ???????? ?????? ??? ????
present case acknowledged that there was 
no proper implementation of regulations or 
control for the supply and distribution of 
acid, it did not issue further guidelines in this 
regard. It focused on compensation and held 
that Laxmi mandated only a minimum com-
pensation of Rs.3 Lakhs. The State govern-
ment has the discretion, however, to provide 
more compensation to the victim in the case 
of acid attack as per the guidelines. 
In the instant case, considering the expenses 
already incurred by the victims’ family, the 
Court directed that Chanchal be paid com-
pensation of Rs. 10,00,000/- and her sister be 
29 [(2014) 4 SCC 427].
30 (2009) 16 SCC 565.
paid compensation of Rs. 3,00,000/- by the 
State government and further that the State 
government be responsible for their entire 
treatment and rehabilitation. This compen-
sation was awarded not only regarding the 
physical injury but also considering the vic-
tim’s inability to lead and enjoy wholesome 
lives because of the acid attack. In addition 
to the increased compensation, the Supreme 
Court passed a few general directions:
a. State governments should take up the 
matter with all private hospitals in their 
States to not refuse but provide full 
treatment to acid attack victims, includ-
ing medicines, food, and reconstructive 
surgeries.
b. ?????????? ??????? ?????? ???????????? ?????
the person is a victim of an acid attack 
???????????????????????????????????????
for reconstructive surgeries and com-
pensation.
This judgment of the Court was progressive 
in stressing the plight of acid attack victims 
to justify the need for enhanced compensa-
tion. It tried to highlight the social stigma 
??????????????????????????????????????????????
obtaining employment, and the tremendous 
medical expenses they incur towards the 
lifelong treatment of their injuries. The Su-
preme Court stated that such enhancement 
of compensation will not only help the vic-
tim secure medical treatment but will also 
motivate the State to strictly implement the 
guidelines so that acid attacks are prevented 
in the future.
In an important direction, the Supreme 
Court also directed all States to take steps 
to include acid attack victims’ names on the 
disability list. This recognizes the life-long 
consequences that acid attack victims face, 
as was effectively pointed out by the Court, 
and would also enable them to rights and en-
titlements under the law relating to persons 
with disabilities.  
Devika Biswas v. Union of India [AIR 2016 
SC 4405]
????????????????????????????????????????????
petition after a mass sterilization camp in 
the Araria District of Bihar. The camp was 
carried out on January 7, 2012, by a single 
surgeon where 53 women were operated on 
within the period of just two hours from 8 pm 
to 10 pm, in a school. The women were oper-
ated on atop school desks by the surgeon, who 
used just a single set of gloves with the aid 
of only a torch-light, and without the facility 
of running water. There was no provision of 
pre-operative and post-operative care, or even 
counseling, that would inform the women of 
the permanent nature of sterilization or its side 
effects. The petition also reported on many 
other sterilization camps that had taken place 
in other States where none of the procedures 
laid down by the government were followed. 
Devika Biswas asked for a series of directions 
including the setting up of a committee to in-
vestigate the facts relating to this sterilization 
camp and to initiate departmental and crim-
inal proceedings against those involved. She 
also prayed that the government guidelines be 
scrupulously adhered to so that such incidents 
do not recur in any part of the country and that 
additional compensation will be paid to the 
women. The PIL highlighted the conduct of 
mass sterilization in highly unsanitary condi-
tions in the States of Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, 
Maharashtra, Chattisgarh, and Rajasthan.
The Supreme Court relied on the case of 
Ramakant Rai (I) and Anr. v. Union of India 
and Ors,30 in which it had prescribed detailed 
guidelines and procedures to be adhered to 
in the conduct of sterilizations. The Court 
directed the Union government during the 
hearings to report on the implementation of 
each direction given in Ramakant Rai and 
the details of the utilization of funds under 
the Family Planning Indemnity Scheme, 
2013. The various State governments were 
???????????????????????????????????????????????
extant situation in their States.
In response to these directions, Chattisgarh 
provided a Status Report on the progress 
made by the “Anita Jha Committee” that 
was set up to address the deaths caused by 
the sterilization camp in Bilaspur. Bihar ac-
cepted the failure of the sterilization camp 
and that it had issued show-cause notices to 
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the relevant persons in charge of the camp. 
??????????????????????????????????????????
deny the conduct of sterilizations, it claimed 
that these were performed under informed 
consent and after review of cases by the 
State Quality Assurance Committee. Rajas-
than stated that standard operating proce-
dures were being followed and Kerala and 
Maharashtra did not submit any substantial 
reports. The Union of India proposed phas-
ing out sterilization camps over the next 
three years and submitted that Tamil Nadu, 
Maharashtra, Sikkim, and Goa, as well as 
Chattisgarh, have phased out sterilization 
altogether.
Finally, the Supreme Court in its judgment 
lamented the lack of a health policy in the 
country, which could address these concerns. 
It disagreed with the Ministry of Health and 
??????? ?????????????????????????????????????
comes solely under the purview of the State 
Government. The Court pointed out that En-
try 20A of the Concurrent List pertains to 
“Population Control and Family Planning” 
over which the Union has superior powers 
of legislation:31
If the sterilization program is intended 
for population control and family plan-
ning (which it undoubtedly is) there is 
no earthly reason why the Union of In-
dia should refer to and rely on Entry 6 
of the State List and ignore Entry 20A of 
the Concurrent List. Population control 
and family planning has been and is a 
national campaign over the last so many 
decades. Therefore, the responsibility for 
the success or failure of the population 
control and family planning program 
(of which sterilization procedure is an 
integral part) must rest squarely on the 
shoulders of the Union of India. It is for 
this reason that the Union of India has 
been taking so much interest in promot-
ing it and has spent huge amounts over 
the years in encouraging it. It is rather 
unfortunate that the Union of India is 
now treating the sterilization program as 
31 [AIR 2016 SC 4405] para 69.
32 (1992)1 SCC 441.
33 (2009)9 SCC 1.
34 Ms. A. S. v. Hungary, Thirty-sixth session, CEDAW/C/36/D/4/2004, 7-25 August 2006, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/protocol/deci-
sions-views/Decision%204-2004%20-%20English.pdf.
a Public Health issue and making it the 
concern of the State Government. This is 
simply not permissible and appears to be 
a case of passing the buck.
????????????????????????????????????????????-
ization should be treated as a subject under 
the competence of the Union Government is 
a fair argument since the federal executive 
has more effective powers, the Court’s ob-
servation that reproductive treatments such 
as sterilization would not be a public health 
issue is of serious concern. Unless violations 
of reproductive rights are not treated as im-
portant public health violations, they will 
never be given priority.
The Court held that the concerned steriliza-
tion procedures endanger the right to life 
under Article 21 of the Constitution, which 
included the right to health and reproductive 
rights. It relied on C.E.S.C. Limited and Ors 
v. Subhash Chandra Bose,32 which has in-
terpreted the “right to health” as an aspect 
of social justice informed by both Article 21 
of the Constitution as well as the Directive 
Principles of State Policy, and internation-
al covenants to which India is a party. The 
Court also relied on Suchita Srivastava v. 
Chandigarh Administration33 in holding that 
the exercise of reproductive rights would in-
clude the right to make a choice regarding 
sterilization by informed consent and free 
from any form of coercion. Finally, the Court 
also referred to a decision of the Committee 
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
?????????????????A.S. v. Hungary,34 ex-
????????? ???? ?????? ???????????? ????
held: Compulsory sterilization...adversely 
affects women’s physical and mental health, 
and infringes the right of women to decide 
on the number and spacing of their children. 
The Court issued the following directions:
a. That the Ministry of Health and Family 
???????? ?????????????????? ??????????????
full list of approved doctors and their par-
ticulars in each State, District and Union 
Territory. 
b. A checklist should be prepared under 
the directions in RamakantRai that ex-
plains the impact and consequences of 
the sterilization procedure along with 
signatures by the concerned doctor as 
well as of a trained counselor certifying 
that the proposed patient has been ex-
plained the contents of the checklist and 
has understood its contents as well.
c. ?????????????????????????????????????????
be given to a patient to accommodate a 
change of mind.
d. Preparation of an annual report, in addi-
tion to the six-monthly reports required, 
to be published by the State Quality As-
surance Committees containing details 
on the number of persons sterilized as 
well as the number of deaths or compli-
cations arising out of the sterilization 
procedure.
e. Strengthening of the Primary Health 
Care centers across India and efforts to 
ensure that sterilization camps are dis-
continued as early as possible.
f. The need to ensure that informal or for-
mal targets towards sterilization are not 
???????????????????????????????? ???????
and others to compel persons to under-
go forced sterilization merely to achieve 
these targets.
g. The Court expressed its displeasure with 
the inadequate responses of Madhya 
Pradesh, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, and 
Kerala regarding the sterilization camps 
????????????????????????? ?????????????-
tices of these States to initiate a suo 
motu public interest petition to consid-
er the allegations that had been made 
against them and directed the States of 
Bihar and Chattisgarh to speedily and 
??????????? ????????? ?????? ??????????????
into the sterilization tragedies.
h. To announce a National Health Policy 
at the earliest, keeping in mind issues of 
gender equity.
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CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court seemed to speak in 
different voices in the year 2016. It gave 
fundamental rights such as the freedom of 
speech a very narrow interpretation. But 
some benches of the Court penned broad 
and expansive directions on the reproduc-
tive rights of women and rights to com-
pensation, treatment, and rehabilitation of 
acid attack survivors. One could question 
whether the Supreme Court interprets rights 
consistently.
It is also important to note that the judicia-
ry has vehemently protected its autonomy, 
even though this attracted severe criticism 
for a lack of transparency. The perceived 
threat to the independence of the judiciary 
seems to eclipse the need for a change and 
participation in the judicial appointment 
process. Their steadfast protection of judi-
cial autonomy indicates that courts tend to 
preach accountability without practicing it.
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Indonesia
DEVELOPMENTS IN INDONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????
Scholar at Indonesia Jentera School of Law
INDONESIA
INTRODUCTION
The Indonesia Constitutional Court is at a 
critical point in history as President Joko 
????????? ??????????????????????????????-
???? ???????????????????????????????????
in 2014, he faced an opposition majority in 
the legislature bent on obstructing him.1 In 
the middle of 2016, however, Jokowi has 
consolidated his power in the arenas of elite 
contestation.2 Jokowi’s coalition now holds 
some 67 percent of parliamentary seats after 
he successfully made some political maneu-
vers to convince two principal opposition 
parties to switch allegiance. 
????????????????????? ????????????????????
administration has entered into the arena 
of an “uncontested” presidency.3 Some 
constitutional stakeholders have been hop-
ing the Court would play a critical role to 
balance the power of the presidency. But the 
Court has gone through periods of transi-
tion from the interventionist court to a now 
seemingly constrained and tamed court.4 
Under the chairmanship of Arief Hidayat, 
the Court has retreated from the boldness 
????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????
1 Stefanus Hendrianto, “Indonesia’s Constitutional Conundrum: The Weak Presidency, the Strong Op-
position, and the Regional Elections Law,” Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Oct. 4, 2014, available at http://www.
iconnectblog.com/2014/09/indonesias-constitutional-conundrum-the-weak-presidency-the-strong-op-
position-and-the-regional-elections-law/.
2 For a detailed analysis of Jokowi’s political consolidation, please see Eve Warburton, “Jokowi and the 
New Developmentalism,” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vo. 52, No. 3, 297-320 (2016).
3 In the recent Jakarta Governor Election, which took place on April 19, 2017, Anies Baswedan 
successfully took down President Jokowi’s key ally, Basuki Tjahja Purnama. Purnama is backed by 
President Joko Widodo’s ruling party. Baswedan is supported by a retired general, Prabowo Subianto, 
who narrowly lost to Widodo in the 2014 presidential election and is expected to challenge him again in 
the 2019 presidential election. The Jakarta governorship is widely seen as a litmus test for winning the 
presidency, and the result would put President Jokowi in the defensive position.
4 For a detailed analysis of the evolution of the Indonesian Constitutional Court, please see Stefanus 
Hendrianto, “The Rise and Fall of Heroic Chief Justices: Constitutional Politics and Judicial Leadership 
in Indonesia,” 25 Washington International Law Journal 489 (June 2016).
became common to refer to the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court as composed only of 
“second-rate judges.” These “second-rate 
judges” had the effect of reducing the im-
pact of the Court’s jurisprudence. 
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
COURT 
The Indonesian 1945 Constitution divided 
the judiciary into the Supreme Court and 
the Constitutional Court as two separate 
institutions. The Constitution maintains the 
Supreme Court has the authority to review 
ordinances and regulations made under any 
statutes. But the Constitution also equips the 
Constitutional Court with authority to con-
duct reviews of statutory legislation. This 
arrangement means that the right of judicial 
review is not uniformly given to a single 
Court; the Supreme Court and the Consti-
tutional Court each share different judicial 
review authority.  
The Indonesian Constitutional Court is a 
?????????????????????????????????????????
on constitutional issues. The Court has the 
power to review laws for their constitution-
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ality in the absence of a concrete dispute.5 
The Constitutional Court Law also allows 
an individual to request a review.6 If a law 
is found unconstitutional, the Court will 
either nullify the law or order the parliament 
or the executive to make amendments. In 
addition to the authority over statutory re-
view, the Constitution also equips the Court 
with the authority to resolve disputes over 
the power of state institutions; to decide 
the legality of the dissolution of a political 
party; to resolve disputes over the results of 
general elections; and, to review a motion 
for impeachment of the President.7
The Court has nine justices that have equal 
authority to decide all the important deci-
sions. The Constitution provides equal ap-
pointment power among the three branches 
of government:  three justices are appointed 
by the President, three appointed by the 
People Representative Council (Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat, hereinafter the “DPR”) 
and three appointed by the Supreme Court.8 
There is a term limit imposed in which the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????? ?????
there is a mandatory age limit in which the 
justices retire at age 70. The Chief Justice 
and Deputy Chief Justice, however, only 
serve for a term of two years and six months 
but can be re-elected for the second term.9  
 
 
5 The Court only has authority to review a constitutional question in an abstract way and not to resolve a concrete constitutional case. The Court’s abstract 
?????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
??????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????
6 Undang – Undang No. 24 of 2003 tentang Mahkamah Konstitusi (Law No. 24 of 2003 on the Constitutional Court), art 51
7 Constitution of Republic of Indonesia 1945, art 24C (1)
8 Constitution of Republic of Indonesia 1945, art 24C (3) 
9 Initially, Article 4 (3) of the Constitutional Court Law 2003 provided that the Chief Justice and his deputy shall serve for a three-year term. But in 2011, the 
lawmakers amended the law and reduced the term of Chief Justice to two years and six months. See Law No. 8 of 2011 on the Amendment of the Constitu-
tional Court Law
10 “Temui Jokowi, Hakim MK Klaim Tak Bahas Gugatan Tax Amnesty.” (Meeting with Jokowi, the Chief Justice Claims No Discussion on the Tax Amnesty 
case) Suara.com, September 1, 2016. Accessed April 15, 2017. http://www.suara.com/news/2016/09/01/150944/temui-jokowi-hakim-mk-klaim-tak-bahas-
gugatan-tax-amnesty
11 In 2013, the Court’s reputation was seriously damaged when the then Chief Justice Akil Mochtar was arrested for accepting a bribe to rule on a regional 
election dispute. Currently, Mochtar is serving life imprisonment
12 “Beef importer Basuki reportedly confesses to bribing Constitutional Court aide.”The Jakarta Post, January 27, 2017.
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/01/27/beef-importer-basuki-reportedly-confesses-to-bribing-constitutional-court-aide.html; see also 
“KPK names MK justice Patrialis Akbar suspect in the bribery case,” The Jakarta Post, February 27, 2017http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/01/27/
kpk-names-mk-justice-patrialis-akbar-suspect-in-bribery-case.html
13 President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono appointed Patrialis Akbar as an associate Justice in August 2013. There was speculation that his appointment 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the appointment of Akbar on the ground that the appointment process was not transparent. The Administrative Court quashed Akbar’s appointment on the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Administrative Court reversed the decision by the District Administrative Court 
The associate justices will elect the chief 
justice and his deputy through an internal 
election mechanism. 
DEVELOPMENTS AND  
CONTROVERSIES IN 2016  
As explained earlier, most judges of the 
current Court are “second-rate judges.” Two 
major controversies have supported this 
?????????????????????????????????????????-
sy was in a series of litigation in the Tax 
Amnesty case. The tax amnesty policy is the 
pet project of President Jokowi, and aims to 
improve tax compliance in Indonesia. 
In July 2016, some NGOs challenged the 
constitutionality of the Tax Amnesty Law 
before the Court. In response to this legal 
challenge, the Jokowi administration moved 
immediately to “pressure” the Court. After 
the hearing process of the judicial review of 
the Tax Amnesty Law had begun, President 
Jokowi “summoned” Chief Justice Arief 
Hidayat to the Presidential Palace. Chief 
Justice Arief Hidayat denied that the meet-
ing was to discuss the tax amnesty cases.10 
According to Hidayat, his visit was intended 
for an audience and conveyed a report to the 
President about the international sympo-
sium on the Asian Constitutional Court.  
Regardless of the nature of the meeting, 
obviously the Chief Justice did not make a 
wise decision by attending a meeting with 
the President while there was pending liti-
gation in the Court against the President. 
The second controversy was the arrest 
of Associate Justice Patrialis Akbar. On 
January 25, 2017, in another major blow to 
the reputation of the Constitutional Court,11 
the Anti-Corruption Commission arrested 
Patrialis Akbar as he had allegedly received 
bribes of US$20,000 (RP 266 million) from 
a prominent beef importing businessman. 
The businessman, Basuki Hariman, has 
admitted giving US$20,000 to an aide of 
Justice Patrialis Akbar, in which the assis-
tant assured Hariman that Patrialis Akbar 
would help to sway the judicial review of 
the Animal and Husbandry Law II case for 
beef importers.12 Indeed, Patrialis Akbar is 
the exemplar of a “second-rate judge.” His 
appointment was quite problematic from 
the beginning, mostly because of his poor 
record as the Minister of Justice.13 During 
his four-year tenure as an associate justice, 
Akbar did not show any stellar performance 
either, and he ended his career as a criminal. 
 
MAJOR CASES 
The Animal Health and Husbandry Law II 
case (Decision No. 129/PUU-XIII/2015)
As explained earlier, this case brought down 
constitutional justice Patrialis Akbar, in 
which he allegedly accepted US$200.000 
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from Basuki Hariman, a major player in the 
beef import business. It was suspected that 
???????????????????????????????????????????-
ence Court decision in the judicial review 
of the statutory regulation that governs the 
beef import industry.
This case is the sequel of the Animal Health 
and Husbandry Law I case.14 On August 
25, 2010, the Court under the chairmanship 
of Mohammad Mahfud issued a decision 
on the judicial review of Law No. 18 of 
2009 on Animal Health and Husbandry. 
The crux of the matter is the Law allowed 
import of beef and cattle from disease-free 
zones, regardless of the disease status in 
the country as a whole. The Court declared 
that the phrase, “a zone within a country” in 
art 59(2) of the Law was unconstitutional. 
The Court considered that the import of live 
animals from “a country or a zone within a 
country” is the manifestation of imprudent 
and dangerous policy because the disease 
may spread into the area from unsafe parts 
of the country. 
In 2014, the government enacted Law No. 
41 of 2014, which reinstated the provision 
that allows animals imported to Indonesia 
to come from a country or a zone within 
??????????????????????????????????????????
standard. The petitioner challenged the con-
stitutionality of the Law and argued that the 
zone system would violate the constitutional 
rights of farmers, traders in livestock, veter-
inarians, and consumers of animal products.
The Court considered that after the issuance 
of the Animal and Husbandry Law I case, 
the Parliament had revised the zone system 
requirement. Thus, the Court opined that 
there is a difference between the object of 
??????????????????????????????????????????
case and the second instance. The Court 
decided that Law No. 41 of 2014 is “condi-
tionally unconstitutional”; that the imple-
mentation of a zone system is allowed when 
there is urgent domestic demand in which 
the Government needs to import from other 
countries. 
14 Constitutional Court Decision No 137/PUU-VII/2009 (the Animal Health and Husbandry Law I case)
15 In 2004, Puteh challenged the constitutionality of the Anti-Corruption Law that was used to charge him, but the Court rejected Puteh’s claim. See the 
Constitutional Court Decision 069/PUU-II/2004
The Court reached the decision unanimous-
ly, and Justice Patrialis Akbar casted out his 
??????????????????????????????? ??????????
November 21, 2016. The Court, however, 
did not announce the decision until Feb-
ruary 7, 2017. It was not clear how much 
????????? ???????????????????????????????-
cision. The fact of the matter is nine Justices 
made the ruling and Akbar only had one 
vote. Regardless of what happened behind 
the scenes, the arrest of Patrialis Akbar has 
tainted the legitimacy of the Court’s deci-
sion in this case.  
The Abdullah Puteh case (Decision No. 51/
PUU-XIV/2016) 
In the last term, the Court decided two 
major cases related to the electoral process. 
????????????????????????????????????????
Abdullah Puteh, who has been sentenced to 
10 years imprisonment, to participate in the 
2017 Aceh Province Governor Election.
????????????????????????????????????????
Aceh Province, Puteh was charged with 
corruption concerning the purchase of two 
MI-2 helicopters for Aceh Province.15 In 
2004, Puteh began serving his ten-year 
sentence. But later, Puteh was out on parole 
before the full sentence was served. Having 
stayed in the political wilderness for more 
than a decade, Puteh was planning a come-
back with a run in the 2017 Aceh Governor 
Election. Nevertheless, Article 67 (2) (g) of 
Law No. 11 of 2006 on Aceh Governance 
prohibited candidates for governor/deputy 
governor who had been sentenced for a 
crime punishable by a term of imprisonment 
??????????????????????????????????????????
or political crimes that have been granted 
amnesty. Puteh then challenged the consti-
tutionality of the Aceh Governance Law to 
the Court.
The Court granted a decision for the claim-
ant. The Court held that Article 67 (2) (g) 
of Law No. 11 of 2006 concerning Aceh 
Government is “conditionally unconstitu-
tional” as long as it does not provide an ex-
ception for former convicts who openly and 
honestly inform the public that he or she 
is an ex-convict. The Court ruling means 
that Puteh can participate in the 2017 Aceh 
????????????????????????????????????????????
public that he was an ex-convict. 
The Voting Rights for Mentally Disabled 
Persons case (Decision No. 135/PUU-
XIII/2015) 
In the second major case that related to the 
electoral process, the Court dealt with the 
issue of voting rights for mentally disabled 
persons. Law No. 8 of 2015 on the Election 
of Governor, Head of Regency, and Mayor 
stipulates that mentally disabled or disor-
dered persons have no right to vote (Art 57 
§3a). 
Some NGOs representing mentally disabled 
persons challenged the law and argued 
that the prohibition violates the constitu-
tional rights of mentally disabled persons 
to participate in the general election. They 
argue that there are different categories of 
mentally disabled or disordered individuals 
???????????????????????????????????????????
does not always lead to incapacity to cast a 
vote. 
The Court ruled that indeed there is a 
distinction between mentally disabled and 
mentally disordered persons. Nevertheless, 
the Law did not explain how to assess the 
distinction between mentally disabled or 
disordered persons. The Court considered 
that the General Election Commission is 
not equipped to evaluate the capacity of 
mentally disabled or disordered persons as 
potential voters. The Court held that not all 
individuals who are experiencing mental 
disorders or memory disorders would lose 
the ability to cast a vote. Moreover, the 
Court considered that the absence of guide-
lines and institutions for psychiatric analysis 
of the potential voters is a violation of con-
???????????????????????????????????????????????
Article 57 (3) (a) is unconstitutional unless 
it was interpreted in the Court’s understand-
????????? ????????????????????????????????? 
as permanent impairment of mental health, 
which removes the ability for someone to 
cast a vote. 
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The Electricity III case (Decision No. 111/
PUU-XIII/2015)
???????????????????????????????????????
???????????? ??????????????Serikat Peker-
ja PLN) and an employee of the State 
Electricity Company (Perusahaan Listrik 
Negara – PLN). The claimants contested 
the constitutionality of Law No. 30 of 2009 
on Electricity by arguing that electricity is 
part of the common good, and therefore it 
should be controlled by the state instead of 
private sectors. 
This is the third case in which the Court had 
to deal with the privatization of the electric-
????????????????????????????????????????????
of the state in providing electricity through 
previous two cases. In the Electricity I case, 
the Court stated that the control over the 
electricity industry is essential for the com-
mon good.16??????????????????????????????
authority of the State Electricity Company 
(PLN) to control the electricity industry in 
the Electricity II case.17 
In the Electricity I case, the Court, under 
the chairmanship of Jimly Asshiddiqie, 
declared the entire Law Number 20 of 2002 
on Electricity to be unconstitutional. In 
2009, however, the government enacted a 
new electricity law which resurrected the 
privatization of policy. Under the 2009 
Electricity Law, the State Electricity Com-
pany no longer has a monopoly in supplying 
electricity to end-users, and it opens up for 
Independent Power Producers (IPPs) for 
involvement in providing electricity. 
In the third case, however, the Court con-
sidered that the 2009 Electricity Law did 
not explicitly rule that the involvement of 
private enterprises eliminated state control 
over the electricity industry. Therefore, the 
Court declared that the provision is “condi-
tionally unconstitutional” if it is construed 
that the involvement of private enterprises 
will eliminate the principle of “state-con-
trolled” in an important sector of industry 
16 Constitutional Court Decision No. 001-021-022/PUU-I/2003
17 Constitutional Court Decision No. 149/PUU-VIII/2009
18 In the Tax Amnesty Law II case (Decision No. 58/PUU-XIV/2016), the Court unanimously dismissed the case and held that it’s ruling in the Tax Amnesty I 
case should be applied to this case
19 Law No. 11 of 2016 on Tax Amnesty 
20 Law No. 1 of 1974, Article 35 
such as electricity. This decision does not 
change the landscape of the electricity 
???????????????????????????????????????????
the role of the state in controlling and 
providing electricity to the entire people, 
but at the same time it did not concur with 
the petitioner’s argument to eliminate the 
involvement of private enterprises. 
The Tax Amnesty Law I case (Decision No. 
57/PUU-XIV/2016)18 
This case involved a challenge against the 
pet project of President Jokowi: the Tax 
Amnesty Law.19 The claimant is an NGO 
called the Indonesian People’s Struggle 
Union (Serikat Perjuangan Rakyat Indo-
nesia). The petitioner argued that the Tax 
Amnesty Law is discriminatory because the 
tax evaders are being rewarded for their tax 
crimes while the honest taxpayers that have 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
receive any appreciation from the govern-
ment.  The claimant further argued that the 
tax amnesty program could undermine the 
criminal justice system in Indonesia as the 
Law prevents the Tax Authority, the Attor-
????????????????????????????? ??????????-
tion Commission to use all the data from 
the tax amnesty program as evidence for 
criminal investigation.  
The Court unanimously rejected the peti-
tion. The Court argued all the data that were 
submitted to the tax amnesty program shall 
be protected or otherwise nobody would be 
interested in participating in it. Therefore, 
those data shall not be used as evidence in 
a criminal investigation. Furthermore, the 
Court ruled that the tax amnesty law only 
provides immunity to tax related crimes, but 
it never provides immunity to other offences 
committed by tax evaders.
As mentioned earlier, there has been a 
growing suspicion that the Jokowi admin-
istration “pressured” the Court to support 
???????? ???????????? ?????????????????
substantial evidence that the Court reached 
the decisions under pressure, the meeting 
between Chief Justice Hidayat and Presi-
dent Jokowi has, nonetheless, tainted the 
legitimacy of the Court’s decision. 
The Prenuptial Agreement case (Decision 
No. 69/PUU-XIII/2015)
The crux of the matter was a prohibition for 
a foreigner to own property under the Right 
to Build (Hak Guna Bangunan), as stipu-
lated in Article 36 (1) of the Basic Agrarian 
????? ?????????????????????????????????????
foreigners, it indirectly applied to an Indo-
nesian citizen who married to a foreigner 
because the Marriage Law No. 1 of 1974 
imposed a joint property arrangement in 
which property acquired during a marriage 
becomes joint property (harta bersama).20 
In other words, a foreigner can acquire 
property through marital relationship with 
an Indonesian citizen. 
The claimant married a Japanese citizen 
but retained her Indonesian citizenship. The 
petitioner purchased an apartment and paid 
the full amount of payment in September 
2012. But the developer refused to provide 
?????????????????????????????????????????
the East Jakarta District Court to revoke 
the purchase. The District Court granted 
the petition and ruled that the claimant has 
no legal capacity to enter into a purchase 
agreement based on Indonesian civil law.  
The claimant challenged the constitutionali-
ty of both Article 36 (1) of the Basic Agrar-
ian Law and Article 35 of the Marriage 
Law (the joint property clause). She also 
challenged Article 29 (1) of the Marriage 
Law, which stipulates, “at the time of or 
before the marriage took place, with the 
mutual consent of both parties, the couple 
may enter into a prenuptial agreement.” The 
Marriage Law does not explicitly recognize 
a postnuptial agreement. But there are many 
couples that might wish to draw up a post-
nuptial agreement. For instance, in a case 
where a couple did not sign a prenuptial 
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agreement but later decide that they want to 
????????????????????????????????????????
after they accumulate some wealth.  
The Court rejected the claim against the 
Basic Agrarian Law and the joint property 
clause in the Marriage Law. Nevertheless, 
the Court chose to review the prenuptial 
clause. In the Court’s opinion, the lim-
itation for husband and wife to enter into 
a postnuptial agreement is a violation of 
the freedom of contract. The Court then 
declared that Article 29 (1) is “conditionally 
unconstitutional” unless it was interpret-
ed that a marital agreement can be made 
before, during, and after the marriage took 
place. In other words, the Court declared 
that the Marriage Law should be interpreted 
in light of the recognition of postnuptial 
agreements. 
CONCLUSION 
Having reviewed some major cases in the 
last term, one can see a pattern of how the 
executive and legislature ignored some 
??????????????????????????????????????????
Court. Then, they passed new laws that 
reinstated the policies that were being 
struck down by the Court. In the last term, 
the Court had to review some cases that 
dealt with the reinstatement of the govern-
ment’s policies. The Court, however, took 
a compromise approach by acknowledging 
that the government has tried to follow the 
Court’s directive, but at the same time it 
moved to declare some challenged pro-
visions “conditionally unconstitutional.” 
Overall, the Court under the chairmanship 
of Arief Hidayat has become a less inter-
ventionist court. In 2017, Arief Hidayat has 
to face re-election as the Chief Justice, and 
the public will wait on whether all of the 
constitutional court justices still trust him 
as the Chief Justice. As we write this report, 
President Jokowi has appointed academ-
ic-cum-activist Saldi Isra as a new Associate 
????????????????????????????????????? ????????
long track record as an anti-corruption ac-
tivist and stellar academic credentials, Saldi 
Isra might be a bold and autonomous judge. 
??????????????????????????????????????
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DEVELOPMENTS IN IRISH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Dr. Eoin Carolan, Associate Professor, University College Dublin
IRELAND
INTRODUCTION
2016 was very much a year of transition in 
Irish constitutional law. The year saw sever-
al significant developments, each of which 
raises important questions for constitutional 
politics in Ireland which remained undeter-
mined at the start of 2017.
The question of whether the constitution-
al regime on abortion ought to be amended 
moved further up the political and consti-
tutional agenda with the establishment of 
a citizen’s assembly chaired by a Supreme 
Court judge to consider the issue. Criticised 
by many as an attempt to delay or avoid the 
making of hard political choices, the assem-
bly is due to make its recommendations in 
2017.
The background tension between the judicia-
ry and the government that has been evident 
for a number of years came to the fore with 
a public dispute over potential changes to 
the judicial appointments system. Dissatis-
faction on the part of the judges (and many 
commentators) about the content of the pro-
posals was exacerbated by concerns over the 
manner and tone of their presentation – a 
position not helped by the arrival into gov-
ernment of a new “independent” minister 
who, in his previous existence as a newspa-
per columnist, had consistently criticised the 
system as one based on cronyism and politi-
cal patronage.
 
1 For discussion, see Mark Tushnet, “National Identity as a Constitutional Issue: The Case of the 
Preamble to the Irish Constitution” in Eoin Carolan (ed), The Constitution of Ireland: Perspectives and 
Prospects (Bloomsbury 2012).
2 Hogan (n 1), at 215-216.
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
COURT 
The current Constitution in Ireland was ad-
opted in 1937 as a successor to the 1922 
“Free State” Constitution. In terms of the 
courts, the 1937 Constitution (like the 1922 
text) departed significantly from the legal 
????????? ???????????????????????????????-
ing a list of fundamental rights with a spe-
cific power of judicial review. The rights in 
question were primarily civil and political 
in nature but also included a right to educa-
tion as well as Directive Principles of Social 
Policy, the latter of which were stated to be 
non-cognisable by the courts.
The Constitution also contained more con-
spicuously Catholic influences than its 1922 
predecessor, including a religious Preamble1
and prohibitions on divorce and blasphemy, 
as well as an acknowledgment of the special 
position of the Catholic Church (the latter has 
since been removed). It has been suggested, 
however, that the nature and impact of these 
Catholic influences may be commonly over-
stated with one leading commentator argu-
ing that “[w]hat is more remarkable … is the 
extent to which that document also reflected 
secular … values of liberal democracy, re-
spect for individual rights and the separation 
of Church and State and the extent to which 
it does not reflect Catholic teaching”.2 In the 
context of developments in 2016 on abor-
tion, it is relevant to note that the express 
protection of the right to life of the unborn in 
Article 40. 3. 3, was not in the original text 
but was inserted by referendum in 1983.
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The Supreme Court was one of two “superior 
courts” identified in 1937 as having the ex-
clusive jurisdiction to invalidate legislation 
as contrary to the Constitution. In practice, 
this meant that almost all constitutional liti-
gation was initiated in the High Court, from 
where it could be appealed as a matter of 
right to the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the 
decision was taken in 1937 that the Supreme 
Court should not be a constitutional court3 
but should have general jurisdiction over all 
matters. As a result, the Supreme Court had 
to combine the dual appellate functions of 
error correction and the principled develop-
ment of the law across all areas. Given the 
significant growth in the volume and com-
plexity of litigation in Ireland in recent de-
cades, the result was a substantial increase 
in the workload of the Court. A 2006 report 
found that the Court received and processed 
substantially more appeals annually than 
any of its counterparts in common law ju-
risdictions.4 The 2006 report recommended 
the establishment of a Court of Appeal. A 
constitutional amendment to allow for the 
establishment of such a court was ratified by 
referendum in October 2013 with the Court 
of Appeal established in October 2014.
At the time of the referendum, the figures in-
dicated that the Court received 558 appeals in 
2013, 605 in 2012, and 499 in 2011 with it 
disposing of 249, 202, and 190, respectively, 
in the same period.5 This gives some indica-
tion of the extent of the appellate backlog that 
had accumulated prior to the establishment of 
????????????? ??????? ????????????????????????
pending appeals were transferred to the new 
Court, the Supreme Court retained a sizeable 
number with two additional judges being ap-
pointed (bringing the Court to nine) for the 
express purpose of assisting it in clearing the 
backlog. By the close of 2016, that appears to 
have been almost accomplished. 
3 Gerard Hogan, “John Hearne and the Plan for a Constitutional Court” 18.1 (2011) DULJ 75.
4 Report of the Working Group on a Court of Appeal (Courts Service 2006).
5 Courts Service, Annual Report 2013 at 33.
6 [1992] 1 IR 1.
7 Eoin Carolan, The Ongoing Uncertainty over Irish Law on “The Unborn”: A Comment on the Matter of P.P. and Health Service Executive, Int’l J. Const. L. 
Blog, Dec. 30, 2014, available at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/2014/12/the-ongoing-uncertainty-over-irish-law-on-the-unborn.
8 Citizens’ Assembly receives more than 13,000 submissions on abortion, December 22, 2016, available at https://www.rte.ie/news/2016/1222/840774-as-
sembly/.
9 [Details of the meetings held (including written and video materials) are available at https://www.citizensassembly.ie/en/Meetings/.
10 Eoin Carolan, “Ireland’s Constitutional Convention: Beyond the Hype about Citizen-led Constitutional Change” (2015) 13 (3) Int J Const Law 733.
The likelihood is, therefore, that there will 
be a significant change in the number and 
nature of cases being dealt with by the Su-
preme Court in the future. The constitutional 
amendments introduced by referendum in 
2013 stipulate that the Supreme Court has 
appellate jurisdiction over a decision of the 
Court of Appeal where it is satisfied that the 
decision involves a matter of general public 
importance or that, in the interests of jus-
tice, it is necessary that there be an appeal. 
In practice, this has meant that a prospective 
appellant must now make a formal written 
application for leave to appeal. The applica-
tion may also be the subject of an oral hear-
ing. Initial experience with this new leave 
stage suggests that, while the Court retains 
a broad residual discretion to admit cases “in 
the interest of justice”, the decision whether 
or not to grant leave will primarily be deter-
mined on the basis of the first criterion of 
“general public importance”. This suggests 
that the Court will deal with a much smaller 
number of cases per year but that these will 
involve complex or significant questions of 
law. It is expected that constitutional litiga-
tion will feature prominently in the Court’s 
caseload.
 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVER-
SIES RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
Abortion
In terms of public profile, the most signifi-
cant issue in 2016 was the ongoing debate 
about the Irish constitutional position on 
abortion. The main provision relevant to this 
debate is Article 40. 3. 3:
“The State acknowledges the right to 
life of the unborn and, with due regard 
to the equal right to life of the mother, 
 
 
guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as 
far as practicable, by its laws to defend 
and vindicate that right”.
This was inserted into the Constitution fol-
lowing a referendum in 1983. The current 
position, as declared by the Supreme Court 
in its 1992 decision in AG v. X,6 is that the 
termination of a pregnancy is constitutional-
ly permissible if there is a real and substan-
tial risk to the life, as distinct from the health, 
of the mother; and that risk could only be 
avoided by the termination of her pregnancy. 
????????????????????????????????????????????
in Ireland, the current debate followed sev-
eral high-profile incidents, including one 
woman who died from sepsis after reported-
ly requesting but not being given an abortion, 
and another where a court order was sought 
to allow the withdrawal of somatic support 
for a pregnant woman who had been brain 
dead for three weeks.7 From the political per-
spective, a significant factor seems to have 
been that the minority government elected in 
2016 includes several independents who had 
publicly expressed support for a change in 
the constitutional position.
The government therefore announced that 
it would organise a “citizen’s assembly” to 
consider the possibility of constitutional re-
form. Comprising a representative sample of 
99 voters and one Supreme Court judge (as 
chair), the assembly has met on a number of 
occasions in both public and private sessions; 
received over 13,000 public submissions8; 
and is due to report its recommendations on 
this issue in mid-2017.9 A similar body was 
established by the previous government to 
address demands for constitutional reform 
on marriage equality. As with that body,10 the 
suspicion has been expressed that the assem-
bly provides a useful mechanism for govern-
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ment to delay addressing an issue on which 
there may be internal disagreement while 
also providing some distance between it and 
any controversial recommendations that may 
emerge. Nonetheless, the existence of the as-
sembly does mean that the issue will remain 
high on the public and political agenda for 
?????? ?????? ??? ????? ???????? ?? ????????????
depending on the recommendations of the 
?????????????? ???????? ?????????????????-
posed amendments to Article 40. 3. 3 being 
held in the short to medium term.
????????????????????????????????????????????-
cerned with abortion policy per se, academic 
discourse in 2016 also considered the possi-
ble content and implications of any change 
to Article 40. 3. 3. This is a more complex 
question than might first appear because of 
uncertainty over the constitutional position 
prior to the 1983 referendum. Several judg-
es had suggested, obiter dicta, that at least 
some of the rights protected by the Constitu-
tion might apply before birth.11 It is unclear, 
therefore, whether the 1983 referendum was 
declaratory of the underlying constitutional 
position or brought about some change in it.
The prospect that the Supreme Court may 
(finally) have to address this ambiguity un-
expectedly increased in 2016 with the deci-
sion of the High Court in IRM v. Minister 
for Justice and Equality.12 This was a chal-
lenge to a deportation order, in which it was 
argued that the Minister was required to take 
into account the rights of the unborn child of 
the prospective deportee. In addressing this 
issue, Humphreys J. referred to the previous 
dicta to hold that the unborn child enjoys 
additional rights beyond the right to life ac-
knowledged in Article 40. 3. 3. Furthermore, 
he expressed the view that these rights are 
extensive given the insertion into the Con 
stitution in 2015 of a specific constitutional 
provision directed to the rights of children.
11 G. v. An Bord Uchtála [1980] IR 32, at 69; McGee v. AG [1974] I.R. 284, at 312; Finn v. AG [1983] I.R. 154 at 160.
12 [2016] IEHC 478.
13 Gerry Whyte, “Abortion on Demand the Legal Outcome of Repeal of the 8th Amendment”, Irish
Times, 28 September 2016.
14 Jennifer Carroll MacNeill, The Politics of Judicial Selection in Ireland (Four Courts Press, 2016).
15 For background to some of these issues, see the blogposts by Laura Cahillane at http://constitutionproject.ie/.
Reflecting the importance of this judgment, 
the Supreme Court has been asked to make 
use of its exceptional “leapfrog” jurisdic-
tion to take an appeal directly from the High 
Court. If the Supreme Court agrees, it may 
be that the question of the wider constitu-
tional position will be definitively addressed 
in 2017. If so, this will clearly have implica-
tions for any potential constitutional amend-
ment. In particular, it raises the possibility 
that the Constitution would continue to have 
some????????? ????? ??????????? ?????-
quences for abortion legislation and policy 
in the event that Article 40. 3. 3 was simply 
deleted.
On the other hand, one leading constitution-
al scholar has suggested in a newspaper ar-
ticle that the removal of Article 40. 3. 3 by 
referendum would not return the law to its 
pre-1983 position but would most logically 
be regarded as a decision by the People “to 
completely withdraw constitutional protec-
tion from the unborn”.13
??????????????????? ?????????????????????????
the Oireachtas (parliament), and the appeal 
in I.R.M. to be heard (possibly by the Su-
preme Court), it seems inevitable that there 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
????????? ????????
Judicial Independence
The other major area of controversy relat-
ed to proposals for a reform of the judicial 
appointments system and, potentially, for 
the establishment of a judicial council. Both 
issues have been discussed in political cir-
cles for an extended period of time. This 
???????? ?? ???????? ?????????? ????? ?????? ????
limitations to the current constitutional and 
statutory frameworks that regulate appoint-
ments and accountability.14 Commonly cit-
ed concerns include the limited role of the 
Judicial Appointments Advisory Committee 
 
 
 
in the selection by government of candidates 
???? ???????????????? ?????????????????????????
of political patronage, the lack of any mech-
anism to discipline judges short of their re-
moval by the Oireachtas, and the absence of 
any formal body to represent the judiciary.15
In 2014, the judiciary expressed support for 
the introduction of a judicial council and 
for reform of the appointments system. In 
a submission to a consultation process, the 
Judicial Appointments Review Committee 
argued that “the present system of judicial 
appointment is unsatisfactory”; that “polit-
ical allegiance should have no bearing on 
????????????? ??? ????????? ???????? ????? ????
new advisory board should have the power 
??? ????? ??????????? ???? ?????? ???? ??? ?????-
nate one as “outstanding”; and that a judicial 
council with responsibility for discipline, 
education and representation of the judiciary 
was “a much needed reform”.
Despite agreement on the need for change, 
however, the new government’s moves to in-
troduce changes to the appointment process 
have attracted criticism from political and 
?????????????
????????????????????????????? ??????????????
??????????????? ???????????????? ????? ?????-
cism, a number of background consider-
ations should be borne in mind.
First of all, there has been a concern about 
the political approach to the judiciary. The 
holding of an arguably unnecessary referen-
dum to reduce judges’ pay and the appear-
ance in the media of details about a meeting 
between the former Chief Justice and Taoi-
seach at which the question of judges’ pen-
sions was raised were regarded as evidence 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
previous government that there may be polit-
??????????????????????????????????????? ??????? 
“elite” or “out of touch” judiciary.
2016 Global Review of Constitutional Law | 101
Second, these developments seem to have 
been perceived by the judiciary themselves 
as an attack upon their position. Most nota-
bly, a representative body, known as the As-
sociation of Judges of Ireland, was found in 
2011 to represent members of the judiciary. 
That this was a direct response to the politi-
cal environment was illustrated by the state-
ment on the AJI website at the time that:
The background to the foundation of 
the AJI was the development, over the 
months that followed the change of gov-
ernment that occurred in March 2011, 
???????????????????????????????????????-
tween the judiciary and the executive, 
from the perspective of many members 
of the judiciary.16
????????????????????????????????????????????
the 2016 general election is a minority co-
alition, the many parties in which are Fine 
Gael (the largest party in the previous gov-
ernment) and the Independent Alliance. The 
???????????????????????????????????????????-
per columnist who had previously criticised 
“cronyism” in the judicial appointments 
process on many occasions. It has been sug-
gested that one of his key demands in gov-
ernment has been reform of the process and, 
???????????????????????????????????????????
have a lay majority and a lay chairperson. In 
addition, however, he has continued as Min-
ister to express strong criticism of the judi-
ciary. He claimed on one occasion that it was 
obstructing reform, and on another that a 
declaration of judicial interests was required 
in case judges might “forget their oaths”. 
This prompted criticism from legal and po-
litical circles and an apparent response from 
the Chief Justice who warned in a speech 
against “inaccurate discussion and misrep-
resentation of the position of the Judiciary”.
There are two aspects of this controversy 
???????????????????????????????????????????????
??? ???? ???????? ????????? ??? ???? ????????????
be appointed (and disciplined) in the future. 
As with the law on abortion, this appears to 
be an issue where some form of change is 
16 http://aji.ie/ (accessed March 31, 2014).
17????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
18 [2016] IESC 73.
likely in the medium term. The government 
is committed to reform, one of its constituent 
????????????????????????????????????????????????
main opposition party has also produced its 
own draft legislation (which largely received 
a more positive response from legal circles). 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
will be is unclear, however. The government 
has outlined general principles but no draft 
legislation has yet been published. Given its 
minority status, it also cannot be assumed 
????????????????????????????????????????????
enough to enact any legislation. However, 
the fact that there is broad political and judi-
cial support for some kind of change means 
a commitment to reform (if not the policies 
currently proposed) may survive a change of 
government.
There also appears to be a degree of consen-
sus that a judicial council would be useful 
but this seems less of a priority at present. 
??????????????????????????????????????? ??-
ing the case for the council, it should be 
???????????????????????????????????????????
by a special committee in 2000.
The second aspect of this year’s controver-
sy that merits attention is the more general 
question of whether this episode – following 
on from others – is a signal of more pro-
found change in the relationship between 
the judicial and political arms of the state. 
Relations between the two sides certainly 
seem strained in a way that appears with-
out precedent since independence. The lack 
of trust on both sides and the willingness to 
engage in a degree of public criticisms that 
would have been deemed inappropriate even 
a decade ago are new dynamics in Ireland’s 
constitutional structures which raise long-
term issues around judicial independence 
and the relative authority of both legal and 
political actors.17? ???????????????????????????
this change is a matter of speculation, it does 
????? ????? ???? ??????? ????????? ????? ??-
forms with important long-term consequenc-
es are being formulated at a time of unusual 
turbulence in this relationship.
MAJOR CASES 
???? ???????????????????????????????????? ???
probably that in Collins v. Minister for Fi-
nance.18 This was a challenge to the issuing 
of long-term promissory notes worth €30 
billion by the Minister for Finance to two 
effectively insolvent banks in 2010 as part 
of the response to Ireland’s severe banking 
crisis.
Aside from the obvious importance of the 
subject matter, the proceedings were con-
?????????????? ??????????? ???????? ????? ???????
novel issues relating to the separation of 
??????????????????????????????????????????????
of the government and the Dáil (lower house) 
in budgetary matters, and of the courts in re-
viewing them.
The plaintiff’s core argument asserted the 
existence of a general separation of powers 
principle that control of national debt and 
expenditure must be vested in the legisla-
tive branch. Substantial reliance was placed 
in this regard on Article 1.8 of the US Con-
stitution and on the Federalist Papers. The 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
abdicated its constitutional function by con-
ferring a statutory power on the Minister to 
issue debt without imposing either a statuto-
ry “debt ceiling” or, alternatively, a require-
ment to obtain legislative approval.
This was rejected by the Supreme Court. The 
Court pointed out that the Irish Constitution 
contained no equivalent provision to Article 
1.8. Rather, “[t]he Constitution’s main con-
??????????????????????? ??????????????????????-
propriation and therefore expenditure of all 
monies is required by Article 11 to be pro-
vided for ‘by law’”.
However, the Court proceeded to hold that 
the phrase “by law” required more than a 
statutory basis for the act in question. In-
stead, it denoted a broader principle of legal-
ity which meant that a law formally enacted 
“must [also] be consistent itself with the dic-
tates of the Constitution, and the order and 
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structure it contemplates”. The Court con-
cluded that the Dáil here had not abdicated 
its function because the legislation, while not 
imposing a debt ceiling, contained other con-
straints on the Minister’s powers. However, 
it cautioned that the Act was defensible as 
“a permissible constitutional response to an 
exceptional situation”. This meant that:
It cannot therefore be considered to be a 
template for broader Ministerial power 
on other occasions. Indeed it is unlikely 
that the Oireachtas would concede such 
wide ranging power in other less press-
ing circumstances, but if it did, and, for 
example, a minister or other body was 
????????????????????????????????????????
support, and without limitation in time 
or object, to any commercial entity, then 
it clearly would not follow from this 
case that such was constitutionally per-
missible.
This suggests that, while the Court did not 
endorse the general principle advanced by 
the plaintiff, it does regard Article 11’s ref-
erence to “by law” as importing a broad-
er “legality” requirement that any formal 
????????? ????????? ??? ??????????????????????
provide for an adequate degree of legislative 
involvement.
Support for this interpretation of Collins can 
arguably be found in the other major deci-
sion of 2016. Barlow v. Minister for Agri-
culture concerned a dispute over access by 
?????????????????????????????????????????-
sel seed beds in Irish waters. This had been 
permitted pursuant to a voisinage agreement 
based on an exchange of letters between the 
relevant government departments in Belfast 
and Dublin in 1965. The legal issue here 
was whether mussel seed were a “natural re-
source” within the meaning of Article 10 of 
the Constitution. This Article requires natu-
ral resources to be managed “by law”. The 
Court concluded that Article 10 did apply, 
and that this arrangement did not comply 
with it. It is noticeable, however, that the 
?????? ???? ???? ??????? ??????? ??? ??????? ?????
this exchange of letters did not constitute 
“law” in a formal sense. Instead, it outlined a 
19 King v. AG [1981] I.R. 223.
more substantive principle of legality which 
????????????????????????????????????????????-
sentation and accountability:
The requirement of Article 10.3 of the 
Constitution for regulation “by law” is 
not merely a formal procedural provi-
sion, important though that would be. 
In constitutional terms, it means that 
the Constitution requires that the regu-
lation of natural resources stated to be 
the property of the State must be the 
subject of a decision by the represen-
tatives of the People who are account-
able to them. Legislation is normally 
required to take place in public (Article 
15.8), which carries with it the possibil-
ity of public knowledge and debate. In 
effect, therefore, the Constitution man-
dates that if State property, in particular 
natural resources, is to be sold, leased, 
managed or regulated, then that decision 
should be made in public by representa-
tives who are accountable to the People 
who can accordingly make their views 
known.
Aside from providing clarity on some of the 
more rarely-litigated Articles of the Con-
stitution, both Collins and Barlow provide 
support for the possibility that the Court may 
be developing a substantive conception of 
legality which extends beyond the right of 
an individual to know the law19 to encom-
pass broader principles of democratic ac-
countability. If this is the case, it may have 
long-term implications for the separation of 
powers in Ireland and, in particular, for the 
legislature’s traditionally submissive rela-
tionship to government. That is particularly 
so given that references to “by law” or “in 
accordance with law” appear frequently in 
the constitutional text.
CONCLUSION
On abortion, on judicial appointments, and 
on the scope of a possible legality principle, 
therefore, 2016 was a year of change – but 
also of continued uncertainty about the form 
that change will ultimately take. 
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ISRAEL
INTRODUCTION 
This review presents key developments in 
the jurisprudence of the Israeli High Court of 
Justice (HCJ) in 2016. These developments 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
role of the HCJ in constitutional challenges 
of the State of Israel which involve com-
plicated dilemmas concerning minorities, 
emergency laws, prolonged belligerent occu-
????????????????????????????????????????????
rules of citizenship, and the complex relation 
between religion and state. 
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
COURT
Israel’s constitutional model is based on an 
incomplete constitution, due to the original 
decision in the early years of independence 
not to complete the constitutional design at 
the time of the establishment of the State, 
but rather to leave it as an incremental enter-
prise. The Israeli constitution includes sever-
al Basic Laws that regulate the governmental 
structure and institutions, and the HCJ also 
has a respectable tradition of judicial protec-
tion over the unwritten common-law rights 
and freedoms. Basic Laws are enacted by 
the Knesset (Parliament), which holds both 
legislative and constituent powers. In 1992, 
the Knesset enacted two Basic Laws on fun-
damental rights- Basic Law: Human Digni-
ty and Liberty, and Basic Law: Freedom of 
Occupation- that constitute a partially en-
trenched bill of rights. The HCJ United Miz-
rahi Bank case asserted the authority of ju-
dicial review, comparable to the “Marbury” 
model. This joint legislative-judicial change, 
known as the “constitutional revolution”, re-
sulted in the HCJ becoming the central in-
stitution in the development of constitutional 
protection of human rights. 
Therefore, the Israeli constitutional law story 
is rather unique as it applies American-style 
judicial review to primary legislation, yet its 
constitutional laws are enacted through or-
dinary legislation procedures, in the British 
style. Israel is also particularly unique due 
to the inverse ratio between the thin written 
constitution and the constitutional role of its 
court. The HCJ hears petitions about Knes-
set legislation and administrative decisions 
??? ???? ????? ?????????? ???? ???? ???????????????
review model is very close to an “abstract” 
review. The HCJ is highly accessible to all 
types of petitions, maintaining broad indi-
vidual standing in administrative and consti-
tutional petitions (also from protected pop-
ulations in Judea and Samarea). For over a 
decade now, the existence and scope of con-
stitutional judicial review in Israel has been 
harshly contested.
DEVELOPMENTS AND  
CONTROVERSIES IN 2016 
Separation of Powers 
HCJ 4374/15 The Movement for Quality 
of Government v. The Prime Minister of 
Israel (27 March 2016)
This case, one of the most prominent of the 
year, addressed the constitutionality of the“-
Gas Outline”, an administrative “outline” 
decided by the Israeli government regard-
ing gas reservoirs found in Israeli economic 
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territory in 2009.1 In 2015, the government 
decided to contract with a series of energy 
companies, including Noble Energy, to pro-
duce natural gas out of the reservoirs. The 
gas deal that was presented in the “outline” 
included many legal and regulatory aspects, 
all of which were concentrated by the gov-
ernment into a single contract with the gas 
companies. For that reason, the HCJ was 
confronted with the need to determine the 
limits of executive authority, and to rule 
on questions of delegation and granting an 
exemption from antitrust law in the energy 
sector through a government contract, which 
in effect reorganized the entire energy sector.
 
????? ????????????????????????????????????
well covered by the media, had engaged sev-
eral departments of the Israeli legal system 
ever since the discovery of the gas reserves 
??????????????????????????????????????????????
The General Director of the Antitrust Au-
thority, Prof. David Gilo, resigned in pro-
test of the Gas Outline, stating that it would 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
natural gas market. During the HCJ’s hear-
ings, the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin 
???????????????????????????????????????????-
troduced the government’s arguments on the 
importance of the Outline. 
The constitutionality of the Outline, as dis-
tinguished from its economic feasibility, was 
???????????? ???????????? ???? ??? ???? ???????-
???????????????????????????????????????????
reluctance of the cabinet to enact it as prima-
ry legislation. The HCJ discussed the author-
ity of the cabinet and its discretion. In par-
ticular, several major issues were analyzed: 
First, the Gas Outline included a “Stability 
Clause” according to which the government 
guarantees the gas companies a stable regu-
latory environment for a period of a decade 
1 A summary is available here. For a review see Rachel Frid de Vries, Stability Shaken? Israeli High Court of Justice Strikes Down the Stabilization Clause in the 
Israeli Government’s Gas Plan, 18 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 332 (2017).
2 The majority opinion consisted of Deputy President Rubinstein and Justices Joubran, Hayut, and Vogelman against the dissenting opinion of Justice Sohl-
berg, who held that the stability clause does not restrict the Knesset’s legislative power, but rather limits the government’s discretion, as it is authorized to 
do, as long as the government maintains its ability to rescind its “administrative promise”. 
3 At a certain point, Netanyahu was simultaneously Israel’s prime minister; foreign minister; Communications Minister; Economy, Industry, and Trade minis-
ters, and Labor Minister and Regional Development Minister. 
4 President Naor, Deputy President Rubinstein, Justices Joubran and Hendel concurring. Based on constitutional interpretation, Justice Meltzer’s substantive 
dissenting opinion was that the Prime Minister was not authorized to serve as a minister. After reading the opinions of the justices of the panel and seeking 
to reach a compromise, Justice Meltzer presented an alternate position according to which he concurred with Deputy President Rubinstein’s opinion regard-
ing the “validity notice”, such that it became the majority opinion.
by agreeing not to make changes in legisla-
tion and by opposing legislative initiatives 
??????????????????????????????????????????????
quotas. The majority of the bench (4-1) held 
that the clause was prescribed ultra vires and 
was void due to it being contrary to the basic 
administrative law principle of the prohibi-
tion on restricting the cabinet’s independent 
discretion. It was ruled that the scope of this 
discretion does not extend to the decision 
not to exercise it, especially when the case 
is subject to political dispute and when the 
government wishes to restrict the discretion 
of its successors. 
Second, a fundamental section of the gov-
ernment’s plan involved a broad exemption 
for the energy companies from antitrust law. 
Since the Gas Outline was contracted in a 
monopolistic regulatory climate, the HCJ 
addressed legal exemption for an agreement 
of that nature. Section 52 of the Antitrust 
Law (1988) vests the Minister of Finance 
with the authority to exempt a restrictive 
practice from the provisions of the Antitrust 
Law on grounds of “foreign policy and se-
curity considerations”. The HCJ deliberated 
the required conditions in which the Section 
can be applied and whether it was exercised 
in a reasonable manner. Aside from Justice 
Joubran, who elaborated on the missing fac-
tual background to serve as a foundation for 
??????????? ???????? ??? ???? ???? ????????????
timeframes given to the public to express its 
position regarding the Outline, the justices of 
?????????????????????????????????????????-
cise of Section 52 of the Antitrust Law.
Third, the HCJ deliberated whether the is-
sues addressed in the Outline needed to be 
regulated by primary legislation, or whether 
????????????????????????????????????????????
Deputy President Rubinstein determined 
that the “aggregate effect” of the Outline 
amounted to a substance requiring primary 
legislation, and consequently necessitated 
an orderly and transparent process. Howev-
er, the majority opinion (3-2) decided that 
the validity of the entire Outline, as distinct 
from the stability clause, was not contingent 
upon being anchored by primary legislation. 
As the public’s trustee for the state’s assets, 
the government is obligated to exercise 
its authority in order to optimally preserve 
the state’s proprietary rights to the natural 
gas. Accordingly, it was decided to cancel 
the Gas Outline due to the stability clause, 
without applying judicial intervention in 
the other matters that were addressed, while 
suspending the declaration of voidness for a 
year to allow for an alternative regulation.2 
HCJ 3132/15 “Yesh Atid” v. The Prime 
Minister of Israel (13 April 2016)
????????????????????????????????????????????
question of whether Basic Law: The Govern-
ment grants the prime minister the authority 
to hold the position of a minister in addition 
to being a Prime Minister. The petition was 
????????????????????????????????????????????-
ground of the appointment of Prime Minis-
ter Netanyahu to several ministerial depart-
ments after the 2015 election.3 Faced with a 
challenge to the Prime Minister’s multiple 
functions, the HCJ determined that whereas 
the Prime Minister’s holding of these cabi-
net positions was technically legal, it was 
an unconducive situation to democracy. The 
majority denied the petition and held that 
according to constitutional interpretation 
and the constitutional convention, the Prime 
Minister was authorized to function as a 
minister.4 However, subject to Deputy Pres-
ident Rubinstein’s opinion (Justices Hendel 
and Meltzer, in their alternate opinion, con-
curring), the decision was served a “validity 
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notice”, whereby if at the end of an eight-
month period the situation remained as it 
was, the case could be appealed again.5  
In December 2016, following the ruling, 
Prime Minister Netanyahu passed his Min-
ister for Regional Development and Minister 
of Economy, Industry and Trade titles to oth-
er members of his coalition. 
MAJOR CASES
Legislative Process and Regulatory Inde-
pendence
HCJ 8612/15 The Movement for Quality 
Government v. The Knesset (17 August 
2016)
This petition addressed the legislative pro-
cess of a reform in the electricity sector: 
merging the Electricity Regulatory Adminis-
???????????????????????????? ???????????????????
the governmental policy regarding the Gas 
Outline. The reform was passed as part of the 
“Economic Arrangements Law”, a rapid om-
nibus government bill presented to the Knes-
set each year alongside the Budget Law.6 
The petitioners claimed that the reform chap-
ter should be invalidated due to constitution-
al defects in the legislative process.7 They 
oppose the Arrangements Law as the appro-
priate legal framework for reform, and criti-
cize the Coalition’s decision to legislate the 
bill in an Ad-hoc Select Committee that was 
assembled outside the Knesset’s Economic 
Affairs Committee to avoid the Chairman’s 
refusal of the Minister of Energy’s request to 
legislate the reform “as is”. 
The HCJ rejected the petition. It has been 
the consistent ruling of the HCJ that legis-
lating under the Arrangements Law does not 
amount, in itself, to an independent cause for 
5 See Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, ?? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? in Patricia Popelier, Sarah Verstraelen, Dirk Van-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Living to Fight 
Another Day: Judicial Deferral in Defense of Democracy, 2016 Wis. L. Rev. 683 (2016). 
6 See Susan Hattis Rolef, Background Paper - The Arrangements Law: Issues and International Comparisons (The Knesset Research and Information Center, 
2 January 2006).
7 Landmark court judgments seem to endorse that judicial review of the legislation might apply in cases of inappropriate legislative procedure whenever 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????See HCJ 5131/03 Litzman v. Knesset Speaker 
59(1) PD 577 [2004] (Isr.); HCJ 4885/03 Isr. Poultry Farmers Ass’n v. Gov’t of Isr. 59(2) PD 14, 46-48 [2004] (Isr.). See Suzie Navot, Judicial Review of the 
Legislative Process, 39(2) ISR. L. REV. 183 (2006).
8 See generally Mordechai Kremnitzer, ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????, in András Sajó (ed.), Militant Democracy 157 (Eleven Internation-
al Publishing, 2004). 
striking down legislation. The HCJ ruled that 
holding the legislation outside the Commit-
tee – the “natural habitat” for the legislation 
– due to the Chairman’s position was “inap-
propriate and unacceptable” (at para. 13 of 
Justice Hayut’s judgment). The court empha-
sized that it prevents effective discourse and 
parliamentary scrutiny, and thus infringes 
the principle of parliamentary independence 
which is crucial to a properly functioning 
democratic regime. The court stressed that 
if the petitioners would have proved that the 
bill was indeed legislated “as is”, it would 
have declared that this was a “severe and 
substantial defect at the root of the legislative 
?????????? ????????????????????????? ????-
er, after examining the legislative process, it 
concluded that the legislation at hand did not 
pass “as is” as legislative deliberations took 
place, and following which the bill was mod-
??????????????????????????????????????????????
did not meet the “severe and substantial” 
threshold for judicial intervention and both 
process and outcome were deemed valid. 
Another claim by the petitioners was that 
merging the two regulatory agencies is an ef-
fective impeachment of the former Electric-
ity Commissioner by the Act, and therefore 
a personal legislation. Justice Esther Hayut, 
leading the court’s opinion, to which Justice 
Vogelman and President Naor concurred, 
started her reasoning with an important 
statement regarding the possibility of inval-
idation of Knesset legislation with “a per-
sonal motive” that “may be infringing with 
the “foundational principles of our system” 
(para. 16). Nevertheless, this argument was 
eventually rejected, mainly because the pe-
titioner did not establish substantial factual 
grounds to prove that this is the case. 
Banning Political nominees
EA 1095/15 The Central Elections Com-
mittee for the 20th Knesset v Haneen 
Zoabi (10 December 2015)
In this ruling, the HCJ rejected the Cen-
tral Election Committee’s decision to ban 
Haneen (Hanin) Zoabi and Baruch Marzel 
as candidates to the 20th Knesset election. 
President Naor scrutinized the case under 
Article 7(a) of Basic Law: The Knesset, 
which determines the standards for banning 
candidates and parties.8 The majority (8-1) 
opinion decided that Zoabi and Marzel’s 
speech and conduct did not cross the thresh-
old of evidence to prove incitement; support 
of terror; or denying Israel’s existence as a 
Jewish democratic state. Deputy President 
Rubinstein (dissenting) held that the banning 
decision should be upheld as is. 
Political Appointments and Corruption
CA 4456/14 Kellner v. The State of Israel 
(29 December 2015)
This ruling, also known as the “Holyland 
Case”, concerned three major public cor-
ruption affairs involving bribery between 
???????????????????????????????????????????????
among them the former Prime Minister of 
Israel, Ehud Olmert, and the former May-
or of Jerusalem, Uri Lupolianski?? ??????
addressing each of the appeals, the court’s 
948-page judgment delved into many cen-
tral and general legal issues in criminal law. 
????? ??????????? ???? ??? ??? ???? ????? ????? ????
judgment upheld, in part, the conviction of 
former Prime-Minister Olmert. The court ac-
quitted Olmert from one bribery offence, but 
upheld the remaining indictments (among 
them, bribery and obstruction of justice) and 
?????????? ???? ??? ???????????? ?? ????? ???
Israel’s history.
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HCJ 232/16 The Movement for Quality 
of Government v. The Prime Minister of 
Israel (08 May 2016)
The HCJ denied the petition against the ap-
pointment of MK Aryeh Deri as the Minister 
of Interior. Deri’s criminal offences, which 
include bribery and breach of trust, were 
committed while holding the position of the 
Minister of Interior during the late 1980s. 
This petition was denied shortly after the de-
nial of an earlier petition against the appoint-
ment of Deri as the Minister of Economy and 
Industry.9 The HCJ held that the petitioners 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
link between the crimes Deri committed at 
the end of the 1980s and the position of Min-
???????????????????????????????????????????????-
ing the position held at the time of his past 
?????????? ??????????? ???????????????? ????-
culties raised by this appointment, it does not 
exceed the margin of reasonableness (Jus-
tices Joubran and Danziger). Justice Hendel 
(Dissenting) held that the decision to appoint 
Deri as Minister of Interior is extremely un-
reasonable, and therefore the appointment 
should be annulled. 
HCJ 43/16 “OMETZ” (Citizens for Prop-
er Administration and Social Justice in 
Israel) v. The Government of Israel  (01 
March 2016)
???????????????????????????? ???????????????
denied the petition against the appointment of 
Adv. Dr. Avichai Mandelblit as the Attorney 
General. The court ruled that the threshold 
justifying intervention had not been crossed, 
despite allegedly administrative law defects 
in Mendelblit’s appointment process. The 
HCJ found that the professional-public com-
mittee that nominates prospective Attorney 
Generals carried out their role meticulously 
 
 
9 HCJ 3095/15 The Movement for Quality of Government v. The Prime Minister of Israel (13 August 2015). Deri resigned from this position following his refus-
al to use his statutory authority under the Antitrust Law prior to the “Gas Outline” approval in the cabinet.
10 See e.g. David Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice: The Supreme Court of Israel and the Occupied Territories 145-163 (2002); Aeyal Gross, The Writing 
on the Wall: Rethinking the International Law of Occupation 163 fn. 118 (2017). 
11 These were non-binding individual opinions.  
12 HCJ 5839/15 Cedar v. The Military Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank (15 October 2015).
13 HCJ 1125/16 Meri v. The Military Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank (31 March 2016). See also Justice Mazuz opinions in HCJ 7220/15 Aliwah v. 
Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank (1 December 2015); HCJ 8154/15 Daud Abu Jamal v. GOC Home Front (22 December 2015); HCJ 6745/15 Abu 
Hashiah v. The Military Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank (1 December 2015); HCJ 1630/16 Masudi et al. v. The Military Commander of IDF Forces 
in the West Bank (23 March 2016).  
and in accordance with Administrative Law 
and the cabinet decisions. The grounds that 
were established against the appointment, 
including the fact that only one nominee was 
recommended and not three as originally re-
quested by the Minister of Justice, as well 
as Mandelblit’s involvement in the “Harpaz 
Affair”, did not justify judicial intervention. 
The HCJ also denied the claims that Mandel-
blit’s previous position as Cabinet Secretary 
???????????????? ?????????? ???????????????-
ed a waiting period prior to his appointment 
as Attorney General, considering there is no 
such waiting period prescribed by law. As 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
the two positions, the HCJ ruled that it can 
??? ????????? ???????? ?? ???????? ??? ?????????
statement.
Human Rights and National Security 
The Home Demolitions Controversy
Against the backdrop of the current wave 
of terrorism in Israel since 2015, the use of 
home demolitions was accelerated. In re-
sponse, a growing number of petitions are 
being submitted against the practice, and the 
HCJ engaged again with the constitutionality 
of the practice, which is governed by Regu-
lation 119 of The Defence (Emergency) Reg-
ulations, 1945. The main debate considered 
the connection between the house residents 
and the offense; the distinction between pu-
nitive sanctions and deterrents and collective 
punishment.10
Although President Naor decided not to set 
an extended panel in order to re-evaluate the 
current precedents on this issue, several Su-
preme Court Justices have expressed doubts 
regarding the legality and effectiveness of 
home demolitions in petitions brought be-
fore them, and some have raised the need to 
 
reopen the discussion on this method.11 In 
the Cedar case,12 Justice Vogelman opined 
????? ???? ???? ????????? ?????????? ????????? ???
involvement of the suspect’s family, and is 
otherwise disproportional. Similarly, Jus-
tice Mazuz in the Meri case13 questioned 
the effectiveness and proportionality of the 
method, as well as the precedents’ validity 
considering near-past developments in inter-
national law and Israeli constitutional law.
HCJ 5304/15 Israeli Medical Association 
v. The Knesset (11 September 2016)
This petition challenged the force-feeding 
prisoners law, arguing that it is unconsti-
tutional as it violates human dignity for an 
improper purpose and violates international 
law as it constitutes a form of inhuman and 
degrading treatment. The case was heard by 
a panel of three Supreme Court Justices. 
The HCJ unanimously rejected the petition-
ers’ arguments and upheld the law as both 
constitutional and in compliance with inter-
national law. In a lengthy opinion by Deputy 
President Elyakim Rubinstein, he surveyed 
the international and comparative law and 
relied on precedents holding that force-feed-
ing prisoners on a hunger strike is neither in-
human nor degrading. Nevertheless, Israel’s 
???????????????????????????????????????????
prisoners is allowed in democratic countries, 
the exclusive consideration is the prisoner’s 
well-being. Only in Israel, the law instructs 
the court to also consider “severe harm to 
security”. Nevertheless, the law’s dominant 
purpose is humanitarian - the preservation 
of the hunger striking prisoner’s life- under 
conditions that aim to ensure protection of 
the prisoner’s dignity, and with strict super-
vision by legal and medical agents. National 
security is only a secondary purpose. There-
fore, the HCJ held that the law allowing 
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force-feeding of hunger-striking prisoners 
passes the tripartite constitutional test set out 
in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.14
Human Rights and Economic policy
HCJ 4406/16 The Association of Banks in 
Israel v. The Knesset (29 September 2016)
???? ??????? ??? ?????????? ????????? ??? ???????
?????????????????????????????????????????-
lic agenda for many years, voicing claims 
against the increasingly high salaries and 
the weak supervisory system. Consequent-
ly, the “Executive Salary Act” was passed 
in 2016, essentially capping the salary of the 
????????????????????????????????????????-
nies to 2.5m NIS (§4(1)) and setting a ra-
tio of 1:35 between the highest and lowest 
paid employees (§2(b)). The Association 
of Banks in Israel and the Israel Insurance 
Association petitioned before the HCJ, chal-
lenging the constitutionality of the set ratio 
and cap, as it infringes upon the Freedom of 
Occupation, Freedom of Contract, Freedom 
of Competition and the property rights of the 
corporation and its executives. The petition-
ers argued that the legislation was not for a 
proper purpose, since the main goal is harm-
ing the executives, and that the ratio infring-
es disproportionately on their rights while 
constituting unlawful discrimination of the 
???????????????????????
The HCJ, in an extended panel of seven Jus-
tices, ruled that the ratio and cap are consti-
tutional and stated that there are no grounds 
to intervene in the intermediate rules, and 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
set by the Act.
HCJ 9134/12 Gavish v. The Knesset (21 
April 2016)
This ruling denied a petition challenging the 
constitutionality of §4 to the Retirement Age 
Law of 2004, which sets the mandatory re-
tirement age at sixty-seven, for both men and 
women,15 and allows an employer to force 
14 For a review of the case from an International law perspective, see Jesse Lempel, Force-Feeding Prisoners on a Hunger Strike: Israel as a Case Study in 
International Law, Harv. Int’l L. J. (2 December 2016).
15 §3 to the Law allows women to voluntarily retire at the age of sixty-two.
16 NLA 209/10 Weinberger v. Bar Ilan University (6.12.12).
17 Previous HCJ rulings have dealt with tangent questions: In HCJ 1031/93 Psaro (Goldstein) v. The Ministry of Interior (1995) and HCJ 5070/95 Na’am-
at-Movement of Working Women and Volunteers (2002) it was decided that a conversion need not be approved by the Chief Rabbinate for the purpose of 
the Law of Return and the civil registration. In HCJ 2597/99 Rodriguez-Tushboim v. Minister of Interior (2004) it was decided that the Law of Return applies 
to a non-Jew who while residing lawfully in Israel underwent conversion, in Israel or abroad. See e.g. Gidon Sapir, How Should a Court Deal with a Primary 
Question That the Legislature Seeks to Avoid? The Israeli Controversy over Who is a Jew as an Illustration, 39 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 1233 (2006). 
the retirement. The petition was submitted 
following the Weinberger case, deliberated 
before the National Labor Court, in which 
it was decided that an employee could not 
automatically be forced to end her employ-
ment upon reaching retirement age, and that 
the employer must exercise discretion, con-
sidering the individual retirement case on 
its merits.16 The National Labor Court left 
the question of constitutionality to the HCJ, 
and Gavish? ?????? ????? ????? ???? ????????????
claimed that even following Weinberger, §4 
is unconstitutional, and actually masks the 
potential discrimination. 
The decision of the HCJ acknowledged that 
the mandatory retirement age infringes upon 
the right to equality; however, it does so in 
compliance with the proportionality tests. 
Nevertheless, President Naor noted that the 
retirement age is a matter that should be 
further addressed in the Knesset and public 
debate.
Religion and State
HCJ 7625/06 Ragachuva v. The Ministry 
of Interior (31 March 2016)
The petitioners were foreign nationals who 
resided in Israel as tourists and were later 
converted to Judaism by private ultra-Ortho-
dox rabbinical courts. The Ministry of Inte-
rior refused to recognize these conversions, 
holding the position voiced by the State in 
its response to the petition that the Law of 
Return of 1950 applied only to those who 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
system overseen by the Chief Rabbinate. 
The question necessitated before the HCJ 
was whether the Law of Return, and specif-
ically Article 4(b), which includes the term 
“converted”, applies to those who have com-
pleted an orthodox conversion in Israel not 
???????????????????????????17
The majority opinion, handed down by Pres-
ident Naor, held that the term “converted” 
should be interpreted as referring to those 
whose conversion was conducted in a recog-
nized Jewish community according to its es-
tablished standards. An interpretation of the 
Law of Return according to which only con-
???????? ???????? ???? ???????? ??????? ??????
?????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????
CONCLUSION 
One cannot overstate the importance of the 
Israeli Judiciary. There is hardly any public 
affair which does not arrive to the court’s 
scrutiny, and the court actively adjudicates 
on political, military and religious issues no 
matter how contentious. In 2016 alone, the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
Outline; recognized conversions to Judaism 
by private ultra-Orthodox rabbinical courts 
for the Law of Return; and gave a “validi-
ty notice” to the Prime Minister for hold-
ing several cabinet positions. It allowed the 
re-appointment of Aryeh Deri as the Minis-
ter of Interior, permitted the policy of home 
demolitions, and approved the law which 
?????????????????????????????????????????????-
cial companies. The impact of the HCJ on Is-
raeli constitutional law, as well as on society, 
thus remains crucial. 
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ITALY
INTRODUCTION 
This report firstly provides a brief introduc-
tion to the Italian Constitutional system, with 
a particular emphasis on the system of con-
stitutional justice (section II). Secondly, the 
report contains a narrative exposition of two 
particularly important controversies from 
2016 (section III). In these decisions, the 
Italian Constitutional Court (ICC) actively 
engaged as the supranational dimension of 
constitutional law, showing at the same time 
a high level of compliance to the principle of 
openness towards supranational and interna-
tional law, and a firm stance in upholding the 
complex substantive and institutional bal-
ance of the Italian Constitution. In section IV, 
the report provides an overview of landmark 
judgements adopted by the ICC in 2016. The 
last section draws some conclusions.
It may be worth mentioning that in 2016 a 
far-reaching constitutional reform law was 
passed by the Parliament to transform its 
second house (Senato) into a body represent-
ing the Regions within national lawmaking 
procedures and at the same time expand na-
tional legislative competences. This reform 
was rejected in a constitutional referendum 
held on 4.12.2016. In the meantime, a new 
electoral law concerning the first house of 
the Parliament (Camera dei deputati) had 
already been passed (in 2015). The ICC was 
just marginally involved in these two highly 
controversial topics. First, the constitutional 
referendum that called upon the Court to rule 
that a consumers’ association had no standing 
to directly challenge the acts summoning the 
referendum.1 Second, the important ruling on 
1 C Cost no. 256 of 2016.
2 Albert Venn Dicey, Flexible and Rigid Constitution (Clarendon Press 1901) 124–213.
the law for the election of the Chamber of 
deputies, which was initially scheduled for 
4.10.2016, was delayed to 2017 (and subse-
quently announced on 25.1.2017).
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
COURT
The Italian Constitution, entered into force 
on the 1st January1948, provides the basic 
provisions regulating fundamental rights and 
constitutional institutions. It was adopted by 
the popularly elected Constituent Assembly 
that led Italy out of the constitutional tran-
sition from the pre-war fascist regime to a 
fully-fledged democratic state. It is a rigid 
constitution,2 as it possesses higher rank than 
ordinary legislation. Constitutional provi-
sions may not be amended or derogated by 
ordinary legislation. Moreover, a special 
procedure for constitutional amendment is 
provided by the Constitution in order to en-
sure that any amendment to it is the outcome 
of a meditated decision to be adopted with a 
relatively broad political and electoral con-
sensus. The ICC is part of the safeguards of 
the 1948 rigid Constitution. Its establishment 
was one of the most impacting institutional 
innovations of the 1948 Republican Consti-
tution. Its nature and function were immedi-
ately revealed by the collocation of consti-
tutional provisions regulating its functioning 
under the section entitled “Guarantees of the 
Constitution”. 
However, the Constitution provided only a 
regulatory sketch of the Institution’s main 
tasks and duties. It took a long time for the 
Court to be equipped with the regulation that 
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the Parliament was in charge of adopting. 
Only eight years after the entry into force 
of the Republican Constitution, the ICC was 
eventually able to function and to deliver its 
first judgment. The ICC is composed of fif-
teen judges, appointed through three differ-
ent channels. Five of them are elected by the 
Parliament, five are appointed by the Presi-
dent of the Republic, and five are elected by 
members of the three superior tribunals (Su-
preme Court, Council of State, and Court of 
Auditors). Eligibility criteria are designed to 
guarantee a high level of independence and 
technical expertise. Each judge is appointed 
for a nine-year term of office, a relatively 
long term for constitutionally relevant of-
fices in the Italian legal system. The term is 
not renewable nor extensible. The ICC is an 
essentially collegial organ, as no dissenting 
or concurring opinions are admitted and de-
cisions are taken collectively. 
The access to the ICC is characterized by 
a mixed system. On the one hand, Regions 
and the central Government have a direct 
access to the Court. The latter is entitled to 
contest regional legislative acts alleged to be 
incompatible with the Constitution while the 
former are entitled to contest national legis-
lative acts alleged to be prejudicial to their 
own legislative competence as guaranteed 
by the Constitution. On the other hand, the 
“general” system of access to the Court is 
an indirect one, where questions of constitu-
tionality may only be raised by judges with-
in the framework of a controversy where 
the legislative act deemed unconstitutional 
needs to be applied. Additionally, referring 
judges are called to play the role of filters, as 
they may refer a question of constitutionality 
only if their doubt on the constitutionality of 
the given act is “not manifestly unfounded” 
and the question of constitutionality affects a 
norm to be applied in the case at bar. In this 
sense, common judges, given their essential 
role in triggering the Court’s jurisdiction, 
have been depicted as “gatekeepers”3 of con-
stitutional adjudication. 
3 Piero Calamandrei, “Il Procedimento per la Dichiarazione di Illegittimità Costituzionale”, Opere giuridiche, vol III (Morano 1956) 372.
4 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd 1945) 268–69. 
5 Vezio Crisafulli, Lezioni di diritto costituzionale: 1 (2 edizione, CEDAM 1970) 41.
6 Leonard FM Besselink, A Composite European Constitution (Europa Law Pub 2007)
Referrals are inadmissible and the ICC does 
not consider their merits if referring judges 
fail in exercising their role as gatekeepers 
(e.g. if they do not explain why the resolu-
tion of the matter is relevant in the case over 
which they are presiding; if the question is 
inherently contradictory; or if it does not in-
??????????????????????????????????????? ????
the Court reaches a decision on the merits 
of a referred question regarding the consti-
tutionality of a legal provision, it issues a 
decision that either sustains (pronuncia di 
accoglimento) or rejects the challenge (pro-
nuncia di rigetto). In the former cases, the 
Court declares a law unconstitutional. The 
effect of these decisions is that the chal-
lenged law loses effect retrospectively: the 
law can no longer be applied by any judicial 
organ or public administration from the day 
after publication of the Court’s decision in 
the official bulletin. This also precludes the 
application of the unconstitutional provision 
to past events. The Court’s declaration is de-
finitive and generally applicable in that its 
effect is not limited to the case in which the 
question was referred. 
A declaration of unconstitutionality may af-
fect only a portion of a law that is deemed in-
compatible with the Constitution. This may 
happen also with a legislative vacuum, thus 
calling the Court to exercise a creative func-
tion that is far from the Kelsenian idea of the 
“negative legislator”.4 This may only hap-
pen when the judicial addition is imposed in 
only one admissible direction from the Con-
stitution, leaving no room for political dis-
?????????????? ?????????? ???????? ?? ????????-
tional challenge, it only declares the referred 
question “unfounded” but does not prevent 
other judges from raising the same question 
(even at a different stage of the same pro-
ceeding), nor the same referring judge from 
raising a different question. Additionally, 
the Court may substantively modulate the 
effects of its decision by adopting interpre-
tative judgements. These decisions confer a 
crucial role to interpretation and the related 
distinction between provisions and norms.5 
???????????????????????????????????????????
strike down interpretation as unconstitution-
al while keeping parliamentary texts integer. 
Another access to the judicial review of the 
ICC is the direct method of judicial review 
to settle controversies arising between the 
Regions and the State. In these cases, the 
Government can appeal directly against a re-
gional law, and a Region can appeal directly 
against a national law or a law enacted by 
another Region. Even though the incidental 
access is generally considered the one char-
acterizing the Italian judicial review system, 
direct review has played an increasingly 
important role among the Court’s tasks, and 
became the larger part of the workload since 
the reform of regionalism that occurred in 
2001. 
A direct access to the Court is also provid-
ed within the category of cases arising from 
conflicts of attributions, where the Court is 
called to settle disputes among State bodies. 
These cases are decided by defining which 
body is entitled a certain power. 
Paradoxically, a description of constitutional 
adjudication in Italy would be only partial if 
limited to the activity of ICC and domestic 
organs. In the dualistic perspective that tradi-
tionally praised the Italian legal system, the 
ICC bears, in principle, exclusive authority 
of reviewing legislation. Nonetheless, the 
ICC needs to cope with the authority of oth-
er judicial bodies endowed with the power of 
adjudication. In particular, the Court of Jus-
tice of the European Union (CJEU) and the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
have been assigned with increasingly im-
portant tasks that need to be coordinated 
with national constitutional adjudication. 
Tasks and functions of the three Courts do 
not overlap; however, they seem to develop 
a composite constitutional system.6 
In particular, Italy’s membership in the EU 
has, over time, affected the Italian constitu-
tional system in a very significant manner. 
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The ICC’s mind-set toward this phenomenon 
has dramatically changed over time. From a 
reluctant approach, the Italian Court trans-
formed itself into one of the most European 
friendly national constitutional courts on an 
ongoing “European Journey”7 that experi-
enced some significant developments during 
2016. The next section focuses on these de-
velopments.  
DEVELOPMENTS AND  
CONTROVERSIES IN 2016  
In the last ten years,8 the ICC has actively 
engaged the supranational dimension of con-
stitutional law and rights. The ICC enforced 
international law and the ECHR, as well as 
EU law. In a few controversial cases, it also 
upheld the complex balance of substantive 
and institutional values underpinning the 
Italian Constitution against some rulings of 
the ECtHR9 and ICJ.10 Last year, poignant 
examples were given for both attitudes, re-
garding EU law and the CJEU.
Judgment no. 187 is (for now) the epilogue 
of a lengthy dispute concerning the compat-
ibility with an EU directive on fixed-term 
work of the extensive use of temporary em-
ployment in schools, as authorized by Italian 
law.11 Considering that the relevant EU pro-
visions had no direct effect and ought to be 
enforced through the constitutional scrutiny 
of national law, the ICC12 voiced widespread 
concerns of lower courts and joined one of 
them in requesting a preliminary ruling from 
the CJEU to clarify the scope of the directive. 
?????????Mascolo judgment,13 the CJEU held 
that, pending the completion of selection 
procedures for the recruitment of tenured 
staff, the renewal of fixed-term employment 
7 Paolo Barile, ‘Il Cammino Comunitario Della Corte’ [1977] Giurisprudenza Costituzionale 2406.
8 Since C Cost nos. 348 and 349 of 2007.
9 C Cost no. 264 of 2012.
10 C Cost no. 238 of 2014.
11???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
L155/43.
12 C Cost no. 207 of 2013.
13 Joined Cases C-22/13, C-61/13, C-62/13, C-63/13, and C-418/13 ???????? ???????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and Comune di Napoli [2015] EU:C:2015:26.
14 Legge 13 luglio 2015, n. 107, (Riforma del sistema nazionale di istruzione e formazione e delega per il riordino delle disposizioni legislative vigenti).
15 Vittoria Barsotti, Paolo G Carrozza, Marta Cartabia, and Andrea Simoncini, Italian Constitutional Justice in Global Context (OUP USA 2016).
16 C Cost no. 24 of 2017.
17 Case C-105/14 Taricco and Others (2015) EU:C:2015:363.
contracts could not be allowed indefinitely 
and that fixed-term employees were entitled 
to compensation for any damage suffered 
because of such renewal. Following this rul-
ing, and before the constitutional proceed-
ings reached their conclusion, in yet another 
school reform,14 the Parliament passed sev-
eral provisions on the maximum duration of 
fixed-term employment contracts in schools 
and on compensation for past temporary 
staff. Therefore, judgment no. 187 conclud-
ed that EU law had been violated, but that the 
resulting abuse had been subsequently “nul-
lified”. Although it may be disputed whether 
the afforded compensation is enough in ev-
ery specific case, this sequence of events is a 
significant instance of cooperation amongst 
courts and with the legislator (albeit some-
what grudgingly). It is also an example of 
the ICC operating in its style and capacity of 
“networking facilitator”.15
The so-called Taricco case, decided on 
23.11.2016, with a ruling published on 
26.01.2017,16 is another case of preliminary 
reference to the CJEU, with remarkably less 
irenic and harmonic overtones. In its 2015 
Taricco judgment,17 the Grand Chamber of 
the CJEU faced a question concerning crim-
inal offences for VAT evasion in Italy. These 
offences are often perpetrated through elab-
orate organizations and operations. Conse-
quently, investigations require a long time 
and prosecution may become time-barred 
under the relevant provisions of the Italian 
Criminal Code, which had been modified by 
the legislator with a significant reduction of 
the limitation period. Based upon the rath-
er broad phrasing of Article 325 TFEU, the 
CJEU held that national time limitations 
should neither prevent effective and dissua-
sive penalties “in a significant number of 
cases of serious fraud affecting EU financial 
interests”, nor provide for longer periods in 
respect of frauds affecting national financial 
interests, than in respect of those affecting 
EU financial interests. The CJEU also add-
???????????? ?????????????????? ?????????
courts should verify by themselves if that 
was the case and, if need be, disapply the do-
mestic provisions regulating the maximum 
extension of the limitation period in order to 
allow the effective prosecution of the alleged 
crimes. According to the CJEU, this would 
not infringe Article 49 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (principles of legality 
and proportionality of criminal offences and 
penalties) nor Article 7 ECHR (no punish-
ment without law) with regard to pending 
criminal proceedings. On the one hand, the 
alleged crimes constituted, at the time when 
they were committed, the same offence and 
were punishable by the same penalties. On 
the other hand, the CJEU considered the stat-
ute of limitation as a procedural institution. 
In the CJEU’s view, the extension of the lim-
itation period and its immediate application 
are not prohibited when the offences have 
never become subject to limitation.
In Italy, some courts perceived a complex 
constitutional problem concerning Article 
25(II) of the Italian Constitution (“No pun-
ishment may be inflicted except by virtue 
of a law in force at the time the offence 
was committed”), with at least two facets: 
the CJEU had called for an ex post facto 
increase of criminal liability, as, according 
to a well-established Italian legal tradition, 
the limitation period is part and parcel of the 
substantive discipline of criminal offences 
(it is the temporal dimension of criminal 
liability); and the possibility of disapplying 
the relevant provisions was not only unfore-
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seen and unforeseeable but also subject to 
exceedingly vague conditions, incompatible 
with the certainty required in criminal law. 
Therefore, questions were addressed at the 
ICC, which in its turn asked the CJEU to take 
into greater account the national principles. 
The ICC asked whether the disapplication is 
mandatory, even when its effect would con-
sist of an infringement on the supreme prin-
ciples of the national constitutional identity 
of a Member State.
In its preliminary reference, the ICC makes 
some effort to frame national constitutional 
concerns within EU legal categories (e.g. 
referencing to Article 4 TEU, and Articles 
49 and 53 of the Nice Charter). Neverthe-
less, by emphatically invoking supreme con-
stitutional principles, the ICC shows itself 
ready to take a bold stance: activating the 
so-called counter limits (limits to sovereign-
ty limitations acceptable due to EU law) to 
interdict the effects of the Taricco judgment 
on national courts. Much will depend on the 
answer that the CJEU has been asked to pro-
vide urgently. 
MAJOR CASES18
Separation of Powers 
Judgment No. 52 of 2016: Constitutional 
Guarantees and Political Discretion on 
Religion
The Court settled a dispute between the 
President of the Council of Ministers and 
the Court of Cassation concerning a de-
cision by the latter upholding an appeal 
brought by an association of atheists which 
had sought an order requiring the President 
of the Council of Ministers to launch nego-
tiations with a view to concluding an agree-
ment (similar to a concordat) with it as a re-
ligious organisation.
The ICC concluded that the decision wheth-
er to start negotiations is reserved to execu-
tive discretion. The Government can be held 
accountable for it as a political matter before 
Parliament, but not before the courts. There-
fore, the matter was considered primarily 
under the separation of powers perspective, 
18?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????
Rights and Freedoms
Judgment No. 63 of 2016: “Anti-Mosques” 
Regional Laws 
In this case, the Court considered a direct ap-
plication from the President of the Council 
of Ministers questioning the constitutional-
ity of portions of a Lombardy regional law 
modifying regional principles for planning 
facilities for religious services. The claimant 
alleged that the legislation violated the equal 
religious freedom of all religious creeds and 
exceeded the legislative competences of the 
Region. The Court struck down those por-
tions of the contested provisions that made 
distinctions based on the relative size of the 
denomination or the presence or absence of 
a formalized pact between the State and the 
denomination. The Court also struck down 
provisions requiring newly-constructed plac-
es of worship to install video surveillance 
systems as exceeding regional competences, 
since the pursuit of safety, public order, and 
peaceful coexistence is allocated exclusively 
to the State under the Constitution. 
?????????????????????????????????????-
search on Embryos
In this case the Court heard a referral order 
concerning the 2004 law on medically assist-
ed reproduction, in which it was requested 
to rule that embryos that were destined to be 
destroyed (as they would not be implanted, 
where affected by disease) could be used for 
????????????????????????????????????????????-
utory prohibition on such usage. Relying on 
ECtHR case law, the Court noted that there 
was no pan-European consensus on such a 
sensitive issue and dismissed the applica-
tion, holding that “the choice made by the 
contested legislation is one of such consider-
able discretion, due to the axiological issues 
surrounding it, that it is not amenable for re-
view by this Court”.
Judgment No. 213 of 2016: Health-Care 
??????????? ???????????????????????
In this case, the Court considered a referral 
order questioning the compatibility with the 
Constitution of the exclusion from certain 
???????????????????????????????????????????-
ners. The provisions at issue entitled spous-
es and close relatives of severely disabled 
people with parental leave. The referral 
order claimed that the law was unconsti-
tutional as long as it did not include more 
uxorio????????????????????????????????????
the right to parental leave. The ICC struck 
down the omission of the more uxorio 
???????????????????????????????????????????-
al, thus extending the parental leave right 
???????????????????????????????????????
that even though more uxorio cohabitation 
and marriage are not fully equivalent, it is 
unreasonable in the case at hand to exclude 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
leave rights, as disabled persons have the 
same needs and right to health care, which-
ever is their marital status.
Judgment No. 225 of 2016: The Rights of 
Children in the Separation of Same-Sex 
Couples
In this case, the referring Court alleged that 
the contested provisions of the civil code 
regulating parent-child relationships, as 
???????? ?????????????????? ?????????????????
as long as they did not allow the referring 
Court to evaluate on a case-by-case basis 
whether it mirrors the interest of minors to 
????????? ?? ??????????? ?????????????????? ????
former partner of the biological parent, with-
in a same-sex couple. The ICC dismissed the 
case as unfounded, since the referring judge 
failed to consider a provision of the civil 
code that could offer adequate protection to 
the interest at issue. In fact, Article 333 of the 
civil code allowed taking into consideration 
behaviors that are detrimental to the interest 
????????????????????????????????????????????-
ruption (imposed by one or both parents) of 
??????????????????????????????????????????????
third persons. In these cases, judicial author-
ities are entitled to adopt any suitable mea-
sures on a case-by-case basis at the initiative 
of the Public Prosecutor, who could possibly 
be requested to act by the subject that was 
????????? ??? ????????????????? ????????????????
?????????????????????????? ???????? ??????????
ICC found that there was no legislative vac-
112 | I•CONnect-Clough Center 
uum, and that the legal position of the former 
partner may be adequately protected through 
these legal arrangements, which the referring 
judge failed to consider.
Judgment No. 286 of 2016: In the Mother’s 
(Sur)name 
In this case, the ICC declared unconstitu-
tional several provisions of the civil code, 
insofar as they did not allow the parents, by 
mutual consent, to attribute to their children 
at the moment of birth the maternal as well 
as the paternal last name. The Court held 
that the voided legal provisions violated 
the child’s constitutional right to his or her 
own personal identity and the constitution-
al right to equal dignity between parents 
and spouses. Moreover, the ICC relied on 
Article 8 (right to respect for one’s private 
and family life) and Article 14 (non-dis-
crimination) of the ECHR, and on the rel-
evant case law of the ECtHR, that recent-
ly declared that the obligation to transmit 
only the father’s name is in violation of the 
ECHR (Cusan and Fazzo v. Italy, App.no. 
77/07, 7 January 2014). As a result of the 
ICC’s decision, parents may agree to add 
the maternal last name after the paternal last 
name to their child’s name at the moment of 
birth or adoption. However, in the absence 
of an agreement between the parents, the 
existing provisions related to the attribution 
of the paternal last name remain applicable 
in expectation of a legislative intervention 
destined to regulate the matter comprehen-
sively in accordance with criteria eventually 
compatible with the principle of parity.
Foreign, International and/or Multilateral 
Relations
Judgement 102 of 2016: Ne Bis in Idem no. 1
One of the most problematic frontiers with 
the ECHR concerns the different notions of 
“criminal matter” adopted by each system: 
narrower in Italy; broader at Strasbourg. A 
number of questions stemmed from this very 
??????????????????????
In Judgment n. 102 of 2016, the Court heard 
two referral orders, from criminal and tax 
divisions of the Court of cassation, con-
19 See also C Cost no 236 of 2015.
20 Application no. 58428/13, Silvio Berlusconi against Italy, lodged on 10.9.2013, communicated on 5.7.2016.
cerning the punishment of the illegitimate 
?????????????????????????? ?????????????????
both criminal and administrative sanctions, 
allegedly in violation of the ne bis in idem 
principle (ECHR Protocol no. 7, Article 4). 
All the questions were found inadmissible 
for various reasons: most notably because, 
although a double line of punishment may be 
in breach of the ECHR (if a formally admin-
??????????????????? ?????????????????????????????
it is for the legislator to settle the issue by 
making the appropriate choices, also taking 
????? ???????? ???? ??????????? ??? ????????????
under EU law. This may include keeping 
both criminal and administrative sanctions 
while unifying or coordinating existing in-
vestigation and punishment procedures.
Judgement 193 of 2016: Lex Mitior
The Court heard a referral order concerning 
administrative sanctions for the violation of 
labor law: their unusual severity had been 
mitigated by a subsequent law, but only af-
?????????????????????????????????????????????
party. The question was whether the Consti-
tution and the ECHR require the subsequent 
and more lenient law (lex mitior) to prevail 
also over res judicata. The question is un-
founded: while in the abstract the lex mitior 
principle may apply to administrative sanc-
tions, the question should focus on single 
??????????? ???? ??? ???? ???????? ?????? ???-
??????? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ??????? ?????? ?????-
??????????????????? ???????????????????????
general norms applicable to all administra-
tive sanctions, as some of them might fall be-
yond the scope of constitutional and ECHR 
guarantees.
Judgment No. 200 of 2016: Ne Bis in Idem 
no. 2
In this case the Court heard a referral order 
concerning a provision of the Code of Crim-
inal Procedure which limits the applicability 
of the ne bis in idem principle to the same 
legal fact as regards its constituent elements 
(idem ius), rather than to the same historical 
fact (idem factum), with the result that the 
criteria for establishing whether the fact is 
the same are more restrictive under Italian 
law (which considers both legal and mate-
rial elements) than under the ECHR (which 
only considers material elements). The Court 
ruled the legislation unconstitutional insofar 
as it did not provide that the applicability of 
the ne bis in idem principle must be assessed 
with reference to the same historical-natu-
ralistic fact, albeit considered with reference 
to all of its constituent elements (conduct, 
event, causal link). Italian law must base its 
assessment on the idem factum, and has no 
scope for idem ius. 
Judgment No. 275 of 2016: Concept of Pun-
ishment in National Law and the ECHR 
In this case the Court considered several 
Referral Orders on the 2012 law providing 
????????????????????????????????????????????-
cal and regional bodies when they are found 
???????? ????????? ???? ????????????? ??? ????????
offences (and also prohibiting them, in the 
???????????????????????????????????????????-
plies when the offences where committed 
before 2012. Many questions were raised, 
and all were found inadmissible or unfound-
ed. Some points are particularly relevant: for 
the ICC, the effects of the questioned norms 
cannot be constructed as a “punishment”, 
neither under Italian constitutional law nor 
under Article 7 of ECHR and the ECtHR 
case law (analyzed in detail by the ICC); 
rather, they are precautionary measures, 
aimed at preventing illegality in public ad-
ministration19 and at enforcing the constitu-
tional duty of citizens entrusted with public 
????????????????????????????????????????????-
cipline and honor” (Article 54, Para. 2, of 
the Italian Constitution). Therefore, these 
measures may also take into account previ-
ous offences and convictions, in barring ac-
???????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????
on issues which will be considered in the up-
coming Strasbourg judgment on the (partial-
ly similar) Berlusconi case.20
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CONCLUSION 
Fifty years after the publication of John Hen-
ry Merryman’s series of articles on the “Ital-
ian style”21 in comparative law, the ICC stays 
true to this peculiarity. In particular, its atti-
tude in the European constitutional space as-
sumed a characterizing stance of active par-
ticipation in the so-called judicial dialogue. 
Even though the general trend of the ICC en-
gagement has been a collaborative one, the 
Court has not missed the opportunity of re-
maining true to its own interpretation of the 
Italian constitutional tradition. This attitude 
towards supranational and international “re-
lationality”22 is a recent development of the 
Court’s mindset towards the globalization 
(and, in particular, the Europeanization) of 
constitutional adjudication, which was dra-
matically developed in its case law in 2016. 
On the one hand, many of the reported judg-
ments rely on the European courts’ case law 
and make a proactive effort to ensure the 
highest level of compliance with EU law and 
with the ECHR.23 On the other hand, when it 
came to the core values of the constitutional 
identity of Italy, the ICC openly embraced a 
distinct position from the one of the CJEU. 
By submitting a reference for preliminary 
ruling, the opportunity arose for further col-
laboration with the CJEU.24 Consequently, 
some distinctive features of the national le-
gal order might become elements for com-
mon values in a system fostering pluralism. 
Only the future will tell if this invitation to 
cooperate will be taken up by the CJEU. As 
to the present, the attitude of the ICC toward 
supranational and international law should 
be evaluated and considered by taking into 
account this complex and articulated picture 
in its entirety.
21 John Henry Merryman, “The Italian Style I: Doctrine” (1965) 18 Stanford Law Review 39; John Henry Merryman, “The Italian Style II: Law” (1966) 18 Stan-
ford Law Review 396; John Henry Merryman, “The Italian Style III: Interpretation” (1966) 18 Stanford Law Review 583.
22 Barsotti and others (n 15) 235.
23 See Section IV, C of this report.
24 C Cost no. 24 of 2017, see further in Section III of this report.
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DEVELOPMENTS IN KENYAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Duncan Munabi O’kubasu, Director of the Centre for Jurisprudence & Constitutional 
Studies at Kabarak Law School
KENYA
INTRODUCTION
This brief review considers significant con-
stitutional events in Kenya in 2016, with 
some spill over to the year 2017. Kenya has 
been a field of remarkable constitutional de-
velopment since 2010, when it enacted for it-
self a new Constitution replacing the 1963 In-
dependence one. The country has since been 
embroiled in constitutional interpretation, 
refinement, and implementation.1 Drafters of 
the 2010 Kenyan Constitution “decided not 
to decide”2 various points, so several consti-
tutional articles end with a clause that Parlia-
ment should enact legislation to implement 
the Constitution.3 Kenya’s Parliament has 
engaged in massive enactment of legislation 
to give effect to various parts of the Consti-
tution in the last six years,4 and courts have 
been involved in interpreting statutes and 
executive action under the authority of the 
Constitution. This review reports these de-
velopments by flagging the important ones, 
some of which started before 2016 but were 
a subject of settlement (judicial or otherwise) 
in 2016. Others will be subject to final deter-
mination in 2017, and as such are not, except 
for one, covered in the review.  
1 See Ben Sihanya, Constitutional Implementation in Kenya: Challenges and Prospects (2011). 
2 The phrase is extracted from Rosalind Dixon and Tom Ginsburg, “Deciding Not to Decide: Deferral in 
Constitutional Design” 9 International Journal of Constitutional Law (2011).
3 See e.g. articles 9, 14, 15, 18, 21, 23, or 63. 
4 A list of legislation enacted in 2016 is available at http://kenyalaw.org/kl/index.php?id=5995. 
5 See generally David Landau, “Abusive Constitutionalism”47 UC Davis Law Review 189 (2013).
6 See Yash Ghai and Jill Cotrell, “Constitution Building Processes and Democratization Kenya” avail-
able at http://www.katibainstitute.org/Archives/images/Constitution_Building_Processes_and_Democ-
ratization-Kenya.pdf  accessed 20 April 2017. 
7 Such as repeal of its section 2A, of the then Constitution that paved way for multi-party democracy in 
1991. 
8 See Rok Ajulu “Kenya’s 1997 Elections: Making Sense of the Transition Process” 14 (1) New Eng. J 
Pub.  Pol. (1998).
9?????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/kenya2/Kenya1202-01.htm (last visited 31 April 2016). 
10 Government of Kenya, Report of the Independent Review Commission, 2009. 
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
COURT(S) 
The Independence Constitution had been a 
subject of sustained “abusive constitution-
alism.”5 It had been amended several times 
before 1992, which has worked to deprive 
it of a propensity to act as a tool of control 
or an incubator of democracy.6 After 1992, 
Kenya resorted to ad hoc constitutional re-
view processes in the form of constitutional 
amendments and attempted constitutional 
revisions7 until 2008, when it was felt that 
the fruitions of such ad hoc measures were 
not a reliable and sufficient framework for 
democracy. In particular, whereas most of 
these reforms were directed at the electoral 
body and courts,8 substantive failure by the 
then electoral body, Electoral Commission of 
Kenya (ECK), to conduct free and fair elec-
tions coupled with a refusal by the then pow-
erful opposition group, Orange Democratic 
Movement, to present its grievance to court 
over the 2007 general elections9 exposed the 
ineffectiveness of the ad hoc measures and 
consequently provided an impetus for ur-
gent constitutional reform processes.10 These 
processes culminated in the Constitution of 
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Kenya 2010 that sought not just to reform 
the judiciary and the electoral body but other 
(if not every) aspects of Kenya’s public reg-
ulation including human rights, institutions, 
public finance, land, and national security.11
Regarding courts, Kenya does not have a 
specialized court to address constitution-
al matters called a “Constitutional Court,” 
as South Africa and Germany have. All the 
superior courts in Kenya (the High Court, 
Employment and Labor Relations Court, 
Environment and Land Court, Court of Ap-
peal and Supreme Court) have the authority 
to make interpretations and determinations 
on the Constitution.12 Ordinarily, the High 
Court has the explicit original jurisdiction 
to (a) determine questions of violations of 
rights and also (b) interpret the Constitu-
tion.13 This jurisdiction is exercised either by 
a single judge or by an even number of judg-
es (more than three) if the dispute concerns 
a novel point of law.14 A decision from the 
High Court can be appealed against to the 
Court of Appeal. The High Court at Nairobi 
in Kenya has a division designated to hear 
and determine petitions on human rights and 
constitutional matters. Other High Court sta-
????????????????????????????????????????????
in Nairobi is purely administrative.
At the apex of the judicial system is the Su-
preme Court.15 The Court has both original 
and appellate jurisdiction. It has original ju-
risdiction to determine (a) presidential elec-
tions and (b) request for advisory opinions 
at the instance of the national government, 
11 See e.g. Karuti Kanyinga and James D. Long, “The Political Economy of Reforms in Kenya: The Post-2007 Election Violence and a New Constitution,” 55 
(1) 35, Afr. St.  Rev. (2012).
12 See Constitution of Kenya, Chapter 10. 
13 Constitution of Kenya, 2010 art. 162. 
14 Ibid.
15 Constitution of Kenya, 2010 art. 163. 
16 Ibid.
17 Art. 163. 
18Standard Team, Raila Odinga, “Why we are holding mass protests against IEBC,” 
available at https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000201969/raila-odinga-why-we-are-holding-mass-protests-against-iebc   (accessed 20 April 2017).
19 Judie Kaberia, “CORD vows to continue Monday protests against IEBC,” May 22, 2016, http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2016/05/cord-vows-continue-
monday-protests-iebc/ accessed 20 April 2017.
20 Nancy Agutu, “We will not allow destructive protests, Uhuru tells Raila,” The Star available at http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2016/06/10/we-will-not-al-
low-destructive-protests-uhuru-tells-raila_c1367112 
21 Francis Gachuri?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????https://citizentv.co.ke/news/iebc-commission-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????.
22 Petition No. 244 of 2014. Others included Petition No 495 of 2014, Justice Leonard Njagi v. The Judicial Service Commission, the Judiciary and The Attor-
ney General; and Petition No 386 of 2015, Lady Justice Kalpana Rawal v. the Judicial Service Commission, the Secretary of the Judicial Service Commis-
sion; Okiya Okoiti Omtatah.
state organ or county government on a mat-
ter that concerns a county government.16 It 
does have appellate jurisdiction to hear and 
determine appeals from the Court of Appeal 
in cases of interpretation of the Constitu-
tion and in cases in which it or the Court 
???????????????????????????? ??????????????-
?????????? ???????????? ??????????????????????
by the Court of Appeal can be reviewed or 
set aside.17 Thus, the Supreme Court is the 
?????? ??????????????????????????????????????-
al interpretation, but that authority can only 
be exercised if a matter falls within its juris-
diction.  
DEVELOPMENTS AND  
CONTROVERSIES IN 2016 
??????????? ????????????????????????????? ???
2016- one purely political and another case 
based. The political one concerned the tenure 
of commissioners of the electoral body, the 
Independent Electoral and Boundaries Com-
mission (IEBC). It started when opposition 
leaders called for the resignation of IEBC 
commissioners that presided over the 2013 
general elections.18 The opposition circulat-
ed an article titled The Kenyan People’s Case 
against IEBC setting out their grievances 
against the electoral body and called upon 
Kenyans to attend (weekly) protests until the 
?????????????????????????? ???? ???????????
????????????? ????????????????????19 The 
??????????? ?????????? ????? ??? ????????????
the protests through the security forces and 
?????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
opposition demands requiring that the con-
???????????? ??????????? ??? ????????? ?????20 
The opposition insisted and promised more 
protests, and following increased violence, 
deaths, and destruction of property, the 
commissioners resigned on their own and 
through a parliamentary initiative involving 
major political parties a process was set up to 
oversee their substitution.21 
However, the most pronounced controver-
sy in 2016 was perhaps one that surrounded 
the succession of the Supreme Court judges, 
??????????????????????????? ???????????????
subject matter started around 2015 but be-
came a subject of Supreme Court determina-
tion in 2016. It was principally a judicial dis-
pute on when the judges of Superior Court 
should retire. The Judicial Service Commis-
sion, the constitutional agency responsible 
for the hiring of judges, issued retirement 
letters to some judges on the basis that they 
were about to get to 70 years which was the 
constitutional timeline for judges appointed 
under the new Constitution. The judges re-
???????????????????????????????????????? ????
High Court, the lead petition being Philip 
K. Tunoi & Another v. The Judicial Service 
Commission & Another.22 The main conten-
tion was about the lawful period of service 
of Superior Court judges who were already 
duly appointed and were in service under the 
repealed Constitution (the Constitution of 
Kenya 1969), and who then continued in ser-
vice under the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. 
Supplemental to the dispute was a claim by 
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the judges that their rights were being violat-
ed and that the Judicial Service Commission 
was breaching their legitimate expectations. 
At the High Court, the petition was heard by 
???????????23  Dismissing it, the High Court 
held in summary that:
there was no violation of the constitu-
tional rights and legitimate expectations 
of the Petitioners; the JSC had no man-
date in determining whether the retire-
???????????? ??????? ???????????? ??????-
fective date was seventy or seventy-four 
years as such mandate belonged to the 
??????????????????????????????????????????-
tirement notices is the responsibility of 
the Judiciary; and the retirement age of 
?????????????????????????????????????????
seventy years.24
The Deputy Chief Justice, Kalpana Rawal, 
was aggrieved by the decision of the High 
???????????????????????????????????????????-
peal in the Court of Appeal, which was heard 
and determined by seven judges.25  It was 
also dismissed, and the Judges of the Court 
of Appeal held:
??? ???? ????? ?????????? ??? ????? ????????
the conclusion that on the whole, the 
High Court did not err in holding that 
the Constitution did not preserve and 
save the retirement age of judges pre-
scribed by section 62(1) of the former 
Constitution as read with Section 9 of 
the Judicature Act and Section 31 of 
the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution, 
and that with effect from the effective 
date, the retirement age of all judges is 
23 R. Mwongo, Pj, W. Korir, J, C. Meoli, J, H. Ong’udi, J, C. Kariuki, J.
24 Para 399. 
25 Justice Kalpana H. Rawal v. Judicial Service Commission & 3 others [2016] eKLR. (Per Justices, Kariuki, Makhandia, Ouko, Kiage, M’inoti, J. Mohammed 
& Odek, Jj.A).
26 The decision is available at http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/122357/  acceded on 23 April 2017. 
27 Kamau Muthoni, “Supreme Court moves to save Rawal and Tunoi hours after Court of Appeal sends them home,” available at 
https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000203232/supreme-court-moves-to-save-rawal-and-tunoi-hours-after-court-of-appeal-sends-them-home  ac-
cessed on 23 April 2017. 
28 Richard Munguti, “Mutunga fast tracks Rawal retirement case,” http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Mutunga-wades-into-Rawal-retirement-case/1056-
3225372-format-xhtml-nt1pdoz/index.html accessed on 23 April 2017. 
29 Ibid.
30 Kalpana H. Rawal & 2 others v. Judicial Service Commission & 3 others [2016] eKLR (Per JB Ojwang), available at http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/
view/123000/ accessed on 23 April 2017.
31 Mutunga, Wanjala and Ibrahim JJSC, against Ojwang and Ndungu JJSC. 
32 Abiud Ochieng, “End of the road the for Rawal, Tunoi as jobs are advertised,” (Daily Nation, 15 June 2017) available at http://mobile.nation.co.ke/news/
end-of-the-road-the-for-rawal-tunoi-as-jobs-are-advertised/1950946-3251578-1185j5a/index.html.
70 years. For these reasons, the appeal 
cannot succeed. It fails and is hereby 
dismissed.26
Justice Rawal, the then Deputy Chief Jus-
???????????????????????????????????????????-
ously, with an application for a stay, staying 
the decision of the Court of Appeal, at the 
Supreme Court. The application for stay 
was heard by a single judge of the Supreme 
Court, Justice Ndungu, who allowed it and 
stayed the decisions of the Court of Appeal.27 
The appeal to the Supreme Court had been 
????? ????? ?? ???? ????? ??????? ???? ???????????
????????? ????? ????????????????????????????-
ki Ndungu had, in granting stay orders at the 
Supreme Court directed that the application 
be heard, inter parties, at a date that would 
be after the departure of the Chief Justice.28 
The Chief Justice in turn, exercising his “ad-
ministrative powers,” varied the orders that 
had been given by Justice Njoki Ndungu and 
gave directions that the application be heard 
on a priority basis.29 
????? ???? ????????????? ????? ?????????? ????
a hearing, a private citizen, Okiya Omtata, 
who had been enjoined by the High Court as 
??????????????????????????????????????????????
that the Supreme Court did not have jurisdic-
???????????????????????????????????????????????
the Supreme Court and whose subject matter 
the applications were aiming to preserve.30 
Five judges of the Supreme Court heard the 
preliminary objections, and the majority up-
held it.31 The effect of upholding the prelim-
inary objection was that the Supreme Court 
????????????????????????????????????????????
to entertain the appeal, let alone to grant the 
orders that had been previously granted. 
The orders were set aside, and the Judicial 
Service Commission advertised for the po-
sitions of Deputy Chief Justice and judge of 
the Supreme Court.32 
MAJOR CASES 
Because of succession at the Supreme Court, 
there were hardly any cases that were heard 
after the decision in the Rawal case. Chief 
???????? ?????????????????? ????????? ???? ????
Rawal case having had the effect of “re-
moving” justices Rawal and Tunoi, both of 
the Supreme Court, there was no coram to 
hear any case. The process of hiring a new 
Chief Justice, as well as other judges of 
the Supreme Court, took time. There were, 
????????? ????? ?????? ??????????? ?????? ?????
were heard in the High Court and Court of 
Appeals involving interpretation and appli-
cation of the Constitution and which had a 
far-reaching impact on the text and princi-
ples that undergird the Constitution, such as 
separation of powers, human rights, and for-
eign relations. Some of these are highlighted 
below. 
Separation of Powers 
The Constitution of Kenya embodies a rich 
symmetry of separation of powers at many 
levels. At the one hand, power is divided 
vertically between the national and county 
governments, and at another level it is di-
vided horizontally between the judiciary, 
executive, and legislature. Even within the 
legislature, powers (and functions) are di-
vided between the national assembly and the 
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senate (both of which make up Parliament).33 
The devolved government is also divided 
into county executives and county assem-
blies.34 Kenya currently has 47 counties, and 
thus also 47 county assemblies.35
There have been legion disputes between na-
tional government and county governments 
over the exercise of powers (as well as priv-
ileges), some of which have been a subject 
of judicial determination in 2016.36 One of 
????????????????????????International Legal 
Consultancy Group & another v. Ministry of 
Health & 9 others [2016] eKLR.37  This case 
was about division of functions between the 
national and county governments in relation 
to health. It arose out of a decision by the 
national government, through the Ministry 
of Health, to procure certain medical equip-
ment to be used in health facilities through-
out the country. Citing the Inter-Governmen-
tal Relations Act 2012, the court, in that case, 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
the interest of county governments and ob-
served that:
“the constitutional and legislative intent 
was to have all disputes between the two 
levels of government resolved through 
?? ?????? ???????? ???????????? ????????????
for the purpose by legislation, a process 
that emphasizes consultation and ami-
cable resolution through processes such 
as arbitration rather than an adversarial 
court system. As a result, a separate dis-
pute resolution mechanism for dealing 
with any disputes arising between the 
national and county governments, or 
between county governments, has been 
established.”38
33 Constitution of Kenya, Chapter 8.
34 Ibid, Chapter 11.
35 Constitution of Kenya, First Schedule.
36 Available at http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/120392/ accessed 31 March 2017 .
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid para. 65. 
39 http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/122379/ accessed 31 March 2017.
40 Para 19. 
41 Ibid, Para 307. 
42 http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/123600/ accessed 31 March 2017
43 Ibid. 
Some other disputes have been on the rela-
tionship between the judiciary and the exec-
??????? ?????????????????????????????? ????????
of Law Society of Kenya v. Attorney General 
& Another [2016] eKLR.39 This case was 
about the powers of the President to appoint 
the Chief Justice and the Deputy Chief Jus-
tice. Proceedings in that case were provoked 
by the enactment of the Statute Law (Miscel-
laneous Amendment) Act 2015 that sought to 
make minor amendments to various statuto-
ry enactments, including the Judicial Service 
Act 2011. Regarding the Judicial Service 
Commission Act, the bill sought to amend 
it to prescribe timelines for transmission of 
names to the President after recommenda-
tion by the Commission and most important-
ly sought to amend the provisions of section 
30(3) of the Judicial Service Commission 
Act by requiring that the Commission sub-
mits names of three persons for appointment 
to the position of the Chief Justice and the 
Deputy Chief Justice. It had been contended 
that by allowing such amendments, the judi-
ciary was going to be perceived by the public 
as an appendage of the executive and more 
importantly that the said amendments would 
achieve a collateral purpose of limiting the 
independence of the Judicial Service Com-
mission and the judiciary, which collateral 
purpose was claimed to have been evidenced 
by the “fact that the amendments only affect 
the Chief Justice and the Deputy Chief Jus-
tice but not the Judges of the Court of Appeal 
and the High Court who are appointed in a 
similar manner.”40 The High Court, which 
heard the case, determined that: 
“To the extent that the amendments to 
section 30(3) of the Judicial Service Act 
compelled the Judicial Service Com-
mission to submit three names to the 
President for appointment of the Chief 
Justice and the Deputy Chief Justice 
respectively, the said amendments vio-
lated the letter and the spirit of Article 
166(1) of the Constitution.”41
Rights and Freedoms
In the year 2016, legion petitions involving 
violations of human rights were heard and 
determined by the High Court. The most 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
Court of Appeal from the High Court: Kenya 
Airports Authority v. Mitu-Bell Welfare So-
ciety & 2 Others [2016] eKLR.42 The appeal 
concerned justiciability and enforceability of 
socio-economic rights under the 2010 Con-
stitution. Most pointedly, the case expressed 
the tension between the right to housing as 
a socio-economic right and the right to pri-
vate property. The Court had to decide on 
the extent to which socio-economic rights 
can trump private property rights. A key fea-
ture in the appeal was the interpretation of 
the scope of the power of the High Court to 
grant appropriate relief as per Article 23 of 
the Constitution in cases involving the im-
plementation of rights and fundamental free-
doms. 
Sometime around 1992, members of Mi-
tu-Bell Welfare Society were relocated by 
the government to occupy and reside in a 
property belonging to Kenya Airports Au-
thority. The residents then put up their slum 
dwellings, schools, and churches and estab-
lished their businesses on the property and 
?????? ??? ????????? ????????????? ???
Lands to issue them title deeds to the portion 
of the appellant’s land that they occupied.43 
In 2011, the Airports Authority placed a no-
tice in the local daily newspapers giving the 
occupants and residents seven days to va-
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cate portions of the suit property that they 
occupied.44 The notice also stated that upon 
expiry of the notice period, any buildings, 
installations, or erections thereon were to be 
demolished or removed and all activity was 
to terminate in the area.
???????????????????????????????????????????????
High Court, and the High Court held, inter 
alia, that any forceful eviction and or dem-
olition without a relocation option is illegal, 
oppressive, and violates the rights of the 
petitioners. Also, that the respondent (state) 
???? ???????????????????????????????????????
60 days, policies and programs for the pro-
vision of shelter and access to housing for 
the marginalized groups such as residents of 
informal and slum settlements. The state was 
further to furnish copies of such policies and 
programs to the petitioners, other relevant 
state agencies, and Pamoja Trust to analyze 
and comment on the policies and programs.45
The state appealed against the decision in 
the Court of Appeal, which allowed the ap-
peal arguing in part that “Under the political 
question doctrine and noting the provisions 
of Article 20(2) and 20 (5) (c) of the Con-
stitution, a trial court should rarely interfere 
with a decision by a state organ concerning 
the allocation of available resources for pro-
gressive realization of socio-economic rights 
solely on the basis that it would have reached 
a different conclusion.”46 The CoA did, how-
ever, observe that “in any eviction, forcible 
or otherwise, adequate and reasonable notice 
should be given. Respect for human rights, 
fairness, and dignity in carrying out the evic-
tion should be observed. The constitutional 
and statutory provisions on fair administra-
tive action must be adhered to.”47
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Kenya Airports Authority v. Mitu-Bell Welfare Society & 2 Others [2016] eKLR, http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/123600/ accessed 31 March 2017
47 Ibid, para 114. 
48 Constitutional Petition 426 of 2016, http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/130653/  accessed on 31 March 2017. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Constitutional Petition 426 of 2016, http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/130653/ accessed on 31 March 2017.
51??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
52 ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? accessed on 31 March 2017.
53 ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? accessed on 31 March 2017.
54 ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????? accessed on 31 March 2017.
55 ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? accessed on 31 March 2017.
Foreign, International, and Multilateral 
Relations
Republic of Kenya All War Heroes & Oth-
ers v. Attorney General & Others [2017] 
eKLR, though decided in January 2017, was 
an important case of the year 2016.48 In the 
Republic of Kenya All War Heroes & Oth-
ers, the petitioners sued 97 respondents and 
named over 70 intended and or interested 
parties. The case also attracted six amicus 
curiae. The respondents and interested par-
ties included former heads of states and gov-
ernments, foreign embassies and diplomatic 
missions, international organizations, and 
individuals. The petitioners, however, en-
?????????????????????????????????????????????
respondents, among them the United Stat-
ed Embassy, and sought an order from the 
Court to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to 
help them effect service of the summons to 
the foreign missions/embassies, internation-
al organizations, and former heads of state 
and governments. In dismissing the applica-
tion, the Court held that it would be: 
“Flouting international law and the pro-
visions of the Privileges and Immunities 
Act and indeed the Constitution if it de-
crees or issues summonses in this case 
??????? ??? ??? ????????? ????? ???? ?????????
has been waived.”49 
The Court further added:
????????? ?????? ????????? ???????????? ????
Articles of Vienna Convention on Dip-
lomatic Relations having the force of 
law in Kenya provides that the immu-
nity from jurisdiction of Diplomatic 
agents and of persons enjoying immu 
 
 
nity under article 37 thereof may be 
waived by the sending state and that 
such waiver must always be express.”50
Other Constitutional Development
The other noteworthy constitutional devel-
opment in Kenya concerned, seemingly, 
unsuccessful attempts of the Parliament and 
political fractions to amend the Constitu-
tion. The Constitution has not been amended 
since its adoption in 2010. Several amend-
ment bills that sought to change that came 
in the year 2016 both from the National 
Assembly and Senate.51 These include: the 
Constitution of Kenya Amendment Bill (No 
2) 2016 that proposed to reduce the num-
ber of county governments from 47 to 46 
by reorganizing Nairobi County under the 
national government;52 the Amendment Bill 
(No 1) 2016, that sought to empower the 
Senate to increase the timelines for transfer 
of functions assigned to the county govern-
ments;53 Constitution of Kenya Amendment 
Bill seeking to amend Article 143 of the 
Constitution in order to extend the presiden-
tial immunities to the Deputy President not 
only because she performs sovereign func-
tions but also because the Deputy President 
symbolizes Kenya’s sovereignty;54 and Con-
stitution of Kenya Amendment Bill 2016, 
that sought to change the process of dealing 
with electoral disputes.55????????????????????
a popular initiative to amend the Constitu-
tion, termed “Okoa Kenya,” collapsed after 
failing to gather the required threshold of a 
million signatures. 
CONCLUSION
Kenya has been through interesting consti-
tutional developments. The dissolution of 
commissioners of the electoral body was 
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perhaps the happening that absorbed the na-
tion and its resolution without an amendment 
to the Constitution demonstrated that (a) the 
Constitution is not the cause of institutional 
?????????? ?????????? ???? ???? ????????? ????
Constitution is not the panacea for political 
grievances and controversies. The Supreme 
Court succession for its part demonstrated – 
all through – that the Court as an institution 
was weak to the extent that it played to pre-
dictions that it would be divided 3:2, based 
on fairly known inter-judge “friendships,” 
creating an ugly impression that the Court 
was not impartial. 
The foregoing notwithstanding, Court deci-
sions on challenged parliamentary legisla-
tion as well as claims by individuals alleging 
human rights abuse evidences that the in-
stitution of judicial review has the potential 
to succeed in Kenya under the new Consti-
tution. The 2010 Constitution bestowed on 
the citizens a duty to defend it and much 
legislation enacted by the Parliament has 
been a subject to judicial review because of 
individual initiatives. The Court has devel-
oped a policy, through jurisprudence, not to 
condemn such parties to pay costs of a peti-
tion in the event they lose and this policy has 
further encouraged judicial review. 
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LITHUANIA
INTRODUCTION 
For the Constitutional Court of the Republic 
of Lithuania, the past year was steadfast 
in terms of the variety and complexity of 
constitutional matters brought before it. In 
2016, the Constitutional Court had, inter alia, 
to adjudicate on such issues as the dismissal 
of criminal proceedings after the expiry of 
a statutory limitation period for criminal 
liability without giving the accused person 
the possibility of removing doubts regarding 
his/her guilt; the limitation on the amount of 
a maternity allowance payable to mothers 
before and after childbirth; the temporary 
removal from office of a municipal mayor or 
deputy mayor suspected of having committed 
a criminal act; the payment of remuneration 
to members of the Seimas (the Parliament 
of the Republic of Lithuania) who fail to 
perform their duties; the approval given by 
the Seimas for a questionable conclusion of 
an ad hoc investigation commission of the 
Seimas, etc.1
As was noted in one of the decisions 
adopted by the Constitutional Court last 
year, under the Constitution of the Republic 
of Lithuania, courts not only administer 
justice but, in the same manner as other state 
institutions, may implement, within their 
competence, the constitutional objectives 
pursued under the foreign policy of the 
Republic of Lithuania and international 
obligations of the state, taking into account 
the constitutionally established geopolitical 
1?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/rulings-conclusions-decisions/171/y2016.
2????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
en. 
orientation of the State of Lithuania. The 
activity of the Constitutional Court in the 
field of international cooperation in 2016 
can serve as an illustration of such possible 
engagement by courts. Two key points 
follow from this activity of the preceding 
year, i.e. the intensive preparation by the 
Constitutional Court for the 4th Congress 
??? ?????????? ??????????? ??? ???????????????
Justice,2 to be held from 11 to 14 September 
2017 in Vilnius, and its cooperation with the 
constitutional courts of the European Union’s 
???????????????????????????????????????????
????????? ??? ????????? ???? ???????????
providing assistance to these countries in 
their processes of creating a state under the 
rule of law.
In 2016, the Constitutional Court also 
strongly advocated in favour of the individual 
constitutional complaint and its introduction 
into the constitutional legal order. The year 
2016 was notable for positive changes in 
the field of public relations and publicity 
of the Court’s activities. For instance, the 
Constitutional Court was the first among 
Lithuanian courts to launch the live Internet 
broadcasting of its public hearings; the 
provisions of the systematised official 
constitutional doctrine of the Republic of 
Lithuania and the texts of other publications 
that had previously been produced only in a 
printed format were made available on the 
official website of the Constitutional Court. 
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THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
COURT 
The Constitution of the Republic of 
Lithuania was adopted by referendum on 
25 October 1992. This marked a new future 
of the constitutional development of an 
independent democratic state of Lithuania. 
The Constitution, as the highest-ranking 
act and a social contract, is based on 
universal and unquestionable values, such 
as sovereignty belonging to the Nation, 
democracy, the recognition of inalienable 
human rights and freedoms and respect for 
them, respect for law and the rule of law, the 
limitation of the scope of state powers, the 
duty of state institutions to serve the people 
and their responsibility to society, civic 
consciousness, justice, and the striving for 
a harmonious civil society and a state under 
the rule of law.
For the first time in the history of the State 
of Lithuania, the Constitution of 1992 also 
consolidated the institute of constitutional 
judicial review. The Constitution stipulates 
that, in Lithuania, constitutional control is 
carried out by the Constitutional Court, which 
consists of nine justices, each appointed 
for a single nine-year term of office. The 
Constitutional Court, which was formed 
and began its activities in 1993, ensures the 
supremacy of the Constitution within the legal 
system, as well as administers constitutional 
justice, by deciding whether the laws and 
other legal acts adopted by the Seimas are 
in conformity with the Constitution, and 
whether the acts adopted by the President 
of the Republic or the Government are in 
compliance with the Constitution and laws. 
Under the Constitution, in performing this 
function, the Constitutional Court has the 
exclusive powers to interpret the Constitution 
by revealing its meaning and the content of 
its provisions. 
According to the Constitution, the right to 
apply to the Constitutional Court is vested 
in the Seimas in corpore, not less than 
1/5 of all the members of the Seimas, the 
3????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
‘Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia – 25 Years’, Bled, June 2016) http://www.us-rs.si/media/zbornik.25.let.pdf. 
4 Paksas v Lithuania App no 34932/04 (ECtHR, 6 January 2011). 
President of the Republic, the Government, 
and all courts. The Lithuanian legal system 
does not provide for the institution of the 
individual constitutional complaint, which 
would enable individuals to directly apply 
to the Constitutional Court. However, 
legislative actions have recently been taken 
(i.e. relevant constitutional amendments 
have been registered) in the Seimas in 
order to introduce individual constitutional 
complaints.   
Currently, the Constitutional Court 
is also a full member of international 
?????????????????? ?????? ??????????? ???
Constitutional Justice and the Conference 
??? ????????? ??????????????? ????????
uniting constitutional justice institutions. 
From the very beginning of its activity, 
the Constitutional Court has been actively 
cooperating with the constitutional courts of 
???????????? ????????????????? ???? ????????
Over the last few years, the Constitutional 
Court has considerably strengthened the 
cooperation with the constitutional courts of 
the European Union’s Eastern Partnership 
??????????????????? ???? ????????? ???
Moldova, and Ukraine. The Constitutional 
Court also maintains cooperation ties with 
the European Commission for Democracy 
through Law (Venice Commission), which 
have become especially evident in the 
context of the upcoming 4th Congress of the 
???????????????????????????????????????????
DEVELOPMENTS AND  
CONTROVERSIES IN 2016 
According to the official constitutional 
doctrine developed by the Constitutional 
Court of the Republic of Lithuania, respect 
for international law is an inseparable part 
of the constitutional principle of a state 
under the rule of law. However, due to the 
fact that the Constitution and international 
law are inherently autonomous and have 
superiority in their respective spheres, certain 
incompatibilities between international legal 
norms and constitutional norms may arise.3 
The so-called Paksas case is a prominent 
example of such incompatibility. 
This case was initiated in the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) after the 
Constitutional Court had adopted the ruling 
of 25 May 2004, in which it was held that, 
under the Constitution, a person who, inter 
alia, grossly violated the Constitution and 
breached the oath and, as a result of this, was 
removed under the impeachment procedure 
from office could never again stand in 
elections for an office requiring a person 
to take an oath to the State of Lithuania. A 
person who was directly affected by the said 
??????????????? ???????? ??????????????????
Paksas, a former President of the Republic of 
??????????????????????????????????????????
of his right to stand in elections. Having 
considered the application, in its judgment 
of 6 January 2011,4 the ECtHR ruled that the 
permanent and irreversible disqualification 
from standing in parliamentary elections 
was disproportionate and that, in having 
established such a disqualification, 
Lithuania had violated Article 3 of Protocol 
No 1 of the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(hereinafter referred to as the Convention), 
which, as mentioned in the judgment of 
the ECtHR, consolidates the fundamental 
principle of an effective political democracy 
and implies the subjective rights to vote 
and to stand for election. In the judgment 
of the ECtHR, it is acknowledged that the 
right at issue is not absolute and that certain 
limitations of this right are permissible, 
but that these limitations may not be of a 
permanent character. 
The Constitutional Court and the ECtHR 
assessed the situation regarding one’s 
ineligibility to stand in parliamentary elections 
from different positions: in its rulings, the 
Constitutional Court emphasised allegiance 
to the State of Lithuania, loyalty, and (in)
eligibility to take up a responsible office once a 
???????????????????????????????????????????
gross violation of the Constitution and a 
breach of an oath taken to the state; while 
the ECtHR interpreted the same situation 
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more through the right of the electorate – the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
and decide whom they would like to see as 
their representatives, as well as through the 
disclosure and interpretation of the concept of 
the electoral right. 
After the delivery of the said judgment of the 
ECtHR, measures were taken in Lithuania 
to implement it. The Seimas adopted 
amendments to the Law on Elections to the 
Seimas, under which, a person who grossly 
violated the Constitution and breached the 
oath could stand in parliamentary elections 
after a five-year period following his/
her removal from the office held. Such 
provisions amending the law were evidently 
incompatible with the doctrinal provisions 
formulated in the Constitutional Court’s 
ruling of 25 May 2004. Thus, it is no 
wonder that the Constitutional Court, in its 
ruling of 5 September 2012, recognised that 
such amendments were in conflict with the 
Constitution. The Constitutional Court held 
that, in itself, the judgment of the ECtHR 
may not serve as a constitutional basis 
for the reinterpretation (correction) of the 
official constitutional doctrine, and that the 
renouncing of international obligations in 
the sphere of human rights would not be a 
constitutionally justified option. This led to 
another important conclusion, namely that 
the Republic of Lithuania is obliged to adopt 
relevant amendment(s) to the Constitution. 
In 2016, the Constitutional Court had to return 
to this issue by assessing the constitutionality 
of the resolution of the Seimas whereby 
the Seimas had approved the conclusion 
of the ad hoc Investigation Commission of 
the Seimas for the Restoration of the Civil 
and Political Rights of President Rolandas 
Paksas.5 Having found the resolution of the 
Seimas to be in conflict with the Constitution, 
the Constitutional Court reiterated that, in 
order to remove the incompatibility between 
the Constitution and the provisions of the 
Convention, as well as to implement the 
related judgment of the ECtHR, there is only 
one way – to amend the relevant provisions 
of the Constitution; any other way is 
impossible under the Constitution.
5 For more information on this case, see Chapter IV.1 of this report.
The Seimas has repeatedly attempted to 
implement the aforementioned judgment of 
the ECtHR in a constitutional way, i.e. by 
adopting the amendments of the Constitution, 
which would lead to the elimination of the 
incompatibility between the provisions of 
the Constitution and the Convention, but 
none of its attempts have been successful.
MAJOR CASES
Separation of Powers
The Constitutional Court has held more 
than once that, after the Constitution has 
directly established the powers of particular 
institutions of state power, no state institution 
may take over such powers from another 
state institution, or transfer or waive them, 
and that such powers may not be amended or 
restricted by means of a law; otherwise the 
principle of the separation of powers, which 
is consolidated in the Constitution, would 
be violated. The Constitutional Court had to 
recall the said doctrinal provision in its ruling 
of 22 December 2016. This case dealt with 
the issue of the approval given by the Seimas 
for the questionable proposals of an ad hoc 
Investigation Commission of the Seimas 
(hereinafter referred to as the Commission) 
for the Restoration of the Civil and Political 
Rights of President Rolandas Paksas. The 
Constitutional Court set out the principled 
provision that the Seimas may not approve 
a conclusion of any possible content made 
by an ad hoc investigation commission of 
the Seimas, inter alia; any such proposals 
formulated therein that would be incompatible 
with, among other things, the requirements 
stemming from the constitutional principle of 
the separation of powers.
One of the proposals set out in the conclusion 
of the Commission was to supplement the 
provisions of the Statute of the Seimas 
governing impeachment proceedings so that 
the Seimas would be granted the competence, 
????????????????????????????????????????????
and annul an impeachment against a person 
without applying to the Constitutional Court 
concerning this issue. The Constitutional 
Court found that such proposal denied the 
constitutional concept of the institute of 
???????????? ??? ????????? ??? ???? ????????
constitutional doctrine, under which two 
??????????????????????????????????????? ????
??????????? ???????????????????????? ?????
powers in impeachment proceedings; under 
the Constitution, each of these institutions 
in impeachment proceedings is assigned 
???????? ??????? ?????????????? ??? ??????
respective functions. If such proposal were 
implemented, the Seimas would interfere 
with the competence assigned to an institution 
of judicial power – the Constitutional Court 
– in impeachment proceedings and take 
the powers granted to the Constitutional 
Court. Moreover, by means of the proposals 
(among other things, to regulate the legal 
consequences of constitutional liability by 
means of a resolution of the Seimas) as set 
out in the conclusion of the Commission, an 
attempt was made to interpret the provisions 
of the Constitution in a way different from 
that provided by the Constitutional Court 
in its acts, thus denying the powers of this 
?????? ????????????? ?????????? ?????????????????
and interfering with the constitutional 
competence of this court (as an institution of 
judicial power) to administer constitutional 
justice.
Therefore, this resolution of the Seimas, 
whereby the Seimas had approved 
the conclusion of the aforementioned 
Commission, was ruled by the Constitutional 
?????? ??? ??? ??? ?????????????? inter alia, the 
constitutional principle of the separation of 
powers.
Rights and Freedoms
The vast part of the constitutional justice 
cases considered in 2016 comprised cases 
??????????? ???? ??????????? ???? ????????? ????
constitutional rights and freedoms of persons 
(the right to fair proceedings, the right to 
freely choose a job or business, the right to 
receive fair pay for work, the right to social 
security, the protection of consumer rights, 
the equality of the rights of persons). Among 
the cases in this category, particular attention 
should be paid to three cases.
Firstly, in one of its cases, the Constitutional 
Court had to assess the constitutionality 
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of the provisions of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure regulating the termination of 
criminal proceedings after the expiry of a 
statutory limitation period. In the ruling 
of 27 June 2016, the impugned legal 
??????????? ???? ????? ??? ??? ??? ???????? ?????
the Constitution insofar as, under this 
regulation, a case was to be dismissed by 
the court without assessing charges brought 
against the accused and without ascertaining 
whether the accused had reasonably been 
charged with having committed a crime or 
whether the acquitted person was reasonably 
acquitted of a crime with which he/she had 
been charged. The Constitutional Court held 
that the impugned legal regulation precluded 
a court from acting in such a way that the 
truth in a criminal case would be established 
and the question of the guilt of the person 
accused of having committed a crime would 
be fairly resolved. If a court fails to assess 
whether the charges brought against the 
accused person are reasonable and the case 
is dismissed for the reason that the statutory 
limitation period for criminal liability has 
expired, the impression is created that the 
accused is not convicted only because the 
prescribed limitation period has expired. 
Thus, the preconditions are created for the 
continued doubts as to whether the accused 
was reasonably charged with having 
committed a crime, as well as the continued 
doubts as to the good repute of the accused.
In the second case at issue, the Constitutional 
Court considered the constitutionality of the 
legal regulation, consolidated in the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, under which a member 
????????????????????????????????????????????
mayor or deputy mayor may be temporarily 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
the commission of a criminal act or is charged 
with committing a crime. The Constitutional 
Court, in its ruling of 17 February 2016, held 
that, under the Constitution, the status of a 
?????????????????? ????????????????????????
of mayor or deputy mayor does not imply 
any requirement that, with regard to this 
municipal council member, the relevant law 
must establish such grounds and procedure 
for applying procedural coercive measures 
(including temporary removal from 
??????? ????? ?????? ??? ?????????? ????? ??????
established with regard to other persons. 
The Constitutional Court also held that the 
Code of Criminal Procedure consolidates 
???? ?????????? ??????????? ??? ??????? ????? ????
rights of a person, inter alia, a member of 
?? ?????????? ???????? ???????? ???? ?????? ???
mayor or deputy mayor who is subject to the 
procedural coercive measure of temporary 
???????? ????? ??????? ?????????? ???? ?????? ???
freely choose a job, would not be limited in 
a disproportionate manner. Therefore, the 
impugned legal regulation was ruled not 
??? ???????? ????? ???? ?????????????? ????????
as it does not establish the prohibition on 
removing a member of a municipal council 
?????????????????? ??????????????? ?????????
any additional criteria limiting the duration 
??????????????????????????????
In the third case in this category, the 
Constitutional Court had to assess the 
constitutionality of the legal regulation 
imposing a limitation on the size of maternity 
allowances. By its ruling of 15 March 2016, 
the Constitutional Court recognised the 
unconstitutionality of the impugned legal 
regulation, insofar as it provided that a 
maternity allowance could not be higher than 
the maximum amount provided for in the Law 
on Sickness and Maternity Social Insurance. 
Under the impugned legal regulation, in cases 
where the average remuneration received by 
a working woman exceeded the maximum 
compensatory earnings, she was granted a 
maternity allowance calculated according to 
these compensatory earnings, and the amount 
of the payable allowance was not connected 
to the remuneration received by the woman 
within the established period before the 
?????? ???? ?????? ??? ????????????? ?????? ?????
the average of the received remuneration. 
According to the Constitutional Court, the 
impugned legal regulation, whereby the 
amount of a maternity allowance was limited, 
did not appropriately implement the guarantee 
of paid leave before and after childbirth, as 
consolidated in Paragraph 2 of Article 39 of 
the Constitution, under which the amount 
??? ???????? ????? ??? ???????? ???????? ???????
the guaranteed period of their leave before 
and after childbirth must correspond to the 
average remuneration received by them 
within the reasonable period of time before 
this leave.
Foreign, International, and Multilateral 
Relations
Substantiating the interpretation concerning 
the right of judges to receive other 
remuneration, the Constitutional Court, in 
its decision of 16 May 2016, revealed new 
aspects of the activity of courts related to 
foreign policy and international relations. 
It noted that, under the Constitution, the 
role of courts is not limited exclusively to 
the administration of justice. Like other 
institutions of state power, courts, within 
their constitutional competence, either 
independently or in cooperation with other 
state institutions, may participate in carrying 
out the general tasks and functions of the 
state. Among other things, courts may also 
engage in the activity aimed at achieving 
the constitutional objectives of the foreign 
policy of the Republic of Lithuania and 
??? ?????????? ?????????????? ???????????? ????
obligations related to full membership in 
the EU and NATO, including participation 
in international cooperation and democracy 
promotion projects. This geopolitical 
orientation pursued by the Republic of 
Lithuania constitutes a constitutional 
value and implies the relevant activity of 
the State of Lithuania, its institutions, and 
individuals employed therein, which is 
aimed at contributing to the partnership of 
other states within the EU or NATO, or at 
contributing to the integration of these states 
into the said international organisations by 
promoting the dissemination of universal 
and democratic values and the principles 
of EU law, including the dissemination of 
these values and principles in the spheres 
related to the improvement of the systems of 
justice and the activity of courts. Thus, the 
participation of the State of Lithuania and 
its institutions, including courts, in the said 
activity may be implemented, among other 
things, through the engagement of judges 
in support projects funded by international 
organisations or foreign states, or in projects 
?????????????????????????????????????????
Cooperation and Democracy Promotion 
Programme, in cases where such projects 
are related to improving the system of 
justice and the activity of courts. However, 
the said participation may not interfere with 
the performance of the main constitutional 
judicial function of administering justice 
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in a proper and effective manner and must 
be compatible with the impartiality and 
independence of judges.
Other
Among other cases of 2016, particular 
mention should be made of the ruling of 5 
October 2016, in which the Constitutional 
Court declared unconstitutional a provision 
of the Statute of the Seimas insofar as, 
under this provision, remuneration for the 
given month could not be reduced by more 
than one-third for a member of the Seimas 
who, during that month, continuously failed, 
???????? ??? ?????????? ??????????? ???????? ???
attend the sittings of the Seimas or the sittings 
of the committees or other structural units of 
the Seimas. In its ruling, the Constitutional 
Court noted that, under the Constitution, 
when regulating one of the guarantees of the 
parliamentary activity of the members of the 
Seimas, i.e. the payment of remuneration 
for the work of the members of the Seimas, 
the legislature must take account of the 
constitutional duty of the members of the 
Seimas to attend the sittings of the Seimas, as 
well as the sittings of the committees or other 
structural units of the Seimas. The legislature 
??? ????? ???????? ??? ???????? ???? ???? ?????????
consequences for continuous failure (without 
???????????????????????????????????????????????
constitutional duty. The episodic or even 
??????????? ??????????? ??? ????? ????? ??? ????
constitutional powers (such as drafting laws 
and other legal acts of the Seimas, meeting 
with voters, performing other parliamentary 
activities) of a member of the Seimas 
???????? ??? ?????????? ??????????? ????????
including failure to attend the sittings of the 
Seimas, or the sittings of the committees or 
other structural units of the Seimas, may not 
be regarded as the proper implementation 
by the member of the Seimas of his or her 
constitutional duty to represent the Nation, 
i.e. the duty for the implementation of which 
the member of the Seimas is remunerated. 
Thus, the payment of remuneration from 
the funds of the state budget to a member 
of the Seimas who continuously, without an 
?????????? ??????????? ???????? ?????? ??? ???????
the sittings of the Seimas, or the sittings 
of the committees or other structural units 
of the Seimas, should be considered a 
??????????????????????????????????????
CONCLUSION
The preceding year was marked not only by 
the variety and complexity of constitutional 
matters brought before the Constitutional 
Court but also by the intensive international 
cooperation and public promotion of the 
activity of the Constitutional Court. In 
2017, the Constitutional Court will face 
other challenges, the biggest one most 
probably being the 4th Congress of the 
????????????????????????????????????????????
which will focus on “The Rule of Law 
and Constitutional Justice in the Modern 
???????? ????????????????????????????????????
Court will carry out its jurisprudential 
activity following from the adjudication of 
constitutional justice cases, which promise 
to be important and complex. For instance, 
the Constitutional Court will investigate 
the constitutionality of the legal provisions 
exempting from mandatory military service 
the priests of certain religious communities 
and associations. It will also have to consider 
????????? ??? ?????? ??? ??????? ??????????????
the Constitution allows refusing to issue 
a temporary residence permit to a foreign 
national who has entered into a same-sex 
marriage or same-sex registered partnership 
in another state with a citizen of the Republic 
of Lithuania who resides in Lithuania (taking 
into account the circumstance that such 
marriages or partnerships are not allowed 
under national law).  
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M A L AY S I A
INTRODUCTION
Readers will be aware that Malaysia has 
since 1957 had a Constitution that is feder-
al and enshrines constitutional monarchy in 
?? ???????? ?????????????????? ?????????????
structure.1 In 1963 the Borneo states of Sa-
bah and Sarawak joined the Federation under 
an amended version of the 1957 Constitu-
tion. Some political background is needed to 
understand the balance of this brief survey. 
Since 1957 Malaysia has been governed 
by the Barisan Nasional (BN, formerly Al-
liance) multi-ethnic coalition, which until 
2008 commanded at least the two-thirds ma-
jority in Parliament required for most con-
stitutional amendments, and was thus able 
to manipulate the Constitution according 
to its desires. Since 2008 the political sys-
tem is best described as two-party, with two 
coalitions (BN and Pakatan Rakyat) each 
commanding around half of the votes in the 
general elections of 2008 and 2013. The BN 
retains power having won a majority of seats 
in Parliament despite securing fewer votes 
than the opposition in the 2013 elections.2 A 
measure of Islamicisation of the legal system 
has proceeded since the dawn of the 21st cen-
tury. Article 3 of the Constitution provides 
that Islam is the religion of the Federation.
1 For an introduction, see AJ Harding, The Constitution of Malaysia: A Contextual Analysis (Hart Pub-
lishing, 2012).
2 ‘Malaysia Vote: PM Najib Razak’s Barisan Nasional Wins,’ BBC, 6 May 2013, http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-asia-22422172 (accessed 24 April 2017).
3 The Economist, ‘Malaysians Underestimate the Damage Caused by the 1MDB Scandal,’ http://
www.economist.com/news/leaders/21710820-opposition-has-do-more-win-over-rural-ma-
lays-malaysians-underestimate-damage (accessed 24 April 2017).
4 ‘Malaysia’s Attorney-General Clears Najib of Corruption over Cash Gift from Saudi Royals’, The Straits 
Times, 27 January 2016, http://www.straits (accessed 24 April 2017).
5 The Economist, above n.3.
DEVELOPMENTS AND  
CONTROVERSIES IN 2016 
Controversy I: Kleptocracy
The year 2016 was overshadowed by a 
non-constitutional event, namely the abject 
failure to secure any meaningful account-
ability of the Prime Minister (PM) in respect 
of the financial scandal surrounding the de-
velopment corporation 1 Malaysia Develop-
ment Berhad (1MDB). The PM has never 
given convincing or consistent explanations 
for the US$681 million that passed through 
his personal bank account nor of the RM42 
billion missing from 1MDB.3 By the begin-
ning of 2016, every form of political and le-
gal accountability in respect of this scandal 
had been blocked, and the Attorney-General 
(AG) had been summarily sacked when it 
appeared he was pursuing criminal charges 
against the PM.4 The year 2016 continued 
this sorry saga in the same vein despite the 
incremental accretion of evidence resulting 
from investigations in the United States, 
Singapore, and Switzerland implicating the 
Prime Minister and people close to him.5 
These events cast a pall over a set of institu-
tional arrangements established under a con-
stitution that signally failed to perform their 
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task. In addition, and relatedly, 2016 saw a 
further reversal of reforms carried out during 
2011-13, as the PM moved to suppress criti-
cism and displays of dissent.6
One development arising from this consti-
tutional blockage was that public opinion 
turned to the traditional Rulers, the nine Ma-
lay Sultans, looking for a resolution of the 
scandal. The Rulers sit in a Conference of 
Rulers that has some limited constitutional 
powers that include the power to make pro-
nouncements on state policy. They issued a 
statement asking for accountability and an 
explanation from the Prime Minister. Even 
this initiative the Prime Minister was able 
to ignore with apparent impunity despite the 
high social and political standing of the Rul-
ers.7
In January 2016 a new Attorney-General 
(AG) declared the Prime Minister innocent 
of any wrong doing in the 1MDB issue. This 
event was followed by a lively and instruc-
tive debate as to the role of the Attorney-Gen-
eral, with the Bar Council challenging the 
dismissal of the previous AG, disputing the 
appointment of the new AG, and the latter’s 
clearing of the PM, as well as arguing that 
the AG had, in any event, no power to make 
a declaration of this kind.8 
In the wake of this decision, there was some 
interest in the question whether the AG’s 
discretion to refuse to prosecute could be re-
??????????????????????????????????????????
judicial review action challenging the AG’s 
decision to exonerate the PM.9 The courts 
in Malaysia have always granted the AG 
an almost completely unfettered discretion 
whether to prosecute or discontinue a case.10
6 See, e.g., ‘Critic of Najib Razak, Malaysian Leader, Gets Prison for 1MDB Disclosure,’ https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/15/world/asia/malay-
???????????????????????????????????????? (accessed 24 April 2017).
7 ‘Rulers Want 1MDB Issue Settled,’ The Star, 6 October 2016, http://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2015/10/06/rulers-want-imdb-issue-settled/ (ac-
cessed 24 April 2016).
8 ‘The Malaysian Bar to Appeal to High Court Decision Regarding Judicial Review of the Exercise of the Attorney-General’s Powers,’ Bar Council Press 
Release, 15 Nobember 2016,  http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/legal/general_news/press_release_%7C_the_malaysian_bar_to_appeal_high_court_deci-
sion_regarding_judicial_review_of_the_exercise_of_the_attorney_generals_powers.html (accessed 24 April 2017).
9 Ibid.
10 Johnson Tan Han Seng v PP [1977] 2 MLJ 66 (FC); Poh Cho Ching v Public Prosecutor [1982] 1 MLJ 86; Rosli bin Dahlan v Tan Sri Abdul Gani bin Patail & 
Ors [2014] MLJU 581.
11 ‘Hudud’ is Islamic criminal law.
Controversy II: Punitive Powers of Syariah 
Courts
On 6 April 2017, the Federal Parliament wit-
nessed the tabling of a controversial Bill to 
increase the punitive powers of the syariah 
(i.e., shari’a) courts. Public debates about the 
Bill had been ongoing for almost two years, 
triggered by the Kelantan State Assembly’s 
unanimous approval to amend the state’s 
Syariah Criminal Code. The amendment 
introduced a range of Islamic criminal law 
punishments in the state (including amputa-
tion for theft offenses and stoning for adul-
tery or same-sex sexual conduct), but these 
could not be implemented because of the 
limitations set by the 1965 Syariah Courts 
(Criminal Jurisdiction) Act. This feder-
al-level law only authorizes Syariah Courts 
to impose a maximum of three years impris-
?????????????????????????? ??????? ????????
(RM) 5000, and/or six strokes of the cane. 
To pursue the implementation of Kelantan’s 
Syariah Criminal Code, the Islamic oppo-
sition party, PAS, which governs Kelantan, 
pledged to table a private member’s bill to 
amend the 1965 Act.
????????????????????????????????????????-
ment was designed in such way as to allow 
Syariah Courts to impose any punishment 
mandated by Islamic law other than the death 
penalty. This broad construction was later 
????????? ????????????? ?????????????????????
to raise the limits of existing punishments 
??? ??? ??????? ?????? ?? ???????? ???? ??? ???
100,000, and/or 100 lashes. For proponents 
of the Bill, therefore, the amendment would 
merely increase the upper limits of Syariah 
punishments. They have largely refrained 
from using the term ‘Hudud Bill’11 (a Mem-
ber of Parliament who supported the Bill 
 
 
 
argued in Parliament that the Bill had noth-
ing to do with Hudud), focusing instead on 
their desire to ‘empower the Syariah Courts,’ 
and prevent personal sins and moral degra-
dation among Muslims. The call for support 
was aimed to strike at the religious senti-
ments of Muslims, but this was also laced 
with other economic and political rhetoric. 
For instance, it was emphasized that Mus-
lims had a duty to unite to safeguard the dig-
nity of Islam as the majority religion (and the 
religion of the Federation) and that Muslim 
judges within the syariah branch deserved an 
equal status (and thus, equal remuneration) 
with their counterparts in the civil branch. 
As it stands, the sentencing jurisdiction of 
the lowest court in the civil court hierarchy 
????????????????????????????????????? ??????
??????????????????????????????????????????????
RM 10,000.
The Bill’s constitutionality continues to be 
a subject of great debate. In particular, the 
possibility of disproportionate punishments 
for personal sins and victimless crimes and 
the implementation of such punishments on 
Muslims raise questions about the rights to 
equality and equal protection. Although the 
ruling party (UMNO) has pledged to support 
the Bill, its progress through Parliament has 
been a mixed success. In May 2016 the gov-
ernment suspended its order of business to 
pave the way for Abdul Hadi Awang (PAS 
President) to table the Bill, but he asked for 
a postponement until the next Parliament 
sitting. Throughout October and November 
2016, the Bill was tabled twice but it was 
never debated. The Bill’s fate remains un-
certain, and public debates about its consti-
tutionality and propriety continue to divide a 
multiracial and multireligious society.
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MAJOR CASES
Apostasy and the Jurisdiction of the Syariah 
Courts
In Azmi Mohamad Azam v Director of Ja-
batan Agama Islam Sarawak and Others,12 
the High Court of Sabah and Sarawak exam-
ined the longstanding questions surround-
ing the formalities of renunciation of Islam 
and the jurisdiction of the syariah courts in 
apostasy cases. The Applicant renounced Is-
lam to embrace Christianity, and he sought 
to change his name and remove the word 
‘Islam’ from his national identity card. His 
request was rejected by the National Regis-
tration Department (NRD), who insisted on a 
letter from the State Islamic Department and 
?? ?????? ?????? ?????????? ???? ?????????? ?????
??????? ????????????????????????????????-
lamic Department (Limbang branch), he was 
told that the department could not assist him 
and was asked to make an application before 
the Syariah Court. The Syariah Court did not 
formally hear his case, but the Chief Syariah 
Judge issued a letter informing the Applicant 
that the court had no jurisdiction to issue the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
the Civil Court for relief, seeking, among 
others, a mandamus order to compel the 
NRD to change his name and remove the 
word ‘Islam’ from his identity card.
The High Court judgment in favor of the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
????? ????????? ???? ??????????????? ???????????
of the Syariah Court. The Court accepted 
the settled principle that apostasy issues 
must be determined according to Islamic 
law, and although the Syariah Court Ordi-
nance 2001 and the Majlis Agama Islam 
Sarawak Ordinance 2001 bore no provision 
regulating apostasy, the Court argued that 
the jurisdiction of the Syariah Courts can be 
implied. However, the Court in this case fo-
cused heavily on the constitutional right to 
religious freedom, when it could have ruled 
that the matter before it should be decided 
by the Syariah Court. The Court considered 
12 [2016] 6 CLJ 562.
13 Lina Joy v Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan & Another [2007] 4 MLJ 585); Hj. Raimi bin Abdullah v Siti Hasnah Vangarama binti Abdullah [2014] 4 
CLJ 253
14 Viran Nagappan v. Deepa Subramaniam & Other Appeals [2016] 3 CLJ 505, 507-8.
15 Ibid., at 508.
religious freedom to be the ‘most inalienable 
and sacred of all human rights,’ and accord-
ingly the right to choose one’s own religion 
should not be subject to Syariah Court ap-
proval. In addition, the Court determined 
that the Syariah Court only has jurisdiction 
over persons professing the religion of Islam, 
and the Applicant – by virtue of being a prac-
ticing Christian – could no longer be said to 
‘profess’ Islam. 
Although the Court took pains to distinguish 
the present case from previous decisions 
concerning apostasy,13 this decision is a wel-
come approach to deciding important consti-
tutional questions, which is rightly under the 
purview of the Civil Courts.
Child Conversions and Custody Battles
These cases continued to be at the centre of 
debates on Malaysian constitutional law in 
2016, particularly in light of the decision in 
Viran Nagappan v Deepa Subramaniam & 
Other Appeals [2016] 3 CLJ 505. The Court 
considered two principal questions: (1) 
whether a Civil or Syariah Court had juris-
?????????????????????????? ??????????????????
???? ???????????????? ????? ??????????? ???-
tody orders; and (2) whether a Civil Court 
could make a recovery order in light of an 
existing (and enforceable) custody order by 
the Syariah Court. The Muslim father in the 
Syariah Court and the non-Muslim mother 
in the Civil Court were both granted custo-
dy of their two children. The son, however, 
was taken away by the father, prompting the 
mother to obtain a recovery order from the 
High Court. On appeal, the father argued that 
the Civil Courts had no jurisdiction over the 
dissolution of his marriage or over the cus-
tody of the children because he is a Muslim, 
bringing these issues within the jurisdiction 
of the Syariah Court. 
In a unanimous judgment, the Federal Court 
held that the conversion of one spouse to Is-
lam does not strip the Civil Courts of juris-
diction in matters of divorce and custody. On 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
Federal Court exercised more restraint. Al-
though the court recognized that the Syariah 
Court had no jurisdiction to grant custody 
order in favor of the father (it also added that 
the father’s application before the Syariah 
Court was an ‘abuse of process’), it never-
theless granted that the syariah order was a 
valid order until it was set aside.14 The exis-
???????????????????????????????????????????-
cluded the High Court from entertaining the 
mother’s application for a recovery order of 
her son.
The outcome of this decision is thus a cu-
rious one, posing practical issues for law 
???????????? ???????? ??????????? ???????????
court orders.15 The Court’s approach could 
be seen, in one respect, as a step forward, 
given its decision that conversion to Islam 
does not automatically dissolve a non-Mus-
lim marriage and preclude the Civil Courts’ 
?????????????? ???????????????????????????????-
riah Court’s custody order in favor of the 
husband (which preceded the Civil Court’s 
order in favor of the mother) was valid could 
be seen as a step backward, as it appears to 
have implicitly legitimized the recalcitrant 
husband’s disregard of the Civil Court order.
Non-Muslims Not Allowed to Become 
Syariah Practitioners
In Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan 
v Victoria Jayaseele Martin [2016] MLJU 
40, the question that arose for determination 
in the Federal Court was whether a non-Mus-
lim possessing the requisite academic and 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
as a syariah practitioner. The Islamic Reli-
gious Council (Majlis Agama Islam) of the 
Federal Territories had declined to process 
the plaintiff/respondent’s application on the 
?????? ????? ??? ????????????? ???????????? ???????
the requirement to be admitted as a syariah 
practitioner. The plaintiff sought judicial re-
view, partly on the ground that the rule re-
quiring syariah practitioners to be Muslims 
is in contravention of Articles 8(1) and/or 
8(2) and/or Article 5 and/or Article 10(1)(c) 
of the Federal Constitution.
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In allowing the Majlis’s appeal and dis-
missing the application for judicial review 
(which had succeeded before the Court of 
Appeal), the Federal Court held that Article 
8 (the equality clause) permits discrimina-
tion on the basis of ‘reasonable or permis-
?????? ???????????????? ???? ?????????????? ????
occurred. The Federal Court observed that 
a syariah court, like any other court, must 
be able to enforce its laws and rules against 
its practitioners when necessary, and in this 
case, it could not legally do so as the plaintiff 
is a non-Muslim. Moreover, from the syariah 
perspective, faith is important, and the plain-
tiff’s non-Muslim faith would be an imped-
iment to her duty to assist the Syariah Court 
in upholding syariah law (para 51). Further, 
the plaintiff was not being deprived of her 
livelihood contrary to Article 5(1) (the right 
to life and personal liberty), as she could 
still practice as an advocate before the Civil 
Courts, and was indeed doing so. The chal-
lenge based on Article 10(1)(c) (the right to 
freedom of association) was also rejected, 
as that provision refers only to the right to 
form associations, not the right to be part of 
any existing association of one’s choosing. 
In view of these, it was held not unconstitu-
tional for the relevant religious body such as 
the Majlis to stipulate that only Muslims can 
be syariah practitioners.
Constitutionality of the Sedition Act
The case of ?????????????????????????????-
ajaan Malaysia16? ??? ???????????????? ???? ????
Court of Appeal’s declaration that a key pro-
vision in the Sedition Act is unconstitutional 
and for its application of the proportionality 
test to determine constitutionality of laws 
vis-à-vis fundamental liberties. According to 
the Court of Appeal, the proportionality test 
is now an entrenched part of Malaysian con-
stitutional law and, as the Federal Court (the 
highest court in Malaysia) opined in Public 
Prosecutor v Azmi bin Sharom,17 the test is 
encapsulated within the equality provision 
(Article 8) in the Federal Constitution. The 
proportionality test is particularly relevant 
where the law implicates a fundamental lib-
????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
16 [2017] 1 MLJ 436.
17 [2015] 6 MLJ 751.
in the case of freedom of speech, guaranteed 
to citizens under Article 10 of the Constitu-
tion.
Malaysia’s Sedition Act makes it an offense 
to say or publish matters with a seditious ten-
????????????????????????????????????????????
as: 
(a) to bring into hatred or contempt or to 
excite disaffection against any Ruler or 
any Government; 
(b) to excite the subjects of any Ruler of the 
inhabitants of any territory governed by 
any Government to attempt to procure 
in the territory of the Ruler or governed 
by the Government, the alteration, oth-
erwise than by lawful means, of any 
matter as by law established; 
(c) to bring into hatred or contempt or to 
excite disaffection against the adminis-
tration of justice in Malaysia or in any 
State; 
(d) to raise discontent or disaffection 
amongst the subjects of the Yang di-Per-
tuan Agong or of the Ruler of any State 
or amongst the inhabitants of Malaysia 
or of any State;
(e) to promote feelings of ill-will and hos-
tility between different races or classes 
of the population of Malaysia; or 
(f) to question any matter, right, status, 
position, privilege, sovereignty or pre-
rogative established or protected by 
the provisions of Part III of the Federal 
Constitution or Article 152, 153 or 181 
of the Federal Constitution.
?????? ???? ???????? ?????? ??????? ???? ??-
fence-creating provision (section 4) of the 
Sedition Act in its earlier decision in Azmi 
bin Sharom, the Court of Appeal opined in 
Mat Shuhaimi that this did not preclude it 
from determining the constitutionality of 
section 3(3) of the Act. Section 3(3) deems 
irrelevant the intention of the person charged 
at the time he spoke or committed any act 
producing the seditious material to establish 
the offense. This, as the Court highlighted, 
puts the issue of the accused person’s inten-
???????????????????????????????????? ?????????
Court appears to countenance this as falling 
within one of the permissible objectives for 
restricting freedom of expression in Article 
10, it nonetheless stated that the provision 
making intent an irrelevant element of the 
offense disproportionately restricts freedom 
of expression and therefore violates the 
equal protection clause. The provision was 
declared invalid. The upshot of this is that 
sedition remains an offense in Malaysia but 
is no longer a strict liability offense.
????????????????????????????????????????? ??-
comed, it is suggested that the Court of Ap-
peal had not adequately dealt with the issue 
that was raised of the Sedition Act being en-
acted in 1948 before the Federal Constitution 
of 1957 came into existence. Article 4(1) of 
the Constitution only provides that ‘any law 
passed after Merdeka Day which is inconsis-
tent with this Constitution shall, to the extent 
of the inconsistency, be void.’ Technically, it 
is questionable whether any provision exists 
in the Constitution for the Court of Appeal 
to have granted the declaration in the terms 
sought by the plaintiff (see para 45). The ap-
propriate provision that the Court could have 
relied on in reaching its conclusion is Article 
162(6), which provides that ‘any court or tri-
bunal applying the provision of any existing 
????????????????????????????????????? ??-
ter Merdeka Day … may apply it with such 
???????????????? ????????????????????????????
into accord with the provisions of this Con-
??????????????????????????????????????? ???????
162(7) as including amendment, adaptation, 
and repeal. It is submitted that the Court 
could have made reference to Article 162(6) 
and 162(7), declared section 3(3) to be in-
consistent with Articles 10(1) and 8(1), and 
declared the offending provision repealed 
???????????????????????????? ????????????????
actually granted can no doubt still be inter-
preted or elaborated in these terms, the con-
cern is that a more executive-minded panel 
of the Federal Court (or even a subsequent 
Court of Appeal) may seize on the ambigu-
ity to deprecate the important conclusions 
reached in ????????????????????????
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Preventive Detention
The case of YB Teresa Kok Suh Sim v Men-
teri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia, YB Dato’ Seri 
Syed Hamid bin Syed Jaafar Abar & Ors18 is 
????????????????????????????????????????????-
tive review test for arrests and detentions un-
der Malaysia’s internal security laws (which 
allow for preventive detention), but for hold-
ing that this standard of review is also ap-
plicable in determining whether an unlawful 
arrest gives rise to compensation. 
The facts giving rise to the case were polit-
ically charged. The appellant, a Member of 
Parliament, was arrested by the police. She 
was subsequently informed that she was be-
ing arrested and detained under the (subse-
quently repealed) Internal Security Act 1960 
(ISA). During her one-week detention, the 
appellant alleged that she was continually 
???????????????????????????????????????????-
humane conditions, was deprived of all her 
constitutional rights, and was not allowed 
reasonable access to her lawyer or her fami-
ly members. She was later released, and the 
Deputy Inspector General of Police issued a 
formal press statement that her release was 
unconditional because ‘the police was satis-
??????????????????????????????????????????????
and security.’
?????? ????????? ???????????????????? ????????
decision in Mohammad Ezam Mohd Nor & 
Ors v Inspector General of Police19 to apply 
????????????????????????????????????????????????
ISA, empowering police arrests and deten-
tions without warrant, the Court of Appeal 
????? ?????????? ???????????????????????? ?????
in any challenge to an administrative action 
or act, the courts are entitled to ‘objective-
ly scrutinize’ the exercise of power to see 
whether there exist reasonable grounds for 
the act or decision. This is notwithstand-
ing any subjective formulation in the pow-
er-conferring statute.20 The earlier case of 
Mohammad Ezam arose from an applica-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court 
of Appeal nonetheless held that the same 
18 [2016] 6 MLJ 352.
19 [2001] 1 MLJ 321 (Federal Court).
20 Ibid, [34].
21 Ibid, [69].
22 Ibid, [67].
objective test applied in determining a civil 
claim for damages for wrongful arrest and 
detention. Applying this test, the Court of 
Appeal adjudged that the police had ‘failed 
????????????????????????????????????????? ?-
??????? ??? ?????????? ????? ???? ?????????? ???????
… had reasonable and substantive grounds 
to support their belief that the arrest of the 
appellant was urgently required to meet the 
ends [prescribed under the statute]’.21 As the 
Court noted, the allegations were made sev-
eral months before the arrest, and therefore 
there was no immediate or imminent act or 
????????????????????????????????????????????????
to arrest and detain without a warrant. There 
was also no attempt by the police to conduct 
preliminary investigations into the allega-
tions before the arrest. Indeed, the Court 
of Appeal called into question the motives 
for the arrest and opined that they appeared 
to be for ‘a collateral or unrelated ulterior 
motive.’22 Consequently, the Court held for 
the appellant and granted not only general 
damages but also aggravated and exemplary 
damages against the police.
This decision is to be welcome as it ensures 
that executive action must be exercised law-
fully and that even though recourse to the 
courts for release may have been overtaken 
by events (e.g. release after a period of de-
tention), a further disciplining tool exists in 
the form of civil compensation.
CONCLUSION
It is impossible to claim that 2016 was an en-
couraging year for the Constitution and con-
stitutional law. Yet, even if political constitu-
tionalism and democratic institutions appear 
under threat (as they are in many places 
where they were thought quite secure), some 
cases in the courts show that there is still a 
judiciary whose decisions may on occasion 
support fundamental rights and constitution-
al values, even if they do so in an inconsis-
tent and sometimes problematical manner.
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MEXICO
INTRODUCTION
Taking a look at the developments in Mex-
ican Constitutional Law in 2016 illustrates 
well the transformation the justice system 
has gone through in the last decade, both 
procedurally and substantively; and, the 
complex social reality of the country. In only 
a decade, the criminal justice system was 
transformed of an inquisitorial to an accu-
satory model in 2008; long-standing proce-
dural rules of the individual constitutional 
complaint mechanism, the Juicio de Amparo 
(amparo suit), were modified in 2011; and, 
shortly after, human rights established in 
international treaties from which Mexico is 
part were incorporated as part of the consti-
tution. All of these changes place a bigger 
burden on the judiciary and particularly on 
the Mexican Supreme Court (hereinafter the 
Supreme Court or Court). As we will see in 
the following sections, one way or another 
these transformations are manifesting. The 
new criminal justice principles are collid-
ing with government interests to tackle se-
rious drug-related violence (Section III); the 
Supreme Court is extensively taking into 
account international human rights instru-
ments to adjudicate the increasing number of 
amparo suits in its docket (Sections II and 
IV); and the Court is often having to solve 
cases closely related to state surveillance and 
national security.         
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
COURT
The design of the Mexican constitutional 
justice system has become increasingly ro-
bust throughout constitutional history. The 
constitution of 1917 was born with a sub-
stantive charter of rights that included the 
social justice demands of the revolution and 
inherited the worldwide known individual 
constitutional complaints mechanism cre-
ated in the 9th century with American and 
European influences: the amparo suit. For 
almost 80 years, the amparo suit was virtu-
ally the only mechanism to bring constitu-
tional questions to the Supreme Court until 
1994 when, in the midst of the fall of the 
single-party hegemonic regime, the dormant 
controversias constitucionales (competence 
allocation mechanism) were modernized and 
the acciones de inconstitucionalidad (ab-
stract judicial review) were adopted. Both 
the competence allocation mechanism and 
abstract review are concentrated forms of 
review granting standing to a limited num-
ber of actors (i.e. the executive and legisla-
tive powers, the attorney general, legislative 
minorities, political parties, etc.), whereas 
the amparo suit is a semi-concentrated and 
concrete form of review granting standing 
to anyone who considers that their constitu-
tionally protected rights have been violated. 
Although the modernization and adoption of 
concentrated forms of judicial review have 
put the Court in a more prominent position 
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as an arbiter of political disputes, the amparo 
suit remains the only mechanism available 
for individuals to bring cases before the Su-
preme Court. 
????????????????????????????????????? ?????????
the Supreme Court is the highest authority 
for constitutional interpretation. Its member-
ship comprises 11 Justices appointed by the 
President (in charge of nominating) and the 
Senate (in charge of confirmation by a quali-
fied majority) to serve for 15-year terms. The 
Supreme Court convenes in en banc sessions 
(Pleno) three times a week and in two five-
judge panel sessions (First Chamber and 
Second Chamber) once a week. Yet, the two 
panels adjudicate the vast majority of cas-
?????????????????????????????????????????
suits. 
Through the amparo suit, individuals are able 
to challenge the constitutionality of statutes, 
legality of authority acts (amparo indirec-
to) and judicial decisions (amparo directo) 
in federal courts. Roughly speaking, ampa-
ro suits only reach the Court in the form of 
appeal when a constitutional question in the 
‘strict sense’ remains unanswered or if the 
Court deems a case important and transcen-
dent. Importantly, it has to be noted that as-
sessing the impact of Supreme Court rulings 
in amparo is a difficult task for two reasons: 
the effects of rulings and precedential rules. 
On the one hand, the effects of rulings are 
inter partes as opposed to erga omnes?
meaning that despite the declaration of un-
constitutionality of a norm in a given case, it 
remains valid for the rest of the population.1 
On the other hand, the amparo’s preceden-
tial system requires five rulings, all with the 
same outcome, to become binding on lower 
????????????? ???? ?????????? ???????? ??????
that constitutional questions are not neces-
sarily settled when the Supreme Court issues 
a decision. In this sense, the reader must bear 
in mind that, in our opinion, the selection of 
1?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
rulings declaring the same norm unconstitutional and previous warnings to Congress, the Supreme Court has the power to declare the unconstitutionality of 
the norm at hand. To this date, the Supreme Court has not exercised this power.
2 SCJN, CT 293/2011. For a thorough analysis of the decision-making of this case and others see: José Ramón Cossío, Raúl Mejía and Laura Rojas, La Con-
strucción De Las Restricciones Constitucionales A Los Derechos Humanos (Porrúa 2015).
3 In fact, this was incorporated by the Supreme Court as the rule in a declarative opinion (Expediente Varios 912/2010) issued in July 2011 shortly after the 
amendment to article 1. SCJN, Expediente Varios 912/2010, 14 July 2011, available at < http://fueromilitar.scjn.gob.mx/Resoluciones/Varios_912_2010.pdf>, 
accessed 10 April 2017. For a detailed analysis of the decision-making process of this opinion see: Ramón Cossío, Raúl Mejía and Laura Rojas, El Caso Ra-
dilla, Estudio y Documentos (Porrúa 2013).
cases in section IV below illustrates well re-
cent developments in constitutional law but 
does not imply an assessment on their impact 
on constitutional rights doctrine. 
In 2011 an amendment to article 1 of the 
constitution introduced major changes for 
constitutional interpretation on human rights 
matters. The amendment incorporated hu-
man rights treaties ratified by the Mexican 
State as part of the constitution, prohibiting 
any restriction or suspension of rights except 
on the cases and under the conditions pro-
vided by the constitution. Moreover, it estab-
lished the pro personae interpretative princi-
ple and the obligation of all state authorities, 
within the scope of their jurisdiction, to 
promote, respect, protect and guarantee hu-
man rights according to the principles of 
universality, interdependence, indivisibility 
and progressiveness. Normatively speaking, 
this amendment incorporated human rights 
established in treaties as part of the consti-
tution, except in a state of emergency (arti-
cle 29 of the constitution). Unfortunately, in 
a major setback of the amendment in 2014, 
in a 10 to 1 decision solving a circuit split 
(contradicción de tesis), the Supreme Court 
decided that any restriction established in a 
constitutional provision should prevail over 
human rights.2 In spite of this hindrance, in 
our opinion, the amendment has already had 
a noticeable impact on the resources Justices 
use to solve rights related cases. Today it 
is already a settled practice to establish the 
interpretative framework to include interna-
tional human rights law,3 a practice that 15 
years ago was virtually non-existent. 
DEVELOPMENTS AND  
CONTROVERSIES IN 2016 
The surge of violence related to drug traffick-
ing and organized crime has been the main 
public issue Mexico has faced in the last de-
cade. The federal government has increas-
ingly relied on the armed forces to act as the 
institutions in charge of most public security 
functions, which according to articles 21 and 
29 of the constitution should be in charge 
of civil authorities and only under a state of 
emergency could the military take control. 
???????? ?? ??????? ???????????? ??? ?? ?????? ???
emergency, what constitutionally is supposed 
to be the exception has become the rule. Re-
markably, in this period the Mexican state has 
also shown efforts aimed at signaling its com-
mitment to rights protection, namely through 
the adoption of constitutional reforms aimed 
at making the criminal justice system trans-
parent and rights protective; and better com-
ply with international human rights standards. 
The normalization of the use of the military 
for public security functions and the con-
stitutional reforms that have been adopted 
aimed at, arguably, transforming the justice 
system into one that fits into a true liberal 
democracy seem to be colliding. On the one 
hand, the government wants to provide the 
military with more power and discretion in 
order to efficiently tackle the problem of or-
ganized crime; but on the other hand, doing 
that would mean putting into question the re-
alization of true liberal democracy.        
 
The 2008 constitutional reform is a good 
example to illustrate the collision of govern-
ment interests. Promoted  as a measure to 
finally have a fair criminal justice system on 
the one hand, the reform substituted a closed, 
inquisitorial, mostly written model with an 
open, adversarial and oral model in order to 
foster transparency and efficiency; however, 
on the other hand, it created a regime of ex-
ception for the investigation and prosecution 
of organized crime (the type of crimes under 
which drug-related matters are prosecuted) 
where minimum standards of due process in 
the phase of investigation do not apply. 
In the 10 years since the war on drugs was 
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launched by the Federal Government in 2006, 
neither having the military on the streets nor 
the institutional mechanisms to make criminal 
investigation more efficient have delivered the 
expected results. As both academia and mass 
media have documented, the war on drugs has 
led to a substantial increase in violence lev-
els and human rights violations. The rise in 
homicide rates is, arguably, the most dramat-
ic proof of this change. These rates increased 
from 8.1 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 
2008 to 23.5 in 2011.4 As this shift has been 
even more noticeable in the states where the 
military has conducted public security tasks, 
the debate within and outside legislative are-
nas has been particularly focused on the role 
said institution should play in public security 
matters. This became a pressing issue partic-
ularly because in 2016 the Secretary of De-
fense, Gral. Salvador Cienfuegos, publicly 
declared a number of times that the military 
no longer wants to perform police functions, 
and explicitly asked for the Congress to issue 
a legal framework to regulate their activities.5 
  
Unsurprisingly, toward the end of 2016 and 
the beginning of 2017, three legislative bills 
were presented to propose the creation of a 
brand new piece of legislation on internal se-
curity aimed at regulating the participation 
of the military in public security functions. 
??????????????????????????????????????????????
presented in the Chamber of Deputies by 
the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party 
(PRI, its acronym in Spanish), and the other 
by the National Action Party (PAN, its acro-
nym in Spanish), the party in power when 
????????????????????????????????????????-
stitutionalize the role and broaden the power 
of the military in law enforcement. Roughly 
speaking, the bills provide a possibility to 
formally declare the existence of threats to 
the interior security, under which the mili-
tary is empowered to take over police and 
?????????????? ?????????????????? ??????????
individuals, conducting searches, conduct-
ing interrogations, intervene communica-
tions, etc.
 
4????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????
5 See ‘Que Las Tropas Regresen a Los Cuarteles, Dice Cienfuegos’ (El Universal) http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/articulo/nacion/seguridad/2016/12/8/
que-las-tropas-regresen-los-cuarteles-dice-cienfuegos accessed 15 April 2017; Cienfuegos: “El Ejército debe salir de las calles; fue un error entrar en esa 
guerra” (Sin Embargo) http://www.sinembargo.mx/16-03-2016/1636596 accessed 15 April 2017.
Those that defend the reform argue that it 
is just providing a legal framework to what 
has been happening on the ground for such 
a long time and establishing clear limits to 
the military. However, the reform has been 
widely criticized by the civil society and 
NGOs who argue that it is militarizing law 
enforcement in Mexico and following a 
strategy that has increased human rights vi-
olations and has not been an effective way 
of combating organized crime. The gov-
ernment is under pressure from two fronts: 
the conditional support of the military by 
the issuing of a statute providing a legal 
framework for their activities; and the re-
alization of the formal constitutional com-
mitments it has acquired aimed at building 
a state where human rights are protected. 
 
Should any of the bills or a mild version of 
them pass, it is feasible to think that soon-
er or later the Supreme Court would have 
to decide on the constitutionality of the 
new piece of legislation. It remains to be 
seen whether the Supreme Court would de-
cide to give preference to the government 
interest for wider discretion and powers 
to investigate and to prosecute organized 
crime or to the protection of human rights. 
 
MAJOR CASES
In the cases decided by the Supreme Court, 
two relevant trends are clearly identifiable. 
On the one hand, the extensive use of inter-
national human rights instruments to set the 
interpretative framework to decide cases; 
and on the other hand, an increasing number 
of rulings discussing the limits to surveil-
lance powers.
Use of International Instruments
Principle of Legality in Criminal Law – 
Amparo Directo en Revisión 2255/2015 
An individual challenged the ruling sentenc-
ing him to spend 10 months and 15 days in 
prison for committing the crime of insulting 
an authority provided in Article 287 of the 
Criminal Code of Mexico City. The Supreme 
Court sitting en banc struck down the provi-
sion on the basis that it went against the prin-
ciple of legal certainty as defined in Article 
14 of the Mexican Constitution and Article 9 
of the Inter-American Convention on Human 
Rights (ACHR). According to the analysis of 
the Court, the crime of insulting an authori-
ty left unclear what conduct would result in 
criminal prosecution. The most prominent 
aspect of this ruling is the strong emphasis 
placed on the interpretation of the principle 
of legality developed by the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights (ICoHR) in the cases 
of Fermin Ramirez v. Guatemala and Castil-
lo Petruzzi et al v. Peru. In Castillo Petruzzi 
et al v. Peru, the ICoHR interpreted Article 
9 saying:
121.The Court considers that crimes must 
be classified and described in precise and 
unambiguous language that narrowly 
defines the punishable offense, thus giv-
ing full meaning to the principle of nul-
lum crimen nulla poena sine lege prae-
via in criminal law. This means a clear 
definition of the criminalized conduct, 
establishing its elements and the factors 
that distinguish it from behaviors that 
are either not punishable offences or are 
punishable but not with imprisonment. 
Ambiguity in describing crimes creates 
doubts and the opportunity for abuse of 
power, particularly when it comes to as-
certaining the criminal responsibility of 
individuals and punishing their criminal 
behavior with penalties that exact their 
toll on the things that are most precious, 
such as life and liberty. 
This Supreme Court could have used exist-
ing interpretations of the principle of legality 
as developed by the Mexican Supreme Court 
but instead it opted for an interpretation de-
veloped by the ICoHR.  
Right to Private Life and Reparations – 
Amparo Directo en Revisión 3236/86 
An individual challenged a ruling by a Mex-
ico City Court of Appeals which found that 
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an individual was guilty of defamation but 
failed to condemn him to provide monetary 
compensation. In this case, the First Cham-
ber ruled that Articles 39, 40 and 41 of the 
Mexico City Law of Civil Responsibility to 
Protect the Rights to a Private Life, Honor 
and Self-Image were unconstitutional. This 
legal instrument provided a civil remedy 
for those individuals subject to defamatory 
statements. The Court ruled said provisions 
were unconstitutional for two reasons. First 
because they did not require monetary com-
pensation on all cases and second because 
they impose a limitation to the amount that 
could be paid. The Court ruled that these 
provisions were contrary to the compen-
sation regime found in Article 63.1 of the 
ACHR, which provides that
If the Court finds that there has been a 
violation of a right or freedom protect-
ed by this Convention, the Court shall 
rule that the injured party be ensured the 
enjoyment of his right or freedom that 
was violated. It shall also rule, if ap-
propriate, that the consequences of the 
measure or situation that constituted the 
breach of such right or freedom be rem-
edied and that fair compensation be paid 
to the injured party.
The Supreme Court interpreted Article 63.1 
directly and ruled that providing an effective 
remedy to a violation of convention rights 
required monetary compensation not subject 
to limitations. 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities – Acción 
de Inconstitucionalidad 33/2015 
In abstract review, the National Human 
Rights Commission challenged the consti-
tutionality of several articles in the Law for 
???? ??????????????????????????????????? ????
???? ?????????? ??????????? ???? ????????? ???
Autism. The Supreme Court upheld most of 
the articles, but the most interesting feature 
of this case is the substantive interpretation 
given to the International Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The Su-
preme Court by a majority of 10 to 1 ruled 
that Article 4.3 of said Convention imposed 
a substantive requirement to give meaningful 
participation to persons with disabilities be-
fore deciding on governmental policy or leg-
islation that affects them directly. A majority 
of 7 Justices found that in this case the re-
quirement had been complied with, but they 
pointed out that it would be better if this obli-
gation was regulated so authorities are aware 
of the requirements they need to comply with 
before passing legislation or implementing 
policies that affect persons with disabilities. 
There were 3 minority votes that considered 
that the legislation did not comply with the 
consultation requirement of Article 4.3 of the 
Convention and therefore the law should be 
struck down. This is another example of the 
Supreme Court making substantive interpre-
tations of international instruments that have 
an effect on the understanding of the require-
ments of the legislative process. 
Gender Equality – Amparo en Revisión 
59/2016 
In this case a married man who was denied 
day care service for his child challenged the 
constitutionality of Articles 201 and 205 of 
the Social Insurance Law for discrimination 
based on gender. The Second Chamber of the 
Supreme Court ruled that said provisions in 
fact were discriminatory and therefore un-
constitutional because they only gave the 
right to childcare to women workers. Ac-
cording to the Court, the Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
???????? ?????? ???????? ??? ??????????? ???
judge with a gendered perspective. There-
fore, adopting a gendered perspective, the 
Court found that this distinction was unjus-
tified particularly because it assigned roles 
based on gender stereotypes, resulting not 
only in the discrimination of men to access 
childcare service but also in an unduly affec-
tion to the child. This is another example of 
the Court adopting a substantive obligation 
from an international instrument. 
Right to Education – Amparo en Revisión 
750/2015
In this case, the First Chamber of the Su-
preme Court ruled that a Public Universi-
ty from the State of Michoacan could not 
charge registration fees because this would 
be a violation of the right to education of 
the plaintiffs. The Constitution of the State 
of Michoacán in its Article 138 had recently 
established the right to free higher education 
and an agreement was signed between the 
state government and the university which 
allowed this measure to be implemented for 
two years. However, the state government 
did not renew its funding commitment to the 
university, thus the latter started charging 
registration fees once again. The Court ruled 
that even though the right to access educa-
tion was not absolute, it was subject to the 
principle of progressiveness and could not 
be rolled back arbitrarily. Based on said 
principle, once a socioeconomic right is es-
tablished or recognized, any rollback should 
??? ???????? ??? ??????? ????????????????? ????
authority should prove both the lack of funds 
and efforts for the realization of the right at 
hand. To justify its interpretation, the Court 
made extensive references to internation-
al human rights instruments that define the 
right to education such as Article 13 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights and the interpretation of 
the progressiveness principle in relation to 
education developed in General Comments 
no. 11 and 13 developed by the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
Right to Equality (LGBTI Rights) – Amparo 
en Revisión 710/2016 
In this case a woman working for the state 
was denied the right to register her wife for 
social security benefits. Accordingly, the 
plaintiff challenged several provisions of the 
Social Services and Security for Government 
Employees Law based on which the registra-
tion denial was motivated on for discrimina-
tion based on sexual preference. The Second 
Chamber of the Supreme Court found that 
the use of heteronormative language to de-
fine the beneficiaries from social security 
resulted in an unconstitutional suspect clas-
sification against same-sex couples. This rul-
ing was uncontroversial and consistent with 
previous rulings made by the Supreme Court 
on the rights of same-sex couples. Just as in 
the set of cases included in this section, the 
Court once again relied extensively on rul-
ings from the ICoHR and on its interpreta-
tion of the ACHR, Article 24 and Article 1, 
in cases such as Espinoza Gonzáles v. Perú 
and Duque v. Colombia. 
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National Security
The Court was faced with national securi-
ty issues mainly in relation to the power of 
law enforcement agencies to wiretap private 
communications and the right to privacy.  
Geolocation without judicial warrant – 
Amparo Directo en Revisión 3886/2013
In this criminal case, the First Chamber de-
cided on the limits of the right to privacy and 
private communications. The defendant ar-
gued that the use of geolocation of the phone 
of the victim should be dismissed as evi-
dence in the trial in which he stood accused 
for kidnapping because, on the one hand, the 
victim had not authorized to reveal private 
communications and, on the other hand, this 
had been done without judicial warrant. In a 
3 to 2 decision, the Court found that when 
there is a criminal investigation in which 
there is reasonable suspicion of a real and 
imminent danger for the victim, the right to 
protect private communications is inapplica-
ble. Accordingly, in cases in which the au-
thority has reason to believe there is a real 
and imminent danger, then it can require, 
without judicial warrant, telecommunication 
companies for private communications in 
which the victim had intervened. In all other 
cases, the Court considered, a judicial au-
thorization is required to allow the police to 
access private communications for criminal 
investigations. 
Geolocation and Call Registry – Amparo en 
Revisión 964/2015 and 937/2015
In the other relevant case on the extent of 
powers to intervene private communications 
in the context of criminal investigations, the 
Second Chamber ruled on whether Articles 
189 and 190 of the Federal Radio and Tele-
communications Law violated their right to 
privacy as protected by Article 11 of ACHR. 
These articles imposed two requirements on 
telecommunication companies: to keep a 
registry with information on the communi-
cations of its users and to provide geoloca-
tion information when required to do so by 
law enforcement authorities. The Court ruled 
that the registry in itself was not unconstitu-
tional but that in order to get access to the 
 
6 See Acción de Inconstitucionalidad SCJN 32/2012.
information contained in it, the legislation 
had to be read as requiring judicial autho-
rization before any information was given. 
The other aspect of the law that was being 
challenged, which was the power of law en-
forcement agencies to get geolocation infor-
mation without judicial authorization, which 
was in line with existing precedent of the 
Court,6 was considered constitutional. 
Recurso de Revisión en Materia de Seguri-
dad Nacional 1/2016
This case was filed directly in the Supreme 
Court under a new judicial review instrument 
tailored for the legal advisor of the President 
to challenge resolutions of the INAI (an 
autonomous agency, whose decisions as a 
general rule are non-appealable for govern-
ment officials) ordering the disclosure of 
information when the President deems it 
affects national security. The individual had 
asked for information on the use of powers 
to wiretap private communications. The pe-
titioners asked from the Centre of Research 
and National Security the number of times it 
had asked for authorization from the federal 
judiciary to wiretap private communications, 
the number of times their petitions had been 
granted, how many had been denied and 
the number of persons or electronic devices 
which had been wiretapped in 2014. Even-
tually the decision reached the Transparency 
Institute, which ordered the disclosure of in-
formation, which in turn was challenged by 
the legal advisor of the President. The Court 
ruled 10 to 1 against the government and 
considered that disclosing the information 
required by the National Transparency Insti-
tute would not affect national security. The 
Court concluded that it is not possible to es-
tablish a general rule to determine what kind 
of information could be disclosed without 
endangering national security, leaving the 
issue to be decided on a case-by-case basis. 
????????????????????? ????????????????????????
that citizens file information disclosure peti-
tions on any issue the President considers to 
be related to national security, the disclosure 
of information would require a two-tiered 
process, one at the Transparency Institute 
and one at the Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION
The selection of cases decided by the Su-
preme Court for this report show interest-
ing aspects of constitutional adjudication in 
?????????????? ??? ??? ?????? ????? ???? ?????? ???
now consistently using international human 
rights instruments in delimiting interpreta-
tive frameworks to adjudicate rights-related 
cases, this does not necessarily mean one 
could argue the Court is becoming a more 
???????????? ??????????????? ??????????????????
a doubt, having Justices open to consider 
international law for their decision-making 
is not a minor feature for the development 
of constitutional law. However, we consider 
it is very important not to forget that, given 
the procedural complexities of the constitu-
tional justice system, in assessing the impact 
and consequences of a given case (especially 
in amparo) it is necessary to make more de-
tailed analyses that are beyond the scope of 
this report. As seen in the cases in Section 
IV above, one can see positive outcomes in 
terms of the right to equality (AR 710/2016 
and AR 59/2016) and to education (AR 
750/2015) but at the same time in the most 
basic (and pressing) issues as due process for 
the intervention of private communications, 
the Court has upheld the constitutionality of 
such interventions without a judicial war-
rant (AR 964/2015 and 937/2015). Put in a 
broader perspective, the latter is particular-
ly relevant to be aware of since it might be 
signalling the Court’s deference to rights-re-
strictive government policies when it comes 
to criminal law enforcement, an issue of par-
ticular importance given the pressing human 
rights crisis Mexico is in and the fact that as 
outlined in Section III will most likely keep 
returning to the Supreme Court’s docket.
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Myanmar
DEVELOPMENTS IN MYANMAR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Daw Hla Myo New, Justice of the Constitutional Tribunal
MYANMAR
INTRODUCTION
The constitution-building process in Myan-
mar is a long journey, like that of most other 
countries. It continues with time as Myanmar 
gains new historical and political experience. 
The most salient issues facing Myanmar re-
late to the struggle with internal armed con-
flict and insurgency that arose since its inde-
pendence.
In a modern democracy, the most important 
feature of a Constitution is mechanisms to 
strengthen popular participation in public 
life. Democracy should connote equality be-
tween the majority people and other national 
races. The participation of national races in 
social justice, protection of human rights, 
and political, administrative, and economic 
concentration is imperative. The Tribunal, 
or Constitutional Court, by recognizing the 
legal norms and sources of law, provides the 
opportunity for minorities to preserve their 
own traditional norms, values, and practices. 
The core function of the Tribunal is to stabi-
lize the constitutional order in an ethnically 
diverse society. 
The constitutional recognition of the free-
dom of belief, religion of every individual, 
and the prohibition of discrimination is a 
paramount guarantee against the possible 
negative impact of a state religion or the pre-
dominance of religion in one country. 
The independence and impartiality of the 
judiciary at large enhances the credibility 
and trust in the Tribunal. Strong institution-
al legitimacy of the Tribunal then promotes 
the “pull” of the Constitution as well as its 
integrity.
CONSTITUTION AND THE 
COURT
The Constitutional Tribunal of the Union, the 
very first of its kind in Myanmar, was estab-
lished in 2011 along with a series of demo-
cratic transitions after the country had been 
under military rule for nearly three decades. 
It started to function on March 30, 2011.
The extent of review powers as well as the 
institutional design of constitutional review 
varies greatly around the world. Of the clas-
sical distinction of decentralized (or “dif-
fuse”) and concentrated (or “specialized”) 
judicial review, Myanmar utilizes the latter, 
?????? ??????? ??????? ?????? ?????? ???? ????
Myanmar, a newly democratic state, views 
constitutional review as a cornerstone of 
judicial power. This power entails the im-
plementation of the rule of law and acts as a 
check on the action of the executive branch 
in accord with constitutional guarantees and 
fundamental rights. The objective is to up-
hold constitutional principles against any 
legislation or other governmental action that 
might contravene them. The Constitution 
endows the Constitutional Tribunal with the 
power to settle disputes between the Union, 
regions, and self-administered areas, as well 
as among them. The Tribunal evaluates, in 
judicial proceedings, legislation and other 
governmental acts to ensure that they com-
ply with the Constitution (Section 322 of the 
Constitution). The Tribunal is thus explicitly 
mandated to examine the constitutionality of 
law.
Constitutions vary on the timing and cir-
cumstances of review. The Myanmar Con-
stitutional Tribunal may entertain a legal 
challenge only after the enactment of a legis-
lation (ex-post review). There are, of course, 
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advantages and disadvantages to both 
pre-enactment constitutional review and 
ex-post constitutional review. But ex-post 
constitutional review allows the Tribunal to 
scrutinize a challenged legislation with full-
er information about its effects in real social 
situations. The Constitutional Tribunal of 
Myanmar, therefore, exercises constitutional 
review only in the context of a specific case 
or controversy. In other words, review takes 
place when a petitioner submits a dispute or 
complaint directly to the Tribunal, alleging a 
violation of the Constitution or its interpre-
tation. The Tribunal acts only on petitions 
brought by authorized individuals or other 
branches of government. 
Constitutional Review in Myanmar in History
Myanmar (formerly known as Burma) re-
gained independence from the British Em-
pire on January 4, 1948. Myanmar has had 
three constitutions since then, namely the 
Constitution of the Union of Burma (1947); 
the Constitution of the Socialist Republic 
of the Union of Myanmar (1974); and the 
Constitution of the Republic of the Union of 
Myanmar (2008), which is currently in force. 
Parliament democracy was instituted in 
Myanmar after independence in accordance 
with the Constitution of the Union of Bur-
ma (1947), which was revoked in 1962 in a 
military coup. In 1974, the Constitution of 
the Socialist Republic of the Union of Myan-
mar entered into force through a referendum. 
From 1974 to 1988, the country was under 
the regime of the Myanmar Socialist Pro-
gram Party as a one-party state. The Consti-
tution of the Socialist Republic of the Union 
of Myanmar was revoked after a military 
coup.1 The idea of establishing a separate 
constitutional authority did not appear in ei-
ther of the two earlier constitutions, although 
the constitutional jurisdiction effectively 
was vested in the Supreme Court according 
to the 1947 Constitution of the Union of Bur-
ma. Its section 151(1) read:
(1) If any time it appears to the President 
that a question of law has arisen, or is 
likely to arise, which is of such a na-
ture and of such public importance that 
1 The military-based State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) suspended the 1974 Constitution upon taking power in 1988.
it is upon it, he may refer the questions 
to that Court for consideration, and the 
Court may, after such hearing as it thinks 
fit, report to the President thereon.
(2) No reports shall be made under this sec-
tion save in accordance with an opinion 
delivered in open Court with the concur-
rence of a majority of the judges present 
at the hearing of the case, but nothing in 
this sub-section shall be deemed to pre-
vent a judge who does not concur from 
delivering a dissenting opinion.
Subject to this proviso, the President could 
seek a legal opinion of the Supreme Court 
on any constitutional problem concerning 
the Constitution by a referral. Under the 
1947 Constitution, the Supreme Court was 
granted additional powers to implement the 
Constitution if was deemed necessary by the 
Parliament (Section 153):
The Parliament may make provision by 
an Act for conferring upon the Supreme 
Court such supplemental powers not 
inconsistent with any of the provisions 
of this Constitution as may appear to be 
necessary or desirable for the purpose of 
enabling the Court more effectively to 
exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon 
it or under this Constitution.
Section 4 of the Union Judiciary Act gave 
expansive powers to the Supreme Court to 
supervise “over all courts in the Union.” The 
Supreme Court could on its own motion or if 
a case was submitted to it, revise and correct 
any court decision within the Union contrary 
to the extant legislation. Moreover, section 
25 of the Constitution gave citizens access to 
the Supreme Court to seek the protection of 
their rights by submitting writs. The Supreme 
Court was, therefore, empowered to check the 
constitutionality of the activities of the judi-
ciary and executive against the Constitution:
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court 
by appropriate proceeding for the en-
forcement of any of the rights conferred 
by this Chapter is hereby guaranteed.
???? ????????????????????????????????????
may be vested in this behalf in other 
Courts, the Supreme Court shall have 
the power to issue directions in the na-
ture of habeas corpus, mandamus, pro-
hibition, quo warranto and certiorari 
appropriate to the rights guaranteed in 
this Chapter.
(3) The right to enforce these remedies 
shall not be suspended unless, in times 
of war, invasion, rebellion, insurrection 
or grave emergency, the public safety 
may so require.
However, with the new Revolutionary Gov-
ernment, the Pyithu Hluttaw (People’s Par-
liament) became authorized to review and 
decide on constitutional issues. Section 200 
and Section 201 of the 1974 Socialist Consti-
tution read as follows:
Section 200
(a) In interpreting the expressions contained 
in this Constitution, reference shall be 
made to the interpretation Law promul-
gated by the Revolutionary Council of 
the Union of Burma.
(b) Amendments to and further interpreta-
tion of expressions contained in the law 
mentioned in Clause (a) shall only be 
made by the Pyithu Hluttaw. (Peoples’ 
Parliament)
(c) The validity of the acts of the Council of 
State, or of the Central or Local Organs 
of State Power under this Constitution 
shall only be determined by the Pyithu 
Hluttaw. (Peoples’ Parliament) 
Section 201
The Pyithu Hluttaw (Peoples’ Parlia-
ment) may publish interpretation of this 
Constitution from time to time as may 
be necessary.
In 1993, the military government organized 
a National Convention with the aim of draft-
ing a democratic constitution. It was ceased 
for nearly three years but resumed in 1996. 
The Convention came to a successful end in 
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2007 when it fully drafted the Constitution 
of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar. 
The Constitution was then adopted in a na-
tional referendum on May 29, 2008. The 
Constitution includes a total of 15 Chapters, 
457 Sections, and 5 Schedules. A separate 
constitutional authority named the Consti-
tutional Tribunal of the Union, composed of 
9 members, including a Chairperson who is 
chosen by the President and Speakers of two 
houses of Parliament, was established to ex-
ercise constitutional review jurisdiction.
Access to the Tribunal
A constitutional matter may be directly sub-
mitted to the Tribunal by the President of the 
Union; the Speaker of the Pyidaungsu Hlut-
taw (Union Parliament); the Speaker of the 
Pyithu Hluttaw (Peoples’ Parliament); the 
Speaker of Amyotha Hluttaw (National Par-
liament); the Chief Justice of the Union; and 
the Chairperson of the Union Election Com-
mission to obtain a constitutional interpreta-
tion, resolution, or an opinion of the Tribunal 
pursuant to Section 325 of the Constitution. 
In addition to those individuals, the Chief 
Minister of the Region or State, the Speaker 
of the Region or State Hluttaw (Parliament), 
the Chairperson of the Self-Administered 
Division Leading Body or the Self-Admin-
istered Zone Leading Body, and at least 10 
percent of all MPs of the Pyithu Hluttaw, or 
Amyotha Hluttaw, may submit a matters to 
the Tribunal to obtain an interpretation, res-
olution, or opinion in compliance with the 
prescribed manners (Section 326).
Individuals or institutions who may not pe-
tition the Tribunal directly due to procedural 
hurdles, shall do so indirectly through a state 
official such as the President of the Union, or 
Speakers of both houses of Parliament, and 
others who have the right to submit matters 
to the Tribunal directly. A private individu-
al cannot bring a case to the Tribunal. But a 
general court may do so if a question arises 
to the constitutionality of a legislative act 
or provision, in a case or controversy, and 
the Tribunal has not decided on the subject 
2 Ibid, s 323.
3 Ibid, s 324.
4 Submission No.2/2011, Rulings of the Constitutional Tribunal (2011) 63.
5 Submission No.2/2012, Rulings of the Constitutional Tribunal (2012) 31.
matter before. The concerned general court 
must stay the trial and submit a question to 
the Constitutional Tribunal. The resolution 
of the Tribunal of the dispute applies to all 
cases.2
???????????????????????????????? ?????????????
Chairperson sets up a scrutiny body propor-
tionally composed of three members from 
among those elected by the President of the 
Union and the Speaker of both houses of 
???????????? ???????????????????????????????
with required documents, the scrutiny body 
reports it to the Tribunal for a hearing. The 
case is heard in a plenary session. If it is not 
possible to be heard in a plenary session be-
cause of the absence of one member or other 
credible reasons, it must be heard by at least 
six members including the Chairperson. The 
hearings of the Tribunal are before public 
except in cases bearing on state secrets or 
security of the Union. 
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conclusive.3 Resolutions, interpretations, 
and opinions of the Constitutional Tribunal 
are published in the Union Gazette and pub-
lished annually as the rulings to be quoted as 
??????????????????????????????? ?????????????
of resolutions are unavailable. 
CASES AND CONTROVERSIES
The Tribunal decides few cases in compar-
ison to constitutional courts and similar in-
stitutions in other jurisdictions. Since its es-
tablishment in 2011, a total of 14 cases have 
been brought before the Tribunal. This could 
be attributed to the fact that:
(a) The Tribunal is a newly established in-
stitution, formed only in 2011.
(b) It is not vested with a power to entertain 
individual complaints.
(c) The access to the Tribunal is subject to 
detailed conditions.
(d) Public and state institutions lack rele-
vant knowledge about the Tribunal.
(e) Referral cases by an ordinary court seek-
ing constitutional interpretation can be 
made through the Supreme Court only 
(one case had been referred since 2011).
(f) ?????????????? ???????????????????? ????
the Tribunal.
 
In one case, the Tribunal decided that a pro-
vision in the law of Emoluments, Allowanc-
?????????????????????????????????????????????
of the Regions/States was unconstitutional, 
since the Ministers of National Races Affairs 
have equal status with the Ministers of the 
Region/States and they should be, therefore, 
entitled to the same rights and privileges. 
The Tribunal also declared once that the 
decision of the executive was not in accord 
with the Constitution. There was also a case 
????????????????????????????????????????????
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the General Administrative Department of 
the Ministry of Home Affairs.4 
In one case, the Attorney General petitioned 
the Tribunal to review its own decision in 
a case that concerned the Civil Procedure 
Code, the Criminal Code, and the Evidence 
Act. The Tribunal opined that neither the 
Constitution nor the Tribunal Law allows an 
interpretation that there is a right of appeal or 
review of its own decisions.5 
There were also cases seeking the interpre-
tation of the Constitution. In a case indirect-
ly related to the electoral rules, the Tribunal 
held that the rules determined the power al-
located to the Union Election Commission. 
The biggest challenge to the Tribunal posed 
the question on the status of Committees, 
Commissions, and Bodies formed by each 
Hluttaw (Parliament). At issue was whether 
these bodies ought to be regarded as Union 
Level work to Union Level Organization 
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was unconstitutional.6 This case led to the 
resignation of all members of the Tribunal, 
including the Chairperson, from their post. 
??????????????????????????????????????????-
cations from the Tribunal whether they shall 
exercise the legislative powers entrusted to 
them under Schedules II and III of the Con-
stitution before a repeal or amendment of the 
extant Union laws.
Cases submitted during 2011-2016 by type:
2011 - Separation of Power     1
         - Constitutional Interpretation     2
2012 - Constitutional Interpretation     3
2013 - Constitutional Interpretation     1
2014 - Constitutional Interpretation     5
2015 - Constitutional Interpretation     1
2016 - Constitutional Interpretation     1
   
   Total     14
MAJOR CASES
In 2016, only one case was brought before 
the Tribunal. On March 30, 2016, a new 
??????????? ??????????????????????????????
of the Tribunal were replaced by new ones 
chosen by the President, the Speaker of the 
People’s Parliament, and the Speaker of the 
National Parliament, respectively, as their 
terms expired, according to the Constitution. 
In the selection process and subsequent ap-
proval of the candidates in the Union Parlia-
ment, two were challenged. The two candi-
?????? ????????? ???? ??????????? ?????? ??? ????
provision: “(iv) person who is, in the opinion 
of the President, an eminent jurist,” may be 
selected as a member of the Constitutional 
Tribunal. However, they failed to meet other 
requirements for the position and, most im-
portantly, were candidates of the Speakers.7 
Despite the challenge, they were approved as 
new members of the Tribunal. 
6 Submission No.1/2012, ibid 1.
7 See s. 333(d) of the Constitution: (ii) person who has served as a Judge of the High Court of the Region
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
least 10 years not lower than that of the Region or State level; or (iii) person who has practiced as an Advocate for at least 20 years.
8 s. 237(a)(iv)(dd).
9 s. 239(a)(iv)(dd).
10 s. 244(a)(iv)(cc).
11 s. 301(d)(iv).
12 s.310(d)(iii).
Twenty-three representatives of the National 
Parliament put forward a submission calling 
on the Tribunal to interpret the provision 
of Section 333, Subsection (iv) of the Con-
??????????? ???? ???? ???????????? ???????????
????????????????????????????????????????????
in the opinion of the President, an eminent 
jurist” does not apply only to members of the 
Tribunal who were selected by the President 
of the Union. Pursuant to Article 4(b) of the 
Law of the Constitutional Tribunal, the Pres-
ident may select a person as a member of the 
Tribunal if the candidate is an eminent jurist, 
???????????????????????????????????????????-
tion. The MPs argued that the selection was 
unconstitutional. 
The core question was whether the “eminent 
jurist” exception only applies to judicial ap-
pointments by the President. The Tribunal 
??????????? ???? ?????? ??????????????????????
necessary to take into account the entire 
Constitution in context. Sections on the ap-
pointment of the Union Attorney General;8 
the Deputy Union Attorney General;9 the 
Auditor General;10 the Chief Justice and As-
sociate Judges of the Supreme Court;11 and 
??????????????????????????????????????????-
tice and Judges of the High Court of the Re-
gion or State12 all include similar clauses that 
empower the President of the Union to use 
??????????????????????????????????????????????
discretion pertains to the last stage of the se-
lection process, where the candidates for the 
Constitutional Tribunal, after being selected 
by the two Speakers and the President, are 
appointed to the bench. Another reason was 
that the President is entrusted with this priv-
ilege as he is the head of state as well as the 
executive. It would be unconstitutional if 
it were restricted that the President had the 
power to exercise discretion to appoint the 
?????????????????????
On the other hand, it was clear after review-
ing the whole submission that it was asking 
the Tribunal to accede to the applicants’ in-
terpretation rather than requesting the inter-
pretation of the Tribunal. The judges thus 
held that the submission was incompatible 
with the Constitution, and it was dismissed.  
CONCLUSION
The Tribunal has confronted some challeng-
es since its establishment. Some commenta-
tors argue that certain constitutional rights 
are absolute, but others are of the view that 
rights, such as the right to free expression, 
????????????????????????????????????????????-
anteed only insofar as their exercise is not 
contrary to the laws enacted for security of 
the Union, law and order, and community 
??????? ????? ???????? ????????? ?????? ????-
ence of the executive on the judiciary, and 
emphasize the importance of judicial inde-
pendence and access to courts, while again 
others argue that access to justice should re-
main exclusive.
The Constitutional Tribunal for its part ap-
plies law to everyone in a fair and consistent 
manner. The Tribunal is committed to the 
principle of impartiality. It tries to promote 
clarity and consistency across the judicial 
process, because coherent legal doctrine 
makes the exercise of justice transparent. 
Transparent and properly functioning judi-
ciary in turn enhances the quality of the rule 
of law.
????????????????????????????????????????????-
sive legislation, the Union Parliament prior-
itizes review and abolition of such old laws. 
The Parliament must enact legal framework 
capable to withstand scrutiny and not mis-
use its power. One of the important functions 
of the Constitutional Tribunal is to protect 
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people’s fundamental rights and promote 
democracy. An appropriate balance in the 
choice of legislative schemes can improve 
the functioning of the government and im-
prove the legitimacy of the actions of all 
branches. Judicial independence leads to the 
rule of law, which forces the impartiality. It 
is also essential to the protection of funda-
mental rights and other constitutional guar-
antees. 
It is necessary for the Constitutional Tribu-
nal to engage in outreach and disseminate 
information about its role, functions, and de-
cision-making. State institutions and citizens 
must have wide knowledge about the Tribu-
nal and how to access it in their pursuit of 
justice. The Constitutional Tribunal is trying 
to share information about its activity and to 
????????????????????????????????????????
???? ?????????? ???? ????????? ????????????????
protection and promotion of fundamental 
rights of citizens is more likely to succeed 
if the constitutional provisions are clear-
ly formulated within a given constitutional 
framework. The effective guarantee of con-
stitutional rights shall be based on the rule of 
law, and it is characterized by foreseeability, 
accessibility, accountability, separation of 
powers as well as recognition and protection 
of the rights of every person. 
It is of this view that the courts should have 
a reputation of being independent, impar-
?????? ?????????? ???? ????????????? ???? ????????
quality. Access both physical and to legal 
assistance to the courts also plays an import-
ant role. Finally, it is necessary to ascertain 
that the bodies protecting the constitutional 
??????? ??? ????????? ???? ????????? ???????????-
nancial, human, and technical resources. 
Since the mandate of the Tribunal does not 
reach to individual complaints, the Union 
Supreme Court has an important role in pro-
moting and protecting citizens’ constitution-
al rights. A citizen whose rights and liberties, 
recognized by the Constitution have been 
violated petition the Supreme Court (writs 
system). The right to petition the Court is, 
however, subject to the exhaustion of other 
available legal remedies. The citizen, a party 
to a dispute, can also request the Supreme 
Court to make a referral to the Constitutional 
Tribunal (the so-called incidental attack on 
constitutionality) for a ruling that a conten-
tious provision of law affecting a resolution 
of the case is contrary to or inconsistent with 
the Constitution.
Another constitutional mechanism of the 
Union Supreme Court that contributes to the 
protection of constitutional rights is its man-
date to receive and consider complaints to 
submit amicus briefs, or recommendations 
to bring cases before the courts on behalf of 
the alleged violation of other constitutional 
rights. Presently, the National Human Rights 
Commission has also gained public trust as 
an independent institution to promote cit-
izens’ rights. The rule of law and constitu-
tionalism are in this sense a joint project to 
which all state institutions must positively 
contribute.
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Netherlands
DEVELOPMENTS IN LITHUANIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Nick Efthymiou, Erasmus University Rotterdam; Roel de Lange, Erasmus University 
Rotterdam 
NETHERLANDS
INTRODUCTION
???????? ????????????? ?? ???? ???? ???? ? ???????
picture of the Constitution of the Kingdom 
of the Netherlands, with a focus on the 
absence of constitutional review of primary 
legislation by the courts. Secondly we will 
discuss two issues that were important in 
constitutional developments in 2016. These 
are a referendum on an EU Association 
Agreement with Ukraine and a court case 
involving climate change. They illustrate 
major issues in Dutch constitutional law. The 
Netherlands does not have a constitutional 
court, so in this respect our contribution will 
differ from most other country reports.
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
Article 115, par. 2 of the Dutch Constitution 
as revised in 1848 introduced the formula 
that ‘statutes are inviolable’. The Hoge Raad 
(Supreme Court) of the Netherlands judged 
in 1961 that this wording (then Article 
131, par. 2) meant that it had no power to 
oversee the constitutionality of a certain 
Act of Parliament, including the procedural 
aspects. The appellant had claimed that this 
Act was not in fact an Act of Parliament 
because it had never been approved in 
a proper manner and according to the 
appropriate constitutional procedural rules. 
The Hoge Raad ruled that it had to assume 
that the legislature itself had considered 
the constitutionality of the Act including 
compliance with the provisions regarding 
legislative procedure, and that courts have 
no power to second-guess the interpretation 
that the legislature itself had given to the 
Constitution. Article 131, second paragraph, 
intended to protect primary legislation 
against constitutional review by the courts. 
It has always been uncontroversial that this 
did not apply to all other types of legislation, 
such as delegated legislation by statutory 
instruments, municipal legislation, by-laws 
enacted by professional and economic public 
authorities, and ministerial legislation. All of 
these types of rules could be constitutionally 
reviewed by all courts. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, proposals 
were made to revise the Dutch Constitution, 
??????????????????????????????????????????
the Revision of the Constitution to include 
judicial constitutional review of primary 
legislation. There was some academic 
support for this, and the Hoge Raad also 
appeared to be sympathetic to the idea. Most 
of the proposals considered constitutional 
review by ordinary courts, in parallel to 
their powers with regard to the effect of 
international law in the Dutch legal order. A 
separate, specialized constitutional court was 
hardly ever considered.
However, little support was found for this in 
political circles.  
??????????? ????????????? ??? ???? ?????
of human rights led to a further shift in 
opinion among lawyers. Early observers 
of fundamental rights protection and its 
potential functions had already noted that the 
need for judicial protection of fundamental 
rights would increase if the government 
became more and more dominant in its 
relationship to Parliament, even to the 
extent that parliamentary participation 
in primary legislation was no more than 
symbolic because majority coalitions in 
Parliament would most often just give their 
blessings to legislative proposals from the 
government rather than seeing themselves as 
co-legislators.
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From 1976 onwards, since the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found 
???? ????? ?????????? ??? ???? ????? ??? ????
Netherlands in the case of Engel,1 Dutch 
lawyers became accustomed to breaches in 
the inviolability of Acts of Parliament. 
????? ??????????????????? ?????????? ??????????
on the revision of the Constitution which 
led to the revised Constitution of 1983. The 
government’s proposal to replace article 
131, second paragraph by the more modern 
wording of article 120 was accepted: ‘The 
courts shall not review the constitutionality 
of Acts of Parliament (statutes) and Treaties’. 
Did this exclude judicial review of primary 
legislation against fundamental unwritten 
principles of law? 
In the cause célèbre, which is the case 
of the Harmonisatiewet,2 the Hoge Raad 
concluded that the limits that followed from 
the ‘traditional place of the judiciary within 
the political system’ prevented constitutional 
review of primary legislation against 
fundamental principles of law. 
THE CONSTITUTION TODAY
This settled the issue of the scope of the new 
article 120 of the Constitution. Courts were 
not allowed to review the constitutionality of 
statutes, neither with regard to their content 
nor to the legislative procedure, and this 
included a review in the light of unwritten 
fundamental constitutional principles.
An important assumption is that the 
legislature itself has a keen eye for issues 
of constitutionality. In practice this turns 
???????? ??????? ?????? ?????????? ???????????
???? ?????????? ???? ??????????????? ???? ?????
of fundamental  rights. There is probably 
room for improvement in a procedural and 
1 ECHR 8 June 1976 (Plenary), Appl. No. 5100/71 a.o., Engel and others v The Netherlands. 
2 Hoge Raad 14 april 1989.
3 The directly elected chamber is called the Second Chamber.
4 ECHR 28 September 1995, Appl. No. 14570/89 Procola v Luxembourg.
5 De Wet 2008. 
6?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????
7 Gerards 2011:58 sq.
8 ECJ 8 april 2014, joined cases C-293/12 & C-594/12: the Directive on data retention was declared invalid by the ECJ. Following this judgment, national 
legislatures have to react speedily, or cases will be brought before the national courts. E.g. Provisional Court The Hague, Judgment of 11 March 2015, 
ECLI:RBDHA:2015:2498.
a substantive way. Advisory bodies pay 
attention to constitutionality of legislative 
proposals, but Parliament is not obliged to 
follow this advice. There is a role here also 
for the indirectly elected First Chamber of 
Parliament.3 
The Rise of the ECHR
The Engel case, mentioned above, concerned 
military disciplinary law, and the violation 
was only minor. Nevertheless, this alerted 
Dutch lawyers of the potential of the 
ECHR as a standard for review of primary 
legislation. On the basis of article 94 of the 
Constitution, norms of every hierarchical 
status can be reviewed against the ECHR, 
and the awareness of this Convention in the 
Dutch courts increased. The 1985 Benthem 
judgment of the ECtHR gave a new impulse 
to the constitutional effects of the ECHR in 
the Netherlands. The arrangement of appeal 
in administrative cases was revised, the 
Council of State was restructured, and the 
scope of judicial review was expanded under 
???? ????????? ??? ???????? ?? ??????????? ????
extended even further by the 1995 judgment 
in the case of Procola, a case concerning the 
Luxembourg Council of State which bears a 
strong resemblance to its Dutch counterpart.4 
In the Netherlands it has had a strong impact 
at an institutional level. In the course of 25 
years, the Dutch Council of State was more 
or less completely restructured. 
In other areas, the ECHR proved equally 
important. Freedom of speech, protection of 
family life, detention regimes, and the law 
of criminal procedure, all saw judgments 
by the ECtHR with strong impact on the 
Netherlands.5
The ECHR grew increasingly important 
and the Constitution lost part of its impact 
???? ???? ???????????? ??? ?????? ?????????? ????
impact of the ECHR functions as a ‘bypass’ 
for the lack of judicial constitutional review 
of primary legislation. That said, it happens 
only exceptionally that a piece of primary 
legislation is found to violate ECHR law. 
More often, the complaints before the 
Strasbourg court concern administrative 
action, sometimes court decisions.
???? ?????? ?????????? ??????? ???? ??????
authoritative’ interpreter of the Convention,6 
and the Netherlands takes that seriously. In 
practice, this means that the cases concerning 
all countries are relevant.
Constitutional Fundamental Rights and 
Treaty Rights
Due to the rise of the ECHR, the fundamental 
rights in the Constitution have become less 
important in practice. A striking example is 
the protection of property rights: art. 14 of 
the Constitution now only protects against 
certain forms of arbitrary expropriation 
without compensation, whereas art. 1 First 
Protocol (‘A1P1’) gives a much broader 
protection.7 
In 2010, the Staatscommissie Grondwet 
????????? ??????????? ??? ???? ??????????????
published recommendations to strengthen 
the constitution by incorporating treaty law, 
e.g. the rights of access to justice, freedom 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
communication. In 2016, the government 
presented a legislative proposal to introduce 
a provision on access to the courts into the 
Constitution. This bill is still pending. 
Privacy protection also is mainly a matter 
of treaty law (now including the Charter on 
Fundamental Rights of the EU).8 
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Interpretation in Conformity with Higher 
Law
In practice, rather than ‘disapplying’ national 
???????????????????????????????????????????????
treaty law, courts prefer interpretation of 
national law in conformity with treaty 
law. In itself, this is a familiar part of the 
canon of interpretation, as we can see from 
the German examples in interpretation in 
conformity with the Constitution and the 
British example of the Human Rights Act 
(courts should interpret and apply national 
law in conformity with the ECHR ‘so far 
as it is possible to do so’), as well as from 
the European Court of Justice’s case-law in 
the Marleasing line. In the Dutch context, 
some spectacular examples can be found 
??? ?????????????????? ??? ???? ???????? ??? ?????
interpretation in conformity avoids the 
irreversibility problem: if a Dutch court 
would disapply a statutory provision, the 
???????????????????????????????? ??? ??????? ????
provision.9 Interpretation in conformity 
seems to leave more room for dialogue, 
both between courts and the legislature, and 
between national and European courts.10 The 
courts strive for consistency and a ‘treaty-
conform’ result.11 
MAJOR CASES
Climate Change: The Urgenda Judgment 
The Dutch corporation Urgenda (a contrac-
tion of Urgent Agenda) advocates sustain-
ability and innovation. In 2012, Urgenda 
requested the Dutch government to reduce 
Dutch greenhouse gas emissions in 2020 by 
??????????????????????????? ?????????? ????
the government did not meet the request, 
Urgenda started a lawsuit against the Dutch 
state in 2013. On 24 June 2015, the Dutch 
district court (rechtbank) at The Hague issued 
its ruling (ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7145). It 
ruled that the state acted unlawfully towards 
Urgenda because of its climate policy. It also 
 
9 Donner 1982.
10 De Lange 2005.
11 See also De Wit 2012. 
12 See e.g. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jun/24/dutch-government-ordered-cut-carbon-emissions-landmark-ruling and Lord Carnwath’s 
speech about Climate change and the courts, held on 26 November 2015. See also Roel Schutgens, Urgenda en de trias (Urgenda and the separation of 
powers), NJB 2015/1675, (p. 2270-2277). 
13 The Dutch state referred to Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) jurisprudence to argue the latter point. See HR 21 March 2003, ECLI:NL:HR:20083:AE8462 
(Waterpakt) and HR 1 October 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AO8913 (Faunabescherming/Provincie Fryslan). 
14 See Roel Schutgens, Urgenda en de trias (Urgenda and the separation of powers), NJB 2015/1675, (p. 2270-2277). 
ordered the state to reduce Dutch greenhouse 
gas emissions in 2020 by at least 25% in 
comparison with 1990. 
In September 2015 the state appealed against 
the ruling. On 9 April 2016 it sent its state-
ment of grounds of appeal to the appeal court 
(gerechtshof) at The Hague. The procedure 
before this court will start in 2017. 
The Urgenda judgment led to many reactions, 
even outside the Netherlands.12 In the Neth-
erlands, many constitutional lawyers wrote 
about the judgment. From a constitutional 
point of view, the judgment is highly relevant 
for the idea of separation of powers (trias po-
litica in Dutch legal parlance). 
In its judgment, the district court remarked 
on separation of powers (paragraphs 4.94-
4.102). It acknowledged that a central issue 
in the judgment was whether ordering the 
state to reduce emissions thwarted the sepa-
ration of powers (4.94). It stressed that there 
is no complete separation of powers in the 
Dutch legal system. Courts are sometimes 
obliged to judge the acts of democratically 
legitimized political institutions. However, 
when such acts entail policy considerations 
of divergent interests concerning the organi-
zation of society, judicial restraint or absti-
??????????????????????????????????????????
asking the court to order the state to cut 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
However, the claim was not outside the do-
main of the courts. Urgenda asked legal pro-
tection and courts should offer this, although 
the issue of emissions involved political de-
cision-making (4.98). The court also stated 
that the facts on which the state and Urgenda 
agreed necessitated wider action by the state 
(4.99). According to the court, Urgenda’s 
claim did not amount to an order to the state 
??? ????? ???????? ???????????? ??? ??????? ???-
sures. Should the court order the state to cut 
Dutch emissions, the state would still be free 
to decide in which way it would act (4.101). 
The district court concluded that separation 
of powers was no obstacle for ordering the 
state to cut emissions, as the state would still 
have discretion (4.102). 
In paragraph 15 of its statement of grounds 
of appeal, the state argued that separation of 
powers was in fact an obstacle for the court 
order. The Urgenda claim concerned Dutch 
climate policy. This policy involved many 
policy and political considerations, so courts 
should exercise restraint (15.1, 15.12, and 
15.13). Another reason for restraint was that 
the order to cut emissions had consequences 
for natural and legal persons who were not a 
party in the proceedings (15.4). Because of 
this, the district court ought not to have giv-
en the order it did (15.5). The state further 
argued that a cut in Dutch emissions could 
only be achieved through acts of Parliament. 
This made the court order an order for legis-
lation, which courts are not allowed to give 
(15.14).13 
Constitutional lawyers were not always 
positive about the judgment. According to 
Roel Schutgens, professor of jurisprudence 
at Radboud University Nijmegen, the dis-
trict court went too far. The court did not 
???? ?????????? ?????????? ??? ???? ??????????? ???
the Dutch government in matters of climate 
policy. The actual policy of the government 
amounted to a reduction of Dutch emissions 
in 2020 by 20% in comparison with 1990. 
The court ought only to have given the order 
it did if it were obvious that the government 
could not reasonably have come to its actual 
policy. According to Schutgens, this was not 
obvious at all. By giving the order, the court 
violated the separation of powers.14 
According to Geerten Boogaard, lecturer 
in constitutional and administrative law at 
Leiden University, the judgment created 
??????????????? ??????????????????? ????????????
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concerned judicial construction and separa-
tion of powers. The judicial construction in 
the Urgenda judgment was perhaps too au-
tonomous. And in relation to the separation 
of powers, the court perhaps talked out of 
turn and should have left matters of climate 
policy to political institutions. It would, ac-
cording to Boogaard, have been better if it 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
that the state acted unlawfully if it did not 
reduce Dutch emissions in 2020 by at least 
25%, in comparison with 1990.15 
The consequences of the Urgenda judgment 
for separation of powers and Dutch climate 
policy are unclear, as the state has appealed. 
????? ????? ??????????? ??? ????? ???? ?????????
might not be in line with Supreme Court 
(Hoge Raad) jurisprudence.16 It also seems 
clear that the court might have made itself 
??????????? ??? ???? ??????? ??? ????????????
in its judgment. This made it easier for the 
state, in its statement of grounds of appeal, 
to criticize the court’s interpretation of the 
facts. 
?????????????????????????????????????????
procedure before the courts. The district 
court gave its order to the state in 2015. 
The procedure before the appeal court will 
start in 2017. Doubtless at least one of the 
litigants will go the Supreme Court after 
the appeal. By the time the Supreme Court 
will reach a verdict, we might be close to 
the year 2020. By then, ordering the state to 
reduce emissions in 2020 by at least 25% in 
comparison with 1990 might be pointless. 
The Referendum on Ukraine
On June 27, 2014, the European Union and 
its 28 Member States17 made an Association 
Agreement with Ukraine. This extensive 
treaty (486 articles, 44 annexes, and 3 
protocols) was agreed simultaneously with 
Association agreements with Moldova and 
Georgia. These are part of the activities of 
15 See Geerten Boogaard, Urgenda en de rol van de rechter. Over de ondraaglijke leegheid van de trias politica (Urgenda and the role of the courts. The 
unbearable emptiness of the separation of powers), Ars Aequi January 2016, p. 26-33. 
16 See the following Supreme Court jurisprudence, as mentioned by the Dutch state: HR 21 March 2003, ECLI:NL:HR:2003:AE8462 (Waterpakt); HR 1 
October 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AO8913 (Faunabescherming/Provincie Fryslan); HR 6 February 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AN8071 (Vrede c.s./Staat); HR 9 
April 2010, ECLI:NL:HR:2010:BK4549 (Clara Wichmann/Staat). 
17 Because both the EU and all of its Member States are parties to the treaty, it is a ‘mixed agreement.’ 
18??????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????
19 The exclusion list mentions budget statutes, revisions of the Constitution, and statutes regarding the monarchy as its most important items. 
20 The Dutch electoral register is linked to the population register, so no separate registration for any election or referendum is required.  
the so-called Eastern Partnership of the EU, 
aimed at promoting stability and prosperity in 
those three countries and Belarus, Armenia, 
and Azerbaijan. The EU has Association 
Agreements with 23 states and groups of 
states, including for example Lebanon, 
Israel, Turkey, and Central America. 
An Association Agreement facilitates free 
movement of goods, services, capital, and 
persons, analogous to the freedoms that form 
the economic core of the EU Treaties. In 
????????????????????????????????????????????????
of a process that resulted in accession to the 
EU, but this is by no means automatic. 
On July 1, 2015, an Act on Consultative 
Referenda came into force in the Netherlands.18 
In it, arrangement was made for consultative 
referenda. It enables referenda with regard 
to statutes, i.e. legislative decisions of 
Parliament and government acting together. 
If a statute has been made, has received 
royal assent, and has been published, it can 
be subjected to a referendum before its entry 
into force. In the Netherlands, the approval 
??? ????????? ??? ?????? ???????????? ?????????
takes the form of a statute. Although there 
????????????????????????????????????????????????
risky to make foreign policy the object of 
referenda, the Dutch legislature decided not 
to include treaty-approving statutes in the 
list of statutes that are excluded from being 
subjected to a referendum.19 Article 11 of the 
Consultative Referendum Act 2015 states: 
???? ??? ???? ????? ???????????? ???????????? ?????
a referendum has led to an advisory opinion 
to reject, a bill will be presented as speedily 
as possible. The bill will propose that the 
statute will be repealed or it will regulate its 
entry into force.’ It is up to the legislature 
to review its own earlier legislative decision, 
and there are two possible outcomes: either 
it accepts the advice of the referendum 
electorate and repeals the statute, or it rejects 
the advice and sets a date for the entry into 
force of that statute. The referendum result 
is therefore clearly not binding on the 
legislature. Furthermore, the Act requires a 
turnout of at least 30% of the electorate20 for 
any referendum result to be valid. 
Almost immediately after the entry into 
force of the Consultative Referendum 
Act, a political grouping centred around 
a rightwing website (GeenPeil) started a 
campaign to subject the Act of approval 
of the Ukraine Association Agreement to 
a referendum. Legislative approval of this 
association agreement had taken place by Act 
of Parliament (statute) of 8 July, 2015 (Stb. 
2015, 315). The GeenPeil campaign was 
motivated by a strong anti-EU sentiment, and 
based on the contention that the Assocation 
?????????????? ?????????????? ??? ????????????
of accession of Ukraine to the EU. The 
??????????????? ????????????????????????????
???? ????????????? ???????? ???????????? ????
ultimately 427.939 signatures supported 
the referendum application. The Kiesraad 
(Electoral Commission) found that among 
???????????????????????????????????????????
signatures to make the application succesful 
(the statutory threshold is 300.000). The 
referendum was held on 6 April 2016. More 
than 4 million voters took part, of whom 61% 
(2,509,395) voted against the approval of the 
Association Agreement, 38,2% (1,571,874) 
voted in favour, and 0,79% (32.344) voted 
blank.
The turnout was 32,8%, which made the 
result valid. 
Aftermath of the Referendum
?????? ???? ??????????????? ??????? ??? ????
referendum result is that of a non-binding 
opinion, a few days before the referendum 
most political parties let it be known that 
they would consider themselves bound to 
the outcome. After the result and the turnout 
of only 32,8%, Parliament and government 
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were confronted with a major political 
problem. They decided not to stick to the 
non-binding character of the outcome, but 
to go into a process of re-negotiation with 
the other EU Member States, all of which 
????? ???????? ???? ???????? ????????????????
progress in this area was not forthcoming. 
Finally, after more than 8 months, the 
Dutch government came forward with a 
declaration by the European Council of 15 
and 16 December 2016, in which  some 
of the concerns that were voiced during 
the referendum campaign were addressed. 
The Dutch government presented this as a 
‘decision’ by the European Council.21 
The Conclusion of the European Council 
of 15 December 2016 is worded as follows 
(under point 23-24): 
‘23. After having carefully noted the 
outcome of the Dutch referendum on 
6 April 2016 on the Act of Parliament 
approving the Association Agreement 
and the concerns expressed prior to the 
referendum as conveyed by the Dutch 
Prime Minister, the European Council 
takes note of a Decision of the Heads of 
State or Government of the 28 Member 
States of the European Union, meeting 
within the European Council (Annex), 
which addresses these concerns in 
full conformity with the Association 
Agreement and the EU treaties. 24. The 
European Council takes note that the 
Decision set out in the Annex is legally 
binding on the 28 Member States of the 
European Union, and may be amended 
or repealed only by common accord of 
their Heads of State or Government. It 
will take effect once the Kingdom of the 
???????????? ???? ???????? ???? ??????????
and the Union has concluded it. Should 
this not be the case, the Decision will 
cease to exist.’ 
Despite the not unambiguous wording of the 
Conclusion and the Annex, this document 
can only be read as an interpretive statement 
of the EU side of the contracting parties. The 
interpretive statement was not co-authored 
by the Ukraine government. Therefore, in 
21 Kamerstukken (Parliamentary documents) 21501-20, nr. 1176, p. 5-7. 
accordance with art. 31, par. 2 (b) of the 
Treaty of Vienna of 1969 it can probably 
only be relevant for the interpretation of 
???? ??????? ??? ???? ?????? ????????? ????? ?????
???????????????????????????????
The conclusion of the Dutch government 
was that a bill to regulate the entry into force 
of the Act of approval was to be submitted 
as soon as possible. After the entry force of 
????? ?????????????????????????????????????????
place. After this the Association Agreement 
itself provides (Article 486, par. 2) that it 
????? ?????? ????? ????????? ????????? ??????? ????
second month following the date on which 
?????????????????????????????????????????
???? ????????? ??????????????????? ?????????
by the Dutch Council of State’s Advisory 
Division on January 18, 2017. The Council of 
State suggested to the government to provide 
??????????????????????????????????????????????
status of the Decision of the 28 Heads of 
State or Government. The government added 
a few lines to its Explanatory Memorandum. 
Parliament will debate the matter after the 
parliamentary elections to be held on March 
15, 2017.
All in all, the picture is that the Dutch 
government and coalition parties, by binding 
themselves in advance to the outcome of a 
referendum before they could know what 
the turnout and the result would be, have 
manoeuvred themselves into a conundrum 
on a European level, incurring in a 
diplomatic result that is unconvincing and 
most likely gratuitous. This must be part of 
a learning process with regard to referenda, 
and with regard to the relationship between 
constitutional norms (and provisions 
regarding the status of referenda) and 
political realities. 
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NIGERIA
INTRODUCTION1
The Supreme Court of Nigeria currently 
comprises the Chief Justice of Nigeria and 
sixteen other Justices. Although the statute of 
the Court envisages as many as twenty-one, 
the present size is the largest in the history 
of the Court. Recent Chief Justices have re-
sisted further expansion of the bench. Com-
pulsory retirement age is set by the Consti-
tution at seventy,2 but Justices may retire at 
??????????? ????????? ??????? ??????? ??????????
their tenure. Since 1999, for example, there 
has been only one retirement before the age 
of seventy (illness). However, high member-
ship turnover, because Justices mostly get 
appointed about the age of sixty (the average 
appointment age of the present bench is 59.5 
years), means there are frequent vacancies 
on the bench. In 2016, membership turnover 
was about 20 percent. (Three Justices retired 
upon attaining seventy while four new Jus-
??????????? ??????????????? ????????? ????? ??-
teen members are participating in the work 
of the Court due to recusal of two Justices 
because of corruption investigations. 
The Supreme Court was established in 1956 
(as the Federal Supreme Court) and was 
initially subject to the appellate jurisdiction 
of the United Kingdom’s Judicial Commit-
tee of the Privy Council, until 1963 when 
????????????????????????????????? ??? ??????-
gerian legal system. Nigeria has a two-tier 
appellate court structure comprising the 
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal be-
low it. During its sixty-year existence, 108 
Justices have served on the Supreme Court. 
1 See generally, Solomon Ukhuegbe, ‘Recruitment and Tenure of Supreme Court Justices in Nigeria,’ 
https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2034920
2 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, s 291(1).
??????????????????????????? ?????? ?????????
???????????????????????????????????????????
although he had acted in that capacity since 
?????????????????????????????????????????
Justice retired. In 2016, there were four fe-
male Justices on the Court, the largest num-
???? ??????????? ??? ??????????? ????????????? ??
half-dozen women have served on the Court, 
???????????????????????????????????????????
However, women account for nearly a quar-
ter of all appointments to the Court since that 
year.
The Court never sits en banc. It conducts 
????? ????????? ??? ??????? ??? ????? ?????????
seven Justices (‘Full Court’) are empanelled 
ad hoc by the Chief Justice for constitutional 
cases and for reconsideration of the Court’s 
precedents. In 2016, about 20 percent of all 
cases were heard by the Full Court, although 
this was rather peculiar as most of these were 
election-related (which usually involve con-
stitutional issues) following the 2015 general 
elections in Nigeria. (In practice, the regular 
??????????????????? ??????????????????????-
peals raising constitutional issues, although 
it is not clear why this is so.) Every Justice 
on a panel is required to write an opinion in 
every case he participates in. This practice 
????????????????????? ??????????????????????
of English appellate courts because unlike 
the former, one Justice is assigned writing 
the primary opinion, which is circulated to 
???????????????????????????? ??????????????
is split, the assignment is given to one of the 
majority Justices. Other Justices are required 
to write their own opinions as well, although 
frequently they are short concurring opin-
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ions, or even merely a statement aligning 
with the primary opinion. Dissents are rare. 
This strong consensus norm is, however, 
weakened by occasional dissensus on jus-
????????????????????? ?????? ????????????????
whether the appeal is allowed or refused. All 
judgments are read in open court.
The business of the Court is mainly private 
law (including commercial law), criminal 
???? ???? ?????? ????????????????? ??????? ???-
es are uncommon, constitutional rights are 
sometimes considered in criminal appeals. 
That said, the Court’s output is low in rights 
jurisprudence, international law and social 
policy.
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
COURT
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is 
set out directly in the Nigerian Constitution 
????????????????????? ?????????????????????-
ry jurisdiction (abolished since 1963), it has 
limited original jurisdiction. But its purely 
appellate jurisdiction is the source of at least 
99 percent of caseload annually (100 percent 
in 2016). The Supreme Court has the exclu-
sive jurisdiction to hear appeals from the 
Court of Appeal, every decision of which is 
potentially appealable to the Supreme Court, 
at least with leave of either Court. Leave is 
not required for any appeal from decisions 
of the Court of Appeal in any civil or crim-
inal proceedings on any question of law, or 
any question as to the interpretation or ap-
plication of the Constitution. In addition, the 
Supreme Court must hear an appeal on any 
question as to whether any of the fundamen-
tal human rights provisions have been, are 
or are likely to be contravened in relation to 
any person, or an appeal for review of a death 
sentence imposed by a lower court. It may 
also hear appeals from the Court of Appeal 
on any question as to whether a person has 
been validly elected under the Constitution 
??? ???? ?????? ??? ??????????? ????? ???????????
Governor, or Deputy Governor, or whether 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
3 Constitution, s 295(3).
4 S 105(1).
5 S 211(1).
????????????????????????????????????????
The original jurisdiction enables direct ac-
cess to the Supreme Court in legal disputes 
between the central government and the 
States, or between the central legislature and 
the President or a State or a State legislature. 
This jurisdiction therefore serves federalism 
and the separation of powers functions. In 
addition, there is a quasi-original jurisdic-
tion to entertain reference of ‘substantial 
questions of law’ from the Court of Appeal.3
Because of its extensive jurisdiction, the 
business of the Supreme Court consists 
mostly of mandatory appeals. It has no ef-
fective means of regulating the volume or 
content of its docket, and hence has almost 
??????????????????????????????????????????????
the Court is under severe caseload pressure 
???????? ??????????? ???????? ????????????????
routine appeals. Except for criminal appeals 
and a few other categories, it takes perhaps 
up to ten years before an appeal is heard. 
DEVELOPMENTS AND  
CONTROVERSIES IN 2016 
Appointments to the Supreme Court, in-
cluding the Chief Justice, are made by the 
President on the recommendation of the 
National Judicial Council (NJC). This twen-
ty-member body, established by the extant 
Nigerian Constitution (1999), has a mandate 
that includes recommending persons for 
appointment to the superior courts and the 
headships of the courts, including the Chief 
Justice of Nigeria. In October 2016, on the 
eve of the retirement of the 15th Chief Jus-
tice, the Council recommended to the Pres-
?????? ??????????? ???? ????????????????????????
Onnoghen, as the sixteenth Chief Justice. It 
has been a consistent practice since the ap-
????????????????????????????????????????????
for the recruitment of the Chief Justice to be 
made from within the Supreme Court strictly 
based on seniority. Ten successive appoint-
ments of Chief Justices spanning democratic 
rule and military dictatorship (1983, 1985, 
1987, 1995, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2012, 
and 2014) have adhered to the seniority pref-
erence. It was a surprise, therefore, that the 
President delayed accepting the recommen-
dation of the NJC for four months (although 
in the meantime he appointed Justice On-
noghen as Acting Chief Justice immediately, 
???????????????????????????????????????????-
ber 2016).
Although the government did not make its 
????????? ?????????? ??????? ??? ???? ?????? ?????
its view was that the recommendation of the 
NJC on the appointment of a Chief Justice 
???? ???? ???????????? ????????? ?????? ??? ????
some support within the legal profession and 
the public, the government’s position was 
generally considered unfavourably as a thin-
ly veiled attempt to take control the judicia-
ry. Even if the position taken was noble, it 
was clearly misguided. Section 231(1) of the 
Constitution provides that, 
The appointment of a person to the of-
??????????????????????????????????????????
be made by the President on the rec-
ommendation of the National Judicial 
???????????????????????????????????????
appointment by the Senate.
Before the present Nigerian Constitution, 
which created the NJC, the appointment of 
????????????????????????????????????????????
the executive. Under the 1960 Independence 
Constitution, the appointment was made by 
the Governor General on the advice of the 
Prime Minister,4 and in the 1979 Constitution 
the appointment was ‘made by the President 
in his discretion.’5 The difference between 
?????????????????????????????????? ??????-
ster-type constitution, with executive power 
vested in the Prime Minister and his cabinet, 
while the latter is a presidential constitution. 
There is, however, a clear shift in the present 
Constitution. The President is merely the tit-
ular appointor with only the power of formal 
appointment. He no longer has a free hand 
to select the Chief Justice, and indeed has no 
discretion at all since the NJC recommends 
only one person for appointment. In such a 
system, the best practice is that the recom-
mendation is binding and where, in excep-
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tional circumstances, the President does not 
accept the recommendation, he should dis-
close his reasons, and must under no circum-
stances appoint a person not recommended.6
At any rate, before 2016 on six consecutive 
occasions with three Presidents under the 
present Constitution, recommendations by 
the NJC for appointment of the Chief Jus-
tice had been accepted without demur. The 
sudden pretence to a presidential prerogative 
or discretion in the appointment comes too 
late in the day. The whole purpose of the 
NJC and its mandate is to secure the auton-
omy of the judiciary.7 The NJC is essentially 
a committee of the judiciary. It is headed by 
the Chief Justice and all but seven members 
are judges or retired judges. This ensures that 
the appointment and discipline of judges are 
completely insulated from interference by 
the government. If the apparent position of 
the government is accepted, nothing stops it 
from extending it to the appointment of oth-
er Justices of the Supreme Court, who are 
also appointed by the President on the rec-
ommendation of the NJC. This would effec-
tively create a presidential veto on judicial 
appointments, a power that the Constitution 
??????????????????????????????????????????-
tion of such appointments. 
The controversy ended happily on 8 Febru-
ary 2017, when, after four months, the pres-
idency yielded to public pressure by accept-
ing the NJC recommendation and sending 
??????????????????????????????????????????????
????????? ???????? ??????? ????????? ????????
????????????????????????????? ??????????????
???????? ????????????????????????????????????
of Nigeria. This was an important victory for 
judicial independence. A critical indicator of 
the institutionalization of the Supreme Court 
of Nigeria during the past fours decades is 
the stability of its recruitment regime and its 
insulation from political interference. 
6 See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Leandro Despouy, UN Doc A/HRC/11/41 (2009), para 33; The 
Commonwealth, The Appointment, Tenure and Removal of Judges under Commonwealth Principles: A Compendium and Analysis of Best Practice (British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2015) 51-56.
7 Some scholars consider this claim unsubstantiated. See Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg, ‘Guarding the Guardians: Judicial Councils and Judicial 
Independence’ (2009) 57 AJCL 201, 228. (‘We also found little evidence in favour of the widespread assumption that [judicial] councils increase quality or 
independence in the aggregate.’)
8 Section 7(1).
MAJOR CASES
Separation of Powers
Governor, Ekiti State v. Sanmi Olununmo 
(2017) 3 NWLR (Part 1551) 1
This case decides a constitutional matter of 
????? ??????????????????????? ???????????????
security of tenure of elected local govern-
ment councils. Despite that, the case was as-
??????? ??????????????????????????????? ???????
than the Full Court. Nigeria has 774 local 
????????????????????????????????????????????
their democratic character as elected bodies, 
it vests in the State’s legislative competence 
to regulate the councils:
The system of local government by dem-
ocratically elected local government 
councils is under this Constitution guar-
anteed, and accordingly, the Govern-
ment, of every state shall…ensure their 
existence under a Law which provides 
for the establishment, structure, com-
????????????????????? ????????????? ?????
councils.8
On the face of the text, the only apparent 
limitation of legislative regulation of local 
councils by the government of a State is the 
guarantee that they must be democratically 
elected. Yet, the import of this was never 
clear. Laws regulating local government ev-
erywhere in Nigeria often vest the State gov-
ernor with the power to dissolve the councils 
before the expiration of their elected tenure. 
Such laws often provide a pretext for State 
capture of the councils and the replacement 
of elected councils with compliant unelected 
‘caretaker committees.’ The constitutional-
ity of one such law was challenged in this 
case. The Local Government Administration 
(Amendment) Law, Cap. L11, Laws of Ekiti 
State (Southwest Nigeria) stipulated a tenure 
of three years for elected council members 
subject to the following proviso in section 
23B:
(1) Provided always that the governor is 
by this law empowered to dissolve lo-
cal government councils for overriding 
public interest subject to the two-thirds 
majority approval of members of the 
House of Assembly;
(2) Such dissolution shall not exceed a pe-
riod of twelve calendar months wherein 
the governor shall have power to appoint 
a seven-member Caretaker Committee 
out of which a chairman shall be ap-
pointed pending the conduct of election 
????????????????????????????????????
Local government councils in the State were 
elected in December 2008 for a tenure of 
three years. However, all sixteen local coun-
cils were dissolved by the Governor in Oc-
tober 2010 and caretaker committees were 
appointed to run the councils pending elec-
tions. It was argued on behalf of the govern-
ment that nothing in section 7 of the Con-
stitution should restrict the legislature from 
enacting a law empowering the Governor to 
dissolve local government councils in the 
State. The Supreme Court rejected this claim 
as ‘an unbridled affront’ to the Constitution. 
Instead, stated the Court,
Having thus guaranteed the system 
of local government by democratical-
ly-elected government councils, the 
Constitution confers a toga of sacro-
??????????????????????????????????????????
whose electoral mandates derive from 
the will of the people freely exercised 
through the democratic process. Put 
differently, the intendment of the Con-
stitution is to vouchsafe the inviola-
bility of the sacred mandate which the 
electorate, at that level, democratically 
donated to them. …Simply put, there-
?????? ???? ????????? ??? ????? ????????? ?????
??????????????????????????????????????????
with constitutional force. They cannot, 
therefore be abridged without breach-
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ing the Constitution from which they 
derive their force. The only permissible 
exception, where a State governor could 
truncate the lifespan of a local govern-
ment council which evolved through the 
democratic process of elections, is ‘for 
over-riding public interest’ in a period of 
emergency.9
This categorical position of the Court on the 
constitutional security of tenure for local 
councils will engender democratic consoli-
dation in Nigeria. Undemocratic governance 
at that level cannot be expected to augur well 
for representative government at State and 
national levels. Although not entirely novel, 
????????? ???????????????????????????????????
precedents on section 7 of the Constitution, 
this Supreme Court decision will put the 
matter beyond doubt. The decision places a 
high threshold for lawful interference with 
the tenure of councils, as a ‘state of emer-
??????? ??????????? ???????????????????????-
der the Nigerian Constitution for a limited 
number of purposes.10 The occasions of law-
ful interference with council tenure should 
therefore be relatively rare. 
Although there was no dissent in this case, Jus-
tice M.D. Muhammad disagreed that the Ekiti 
State law was unconstitutional, but found that 
the Governor acted unlawfully by the terms of 
section 23B of the law. In his view,
A community reading of [both the Con-
stitution and the legislation] makes one 
conclusion necessary: that the Ekiti State 
House of Assembly is empowered to 
make laws for the function of local gov-
ernment councils in the State provided 
such laws do not temper [sic] with or 
abrogate the guaranteed existence of the 
democratically elected councils in the 
State.
?????????????????????????????????????????
considered view that section 23B of 
the Ekiti State Local Government Ad-
ministration (Amendment) Law which 
empowers the governor to dissolve 
9 (2017) 3 NWLR (Part 1551) 1, 33 (Nweze, JSC).
10 Section 306.
11 (2017) 3 NWLR (Part 1551) 1, 45-46.
democratically elected councils “for 
over-riding public interest subject to the 
two-thirds majority approval of members 
of the House of Assembly” only is not by 
its tenor inconsistent with section 7(1) of 
the 1999 Constitution that guarantees the 
??????????????????????????? ????????????-
stitutional is the use to which the Gover-
nor invoked his powers as lawfully con-
ferred by the legislation. A lawful resort 
to the section presupposes the existence 
of facts from which the “over-riding pub-
lic interest” behind the dissolution of the 
council(s) by the governor may readily 
be inferred. In the instant case, the ap-
pellants have failed to demonstrate these 
?????????????? ???? ????????? ???? ?????????
function of a local government council, 
for whatever reason, has become impos-
sible, the House of Assembly may by a 
resolution of two thirds majority approve 
the Governor’s request to dissolve the 
council(s). It is unthinkable to imagine 
that such a situation would engulf the 
entire sixteen councils at the same time. 
Even if the sixteen local government 
councils had been so affected, it remains 
the appellants’ burden to so establish. 
Having failed to discharge this burden, 
the lower court is right not only in its 
decision that the trial court had wrongly 
declined jurisdiction but also in the deci-
sion…that, on the merits, the governor’s 
dissolution of the sixteen democratical-
ly elected councils was unconstitutional 
and void. The governor’s exercise of his 
powers under the enabling law is arbi-
trary and unpardonable.11       
The extent that the section 7 guarantee of 
“democratically elected local government 
councils” does not trump a law granting the 
governor power to sack the councils may sug-
gest that Justice Muhammad understates the 
?????????? ???????????? ??? ???? ???????????????
provision. However, his less categorical ap-
proach to reading the provision implicitly ac-
knowledges due deference to the legislature, 
especially as section 23B of the Ekiti State 
law contains the democratic safeguard of 
two-thirds majority legislative approval of the 
Governor’s exercise of the statutory power in 
the “over-riding public interest.”  
    
Rights and Freedoms                                          
Orji Uzor Kalu v. Federal Republic of Nigeria 
(2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1516) 1
This case is an important contribution to the 
execution of anti-corruption policies in Nige-
ria. The Supreme Court ended an abuse of legal 
process politically-exposed persons (PEP) used 
to frustrate criminal investigation and prosecu-
tion initiated against them. Using the pretext of 
enforcing their constitutional rights against an-
ti-corruption and other law enforcement agen-
cies, PEPs seek, and sometimes secure, injunc-
tions enjoining these agencies not to arrest or 
prosecute them until the determination of suits 
????????????????????????????????????? ???????????
“gagging suits” drag out in court, the pressure 
from law enforcement wanes.
The appellant, Mr. Orji Kalu, a former State 
?????????????????????????????????????????????-
tional rights and obtained an ex parte order 
from a High Court restraining the Economic 
and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) 
from arresting him. EFCC was investigating 
him for corruption and money laundering 
committed while he was governor. Despite 
????????????????????????????????????????????-
eral High Court. He unsuccessfully sought to 
quash these charges with the injunction.
The Supreme Court held that it was improper 
to use legal processes to “muzzle” or prevent 
a law enforcement agency from discharging 
its statutory functions, especially the inves-
tigation and prosecution of crimes. As the 
Court pointed out, the constitutional rights of 
personal liberty and freedom of movement 
???????????????????????????????????????????????
person before a court in execution of a court 
order or upon reasonable suspicion of his hav-
ing committed a criminal offence.
For a person to rush to court to place a 
clog or shield against criminal investiga-
tion and prosecution is a clear interfer-
ence with the powers given by law and 
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the constitution to EFCC in the conduct 
of criminal investigation and prosecu-
tion. It is clearly an abuse of due process 
of the law.12
Mathew Nwokocha v. Attorney-General of 
Imo State (2016) 8NWLR (Pt. 1513) 141
One of the constitutional guarantees to safe-
guard fairness in the criminal process is the 
right of “every person who is charged with a 
criminal offence [to] have, without payment, 
the assistance of an interpreter if he cannot 
understand the language used at the trial of 
the offence.”13 This right is critical in a soci-
ety with a large illiterate population. The Su-
preme Court has held that the use of an inter-
preter was mandatory where a person charged 
with a criminal offence does not understand 
the language used in the trial and should be 
entered in the trial record.
????????? ??? ???????????? ??? ????????? ???
the commencement of the trial and a re-
cord of this is made, it is desirable, and 
indeed a constitutional duty of the trial 
judge to record this fact also on subse-
quent days of the trial when use is made 
of the interpreter. Where however the 
judge fails to make a record of the use 
of the interpreter in subsequent days of 
the trial, the trial is not per se thereby 
vitiated.14
 
In the present case, the Supreme Court clari-
?????????????????????????????????????????????
use of an interpreter throughout a trial. The 
defendant was charged with armed robbery 
and was convicted and sentenced to death. 
The trial record showed that an interpreter 
was used when the charges were read and his 
plea taken. But there was no record of use of 
an interpreter subsequently during the trial. 
One of the grounds of appeal was that failure 
to use an interpreter throughout the trial was 
denial of a fair hearing and hence vitiated the 
trial.
12  (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1516) 1, 19-20.
13  Constitution, s 36(6)(e).
14  Anyanwu v. The State (2002) 13 NWLR (Pt. 783) 107, 127 [emphasis added].
15  (2016) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1513) 141, 188
16  ‘It is borne out on record also that the appellant was represented by counsel at the trial and he did not object to the proceedings on account of absence 
of an interpreter. The right, having been lost is now too late in the day and cannot be revisited. It is an afterthought.’ Ibid., 164.
The Supreme Court surprisingly disagreed. 
According to the Court, ‘Once it is shown 
that there was an interpreter at the com-
mencement of the trial, there is a presump-
tion of regularity that the interpreter was 
present on subsequent days, even though 
not so recorded, unless proved otherwise.’15 
It is not clear why the burden should be on 
the defendant to show that he was denied his 
constitutional right to be assisted with an in-
terpreter where the record of the trial is silent 
on the matter, especially where the defendant 
is charged with a capital offence. The con-
stitutional right becomes meaningless in the 
circumstances. Perhaps what partly swayed 
the Court was the failure of the defence 
counsel to raise the matter during the trial.16 
Even that, however, does not justify why the 
constitutional right did not seem to carry 
much weight in the Court’s consideration.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Nigeria is a strong 
and autonomous institution. The prolonged 
stability of the Court and absence of any di-
rect political interference has resulted in the 
accumulation of diffuse support. There is 
growing public trust in the Court’s resolu-
tion of important political issues. The elec-
tion cases, which are not reviewed here due 
to space constraint, where the Court resolved 
issues of credibility of elections, the role of 
political parties and innovative use of elec-
?????? ?????????????? ??????? ???? ???????????
level of trust political actors and the public 
have in the Court. 
Perhaps the next set of Supreme Court Jus-
tices may include persons from outside the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????-
cades as part of a plan to diversify recruit-
ment, portending important changes for the 
Court. But, unfortunately, there is as yet no 
plan to relieve its present caseload pressure, 
??????????????????????????????????????????-
ational stress.
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Norway
DEVELOPMENTS IN NORWEGIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Anine Kierulf, Postdoctoral researcher, University of Oslo School of Law
NORWAY
INTRODUCTION 
Developments in Norwegian constitutional 
law 2016 were marked by courts’ adjust-
ments to a major constitutional reform of 
2014. In it, the 1814 Norwegian Constitu-
tion was amended with a bill of rights, thus 
constitutionalizing international human 
rights that had until then been incorporated 
by ordinary legislation. Questions of rights 
dominated constitutional adjudication. The 
political debate saw some discussion of two 
separation of power issues: one, the prepara-
tions towards the separation between church 
and state, a constitutional alteration of 2012 
effectuated from January 1, 2017;1 the other 
questions of parliamentary competence to 
instruct the government in concrete cases in 
connection with a government decision to re-
duce quotas in the licensed hunt of wolves.2 
Norway is a monarchy functioning as a con-
stitutional democracy. It was established as 
a state independent from Denmark in 1814, 
enacted its Constitution, and was then union-
ized by Sweden until 1905. In the 1800s, 
the Norwegian Constitution was considered 
positive law and played a significant role in 
adjudication, both due to the lack of statutes 
1 Parliamentary enactment of May 21, 2012.
2 Following the Constitution § 75 a) and d), Parliament regulates the Government through legislation 
and budgetary dispositions. Legal foundations for instructing the Government in concrete cases are 
less clear, but the tendency of Parliament to “invite” the Government to (re)consider concrete cases 
has been rising since 2000, with a particular surge in 2015-2016, see Meld. St. 17 (2016–2017), https://
www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/meld.-st.-17-20162017/id2538216/sec1 (retrieved April 5, 2017). 
3 Two referenda, in 1972 and 1994, voted “no” to the EU by slim majorities (53.5% and 52.2%).
4 The EEA agreement was incorporated into Norwegian law by Lov av 27. november 1992 nr. 109. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
EU directives are also relevant to Norway under the EEA, see NOU 2012:2, 25.3.3 In addition to the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
http://www.europautredningen.no/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/NOU201220120002000EN_PDFS.pdf 
(retrieved March 15, 2017). 
5 The Human Rights Act 1999 (lov av 21. mai 1999 nr 30) § 3.The other conventions are the Internation-
al Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (both 1966), the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965), Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979) and Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (1989).
in the new country and to its symbolic val-
ue as a Norwegian base of law. Less used in 
legal adjudication through the 1900s, it has 
remained a central political and legal docu-
ment. 
?????????? ?? ?????? ??? ???????3 EU legal in-
fluence is significant due to the Norwegian 
membership in the European Economic Area 
(EEA), which grants access to the internal 
market on the condition that Norway imple-
ments relevant EU legislation.4 The core in-
ternational Human Rights conventions, and 
the European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR) are incorporated into Norwegian 
law through the Human Rights Act of 1999 
(HRA), and influences Norwegian law in a 
constitution-like way as the provisions of 
these instruments take precedence before 
conflicting Norwegian law.5
In politics, 2016 was Prime Minister Erna 
Solberg’s (Conservative) third of her four-
year-term coalition government. The minori-
ty right-of-centre government, comprising 
the Conservatives and the right wing Prog-
ress Party (FrP), is reliant on parliamentary 
support from two centrist parties, the Liberal 
Left and the Christian Democrats. Areas of 
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political disagreement within this group of 
parties have been environmental policies and 
stricter immigration and asylum regulations. 
The Norwegian economy ?????????????????
the decrease in oil prices in 2015 and parts 
of 2016. Norges Bank (the central bank) has 
left its main policy interest rate on hold at a 
record-low 0.5% since March 2016. Real es-
tate prices are still rising, particularly in the 
capital, Oslo, and other larger cities. The un-
employment rate continued to rise in 2016, 
but is still low compared to other European 
countries, at 4.5%. 
Among social developments, questions of 
immigration and asylum following the ref-
ugee crisis of 2015 are still high on the pub-
lic and political agenda, as is the fear of in-
creasing terror in Europe. Areas of particular 
concern are how to ensure the protection and 
care for unaccompanied minor asylum-seek-
ers, and how proposed expansions of police 
and security forces’ investigative and pre-
ventive measures balance the public need 
for security against the right to privacy and 
freedom of expression. 
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
COURT  
Outside the United States’1789 Constitu-
tion, Norway’s from 1814 is the oldest still 
in force. Enfranchising a comparatively sub-
stantial part of the population, it also con-
tains central constitutional principles such 
as the division of powers, and rights, such 
as the protection of free speech and proper-
ty, a ban against retroactive legislation and 
???????????? ?????????? ?????? ??????? ?????
changed more than 300 times since, the Con-
stitution has proven particularly durable.6 
Judicial review was developed early after 
6 See Ginsburg, T. and Melton, J., Norway’s Enduring Constitution: Implications for Countries in Transition, available at ????????????????????????????????????
norways_enduring_constitution.pdf (retrieved March 15, 2017). 
7???? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
8 Tushnet, M., Alternative forms of judicial review, 101 Michigan Law Review 2781 (2003).
9 Parliamentary enactment June 1, 2015. 
10 The Court Act (1915) § 55 a.
11 See Kierulf, A., Norway: New Chief Justice Appointed to the Supreme Court, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Mar. 1, 2016, at: http://www.iconnectblog.
com/2016/02/norway-new-chief-justice (retrieved March 21 2017).
12 See Supreme Court Annual Report 2016, available at http://www.domstol.no/globalassets/upload/hret/arsmelding/supremecourtofnorway2016.pdf (re-
trieved March 21 2017).
13 See i.a. Husa, J., Nuotio, K. & Pihlajamäki, H. (eds.), Nordic Law - Between Tradition and Dynamism, (Intersentia 2008), pp. 55-64; Schlesinger, R., Baade, 
the constitutional enactment, and practiced 
throughout the 1800s. It was explicitly as-
certained by the Supreme Court in 1866. The 
Norwegian form of review resembles U.S. 
review in time of origin and way of devel-
opment.7 It is concrete, ex post and “strong 
form”,8 yet has historically been practiced 
quite deferentially, but with a certain in-
crease following 2000. The customary law 
of review was written into the Constitution 
§ 89 in 2015.9
????? ?? ???? ???????????? ?????????? ???????
have general jurisdiction and preside over 
criminal and civil cases, as well as adminis-
trative and constitutional ones. Courts are or-
ganized in three levels: 64 district courts, six 
general courts of appeal and one Supreme 
Court. In principle, all legal disputes may 
be brought before the Supreme Court, but 
subject to approval from the three-member 
Supreme Court board of appeals. Approval 
??????????????????????????????????????????????
outside the case in question, or that otherwise 
a rise questions of particular importance. The 
Supreme Court is a court of precedence, and 
its principal goal is to contribute to clarity 
and development of the law within the Nor-
wegian constitutional and legal framework. 
In ordinary cases, the Court sits in panels of 
????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????????????? ???????????
or those potentially reversing constitutional 
precedence, in Grand Chamber of 11 justices 
or with all 20 justices in plenary. 
Norwegian Supreme Court Justices are ap-
pointed for life, i.e. until mandatory retire-
ment at 70. Under the Constitution, both 
judges and Supreme Court Justices are 
appointed by the government. By statute, 
such appointments take place following the 
recommendation of an independent adviso-
ry board.10 In the absence of parliamentary 
hearings, judicial appointments have drawn 
little public attention, and have traditional-
ly been un-politicized. Rules for appointing 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????
female Chief Justice, Toril Marie Øie, was 
appointed to the Supreme Court. She had 
been on the Court since 2004 and had previ-
ous experience from the Ministry of Justice 
?????? ???????????? ?????? ???? ??? ??????????
recognized as a sound choice for the posi-
tion, the process leading up to her appoint-
ment drew some criticism for lack of trans-
parency.11 
The principle of oral contradiction is central 
to Norwegian adjudication. The Supreme 
Court annually decides between 110 and 130 
cases following oral hearings. The remainder 
of the 2000+ annual full or limited appeals 
is decided following written proceedings – 
around 500 with reasoned premises, the rest 
?????????? ?? ?????????? ??????????? ??? ??????
the Supreme Court received 2,331 appeals. 
829 of these were appeals against judgments, 
the rest were against orders or decisions.12 In 
the last 15 years, the number of dissenting 
judgments has varied between 16-26%. In 
?????? ???? ??????? ???? ????? ?????????????
down from the 24% in 2015.
DEVELOPMENTS AND  
CONTROVERSIES IN 2016   
For long historical periods, constitutional 
adjudication has been a rather peripher-
al part of Norwegian law and political life. 
Constitutional law is generally under-theo-
rized, and marked by much the same legal 
pragmatism seen as a central tenet of Scan-
dinavian law.13 In the last 10-20 years, how-
ever, constitutional debates particularly over 
questions of rights have gradually picked up 
following three different, but interconnected 
phenomena: 
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First, an increasing judicialization of politics: 
politically initiated as answers to ever more 
complex societal challenges, this shifts areas 
formerly subject to political deliberation via 
legal regulations to judicial adjudication. In-
creasing caseloads have led to reforms aiming 
to have the Supreme Court concentrate on the 
more principled cases and precedence-mak-
ing. Judicialization increases the potential 
decision-making power of the judicial branch. 
Second, an increasing globalization, partic-
??????? ???? ????????? ??? ????????? ????? ???-
tributing further to the complexity of soci-
etal regulation and posing new challenges 
to previously nation-focused legal systems. 
Formally, neither EU law nor internation-
???????????????? ?????????????? ???? ???
???? ????? ??????????? ??? ??? ??? ?????????-
????????????? ????? ??? ???? ???? ?????????????
into the dualistic Norwegian legal system 
through ordinary laws, and can be political-
ly repealed by ordinary laws.14 In practice, 
however, both sets of rules function consti-
???????????? ?????? ??? ????? ????? ?????? ???? ????-
tical legal scope for political action through 
???????????????????????????????????????????????
political climate, and second that by their in-
corporative acts they are given precedence 
????????????????????????????????????????????
placing them in a semi-constitutional posi-
tion. In addition to the basic EU principles, 
more than 170 statutes and 1000 adminis-
trative regulations have been incorporated 
in Norway in the period 1992-2011.15 The 
????????? ??? ??????????? ???? ???? ??????????-
H., Herzog, P. & Wise, E., Comparative
Law, 6th ed., New York (Foundation Press, 1998).
14 See note 5 and 6.
15 NOU 2012:2, 7.1.
16 See Bårdsen, A., Guardians of Human Rights in Norway: Challenging mandates in a new era. Speech given in Litteraturhuset, Bergen, May 11 2016, avail-
able at  http://www.domstol.no/globalassets/upload/hret/artikler-og-foredrag/guardians-of-human-rights---11052016.pdf (retrieved April 5, 2017).
17 Added to the prohibition against prosecutor’s inhumane treatment (§ 96), the anti-retroactivity ban (§ 97), freedom of expression (§ 100) and the takings 
clause (§ 105) were: the right to free and secret elections (§ 49), the right to life (§ 93), protection of liberty (§ 94), the right to a fair trial (§ 95), the presump-
tion of innocence (§ 96, 2), equality before the law (§ 98), freedom of assembly (§ 101), the right to privacy (§ 102), the rights of the child (§ 104), freedom 
of movement (§ 106) and the principle of legality (§ 113). Some socio-economic rights were subject to substantial debate in Parliament. Amended to the 
Constitution were the right to education (§ 109), the right to work (§ 110), the right to a healthy environment (§ 112) and the rights of the Sami people (§ 108), 
whereas the right to participate in cultural activities (§ 107) and to health (§ 111) were not. 
18 Search in database “Lovdata”, Supreme Court civil and criminal cases, reasoned decisions from chamber and appeals committee for all years, and 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????
19 Peaking in 2010, with four cases. 
20 Parliamentary enactment of March 31, 2016.
21 ETS No.122.
22 Parliamentary enactment of May 24, 2016.
23 Dok 12:8 and 12:19 (2015-2016).
ing of EU law, but the substantial part of EU 
law enters Norway through legislative acts 
based on directives or other EU legal acts. 
?????? ?????? ??????? ???????? ????? ???????-
rated by Parliament through the Human 
Rights Act (1999), the effectuation of it is 
primarily done through cases brought before 
the courts, thus enhancing the focus on how 
another branch than the political is arbiter of 
the scope of political action. 
A third development is a gradually renewed 
judicial focus on constitutional rights-think-
ing in the last decade. Up until 2014, this 
may have been inspired by the international 
????????????????????????????????????????????
– the combined rights focus and state-cit-
????? ???????? ????????? ??? ??? ???? ?????
law resembles constitutional adjudication 
more than ordinary legislative adjudication. 
????????????????????????????????????16 cen-
tral human rights until then “only” protect-
ed by conventions and incorporated through 
the HRA were amended to the Constitution 
as part of the celebration of the Constitu-
tion’s 200-year anniversary.17 This led to a 
substantial rise in the use of constitutional 
provisions in Supreme Court reasoning in 
2016.18 The average number of cases refer-
ring to the Constitution was 0.6% of the total 
annual case load in the years 1990-1999, and 
1.2% in 2000-2009. In 2010-2016, the aver-
age was 2.1%, with the years 2015 and 2016 
as top years, at 3.6% and 5.2%, respectively. 
It is important to note that even with this 
marked increase in use of the Constitution, 
cases disregarding or substantially reinter-
preting legislative acts have remained stable. 
The average number of such cases in the 
year 2000-2017 is one to two per year,19 and 
the years 2015 and 2016 follow this average. 
Two amendments were made to the Consti-
tution in 2016: in March, § 49 of the Consti-
tution was altered in order to constitutional-
ize the principle of local self-government.20 
Norway has a long history as a decentralized 
country where local communes have sub-
stantial self-government, but this has not 
????????????????????????????????????????????-
ation concluded a series of debates follow-
????????????? ??????????????? ???????????? ???
Europe Charter on Local Self-Government 
in 1989,21 which article 2 provides that “The 
principle of local self-government shall 
be recognized in domestic legislation and, 
where practicable, in the constitution”. In 
May, the Norwegian Central Bank, “Norges 
Bank” (1816), was written into the Constitu-
tion in § 33, which now reads: “Norges Bank 
is the Norwegian Central Bank”.22
In the 2015-2016 parliamentary period, 44 
proposals to amend the Constitution were 
???? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ?????????? ?????-
cation, re-proposals or linguistic questions 
arising from the 2014 constitutional reform. 
Two of them concerned issues of substantial 
debate in the 2014 reform: one proposal to 
constitutionalize requirements for interfer-
ing into the constitutionalized rights and one 
the details of judicial review doctrine.23 
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MAJOR CASES 
Right of boycott vs. right of establishment 
HR-2016-2554-P
The only Supreme Court plenary case in 2016 
?????????????????????????????????? ???????
Union aiming to boycott the Danish-owned 
company Holship Norge AS to prevent Hol-
ship from using its own stevedores to load 
ships in a Norwegian Port. The Union wanted 
to force Holship into signing a Norwegian col-
lective agreement assuring registered steve-
dores preferential rights. The Supreme Court 
concluded on dissent (10-7) that the boycott 
ran counter to the right of establishment under 
the EEA Agreement Article 31. The majori-
ty held that the primary object of the boycott 
was to prevent Holship from establishing it-
self in the loading and unloading business at 
the Port of Drammen. In balancing the right 
to boycott under the Norwegian Boycott Act, 
as seen in light of the un-incorporated rights 
following from the ILO-Convention nos. 87, 
98 and 137 and the revised European Social 
Charter,24 and the EEA right to establishment, 
the latter prevailed. The majority emphasized 
an interpretation obtained from the European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA) Court on the 
matter. 
The case merits interest for answering a con-
stitutional question of some controversy and 
for solidifying the judicial view of another: 
First, in the 2014 constitutional reform, the 
formulation of a new article 92 created un-
certainty about whether all human rights 
????????? ??????????????????????? ?????????-
tected in the same way that the human rights 
???????????????????????????????????? ???????
the rights not constitutionalized remained of 
the same hierarchical (non-constitutional) 
status as before. On this question, the Court 
24 Convention concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise (Entry into force: 04 Jul 1950), Convention concerning the Appli-
cation of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively (Entry into force July 18, 1951), Convention concerning the Social Repercussions 
of New Methods of Cargo Handling in Docks (Entry into force July24, 1975), ETS No.163.
25??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
26 See HR-2014-2288-A, HR-2015-206-A, R-2015-289-A.
27 Case of Lindheim and others v. Norway, 13221/08.
28 Proposal No. 41 to the Odelsting (2003-2004), p. 11.
29 The Ground Lease Act (1996) § 33.
30 HR-2007-1594-P.
31 Case of Lindheim and others v. Norway, 13221/08.
32 Act 2015-06-19-63.
en banc held the latter, with the effect that 
the un-incorporated ILO Conventions were 
seen as less weighty in the balancing process 
against the EEA right of establishment. 
???????? ??? ????????? ???? ????????? ??????? ???
the fact that Parliament, when constitution-
alizing human rights in 2014, voted against 
constitutionalization of a proposed article 
setting out the criteria for interfering into 
???????????????????????????????????????????
by law, be proportionate and necessary.25 
???? ??????? ???????? ???? ??????????? ????????
in line with Norwegian constitutional tradi-
tion. But that also means they are textually 
“absolutes”, an implication the un-amended 
provision was meant to resolve. Considering 
the rights absolute was no viable option for 
the Supreme Court, which instead in sev-
eral cases has chosen to interpret them in 
light of their international counterparts,26 
thus in reality adjudicating according to the 
un-amended provision. This line of interpre-
??????????? ????????? ????? ???? ???????????????
rights provisions are to be interpreted in light 
???????????????????????????????????????????-
lowed by all justices in this plenary decision. 
Right of property – ground lease regulations 
HR-2016-304-S, HR-2016-2195-S
A particular Norwegian ground lease ar-
rangement has created a number of contro-
versies in the last 15 years – politically, in 
Norwegian courts, and also in the ECtHR.27 
??? ???? ?????????? ????? ???????? ??????????
made ground lease arrangements attractive. 
Property owners could expediently obtain a 
steady income from their land without mak-
ing investments or selling it, and non-proper-
ty owners could lease land at affordable pric-
es. There exist some 350.000 ground lease 
contracts, the majority of which are for pri-
vate homes.28 Prior to 1976, such agreements 
were governed by contracts, often conclud-
ed for a period of 99 years and with clauses 
giving the lessee a right to extension upon 
expiry. A new Ground Lease Act granted all 
lessees the right to claim extension of their 
lease on the same conditions as previously 
???????????????????????????????? ???????????-
tate prices soaring in the 1980s, a number of 
lessors used the opportunity under the law to 
demand redemption, which resulted in many 
???????????????????????????????????????????-
sition. Because of the dramatic increase in 
pressure on real estate prices, the legislator 
thought it necessary to intervene to protect 
the lessees’ interests. The level of possible 
rent increases was regulated so that they 
?????? ????? ??????? ???????? ?????????? ???? ????
rising cost of land, and by allowing the les-
see a right to extension upon expiry under 
un-altered conditions.29 The Supreme Court 
in Plenary upheld this right of extension in 
a decision from 200730 while the ECtHR in 
Lindheim v. Norway found it to interfere un-
duly with the right of property under Proto-
col 1, no. 1 in 2012.31 Parliament altered the 
Act in 2015.32
Two Grand Chamber cases concerning 
ground lease were decided in 2016. HR-
2016-304-S, dealing with a concrete esti-
mation of redemption price, merits interest 
because of the way its reasoning differs from 
that of the 2007 Supreme Court decision, 
where the ECtHR found the reasoning in the 
2007 case to fall short of demonstrating that 
the Supreme Court had properly understood 
???????????????????????????????????????????-
sistence with ECtHR case law criteria, this 
2016 case is reasoned in a way both properly 
discussing the redemption regulation under 
ECtHR criteria and explaining how Parlia-
ment has reasoned before striking the bal-
ance as regulated. 
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HR-2016-2195-S was based on a claim that a 
2006 case solved by reference to the old Act 
merited compensation from the state as it 
was based on grounds incompatible with the 
ECHR protection of property, as shown by 
the 2012 Lindheim case. The Grand Cham-
ber held (8-3) that § 200 of the Courts Act 
(1915) made the case un-actionable, as it in 
reality represented a replay of the 2006 case 
in which the claim of ECHR incompatibility 
could have been raised, but was not. The mi-
nority held the claim actionable as grounded 
on the state’s liability as legislator. 
Retroactive legislation, property rights: Par-
liamentary pensions HR-2016-00389-A 
A retired MP, Carl I. Hagen (FrP) argued 
that amendments to a statute regulating par-
liamentary pensions were in violation of the 
prohibition against retroactive laws in the 
Constitution § 97. The amendment did retro-
actively affect Hagen’s pension, a protected 
property right under the Constitution § 105 
and ECHR Protocol 1, art. 1. Under § 97 
precedent, it only bars retroactive legislation 
interfering in legitimate expectations and of 
a certain magnitude. The Supreme Court did 
????????????????????????? ???????????????????
amendment. It emphasized that the amend-
ment did not involve a particularly extensive 
interference into Hagen’s protected property 
rights, and that he in any case did not have 
a legitimate expectation that this right in 
the form of the pension in question would 
remain unchanged. Social considerations 
such as economic sustainability, equality and 
a fair distribution between the generations 
were emphasized in the Court’s overall as-
sessment. 
Sami rights HR-2016-2030-A
A group of Sami reindeer herders had used 
Stjernøya Island in Finnmark as a summer 
grazing area for a number of years, and 
claimed this made them the rightful owners 
of parts of the island with reference i.a. to ILO 
Convention no. 169.33 The Supreme Court 
concluded that the ILO Convention did not 
provide for such rights, but that principles of 
property law should be interpreted in light of 
Sami conditions. The reindeer herders had 
not been the original owners of the island, 
33 Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (Entry into force: 5 Sep 1991). 
and thus had not established ownership by 
principles of occupation of ownerless land. 
The state had exercised right of ownership 
to Stjernøya since the 18th century and the 
????????????????????????????????????????????-
sources. The Sami reindeer herders’ use had 
???????????????????????????????????????????-
inating to be able to establish right of owner-
ship on the basis of immemorial usage. 
Right of privacy, principle of legality HR-
2016-1833-A 
???????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????-
fendant refused to cooperate with the police 
????????????????????????????????????????????
?????? ???? ????????? ?????????? ???? ?? ????
gives the police grounds for “bodily search-
es”, including taking blood samples, the 
?????????????? ???? ???? ???? ???? ??????? ????
??? ?????????? ?????? ??? ??? ???????? ??? ?????
provision. A textual interpretation suggested 
?????????????????? ?????????????????????????
evidence on or within the body of a suspect, 
not the use of a body part to access evidence 
outside of the body. The Constitution § 113 
?????????? ??? ????????????? ????? ???? ??????????
and there was no other legal basis to interfere 
into the private sphere of the suspect as pro-
tected by the Constitution § 102. 
CONCLUSION
 
?? ???????? ?????????? ????? ????? ??? ????? ??? ??
political and legal community, courts in the 
forefront, endeavoring to cope with the im-
plications of the 2014 constitutional reform. 
?????? ??????? ??????? ??? ??????????????????
rights already well established in Norwegian 
law, its revitalization of constitutional think-
???? ??? ?? ???????? ?????????????? ??????????????
a rather pragmatic approach to the Constitu-
tion presents a number of legal methodolog-
????? ??????????????? ??????????????? ??????
are likely to continue, both in court practice 
and possibly also in debates over some of the 
proposed constitutional amendments in the 
coming 2017 parliamentary election.  
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Pakistan
DEVELOPMENTS IN PAKISTANI CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Moeen Cheema, Senior Lecturer and the Convenor of the LLM program in Law, 
Governance and Development, Australian National University College of Law
PAKISTAN
INTRODUCTION
Since the retirement of the former Chief Jus-
tice Iftikhar Chaudhry at the end of 2013, Pa-
kistan’s apex court has progressively looked 
to extricate itself from the political limelight. 
The era of the ‘Chaudhry Court’ was marked 
by extraordinary exertions of judicial power 
such that the judiciary had emerged as one of 
the most prominent players in the country’s 
governance system.1 However, this was also 
a period during which the charges of judicial 
activism and overreach beyond constitution-
al bounds had to some extent tarnished the 
court’s standing, and the Chaudhry Court 
was increasingly seen as an overtly politi-
cal institution. As a result, with the end of 
the Chaudhry era, the judiciary was under 
pressure to show restraint on a range of po-
litical questions and confine itself to a more 
traditional role. Given the relatively short 
tenures of the Chief Justices who followed 
in Chaudhry’s footsteps, the court also ap-
peared to lack strong leadership and clear 
direction. 
????????? ???????? ????? ????? ??????????? ??????
chief justices assumed office and completed 
their tenures as per the mandatory appoint-
ment and retirement terms under the Consti-
tution. Quite poetically, the 23rd Chief Jus-
tice of the Supreme Court served a mere 23 
days in that office. Anwar Zaheer Jamali, the 
24th Chief Justice, assumed office in Sep-
tember 2015 for a tenure that was scheduled 
to end on 30 December 2016. Chief Justice 
Jamali appeared determined to put the public 
law jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in a hi-
atus and reduce this constitutional court to a 
1 Moen Cheema, ‘The “Chaudhry Court”: Deconstructing the “Judicialization of Politics” in Pakistan’ 
[2016] 25 ????????????????????????????????????????
purely appellate forum. This is an endeavour 
he nearly succeeded in despite the political 
storms blowing over on the capital’s Consti-
tution Avenue, on which the Supreme Court 
of Pakistan sits between the Parliament and 
the Prime Minister’s Secretariat.  
2016 was thus the year of the Supreme 
Court’s ultimately futile attempt to dust off 
a political question doctrine and voluntarily 
hand back the powers it had accumulated 
over the last decade. That it failed despite 
such conscious effort reveals the extent 
to which the court has become a central 
player in Pakistan’s constitutional scheme, 
which appears to be the lasting legacy of the 
Chaudhry Court.
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
COURT
Prior to analysing the reluctant constitution-
alism of the Supreme Court in 2016, it may 
?????????????????????????????????????????????-
tutional scheme and the place of the judiciary 
in it. Pakistan’s 1973 Constitution, which has 
undergone several major changes, provides 
for a federal and parliamentary system of 
government in its present form. 
The federation is composed of four provinces 
and four territories. The Punjab is the largest 
province in the country, with more than half 
the population of the country residing there-
in. The dominance of the Punjab in the politi-
cal system and overwhelming representation 
in the military and bureaucracy has histori-
cally been the source of tension amongst the 
federating units. The 18th Amendment to 
the Constitution, passed in 2010, transferred 
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considerable powers and legislative compe-
tencies to the provinces, thereby alleviating 
some of the historical grievances on the part 
of the smaller provinces. 
However, the general elections held in 2013 
resulted in a political landscape whereby the 
Pakistan Muslim League (PML) of the in-
cumbent Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif won 
the overwhelming majority of the seats for 
both the provincial and the national legisla-
tures in the Punjab, thereby enabling the par-
ty to form the federal government. The major 
opposition parties – the PTI, led by famous 
cricketer-turned-politician Imran Khan, and 
the PPP, headed by former president Asif Ali 
??????? ?????????? ??? ???????? ???? ??????-
cial governments in two of the other prov-
????????????? ????? ?????????? ?????????????????
for the emergence of a positive strand of 
competitive federalism whereby the differ-
ent provincial governments may be incentiv-
ised to outperform each other in governance, 
the political system has somewhat reverted 
to the old scheme of inter-provincial resent-
ment at the dominance of the Punjab in poli-
cymaking and allocation of resources by the 
?????????????????????? ???????????????????????
competition between the various political 
parties.
Another key issue that has historically been 
salient in Pakistan’s constitutional politics 
??? ???????????????????????????????????????-
kistan was meant to be a parliamentary de-
mocracy under the 1973 Constitution, the 
country has experienced two extended pe-
riods of military rule, from 1977-1988 and 
again from 1999-2007. Despite the ouster 
of the military from a direct role in gover-
nance, Pakistan remains a weak and transi-
tional democracy with the military retaining 
the capacity to by and large dictate important 
aspects of foreign and national security pol-
icy. There are lingering concerns that polit-
ical instability caused by street protests by 
the opposition parties risks weakening the 
government, thereby further empowering 
the military. 
2 Criminal Original Petition No. 06 of 2012, In Suo Motu Case No. 04 of 2010, P.L.D. 2012 S.C. 553.
3 Muhammad Azhar Siddique v. Federation of Pakistan, P.L.D. 2012 S.C. 660. 
Since 2002 Pakistan has been plagued by a 
multi-faceted and complex problem of ter-
rorism, militancy and insurgency which has 
caused enormous loss of life and economic 
???????? ??????? ???? ????? ???????? ???????????
terrorism and insurgency, the military has 
?????????????????????????????????????????-
tic security policies as well. 
In the aftermath of a particularly gruesome 
attack on a school in December 2014, the 
???????????????????????????????????????????-
lic pressure to compel all the major parties to 
agree on the 21st Amendment, which sanc-
tioned the establishment of military courts 
to try terrorists for an initial period of two 
years. The constitutionality of the amend-
ment was challenged before the Supreme 
Court in 2015 on the basis that it violated the 
??????? ??????????? ??? ????????????????????????
the court upheld the validity of the amend-
ment by a considerable majority, it was nota-
ble that six judges wrote dissenting opinions 
questioning the constitutionality of the con-
stitutional amendment.
Pakistan’s judiciary is composed of three 
??????????????????????????????????????????????
the districts and several special courts and tri-
bunals; a High Court in each of the provinces 
as well as the capital territory of Islamabad; 
and the Supreme Court at the apex. In addi-
tion to having an appellate jurisdiction in civil 
and criminal cases decided by the subordinate 
judiciary, the High Courts have a prominent 
????????? ??????? ??? ??????? ????????????? ??????
Article 199 of the Constitution. Although 
Article 199 does not use the nomenclature of 
the prerogative writs it does grant the High 
Courts powers to issue orders in the nature 
of certiorari, mandamus, habeas corpus and 
quo warranto. Furthermore, it gives the High 
Courts the power to ‘make an order giving 
such directions to any person or authority…
as may be appropriate for the enforcement of 
any of the Fundamental Rights.’ 
The Supreme Court sits as the appeal court 
from the decisions of the High Courts under 
Article 185, including in cases under their 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????
‘Original Jurisdiction’ under Article 184(3) to 
directly hear questions of ‘public importance 
with reference to the enforcement of any of 
the Fundamental Rights’ and has the power 
to issue any order of the nature that the High 
Courts can issue under Article 199. 
Since the 1990s, the Supreme Court has lib-
eralised standing requirement and procedur-
al formalities in cases falling under its Orig-
inal Jurisdiction in order to create the scope 
for Public Interest Litigation. The court also 
granted itself the power to take up cases suo 
motu???????????????????????????????????????-
tioner. The Chaudhry Court made a dramat-
ically expanded use of the Original Jurisdic-
tion by entertaining or initiating suo motu 
petitions challenging a range of governmen-
tal action including several prominent cas-
es of mega corruption scandals against the 
federal government; highest appointments 
in the bureaucracy, public corporations and 
regulatory bodies; as well as human rights 
cases involving abuse of powers by the po-
lice, bureaucracy and local politicians. In 
one prominent and highly controversial case 
in 2012, the Chaudhry Court convicted the 
incumbent Prime Minister of contempt for 
refusing to follow the court’s direction to 
re-initiate money laundering and corruption 
investigations against President Zardari.2 
The court subsequently held that the elected 
??????????????????????????????????????????
a Member of Parliament and dismissed him 
???????????3 
As noted earlier, the post-Chaudhry Su-
preme Court attempted to reduce its political 
footprint but struggled to completely extri-
cate itself from adjudicating controversies 
of pure politics. By late 2014, for example, 
after making several public demands on 
the Supreme Court to take up allegations of 
large-scale rigging in the 2013 elections, the 
opposition PTI launched a ‘Long March’ on 
the capital Islamabad and successfully orga-
nized a protest sit-in on Constitution Avenue 
opposite the Parliament and the Supreme 
Court. As Pakistan veered dangerously close 
to political instability, speculations of yet an-
other military coup were rife. 
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Nonetheless, the Supreme Court, which ap-
peared to be the only constitutional institu-
tion capable of resolving this crisis, remained 
steadfastly on the sidelines. Ultimately, how-
ever, the judiciary was dragged in the mid-
dle of the controversy when the government 
and opposition agreed on the formation of a 
commission of Supreme Court judges to in-
vestigate the claims of large-scale rigging.4 
In July 2015, after extensive hearings, the 
judicial commission found that while there 
had been several irregularities and errors, 
the elections were by and large fair. The 
???????????????????? ????????????????????-
ings even if grudgingly and the judiciary 
thus succeeded in ending a protracted con-
troversy which had nearly led to the ouster 
of yet another elected government through 
extra-constitutional means. Such was the 
immediate context to Chief Justice Jamali’s 
ascension and partially explains his resolve 
to take the Supreme Court further away from 
the political spotlight.
DEVELOPMENTS AND  
CONTROVERSIES IN 2016 
The relative calm enjoyed by the Supreme 
?????? ??????? ???? ????? ???? ??????? ??? ??????
Justice Jamali’s tenure was shattered in April 
2016 by the storm of ‘Panamagate’ when 
the International Consortium of Investiga-
??????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????? ????? ??? ?? ??????????? ???? ????
publicly available. These leaks revealed the 
????????????????????????????????????????????
Prime Minister, his brother the Chief Minister 
of Punjab and his two apolitical sons resid-
ing in the UK, and his daughter, who has been 
??????????? ????????? ???????? ????? ??? ??????
eight offshore companies which owned some 
of the most expensive properties in London. 
The Panama leaks thus gave credence to 
long-standing allegations of corruption and 
money laundering dating as far back as the 
early 1990s when Nawaz Sharif enjoyed the 
??????????????????????????????????? ?????????
4 Moeen Cheema, “Election Disputes” or Disputed Elections?: Judicial (Non-)Review of Elections in Pakistan’ in P J Yap (ed), Judicial Review of Elections in 
Asia (Routledge 2016).
5 Hasnat Malik, ‘SC upholds death penalty for 16 terrorists’ (The Express Tribune, 30 August 2016) https://tribune.com.pk/story/1172316/sc-up-
holds-death-penalty-16-terrorists/.
Under pressure from the opposition, the 
Prime Minister made an address to the nation 
and then before the Parliament proffering 
vague explanations of his family’s fortunes 
and offering himself up for accountability. 
???? ?????? ????????? ????? ??????? ??? ???????
an inquiry commission composed of retired 
judges but after criticism sent a request to 
Chief Justice Jamali to constitute a judicial 
commission of Supreme Court judges to 
probe the Panama controversy. The Chief 
Justice, however, declined to form a com-
mission on the grounds that the terms of ref-
erence sent by the Prime Minister were so 
broad that it would take the omission several 
years to conclude its proceedings. 
After extended wrangling between the gov-
ernment and opposition parties over the 
terms of reference of a judicial commission, 
??????????????????????????????? ????????????
????????? ????????????????????????????????-
cation of the Prime Minister on the grounds 
that he had lied before Parliament in his ad-
dress and had failed to disclose his assets 
before the Election Commission prior to 
contesting the last elections. Simultaneous-
ly, the PTI launched a campaign of protest 
gatherings across the country. As the polit-
ical temperature soared, the Supreme Court 
refused to act. 
In October, six months after the Panama 
leaks, Imran Khan called upon the rank and 
???? ??? ???? ???? ??? ?????? ??? ?????????? ????
forcibly lock down the capital. The day be-
fore the scheduled lockdown, amidst a police 
operation and the looming threat of violent 
????????????????????????????????????????????
defuse the tensions by announcing the for-
mation of a larger bench headed by the Chief 
Justice to hear the Panama case and expedite 
the proceedings. Throughout November, 
the court gathered extensive documenta-
tion form both parties and began hearings. 
However, the proceedings were prematurely 
and somewhat abruptly ended on December 
9 citing the Chief Justice’s impending re-
tirement and the scheduled holidays. Quite 
 
problematically, the court also declared that 
the proceedings conducted thus far would be 
disregarded and a new bench constituted by 
the incoming Chief Justice would proceed 
afresh. 
The judicial year 2016 and the tenure of 
Chief Justice Jamali thus ended with a 
whimper, accurately symbolizing the equiv-
ocations of the apex court in the face of chal-
lenging constitutional crises.
MAJOR CASES
????????????????????????????????????????????
decided by the Supreme Court in 2016 reveal 
the absence of a coherent judicial agenda. 
???????? ??? ?????? ?????? ?????????? ???????????
retrenchment of the Supreme Court’s role or 
its refusal to exercise robust review of gov-
ernmental action. 
Separation of Powers
As noted earlier, one of the most critical is-
sues falling under the head of the separation 
of powers concerns the role of the military. 
Formally, the military is a subordinate agen-
cy of the executive but has historically en-
???????????????????????????????????????????
national security policymaking even under 
civilian governments. In 2016, the Supreme 
Court continued to turn a blind eye towards 
the military’s de facto power. For instance, 
a bench headed by Chief Justice Jamali up-
held the convictions and award of capital 
punishment to proclaimed terrorists by mil-
itary courts established pursuant to the 21st 
Amendment.5 The court claimed a rather 
narrow jurisdiction to review the record of 
the decisions of the military courts and dis-
avowed appeals on the merits of individual 
cases. The court further held that the trials 
by military courts did not contravene the 
right to fair trial under Article 10-A of the 
Constitution. This is highly problematic giv-
en the weak procedural safeguards, lack of 
transparency and the heavy reliance on con-
fessions and secret evidence by the military 
courts. 
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As regards the civilian government in con-
trast, a rare decision of the court in 2016 can 
be highlighted as deepening the democratic 
process in Pakistan. In Mustafa Impex, the 
??????????????????????????????????????????-
ernment and who can exercise the powers 
vested in the federal government.6 Article 90 
states that ‘the executive authority of the Fed-
eration shall be exercised … by the Federal 
Government, consisting of the Prime Minis-
ter and the Federal Ministers, which shall act 
through the Prime Minister.’ Essentially, the 
question before the court was whether the 
Prime Minister could, independently of the 
Cabinet and while exercising a discretionary 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
the federal government. The court held that 
the federal government includes the Prime 
Minister and his Cabinet, and even though 
???? ??????????????? ??? ????? ???????? ???????
he cannot solely act on behalf of the federal 
government without the approval of the Cab-
inet. The court further held that the powers 
of the federal government could not be del-
?????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????? ??????? ??? ?????????????? ??? ????
Finance Division without the approval of the 
Cabinet were void. This judgment ended the 
established practice of department secretaries 
exercising powers of the federal government 
without prior Cabinet approval. It also com-
pelled the Prime Minister to convene regular 
????????????????????????? ????????????????????
the ruling party, which is dominated by the 
Sharif family is such that cabinet meetings 
will continue to be largely rubber-stamping 
exercises, this decision nonetheless compels 
formal consultation with the Cabinet on the 
????????? ??? ?????????? ???? ?????? ??????? ???
the federal government.
Rights and Freedoms
In a criminal appeal decided in late 2015 and 
reported in early 2016, the Supreme Court 
????? ???? ????? ???????????? ??????????????
on vigilante action against those accused of 
blasphemy. The misuse of blasphemy laws 
has become an issue of grave concern as 
there have been several gruesome cases in-
6 Messers Mustafa Impex, Karachi v. Government of Pakistan, P.L.D. 2016 S.C. 808. 
7 Malik Muhammad Mumtaz Qadri v. State, P.L.D. 2016 S.C. 17. 
8 Malik Muhammad Mumtaz Qadri v. State, P.L.D. 2016 S.C. 146.
9 Government of Punjab v. Aamir Zahoor-Ul-Haq, P.L.D. 2016 S.C. 421.
volving unfounded accusations of blasphe-
my or religious desecration which resulted in 
mob violence and killings of those accused. 
?????? ????? ????? ?????????? ????? ?????????
accusations against people belonging to reli-
gious minorities – especially Christians and 
Ahmadis – several cases have involved blas-
phemy allegations against Muslims as well. 
In one such case a police guard killed the late 
governor of Punjab Salman Taseer after he 
criticised the abuse of blasphemy laws in a 
case involving a Christian woman and called 
???? ???????? ??? ???? ????????????? ??? ???? ?????
appeal in the Mumtaz Qadri case, a bench 
of the Supreme Court upheld the conviction 
and the award of capital punishment.7 No-
tably, the court held that criticizing blasphe-
my law was not tantamount to committing 
blasphemy itself. Furthermore, it dismissed 
the plea of provocation, held that the vigilan-
te killing of a person accused of blasphemy 
????????????????? ??????????????????????????
the original charge under the anti-terrorism 
legislation given the circumstances in which 
the murder had been committed by a police 
guard in a public place. The court subse-
quently dismissed a review petition which 
had attempted to raise questions of Islamic 
law on the basis that these had not been ar-
gued in the original appeal.8 In addition to 
??????????????????????????????????????????????
vigilante violence in the aftermath of blas-
phemy accusations, the case also demon-
strated the courts capacity to deal with high-
ly contentious terrorism incidents. 
Foreign Relations
In August 2015, a three-member bench of the 
Supreme Court headed by the then Chief Jus-
tice Jawad S Khawaja declared the issuance 
of licenses to hunt the endangered Houbara 
Bustard to be illegal on the grounds that the 
practice not only violated federal and pro-
vincial laws but also relevant commitments 
under international law. Despite the protect-
ed nature of this rare bird species, the provin-
cial governments of Balochistan and Sindh 
had issued such licenses to visiting Arab dig-
nitaries and the federal government argued 
for the continuance of this practice before 
the Supreme Court on the basis that this was 
vital for maintaining friendly relations with 
important allies in the Middle East. 
Merely a few months after this decision, the 
concerned provincial governments and the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????
By this stage, Justice Jawad S Khawaja had 
retired and had been replaced by Justice Ja-
mali. Exercising his discretion in the consti-
tution of the bench, Chief Justice Jamali de-
parted from established convention and rules 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
to hear the review petition. Even more ex-
ceptional was the decision not to include one 
of the other judges from the original bench in 
the review petition. 
By a majority of 4-1, the larger bench re-
versed the original decision of the Supreme 
Court and reinstated the licenses.9 Justice 
??????????????? ???????????????????????????-
cision, now wrote a scathing dissent criticiz-
ing the decision to constitute a larger bench, 
the exclusion of the other serving judge and 
the reversal on the basis of a palpable error 
on the face of the record. 
This case provided clear evidence of ideo-
????????????????????????????????????????????
on the part of the Jamali-led court to placate 
the government. It also provided indication 
of problematic personal and possibly busi-
ness links between the Sharif family and 
Arab royals, an issue that became explicit 
??????????????????????????????? ?????????-
peared that the Sharif family would fail to 
provide any proof of how it generated and 
transferred funds to invest in multiple steel 
mills in gulf states, from the sale of which it 
had ultimately acquired the London proper-
ties, a prominent member of the Qatari royal 
family produced a letter of dubious veracity 
claiming that the funds had been provided by 
??????? ??????? ??? ???????????? ??? ??????????
Minister’s late father decades earlier. The 
Sharif family’s unduly close links with Saudi 
and Gulf royalty have emerged as a source of 
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concerns in an agreement by Pakistan to pur-
??????????????????????????????????????????
prices as well as the government’s willing-
ness to support the foreign policy objectives 
of the Saudi government in the Middle East 
even when this does not appear to be in Paki-
stan’s best interests.
Other Decisions Impacting Judicial Power
????? ????????? ????????????? ???????? ????-
li declared 2016 to be the year of judicial 
accountability. However, the Chief Justice 
failed to make any stride towards reinvig-
orating the Supreme Judicial Council, the 
constitutional body mandated to hold judges 
accountable. Nonetheless, one decision of 
the court went some way towards instituting 
good administrative practices in the judicia-
ry. In the Islamabad High Court case, the Su-
preme Court entertained a petition under its 
Original Jurisdiction questioning the legality 
of administrative appointments, promotions 
and transfers at the time of the founding of 
the High Court of the capital territory.10 
The Supreme Court found several instanc-
es of irregularities and breaches of rules in 
the appointment and transfer of the admin-
istrative staff in the High Court. As a con-
sequence, one judge of the Supreme Court 
who had been the chief justice of the High 
Court during the impugned period resigned 
????? ???? ??????? ???? ????? ???? ??? ??????????
precedent for transparent and meritocratic 
processes in the appointments, promotions 
and transfers of administrative staff not only 
in the courts but also other public organi-
zations. In addition, a handful of suo motu 
cases taken up by Chief Justice Jamali nomi-
nally continued the practice of the court tak-
ing up human rights issues based on media 
reports. There is no clear pattern or logic to 
these rare suo motu actions beyond a mini-
mal assertion of the court’s power to under-
take such actions. 
Postscript on the Panama Case
??? ?????????????? ?? ?????????????????????-
ber bench of the Supreme Court took up the 
issue of the Panama leaks, corruption charges 
against the Prime Minister and his family, 
 
10 Muhammad Akram v. Registrar, Islamabad High Court, P.L.D. 2016 S.C. 961.
11 Haseeb Bhatti and Naveed Siddiqui, ‘Panamagate verdict: PML-N declares “victory”, Supreme Court orders JIT probe of Sharif family’ (The Dawn, 20 April 
2017) https://www.dawn.com/news/1327961/panamagate-verdict-pml-n-declares-victory-supreme-court-orders-jit-probe-of-sharif-family.
???? ???? ?????????? ???????????????? ????????
that had been belatedly and grudgingly taken 
up by the Jamali-led bench in late 2016 and 
had been left unresolved after the consump-
tion of considerable court time. After regular 
hearings, the bench reserved its judgment on 
February 23. On April 20, after a delay of 
nearly two months, the bench published its 
much-awaited judgment according to which 
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif narrowly avoi-
???? ?????????? ??????????????????? ?????????
by a narrow majority of 3-2, the court orde-
red the creation of a Joint Investigation Team 
composed of members from various civili-
an and military agencies to investigate the 
charges of corruption and money laundering 
against the Prime Minister and his family. 
?????? ????? ???? ???? ??????? ??? ?????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????
Minister without further investigation, all 
the members of the bench recorded adverse 
observations against him. It appears that the 
majority of the Supreme Court bench essen-
tially decided to kick this political football 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
the Panama leaks controversy will continue 
to dominate Pakistan’s politics for at least a 
few months.
The majority decision in the Panama case 
saga represents to some extent a hangover of 
the reluctant constitutionalism of Chief Jus-
tice Jamali’s tenure. Billed by some as the 
anti-Chaudhry court, the Jamali-led Supreme 
Court tried to make a virtue of indecision and 
lack of purpose by claiming a righteous form 
of judicial restraint. Its ultimately futile at-
tempt to stand fully apart from political con-
troversies that only an impartial and credible 
judiciary may resolve highlights the lasting 
legacy of the Chaudhry era. Pakistan’s supe-
rior judiciary has irreversibly evolved from 
a peripheral institution to a central player 
in constitutional politics and statecraft. The 
strength of the dissents in the Panama case 
may indicate that in the coming years the Su-
???????????? ???????????????????????????????
prominent role and adjudicate challenging 
constitutional controversies with credibility.
160 | I•CONnect-Clough Center 
Philippines 
DEVELOPMENTS IN PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Dante Gatmaytan, Professor at the University of the Philippines, College of Law
PHILIPPINES
INTRODUCTION: CALM BEFORE 
THE STORM
It was, for a very long time, revered as an 
institution untainted with corruption. But 
the Court squandered its reputation when, in 
1973, it ruled in favor of extra-constitution-
al revision of the Constitution and allowed 
a dictatorship to take root and flourish. Fer-
dinand Marcos railroaded the adoption of a 
new constitution by creating citizens’ assem-
blies which, by a show of hands, allegedly 
approved his constitution. This was accom-
plished in an atmosphere of restricted civil 
liberties brought on by Marcos’s imposition 
of martial law.
The Supreme Court avoided confronta-
tion with Marcos by invoking the “political 
????????????????????????????????????????????
raised before it were better decided by other 
branches of government. The post-Marcos 
1987 Constitution empowered the Court to 
determine whether there has been an abuse 
of discretion on the part of other branches of 
government, thereby weakening the political 
question doctrine.
Because it had opted to support Marcos, the 
Philippine Supreme Court will always be un-
der public scrutiny.
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
COURT 
The Constitution of the Republic of the Phil-
ippines is thirty years old. It was drafted in 
1986 after Ferdinand Marcos was forced out 
of office by days-long massive protests, and 
ratified overwhelmingly the following year. 
The Constitution was a response to the abus-
es of the Marcos regime, containing several 
innovations that are designed to strengthen 
the separation of powers, as well as checks 
and balances. 
Some of the clearest attempts to prevent a re-
prise of dictatorial experience were the inno-
vations to strengthen the judiciary. This was 
imperative because of the Supreme Court’s 
role in sanctioning and sustaining the dicta-
torship.
Constitutionally barred from seeking a third 
term, Marcos called for a constitutional 
convention to rewrite the Constitution and 
adopt a parliamentary form of government, 
which would then allow him to rule as Prime 
Minister. Marcos then attempted to railroad 
the adoption of the Constitution, ignored 
procedures for the amendment or revision 
of the Constitution, and created “citizens’ 
assemblies” (which included children) to 
signify their consent by raising their hands. 
In Javellana v. Executive Secretary, a ma-
jority of the Supreme Court members ruled 
that the Constitution was not validly ratified, 
although the Court also ruled that the new 
Constitution was already in force through the 
acquiescence of the people. It was a politi-
cal question, not a legal one, and not some-
thing that could be decided by the Court. The 
Court would later use the “political question 
doctrine” to sanction almost every act by 
Ferdinand Marcos, allowing him to pervert 
the rule of law.
The 1987 Constitution expanded judicial 
power to include the duty of the courts of 
justice to settle actual controversies involv-
ing rights which are legally demandable and 
enforceable, and to determine whether or not 
there has been a grave abuse of discretion 
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction 
on the part of any branch or instrumentali-
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ty of the government. This was designed to 
prevent courts from resorting to the political 
question doctrine and to rule on the merits 
of the case.
DEVELOPMENTS AND  
CONTROVERSIES IN 2016 
The Supreme Court is stronger under the 
1987 Constitution, reviewing acts of the Ex-
ecutive and Legislative branches and striking 
them down on the ground that there was an 
abuse of discretion on their part. The Court is 
quick to point out, however, that the Consti-
tution did not completely extinguish the po-
litical question doctrine. In 2016, the Court 
faced its first major case questioning an act 
???????????????????????????????????????????
former President Marcos in the Libingan 
ng mga Bayani (Heroes’ Cemetery). In that 
case, the petitioners argued that the burial of 
Marcos at the LNMB should not be allowed 
because it rewrites the history of revolting 
against an authoritarian ruler and it condones 
the abuses committed during the Martial 
Law regime, which would violate the letter 
and spirit of the Constitution, which they de-
scribed as a “post-dictatorship charter” and a 
“human rights constitution”.
The Court held that the decision to have the 
remains of the former president interred at 
the Libingan ng mga Bayani was not a jus-
ticiable controversy because it involved a 
political question. According to the Court, 
the President decided a question of policy 
based on his wisdom that it would promote 
national healing and forgiveness. The Court 
held that his acts were consistent with the 
Constitution, pertinent statutes, international 
human rights laws, and jurisprudence.
Duterte will likely cross paths with the Su-
preme Court again. Unlike Marcos, who 
wanted the judiciary to provide the legal 
scaffolding for his work, Duterte despises 
????????????????????? ??????????????????????
wrote him about the constitutional proce-
dures that should be followed in cases in-
volving judges allegedly involved in illegal 
drugs, he told the Chief Justice: “I’m giving 
you a warning. Don’t create a crisis because 
I will order everybody in the Executive de-
partment not to honor you.” He accused the 
Chief Justice of interfering with his job and 
threatened to declare martial law.
The Philippines presently finds itself under 
this atmosphere of increased tension be-
tween the President and the Courts. 
MAJOR CASES
Separation of Powers
Another constitutional change introduced in 
the 1987 Constitution was the creation of the 
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), which vets 
aspirants to the judiciary and submits a list 
of names from which the President can nom-
inate aspirants to judgeships. It reduces the 
President’s discretion and theoretically pre-
vents the President from packing the Court 
with friends.
In a case involving multiple vacancies in 
the Sandiganbayan (a special court created 
to deal with graft cases), the JBC clustered 
nominees in six separate lists. Then President 
Benigno Aquino III disregarded the clusters 
when he appointed the Justices to fill the 
vacancies. His acts were challenged before 
the Supreme Court. The Court sided with the 
President and held that the JBC, in sorting 
the qualified nominees into six clusters, one 
for every vacancy, could influence the ap-
pointment process beyond its constitutional 
mandate of recommending qualified nom-
inees to the President. Clustering impinges 
upon the President’s power of appointment 
as well as restricts the chances for appoint-
ment of the qualified nominees because (1) 
the President’s option for every vacancy 
is limited to the five to seven nominees in 
the cluster; and (2) once the President has 
appointed from one cluster, then he is pro-
scribed from considering the other nominees 
in the same cluster for the other vacancies. 
The said limitations are utterly without legal 
basis and in contravention of the President’s 
appointing power.
Rights and Freedoms
The Committee on Trade and Related Mat-
ters (CTRM) of the National Economic 
and Development Authority held a meet-
ing where it resolved to recommend to then 
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo the lift-
ing of the suspension of the tariff reduction 
schedule on petrochemicals and certain plas-
tic products, thereby reducing the Common 
Effective Preferential Tariff rates on certain 
products. A stakeholder in the petrochemical 
industry filed a case to compel the CTRM 
to provide the minutes of the meeting that 
led to the CTRM’s recommendation. The 
trial court dismissed the case and the issue 
that was elevated to the Supreme Court was 
whether the CTRM may be compelled to fur-
nish the petitioner with a copy of the minutes 
of the meeting based on the constitutional 
right to information on matters of public 
concern and the State’s policy of full public 
disclosure. The Court affirmed the dismissal 
of the case.
According to the Court, two requisites must 
concur before the right to information may 
be compelled by writ of mandamus. First, 
the information sought must be in relation to 
matters of public concern or public interest. 
Second, it must not be exempt by law from 
the operation of the constitutional guarantee. 
There is a need to strike a balance between 
the right of the people and the interest of the 
Government to be protected. In this case, the 
need to ensure the protection of the privilege 
of non-disclosure is necessary to allow the 
free exchange of ideas among Government 
officials as well as to guarantee the well-con-
sidered recommendation free from interfer-
ence of the inquisitive public.
Another case involved a Davao City ordi-
nance which imposed a ban against aerial 
spraying as an agricultural practice. The Fili-
pino Banana Growers and Exporters Associ-
ation challenged the constitutionality of the 
ordinance, alleging that it was an unreason-
able exercise of police power and a violation 
of the equal protection clause, and amounted 
to the confiscation of property without due 
process of law. The Court ruled in favor of 
the respondents on all counts, holding the or-
dinance unconstitutional. 
The City justified the prohibition against ae-
rial spraying by insisting that the occurrence 
of drift causes inconvenience and harm to 
the residents and degrades the environment. 
The Court noted, however, that drift occurs 
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regardless of how pesticides are released. 
Another flaw in the Ordinance was that it 
required the maintenance of the 30-meter 
buffer zone regardless of the area of the agri-
cultural landholding, geographical location, 
topography, crops grown, and other distin-
guishing characteristics that ideally should 
bear a reasonable relation to the evil sought 
to be avoided.
An election-related case involved Rappler, 
Inc., which filed a petition for certiorari 
and prohibition against respondent Andres 
Bautista, in his capacity as Chairman of the 
Commission on Elections, to nullify a part 
of the Memorandum Agreement on the 2016 
presidential and vice-presidential debates. 
Rappler claimed that they were being exe-
cuted without or in excess of jurisdiction 
and that they were violating its fundamental 
constitutional rights. The parts sought to be 
nullified allowed the debates to be shown or 
streamed on other websites, and allowed a 
maximum of two minutes of excerpt from 
the debates to be used for news reporting or 
fair use by other media or other entities. Rap-
pler contended that it was being discriminat-
ed against because the MOA granted radio 
stations the right to simultaneously broad-
cast live the audio of the debates, even if they 
were not obliged to perform any obligation 
under the MOA. Despite this, Rappler and 
other online media entities were denied the 
right to broadcast by live streaming the audio 
online. The Court partially granted the peti-
tion, allowing the debates to be livestreamed 
unaltered on other websites, including Rap-
pler’s, subject to the copyright condition that 
the source be clearly indicated.
In ruling for Rappler, the Supreme Court 
held that the presidential and vice-presiden-
tial debates are held to assist the electorate in 
making informed choices on election day. The 
political nature of the national debates and the 
public’s interest in the wide availability of the 
information for the voters’ education certain-
ly justify allowing the debates to be shown or 
streamed on other websites for wider dissemi-
nation, in accordance with the MOA.
The debates should be allowed to be lives-
treamed on other websites, including the 
petitioner’s, as expressly mandated in the 
MOA. The respondent, as representative of 
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), 
which provides over-all supervision un-
der the MOA, including the power to “re-
solve issues that may arise among the par-
ties involved in the organization of the 
debates,” should be directed by this Court to 
implement Part VI (C), paragraph 19 of the 
MOA, which allows the debates to be shown 
or livestreamed unaltered on petitioner’s and 
other websites subject to the copyright con-
dition that the source is clearly indicated.
Foreign, International and/or Multilateral 
Relations
The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agree-
ment (EDCA) authorizes US military forces 
to have access to and conduct activities with-
in certain “Agreed Locations” in the coun-
try. It was not transmitted to the Senate, on 
the executive’s understanding that it was not 
necessary. The Department of Foreign Af-
fairs (DFA) and the US Embassy exchanged 
diplomatic notes confirming the completion 
of all necessary internal requirements for 
the agreement, after which it was ratified by 
President Benigno S. Aquino III. The peti-
tioners challenged the procedure by which 
EDCA became law.
The Court upheld the constitutionality of 
EDCA because the President has the choice 
of entering into executive agreements in-
stead of treaties, provided the law is con-
fined to the adjustment of details regarding 
existing arrangements with foreign military 
forces. EDCA fulfills this requirement, as it 
is consistent with the content, purpose and 
framework of the existing Mutual Defense 
Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement. 
The only exception is when the agreement 
involves allowing foreign military bases and 
troops, which should be done through a trea-
ty duly concurred in by the Senate.
The Court also had occasion to rule that a 
British national wrongly accused of rape 
could not ask the courts to enforce a Unit-
ed Nations Human Rights Committee View 
that under  International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, the Philippines should 
compensate him for his detention. The Court 
held that there must be an act more than rat-
ification to make a treaty applicable in the 
Philippines. The Court explained that while 
the Philippines is a signatory to the ICCPR 
and the Optional Protocol, nowhere in these 
instruments does it say that the View of the 
Committee forms part of the treaty.
Other Cases
Among the most significant cases decided 
by the Supreme Court involved the citizen-
ship of Grace Poe, a Senator and presidential 
candidate in the May 2016 elections. 
On March 8, 2016, the Philippine Supreme 
Court promulgated a landmark decision hold-
ing that Senator Grace Poe, a foundling, is 
a natural born citizen and eligible to run for 
President in the May 2016 national elections.
Poe had been naturalized as a citizen of the 
United States in 2001 after being petitioned 
by her husband, who has dual citizenship. 
After her father’s death, however, she gave 
up US citizenship and entered public life, 
serving briefly as the chair of the Movie and 
Television Regulatory and Classification 
Board. Thereafter, she for Senator in 2010, 
garnering the highest number of votes.
Immensely popular, political parties were 
eyeing Poe as a potential candidate either 
as President or as a Senator. Her status as a 
foundling, however, posed serious problems, 
because according to the Philippine Consti-
tution, a Senator and the President must be 
natural born citizens. 
????????????????????????????????????????????
for President on October 15, 2015, a petition 
was filed to have it cancelled on the ground 
that she satisfied neither the citizenship nor 
residency requirements of the Constitution. 
The COMELEC ruled against Poe. Three 
other petitions filed to disqualify Poe from 
the elections on the same grounds were de-
cided against her. 
Poe brought the COMELEC rulings to the 
Supreme Court, and in a 9 to 6 ruling, the 
Court reversed decisions of the COMELEC 
and held that Poe satisfied both the citizen-
ship and the ten-year residency requirements 
and was qualified to be a candidate for Pres-
ident in the May 2016 elections.
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The challenge to Poe’s citizenship rested 
on the fact that foundlings are not expressly 
mentioned as citizens in any of the country’s 
Constitutions. On this point, the majority of 
the Supreme Court held that “As a matter of 
law, foundlings are, as a class, natural-born 
?????????? ????????????????????????????????-
meration is silent as to foundlings, there is no 
restrictive language which would definitely 
exclude foundlings either.” The Court exam-
ined the intent of the framers of the Consti-
tution and found that there was an attempt 
to include foundlings in the enumeration 
of natural born citizens in the Constitution. 
This was not carried out “not because there 
was any objection to the notion that persons 
of ‘unknown parentage’ are not citizens but 
only because their number was not enough to 
merit specific mention.”
The Court could not discern any “intent or 
language permitting discrimination against 
foundlings” and instead found that all three 
Constitutions guarantee the basic right to 
equal protection of the laws and exhort the 
State to render social justice. It cited provi-
sions in the present Constitution that do not 
show any intent to discriminate against found-
lings “on account of their unfortunate status.”
On Poe’s residency, the Court criticized the 
COMELEC for reckoning her residency 
from the date stated in Poe’s “sworn declara-
tion in her COC [certificate of candidacy] for 
Senator.” The COMELEC said that the state-
ment was an admission that her residence 
in the Philippines began only in November 
2006, falling short of the ten-year residency 
requirement.
This, said the Court, ignores case law that 
holds that it is the fact of residence, not the 
statement of the person, that determines res-
idence for purposes of compliance with the 
constitutional requirement of residency for 
election as President. The Court explained 
that when Poe made the declaration in her 
COC for Senator that she has been a resi-
dent for a period of six years and six months 
counted up to the 13 May 2013 elections, 
“she naturally had as reference the resi-
dency requirements for election as Senator 
which was satisfied by her declared years of 
residence.” In other words, Poe had written 
down the period that satisfies the residency 
requirements for Senator; but there was ev-
idence showing that she had established her 
residency earlier still.
Chief Justice Lourdes Sereno, in her con-
curring opinion, explained her approach to 
addressing the absence of any reference to 
foundlings in the Constitution. She said that 
in interpreting the Constitution, the Court 
“should strive to give meaning to its provi-
sions not only with reference to its text or 
the original intention of its framers.” She 
cited ideals enumerated in the Preamble of 
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the general welfare”; to “build a just and 
humane society”; and to “secure the bless-
ings of independence and democracy under 
the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, 
freedom, love, equality, and peace.” She 
concluded that any construction that would 
detract from these fundamental values can-
not be countenanced. Using her approach, 
she opined that a declaration that foundlings 
are not natural-born citizens is unconsciona-
ble and would effectively render all children 
of unknown parentage stateless and would 
place them in a condition of extreme vulner-
ability. Depriving them of citizenship would 
leave foundlings without any right or mea-
sure of protection.
The legality of Poe’s election as a Senator 
was decided in another case. Rizalito Da-
vid, a losing candidate in the 2010 senatorial 
elections, challenged her qualifications as a 
Senator before the Senate Electoral Tribu-
nal (SET). The SET ruled in Senator Poe’s 
favour and this decision was elevated to the 
Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court upheld the SET’s con-
clusions, saying that they are in keeping with 
a faithful and exhaustive reading of the Con-
stitution, one that proceeds from an intent to 
give life to all the aspirations of all its pro-
visions. 
The SET was confronted with a novel legal 
question: the citizenship status of children 
whose biological parents are unknown, con-
sidering that the Constitution, in Article IV, 
Section 1 (2) explicitly makes reference to 
one’s father or mother. It was compelled to 
exercise its original jurisdiction in the face of 
a constitutional ambiguity that, at that point, 
was without judicial precedent. Acting with-
in this void, the Senate Electoral Tribunal 
was only asked to make a reasonable inter-
pretation of the law while heedfully consid-
ering the established personal circumstances 
of the private respondent. It could not have 
asked the impossible of the private respon-
dent, sending her on a proverbial fool’s er-
rand to establish her parentage, when the 
controversy before it arose because the pri-
vate respondent’s parentage was unknown 
and has remained so throughout her life.
The SET knew the limits of human capacity. 
It did not insist on burdening the private re-
spondent with conclusively proving the one 
thing that she has never been in a position 
to know throughout her lifetime. Instead, it 
conscientiously appreciated the implications 
of all other facts known about her finding. 
Therefore, it arrived at conclusions in a man-
ner in keeping with the degree of proof re-
quired in proceedings before a quasi-judicial 
body: not absolute certainty, not proof be-
yond reasonable doubt or preponderance of 
evidence, but “substantial evidence, or that 
amount of relevant evidence which a reason-
able mind might accept as adequate to justify 
a conclusion.” The Court held:
Equality, the recognition of the humani-
ty of every individual, and social justice 
are the bedrocks of our constitutional 
order. By the unfortunate fortuity of 
the inability or outright irresponsibili-
ty of those who gave them life, found-
lings are compelled to begin their very 
existence at a disadvantage. Theirs is a 
continuing destitution that can never be 
truly remedied by any economic relief.
If we are to make the motives of our 
Constitution true, then we can never 
tolerate an interpretation that condemns 
foundlings to an even greater misfortune 
because of their being abandoned. The 
Constitution cannot be rendered inert 
and meaningless for them by mechani-
cal judicial fiat....
It is the empowering and ennobling in-
terpretation of the Constitution that we 
must always sustain. Not only will this 
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manner of interpretation edify the less 
fortunate; it establishes us, as Filipinos, 
as a humane and civilized people.
The petition was dismissed, and the Court 
held that the SET did not act without or in 
excess of its jurisdiction or without grave 
abuse of discretion in holding that Poe-Lla-
manzares was a natural-born citizen quali-
fied to hold office as Senator of the Republic.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s plate in 2016 was a 
standard mix of cases implicating both the 
structure of government and the people’s 
rights. Some cases touched upon the national 
elections held in May of that year. On this 
score, the Court performed well by ruling on 
the qualifications of foundlings for national 
offices, and ensuring that the public be af-
forded every opportunity to make informed 
decisions.
The results of the elections will make 2017 
more interesting. President Duterte’s ap-
proach to governance will trigger litigation 
that will reach the Supreme Court. More than 
8,000 suspected drug users or pushers have 
been killed without the benefit of due pro-
cess; there are no warrants of arrest, and no 
trials. His top critic, a Senator who conduct-
ed an investigation of the “war on drugs,” is 
now in jail. The Vice-President, also a critic 
of the drug war, is being threatened with im-
peachment. Most members of Congress have 
aligned themselves with the President. The 
Supreme Court is the only institution that 
can serve as a check on the President.
The rule of law in the Philippines will be 
tested very soon. There are cases challeng-
ing the President’s anti-drug program pend-
ing before the Supreme Court and the Office 
of the Ombudsman. The Court will be at a 
crossroads: in a position to either reprise its 
role in 1973 and bend to the Executive’s will 
or stand its ground and serve as a legitimate 
check on government excesses.
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POLAND
INTRODUCTION
In 2015-2016, the Polish constitutional scene 
was reshaped beyond recognition. The Pol-
ish Constitutional Tribunal (hereinafter re-
ferred to as “Tribunal”) was emasculated 
to the point that constitutional review was 
rendered meaningless and reduced to mere 
?????? ???????????????? ???????????????????
times, review of the constitutional jurispru-
dence would comprise “ordinary” constitu-
tional controversies that made their way onto 
the Tribunal’s docket. Yet, given the unprec-
edented attack from the ruling majority on 
the Tribunal’s stature and functions and the 
constraints of space, the authors had to make 
a difficult choice of skipping the “business 
as usual” case law1 and instead focusing en-
tirely on the “existential jurisprudence” of 
the Tribunal. The “existential jurisprudence” 
aims at safeguarding the essence of judicial 
review in Poland and saving the Tribunal 
???????????????????????????? ?????????????-
tution’s very survival is on the line, every-
thing else must be pushed to the background.
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
The Polish Constitution was adopted in 
1997. The Constitution opens with an inclu-
sive Preamble that provides, inter alia, fun 
1 Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, it must be mentioned that the Tribunal had decided some 
interesting cases in this category of “ordinary controversies”. In normal constitutional times they would 
merit our attention. For example, case K 1/13 (elucidating the principles on the creation of trade unions; 
judgment of 2 June 2015); K 12/14 (right of a physician to refuse performing an operation inconsistent 
with his conscience; 7 October 2015); P 31/12 (lustration of the judges, 2 April 2015); Kp 1/15 (supervi-
sion of the Ministry of Justice over the courts); P 1/14 (pension scheme, 3 November 2015).      
damental axiological signposts for constitu-
tional interpretation: “We, the Polish Nation 
- all citizens of the Republic, Both those who 
believe in God as the source of truth, justice, 
good and beauty, As well as those not shar-
ing such faith but respecting those universal 
values as arising from other sources, Equal 
in rights and obligations towards the com-
mon good - Poland […] Obliged to bequeath 
to future generations all that is valuable from 
our over one thousand years’ heritage […], 
Hereby establish this Constitution of the 
Republic of Poland as the basic law for the 
State, based on respect for freedom and jus-
tice, cooperation between the public powers, 
social dialogue as well as on the principle of 
subsidiarity in the strengthening the powers 
of citizens and their communities, We call 
upon all those who will apply this Consti-
tution for the good of the Third Republic to 
do so paying respect to the inherent dignity 
of the person, his or her right to freedom, 
the obligation of solidarity with others, and 
respect for these principles as the unshake-
able foundation of the Republic of Poland”. 
Building on this, the Constitution is organ-
ised in XIII Chapters, of which most import-
ant are Chapter I (Republic), II (freedoms, 
rights and duties); III (sources of law); IV 
(Legislative branch composed by the lower 
chamber  (Sejm) and upper chamber (Sen-
ate)); V (President of the Republic); Chapter 
VI (executive branch of government); Chap-
ter VII (local government). Judicial power is 
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regulated in Chapter VIII (Courts and Tribu-
nals). The Polish Constitutional Tribunal’s 
mandate is spelled out in art. 188-197.2      
DEVELOPMENTS AND  
CONTROVERSIES IN 2016  
2015-2016: Anni horribili of the Polish Con-
stitutional Tribunal
Polish elections on 26 October 2015 com-
pletely reshaped the political landscape, 
bringing back to power the right-wing con-
?????????????????????????????????????????????
which reads in English “Law and Justice”), 
which was ousted from power in 2007. The 
Tribunal was the first victim of the narrative 
by PiS, whereby the Poland of today is in dire 
need of some major political and moral over-
haul. The newly elected majority, acting in 
unison with the President, took no less than 
one month to dismantle the Tribunal by refus-
ing to honor the election of the judges made 
by the old Parliament and to swear them in, 
and instead electing their own “good judges” 
by arrogating the power of constitutional re-
view and by retroactively voiding the term 
of office of the current President and Vice 
President of the Tribunal. In the process, most 
fundamental principles of Polish constitution-
???????? ????rule of law, legality, separation 
of powers, independence of the judiciary, the 
supremacy of the Constitution and the consti-
????????? ??????? ??? ???????????? ????? ?????
now de facto obliterated.
The ruthlessness with which the Tribunal 
has been captured by the majority, and the 
persistence with which it has been thwarting 
the unconstitutional attempts to pack it and 
disable it, tell a story of democracy and insti-
tution in distress. In 2015 and 2016, the Tri-
bunal was  defending itself against attacks by 
the political power on its institutional status 
???? ????????? ??????????????????? ???????? ???
“court-packing” though, soon transformed 
into an all-out attack on the judicial review 
and checks and balances. This attack has 
been unprecedented in scope, efficiency and 
???????????????? ?????????? ??????????????? ????
majority resorted to a device unheard of in 
 
2 English text of the 1997 Constitution is available at http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm.
3 This section should be read in light of the Introduction above. 
Europe: refusal to publish judgments deliv-
ered by the Tribunal. According to Article 
190(2) of the Constitution, rulings of the 
Tribunal are to be immediately published in 
the official publication in which the original 
normative act was promulgated. The Tribu-
nal’s case law of 2016 confirmed that all 
judgments must be published, as required 
by the Constitution. Yet, the Government 
persistently refused to publish judgments 
rendered by the Tribunal in 2015 and 2016, 
claiming that they were vitiated by proce-
dural errors and lacked a legal basis. The 
unconditional publication of the Tribunal’s 
judgments between 10 March 2016 and 30 
June 2016 was also found by the Venice 
Commission to be the condition sine qua non 
for any viable constitutional settlement. The 
Venice Commission regarded the refusal to 
publish the judgment of 9 March 2016 (case 
K 47/15) that disqualified court-packing as 
unconstitutional and contrary to the principle 
of the rule of law. For the Commission, such 
refusal constitutes an unprecedented move 
that further deepens the constitutional crisis. 
Separation of powers, judicial independence 
and effective functioning of the Constitu-
tional Tribunal are keywords underpinning 
???? ?????????????? ??? ???? ?????????? ??????
December judgments have now been for-
mally published after protracted wrangling 
between the President of the Tribunal and 
Government officials, a dangerous precedent 
of cherry picking has been set. Despite pub-
lication, to this day they have not been im-
plemented and respected with the President 
of the Republic being steadfast in refusing 
to swear in the three judges elected consti-
tutionally by the old Sejm and the Govern-
ment’s refusal to publish the Tribunal’s judg-
ments becoming a daily weapon of power 
against “unwanted” case law. 
As of this writing, with the new law on the 
status of the judges in place and the Tribu-
nal’s bench finally captured and staffed with 
the henchmen of the ruling party, the curtain 
has fallen on judicial review and the rule of 
law in Poland.    
MAJOR CASES
2015-2016: Existential jurisprudence3 
On 3 December 2015 (case K 34/15), the 
Constitutional Tribunal examined the applica-
tion submitted by a group of Members of the 
Polish Parliament regarding the articles of the 
Constitutional Tribunal Act, which regulates, 
among others, the election of Constitutional 
Tribunal judges, the status of these judges 
and the proceedings before the Constitutional 
Tribunal. The Constitution imposes an obliga-
tion to elect a Constitutional Tribunal judge 
on the lower house of Polish Parliament in 
the term of office during which the post of 
the Constitutional Tribunal judge was made 
vacant. The election of a Constitutional Tri-
bunal judge cannot be conducted somewhat in 
advance. The Tribunal found that regulation 
of the Constitutional Tribunal Act is incom-
patible with the Constitution to the extent of 
providing the competence for the lower house 
of Polish Parliament of the previous term of 
office (2011-2015) to elect two judges to fill 
the vacant posts of judges whose term of of-
fice ended on 2 and 8 December. But the arti-
cles regulating the election of three judges to 
fill the vacant posts of Constitutional Tribu-
nal judges whose term of office ended on 6 
November 2015 were found to be compatible 
with the Constitution. 
Consequently, the ruling of the Constitutional 
Tribunal implies that the legal base for elect-
ing the successors of the two judges whose 
term of office ended on 2 and 8 December 
is regarded as unconstitutional. Therefore, 
these two judges, who were elected, cannot 
take their office. Meanwhile, the legal base 
for appointing and voting by the lower house 
of Polish Parliament on the election of three 
constitutional judges in place of the judges 
whose term of office ended on 6 November 
2015 raises no constitutional doubts. This 
election was conducted by the lower house 
of Polish Parliament in the term of office 
during which the posts were made vacant. 
In addition, the Tribunal held that articles 
regarding the oath-taking by the Constitu-
tional Tribunal judge before the President of 
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Poland imposed an obligation on the head of 
state to accept such an oath immediately. Any 
other interpretations of this article are bound 
to be unconstitutional. Moreover, the Con-
stitution doesn’t provide for the President 
to have a possibility of refusing to accept an 
oath from the newly elected Constitutional 
Tribunal judge, and the eventual concerns 
raised by the head of state regarding the con-
stitutionality of the articles, on the ground of 
which the election of Constitutional Tribunal 
judges had been conducted, can be evaluated 
solely by the Constitutional Tribunal. De-
spite a lack of statutory articles which could 
specify the term of accepting the oath it must 
be understood that the President has to fulfill 
his obligation immediately. 
Articles regulating the appointment of Presi-
dent and Vice-President of the Constitution-
al Tribunal by the President of Poland were 
ruled to be compatible with the Constitution. 
According to the Constitution, the President 
of the Republic of Poland is obligated to ap-
point the President and Vice-President of the 
Constitutional Tribunal among candidates 
chosen by the General Assembly of the Judg-
es of the Constitutional Tribunal. The Presi-
dent doesn’t have authority to freely choose 
the candidates to be appointed to the afore-
mentioned posts. An obligation is imposed 
on him to appoint one of the previously pro-
posed candidates for these posts. 
Furthermore, the Tribunal held compatibili-
ty with the Constitution of providing retired 
Constitutional Tribunal judges with the for-
mal immunity, which indicates that the con-
stitutional judges can be held criminally lia-
ble (excluding delinquencies) or deprived of 
freedom only upon the consent of the Gen-
eral Assembly of the Judges of the Consti-
tutional Tribunal. Retired judges of all types 
of courts in Poland are entitled to such im-
munity. This protection has a special mean-
ing for constitutional judges as their term of 
office is relatively short. Accordingly, they 
rule on compatibility with the Constitution 
of the law adopted by politics and they solve 
disputes over authority between central con-
stitutional public authorities, and in conse-
4 In this case, the Tribunal dealt with the amendments adopted on 22 December 2015 by the Sejm (lower house of the Parliament) to the Law on the Constitu-
tional Tribunal. The amendments aimed again at limiting the Tribunal’s review functions and debilitating its procedural capacities.
quence  are more likely to be exposed for the 
eventual repercussions coming from politi-
cians not satisfied with the Constitutional 
Tribunal judgment. 
On 9 December 2015 (case K 35/15), the 
Constitutional Tribunal examined the ap-
plications of a group of Members of Polish 
Parliament, the Ombudsman, the National 
Council of the Judiciary and the First Pres-
ident of the Supreme Court, regarding the 
amendment of the Constitutional Tribunal 
Act. The statute introduces terms of office 
in the exercise of the function of the Pres-
ident of the Constitutional Tribunal with a 
possibility of reelection. The Tribunal held 
that the procedure of filling leading posi-
tions, to the extent in which the amendment 
provides for a possibility for reelection re-
garding the position of the President of the 
Constitutional Tribunal, gives the executive 
authority room for unlawful interfering with 
the activity of a Constitutional Tribunal. The 
Tribunal agreed with the applicant’s charge 
about the unconstitutionality of the statuto-
ry provision, which provides for the person 
elected to be a judge of the Tribunal to take 
an oath before the President within 30 days 
of the election. According to the Tribunal, 
establishing such a time limit for taking an 
oath violates the rule that the Constitutional 
Tribunal judge must be allowed to take an 
oath immediately after the election. A pro-
vision was found as incompatible with the 
Constitution as well, stating  that “taking an 
oath initiates the term of office of the Consti-
tutional Tribunal judge.” Such a solution-the 
initiation of term of office of the Tribunal’s 
judge to be made dependent on taking an 
oath-would result in postponing the start of 
a judge’s term of office, and would lead to 
an indirect participation of the President in 
the procedure of appointing a Constitutional 
Tribunal judge, for which the Constitution 
doesn’t provide. Another statutory provision 
which was regarded unconstitutional provid-
ed for the expiration of the existing President 
and Vice-President of the Constitutional Tri-
bunal’s “term of office” after three months 
from the amendment law’s entry into force. 
The Tribunal held that the article in question 
was, in fact, an unlawful interference of the 
lawmaker with the judicial power sphere and 
it violated the rule of the Tribunal’s inde-
pendence from other powers. The Tribunal 
admitted that it is conceivable for the legisla-
ture to change the length of the term of office 
of both President and Vice-President, and 
the voiding of a term of office that already 
started to run impinges on the prerogative 
of the President to appoint the President and 
Vice-President of the Tribunal. The judgment 
puts great stock in with provisions on the sta-
tus of the President and Vice-President of the 
Constitutional Tribunal, in particular as re-
gards their terms of office are closely linked 
with the principle of the independence of the 
Tribunal as such. The legislature may depart 
from the hitherto adopted solution and may 
determine the length of the term of office in 
the case of the President or Vice-President 
of the Tribunal in a more fixed way. How-
ever, amending Law constitutes interference 
in the scope of the constitutional competence 
to appoint the President and Vice-President 
of the Tribunal, which is vested in the Presi-
dent of the Republic of Poland. The Tribunal 
agreed with the view presented by the appli-
cants that the legislature’s termination of the 
terms of office of the incumbent President 
and Vice-President of the Tribunal violates 
the principle of the independence of those 
authorities, and thus infringes Article 10 in 
conjunction with Article 173 of the Constitu-
tion, Article 194(1) and (2) as well as Article 
7 of the Constitution. 
On 11 August 2016 (case K 39/16), the 
Tribunal thwarted yet another attempt at 
court-packing when it examined the compat-
ibility with the Constitution of a new statute 
of 22 July 2016 on the Constitutional Tri-
bunal. In this case, the Tribunal built on its 
previous unpublished (case K 47/15)4 and 
unimplemented (K 34/15 and K 35/15) judg-
ments. In view of the repetitive nature (the 
ruling party pressed ahead with the second 
court-packing despite the fact that most of 
the provisions were already declared uncon-
stitutional in K 47/15) of most of the claims 
and duplicity of the subject-matter, the Tri-
bunal felt strong enough to decide the case 
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by way of a reasoned order rather than a 
judgment. The order emphasized that most 
of the provisions in the new Law replicated 
the Tribunal found unconstitutional in its 
judgment given on 9 March 2016. The Tri-
bunal reiterated that rulings of the Tribunal 
must be published immediately in the short-
est possible time given the circumstances of 
each case. Government authorities have no 
discretion but to publish all rulings of the 
Tribunal. A fortiori, the Tribunal criticized in 
the strongest possible words the practice of 
singling out its rulings that will be published 
in the Journal of Laws. The Tribunal saw 
through the intentions of the Sejm. The Sejm 
performed a review of individual rulings and 
concluded that judges behind these rulings 
acted ultra vires. Therefore, the refusal to 
publish these “negatively reviewed” rulings 
would be held to be justified and, as a result, 
make the future publication of the Tribunal 
rulings dependent on the consent of the Leg-
islative branch. For the Tribunal, this was an 
inadmissible encroachment by the executive 
on the competencies of the Constitutional 
Tribunal and aimed at the stigmatization of 
the judges who decided these cases. Such 
practice runs afoul of the standards of the 
state governed by the Rule of Law (Recht-
staat) and is alien to the legal culture to 
which the Republic of Poland belongs. The 
Tribunal was clear: all rulings are uncondi-
tionally binding and must be published. As 
for the vexing problem of the Tribunal’s 
composition, the order simply referred to the 
constitutional interpretation already made in 
December 2015 judgments and calls on the 
state authorities to bring to an end the situ-
ation of disrespect of the Tribunal’s rulings. 
The Tribunal strongly expressed that the leg-
islator must not elect new judges when there 
is no vacancy as was the case here. Forcing 
the President of the Tribunal to allow three 
judges elected by PiS would be unconstitu-
tional and “incompatible with the judgments 
of the Court which are binding on all state 
authorities, the Tribunal and its President in-
cluded.”
5 Judgment in K34/15, point10.3 of the reasons, and repeated in K47/15, point 5.3.2. of the reasons. 
6 See also T. T. Koncewicz, The “emergency constitutional review” and Polish constitutional crisis. Of constitutional self-defence and judicial empowerment 
(2016), Polish Law Review Vol. 2(1). 
7 L. Pech, K. L. Scheppele, Poland and the European Commission, Part I: A Dialogue of the Deaf? p. 2 available at http://verfassungsblog.de/poland-and-the-
european-commission-part-i-a-dialogue-of-the-deaf/. 
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prudence in response to “clipping the wings” 
of the Tribunal and procedural court-pack-
ing stands for the following: “in the context 
of the Tribunal’s systemic position and the 
unique nature of its competence, it is par-
ticularly justified that proceedings before 
the Tribunal should be effective and would 
result–within a reasonable period of time–in 
issuing a final ruling, especially in cases that 
are of significance for the functioning of the 
organs of the state as well as for the exercise 
of rights and freedoms enshrined in the Con-
stitution. This follows from the principle of 
efficiency in the work of public institutions, 
which arises from the Preamble to the Con-
stitution. Consequently, a statutory model of 
proceedings before the Constitutional Tribu-
nal needs, on the one hand, to take account of 
the unique nature of the Tribunal’s systemic 
function and, on the other, ensure efficiency 
in the exercise of the Tribunal’s powers.”5 
On 7 December 2016 (case K 44/16), the 
Constitutional Tribunal examined the ap-
plication submitted by a group of Members 
of Polish Parliament regarding the rules of 
appointing the President and Vice-President 
of the Constitutional Tribunal. The Tribunal 
held that the statutory injunction for the Gen-
eral Assembly of the Judges of the Consti-
tutional Tribunal to propose to the President 
three candidates to the position of President 
and Vice-President of the Tribunal doesn’t 
violate the Constitution. Only the correla-
tion between the number of candidates pro-
posed to the President, the precise number 
of votes to which the Tribunal judges are 
entitled during the election of candidates 
and the rules governing this election have an 
impact on the scope of competence given to 
the General Assembly of the Judges of the 
Tribunal as well as on the capacity for this 
authority to perform its constitutional func-
tions. The Tribunal stated that proposing 
candidates to the President, performed by a 
collegial body, must take the form of a reso-
lution which requires for its validity support 
by a majority of voting judges. Representa-
tion may be ensured either by an election in 
which every judge is entitled to have a such 
number of votes that is identical with the 
number of candidates or through a separate 
voting on each candidate where every judge 
holds only one vote. The Tribunal regarded 
as candidates for the position of President 
and Vice-President of the Tribunal, in the 
constitutional meaning of this term, only 
those candidates who received support from 
a majority of voting judges. Significantly, 
only such candidates ought to be considered 
as having the support of the General Assem-
bly of the Judges of the Tribunal.
CONCLUSION 
2015-2016 saw an unprecedented attack on 
the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, judicial 
independence and the rule of law. Impor-
tantly, this attack has not been premised on 
dissatisfaction with the overall performance 
or particular acts of the Tribunal, but rather 
struck at its very existence?? ??????????????-
ing with some hasty decisions of the ma-
jority as a result of transient dissatisfaction 
with the Tribunal’s case law. If this were the 
case, we would not have reason to sound the 
alarm: political tinkering with unwanted de-
cisions by Constitutional Courts happens all 
the time and everywhere. This forms part of 
a larger and more sophisticated plan aimed 
at debilitating possible pockets of resistance 
and independence, curbing democracy, the 
rule of law and the division of powers.6 
The experience of the Polish Constitutional 
Tribunal shows how constitutional capture 
and the piecemeal undermining of the lib-
eral democratic state pose new challenges 
for the rule of law and external constraints 
imposed on the domestic pouvoir constitu-
ant. As forcefully argued by K. L. Scheppele 
and L. Pech, “consolidation of majoritari-
an autocracies […] represents more of an 
existential threat to the EU’s existence and 
functioning than the exit of any of its Mem-
ber States.”7 Constitutional capture plays a 
pivotal role in disabling the checks and bal-
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ances. Constitutional capture makes a sham 
of a constitutional document as it strips it of 
its limiting and constraining function. Yet 
constitutional capture is not a one-off aber-
ration. It is a novel threat to the rule of law 
as it is not limited to one moment in time. It 
is a process of incremental taking over the 
independent institutions and the liberal state. 
Hungary is a prototype of a “captured state,” 
and one would be right in assuming that the 
Commission had learned from its passivity 
and acquiescence to V. Orban’s tactics of 
capturing the state and independent insti-
tutions. The lesson was loud and clear and 
yet missed by the Commission, as the Polish 
case shows the only way to derail constitu-
tional capture or to “constitutionally recap-
ture the unconstitutional capture” is to act 
preemptively before the capture is complete. 
????????????????????????????????????????????-
petrators and hoping for their change of heart 
only emboldens and entrenches the regime. 
The constitutional capture as a process needs 
time, so time plays a pivotal role in striking 
back at the capture and thwarting it in the 
building-up process, not later. The regime 
knows that and will do anything to buy more 
time to entrench the capture and make the re-
capture very unlikely.
The recurrent themes that go beyond the 
“existential jurisprudence” of the Tribunal 
are the rule of law, separation of powers 
and exclusiveness of constitutional review 
vested with the Tribunal. The judgments8 
make perfectly clear that the Tribunal was 
fully aware of the critical juncture in which 
it found itself deciding these cases and fully 
understood the dangers inherent in the belief 
that the political will of the new majority 
could replace decisions of the Constitutional 
Court with a constitutional monopoly of ad-
judication. Under this belief, moral doubts of 
the parliamentary majority would suffice to 
set aside the law, which was validly adopted 
and upheld by the Court. It would be sheer 
power that dominates, with constitutional 
considerations relegated to the margin. So, 
unsurprisingly, the Tribunal stressed that 
in the case of constitutional doubts, other 
 
8 The relevant part of the judgment in K 34/15 reads: “The Tribunal has vital duties pertaining to safeguarding the supremacy of the Constitution, protecting 
human rights and freedoms as well as preserving the rule of law and the separation of powers”.
branches of government are not to act freely, 
but must submit these doubts to the Tribunal 
for an authoritative interpretation. 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
and now” needed solving, the long-term im-
portance of the judicial resistance merits par-
ticular attention. The Tribunal stood up for 
the “balanced constitution” in which separa-
tion of powers is more than a mere fig leaf, 
and for limited government, both of which 
have a strong tradition in Polish constitution-
al thinking. In Poland in 2015-2016 we wit-
nessed the redrawing of constitutional lines. 
For the very first time since its birth back in 
1986, the very survival of the Tribunal was 
on the line. The particular constellation of 
lucky events that allowed it to survive in 
the past came to an end. The time  finally 
came to admit that the Polish Constitutional 
Tribunal did not manage “to get away with 
it this time.” Its self-defense and steadfast 
loyalty to the constitutional document were 
not enough against no-holds-barred politi-
cal power. The Tribunal we used to know is 
gone. It is comforting to know, though, that 
in the darkest of times it never faltered and 
backed down and was always ready to stand 
up for the constitutional essentials. The “ex-
istential jurisprudence” it managed to build 
over the last year in response to the attack 
on its independence and the rule of law is 
something we must look up to and see it as a 
reflection of the best constitutional traditions 
Poland has to offer. That is a lot moving for-
ward while waiting for better constitutional 
times. Let there be no doubt that they will 
eventually come and, with them, a full vindi-
cation of Polish Constitutional Tribunal.  
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Romania 
DEVELOPMENTS IN ROMANIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
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ROMANIA
INTRODUCTION 
In 2016, as well as in the last 15 years, the 
Romanian Constitutional Court’s case law 
remained at the core of the constitutional de-
bate, especially as regards the enforcement of 
fundamental rights, but also the relationship 
between state powers. ????? ?? ?????????????
Government in place and political parties 
busy to reposition themselves on the political 
scene for the local elections in June and par-
liamentary ones in December, the year 2016 
was quite paradoxical. Main controversies 
did not concern elections or parties, and the 
Romanian Constitutional Court (hereinafter 
RCC) continued to constitutionalize large 
portions of political life mainly by moraliz-
ing public officials and authorities.
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
COURT 
The Romanian post-communist Constitution 
was adopted after the fall of the totalitarian 
regime in December 1989. The Constitution 
was approved by referendum in December 
1991 and has been amended once, in 2003. 
Its text expresses the commitment of Roma-
nia to the principles of the rule of law, sep-
aration of powers, democracy, respect for 
fundamental rights and freedoms, and a mar-
ket economy.1 Ever since 1991, the country 
has struggled to give life to these principles. 
In 1993, Romania became a member of the 
Council of Europe, in 1994 the Parliament 
ratified the European Convention on Human 
Rights, and since 2007 it has been a mem-
ber state of the European Union. Romania’s 
membership in the EU has been finalized un-
1???????????????????????????????????????????????????The Constitution of Romania. A Contextual Analysis, 
Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2016.
2??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
3???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????
Constitutional Law Review n°1/2008, p. 64-97. 
??????????????????????????????????????????
and Verification Mechanism,2 which initial-
ly targeted aspects pertaining to EU acquis 
together with problems related to the inde-
pendence of the judiciary and currently ad-
dressed only these last ones, especially the ir-
reversibility of anti-corruption policies. If in 
the field of independence of justice progress 
has been fast and notable, the fight against 
corruption, particularly against high-level 
corruption, remains a sensitive issue. 
The Romanian constitutional system is 
semi-presidential, largely inspired by the 
French one, albeit with significant differ-
ences. The republican form of government, 
although introduced by the communist totali-
tarian power in 1947, has been maintained by 
the current Constitution and included among 
the unamendable provisions. The President 
of the Republic, although directly elected 
by the people, has more limited powers than 
their French counterpart. The design of the 
presidential institution was a result of remi-
niscent fears from the communist past, when 
one person came to impersonate the whole 
power at political and state levels, becoming 
a dictator.3 Therefore, although the people 
gained their right to elect the President, the 
latter should see their powers balanced by a 
relatively strong Parliament. 
The Romanian Parliament is bicameral, with 
?????????????????????? ???????????? ????
???????????????????????????????????????????
Prime-Minister, who is nominated by the 
President and appointed by the Parliament 
in a “vote of confidence,” leads the Govern-
ment. The Constitution details the relation-
ship between Parliament and Government 
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in a separate chapter, including the power of 
the Parliament to dismiss the Government by 
adopting a motion of censure. The Govern-
ment, at its turn, can engage its responsibility 
before the Parliament and can adopt delegat-
ed legislation (ordinances and emergency 
ordinances). The constitutional design of 
the legislative delegation and its actual use 
and misuse in practice have been some of 
the most sensitive issues in the last 25 years. 
This is also one of the most controversial 
“chapters” in the case law of the RCC.
The 1991 Constitution introduced as a novel-
ty in the Romanian constitutional design the 
Constitutional Court. The Court is a reflec-
tion of the Kelsenian model of constitutional 
review in Romania, although the country has 
known, between 1911 and 1947, a judicial 
review based on the American model. The 
Constitutional Court is especially import-
ant for its role in the constitutionalization 
of the legal system, with a mostly positive 
role over the years. The powers of the Court 
include judicial review (ex ante and ex post, 
via the referral or “exception” of unconsti-
tutionality) of primary legislation (laws and 
Government ordinances), review of Parlia-
ment’s Standing Orders and other parlia-
mentary resolutions, of international treaties 
and constitutional amendment draft laws. 
The Court can also rule on elections, consti-
tutional-legal conflicts between authorities 
and the constitutionality of political parties.4 
The Constitutional Court is independent 
from the judiciary (which has as apex court 
the High Court of Cassation and Justice) and 
from the other state powers. It is composed 
of nine judges, six of which are designated 
by the Parliament (three by each Chamber) 
and three by the President of Romania.
The semi-political nature of the Court, giv-
en by the political appointment of judges, as 
well as some of its powers, has been a factor 
of politicization of its case law. However, the 
 
Court is seen as an important guarantee of 
the rule of law in the Romanian constitution-
al system. 
4???????????????????????????????????????????
MAIN CONTROVERSIES IN THE 
YEAR 2016
Notwithstanding local and parliamentary 
elections held in June and in December 2016 
respectively, main controversies and societal 
debates in Romania focused rather on issues 
pertaining to the identity of the Constitution 
and the threshold between moral and legal 
norms. Thus, the issue of same-sex marriage 
stirred passions among NGOs and constitu-
tional judges alike while the legal regime of 
criminal repression and incompatibilities of 
both civil servants and elected dignitaries 
provided a large share of the case law of the 
Constitutional Court.
Mixing arguments related to an originalist 
interpretation of the Constitution, constitu-
tional identity of Romania and religion, the 
“Coalition for the Family” (an NGO) decid-
ed to start a popular initiative meant to re-
vise the Constitution in order to replace the 
phrase The family is founded on the freely 
consented marriage of the spouses in Article 
48 with The family is founded on the freely 
consented marriage of a man and a woman. 
It is not clear to what extent the 2,6 million 
Romanians who signed the initiative all 
through the spring and summer of 2016 were 
aware of the European and international con-
text framing the issue of same-sex marriage, 
with some countries legalizing it (Belgium, 
France), others accepting it via judicial re-
view (USA, Taiwan) and others still rejecting 
such a possibility (Croatia). The fact remains 
that they largely exceeded the threshold re-
quired by Article 150 of the Constitution, ac-
cording to which a revision can be initiated 
by at least 500.000 citizens having the right 
to vote. The procedure for the revision of the 
Constitution requires that the RCC perform 
an ??? ?????? control of any such initiative. 
In its Decision n°580/2016, the Court not-
ed that the initiative only refers to the legal 
institution of marriage, as regulated by Ar-
ticle 48, and not to the family life, which is 
protected by Article 26 of the Constitution. 
Therefore, it argued that the initiative does 
not suppress the right to marriage, nor does it 
diminish its guarantees, while leaving intact 
the respect of the private, intimate and fam-
ily life, thus not contradicting the “eternity 
clause” (Article 152) of the Romanian Con-
stitution which entrenches inter alia the fun-
damental rights and freedoms of citizens and 
their safeguards. Amid contestation from a 
large part of the population, which believes 
that the concept of family is larger than mar-
riage between a man and a woman, this pop-
ular initiative for the revision of the Consti-
tution has been used in electoral campaigns 
both for local and parliamentary elections. 
Indeed, none of the political parties dared to 
risk a confrontation with Christian churches 
present in Romania (orthodox, Catholic and 
protestant), although some of their members 
or even leaders did voice concern or invoke 
tolerance. As a result, a vote in Parliament 
and, eventually, a referendum to in/validate 
the revision of the Constitution are expected 
?????????????????????????????
But same-sex marriage is an issue for Ro-
manian society also when its legally bind-
ing value has to be merely recognized in 
Romania. Thus, in November 2016 the 
RCC addressed from the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) a preliminary question per-
taining to the free circulation of persons, as 
regulated through Directive 2004/38/EC, in 
relation with a same-sex third country na-
??????? ???????? ????? ???? ???? ????? ????? ?????
the Romanian constitutional judge entered 
a direct dialogue with the ECJ but, in fact, 
it provided the constitutional judge with 
a possibility to delay its decision in a case 
that dealt with the recognition in Romania 
of a homosexual marriage legally contracted 
abroad. Moreover, the RCC resolved to this 
????????????????????????in extremis, after not 
being able to reach a decision in 12 months 
of deliberation, the case being put back on 
roll twice. The preliminary question shows 
that the RCC is aware of the case law of the 
ECJ in Maruko, Römer or Parris, where the 
ECJ declared that “as European Union law 
stands at present, legislation on the marital 
status of persons falls within the competence 
of the Member States”, and in Carpenter and 
Metock, where the ECJ held that there is a 
right for citizens of the European Union to 
be joined or accompanied by family mem-
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bers, even if they are third-country nationals, 
irrespective of where they are coming from 
and irrespective of the legality of their pre-
vious residence in another Member State. 
However, the RCC hopes it will not have to 
bear alone the full responsibility whatever 
the outcome of the case in front of it might 
be. Clearly, this is a test case not only for the 
RCC but also for the Romanian Constitution 
and society at large, not only due to the way 
in which it relates to basic values engrained 
in the fundamental law, such as pluralism 
and tolerance, but also because of the deep 
societal division is has induced. 
As for the criminal repression and the immu-
??????????????????????????????????? ???? ??????
noticed in 2015 particularly with regard to 
members of Parliament, in 2016 the issue 
enlarged to civil servants, locally elected 
dignitaries and notaries. Thus, the RCC had 
to admit that the situation of MPs is differ-
ent from that of locally elected dignitaries 
as far as incompatibilities are concerned: 
while MPs cannot be held administratively 
responsible for incompatibilities because 
they enjoy parliamentary immunity (De-
cision n°132/2016), locally elected people 
see their mandate terminated upon the no-
?????????? ??? ?????? ???????????????? ?????-
sions n°175/2016, n°544/2016). However, 
when it comes to the criminal repression of 
misdeeds, the RCC made no difference be-
tween locally elected dignitaries (Decision 
n°66/2016, n°536/2016), civil servants (De-
cision n°188/2016) and even notaries (Deci-
sion n°582/2016): they all see their mandate 
or labor relationship terminated whenever 
they are convicted to a criminal sentence, 
irrespective of whether they actually go to 
prison or they are under judicial control. In 
fact, the case law of the RCC is quite nu-
anced because it has to take into account 
a variety of particular cases. For instance, 
when both MPs and locally elected people 
are convicted and put under judicial control, 
the complementary sanction of banning them 
from continuing to exercise the professional 
activity which made possible the criminal 
conduct cannot be enforced in the same way 
for MPs and for those locally elected (De-
cision n°336/2016). Or, vice-mayors are in 
5 http://www.nineoclock.ro/mayor-catalin-chereches-suspended-after-he-was-sworn-in/.
a different situation then local councilors 
????????????????????????????????? ????????????
commercial activities (Decision n°13/2016). 
Overall, in 2016, it seems that the RCC 
started a vast operation of moralizing public 
????????? ???? ????????? ??????? ?????????? ???
????????? ??? ??????? ???????? ??? ???? ?????? ???-
isfaction of large portions of the population. 
Under these circumstances, it is even more 
????????? ??? ??????????? ???? ??????? ?????????
that the mayor of Baia Mare, an important 
city in the northwest of Romania, to be elect-
ed despite the fact that he was under the sus-
picion of criminal deeds and in the custody 
of police during the very day of local elec-
tions. In fact, once the results of the elections 
were announced, he was accompanied to the 
city hall to take the oath and then taken back 
again in the custody of the police, only to be 
????????????????????5 and later released un-
der house arrest. 
CASE LAW
Relations between Public Authorities
2016 was the year of “the technocratic Gov-
????????????????????????????????????????????
caused the death of 64 people in a nightclub 
called “Colectiv” in November 2015, mass 
demonstrations forced the resignation of the 
executive then in power amid revelations of 
vast corruption in various public sectors. The 
entire political class reached a consensus that 
a technocratic Government should be in-
stalled for one year to give political parties 
the necessary respite to organize and position 
themselves in view of local and parliamentary 
elections regularly scheduled in 2016. Under 
these circumstances, the case law of the CCR 
displayed two main tendencies with regard 
to the interaction between public authorities; 
namely, to preserve and even enhance the dis-
cretionary powers of Parliament and to drib-
ble issues pertaining to a balanced budget as 
required by the European “?????? ???????” 
????????????????????????????
Thus, the Constitutional Court rejected any 
attempts to limit the legislative powers of 
Parliament, such as establishing the legal 
regime of policemen through administrative 
orders of the Minister of Internal Affairs 
(Decision n°244/2016) or establishing the 
legal regime of employees of the national 
system of penitentiaries through admin-
istrative orders of the Minister of Justice 
(Decision n°803/2016). Also, criminalizing 
conducts is the privilege of the legislative 
power, so when investigating the crime of 
????????????????????????????????????????????
refer to laws and delegated legislation and 
not to other kind of normative acts (Decision 
n°405/2016). 
The Constitutional Court declared Parlia-
ment the supreme locus of democracy also in 
relation to attempts made by the technocratic 
Government to limit its appetite towards ex-
penditure based on the obligations assumed 
by Romania under the European “Fiscal 
compact,” particularly during an electoral 
year. Towards the end of 2016, it became 
clear that the RCC does not consider the bal-
anced budget rule as bearing constitutional 
standing or relevance. Therefore, on rare oc-
casions (Decisions n°22/2016, n°593/2016 
and n°764/2016), the Court ruled that Parlia-
ment is obliged to request information from 
Government whenever a legislative initiative 
implies changes in the national budget in ac-
cordance with Article 111 of the Romanian 
Constitution and not because this could have 
an impact on the balanced budget as as-
?????? ??????????? ???????? ???? ????????????
of the Fiscal Compact. However, in all other 
cases (Decisions n°593/2016, n°620/2016, 
n°765/2016, n°767/2016, n°795/2016), the 
Court declared that the obligation to make 
sure that incomes do match expenditures be-
longs with Government, and the Parliament 
would see its decisional powers limited were 
it obliged to observe such restrictions or to 
respect the requests coming from the Exec-
??????? ?????prima facie this may look as if 
the RCC is granting higher constitutional 
protection to the political rather than techno-
cratic authority, it may also be an expression 
of a certain disregard for the international 
obligations assumed by Romania, particular-
ly within the European Union.
This is even more puzzling since it stands in 
contrast with another interesting feature of 
the RCC case law during 2016. The tenden-
cy started already before, but in 2016 there 
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was a statistically high frequency of refer-
ences made to guidelines and other reports 
or documents issued by the European Com-
mission for Democracy through Law (better 
known as the Venice Commission as it meets 
in Venice), an advisory body of the Council 
of Europe on constitutional matters. Twen-
ty-four decisions issued in 2016 mention 
various advisory documents of the Venice 
Commission; in the overwhelming majority 
of cases the argument being used is to reject 
the claim presented in front of the RCC. It is 
interesting to note that in 16 cases6 the Code 
of Good Practice in Electoral Matters has 
been used in order to reject all contestations 
regarding the law on local elections or local 
referendum (Decision n°361/2016) while the 
same has been true only once for  parliamen-
tary elections (Decision n°737/2016).   
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms
Similar to 2015, in 2016, the Romanian Con-
stitutional Court (RCC) had a rich case law 
regarding fundamental rights and freedoms. 
However, unlike in 2015, in 2016 the Court 
did not focus so much on the new Criminal 
Code (CC) and Code of Criminal Procedure 
(CCP). Some landmark decisions were ad-
opted in this respect, especially as regards 
access to justice, but the overall number of 
?????????? ?????????? ???? ?????? ???? ??????-
cantly lower than in 2015. In all decisions 
presented below, the Constitutional Court 
made extensive use of the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights. 
1. Access to Justice, Principle of Equality
One of the recurring issues in the rights-
based constitutional review practiced by the 
Romanian Constitutional Court is access to 
justice. The 2016 case law made no excep-
tion and a few decisions stand out on this is-
sue. In Decision n°. 24/2016, the Court held 
that the exclusion from judicial review of 
the decision by which the preliminary cham-
ber judge or any court order precautionary 
measures in a criminal case entail a violation 
of access to justice because the persons af-
?????????? ??????????????????????????? ?????
guarantees to defend their property rights. 
Therefore, the principle of access to justice 
is infringed. 
6 See decisions n°246, n°286, n°287, n°288, n°289, n°290, n°292, n°354, n°355, n°356, n°357, n°358, n°359, n°360,  and n°534 all of 2016.
The Court also considered the respect of the 
access to justice in administrative matters. 
Thus, Decision n° 34/2016 brought about the 
issue of administrative jurisdictions, which, 
according to the Constitution, are optional. 
The Court held in this case that a legal pro-
vision that made compulsory a procedural 
remedy in matters related to the material 
responsibility of military persons, a remedy 
that was decided by a special administrative 
jurisdiction, transformed the optional char-
acter of such jurisdictions into a binding one, 
which is contrary to Article 21 of the Consti-
tution on access to justice. 
The Constitutional Court ruled on access 
to justice using the principle of equality in 
Decision n° 540/2016. The impugned legal 
provision Article 434 (1).1 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure excluded the judicial 
decisions given in appeal by the High Court 
of Cassation and Justice (Supreme Court of 
the land) from being challenged by an ex-
???????????? ???? ??? ?????? ???? ??????????
appeal (recurs in casatie). This exception 
was considered by the Constitutional Court 
a discrimination based on the criterion of the 
court that rules on the appeal. Thus, both the 
accused and the other parties to the criminal 
trial (the prosecution and the parties to the 
civil action) are discriminated against by this 
special exception, the constitutional disposi-
tions on access to justice and equality being 
infringed. 
2. Right to Liberty and Security
In the matter of the right to liberty and se-
curity, the Constitutional Court was called 
to assess the constitutionality of some dis-
positions of the CCP on the preventive 
measure  of subjecting the accused to legal 
constraints during a criminal trial (control 
judiciar). However, this time the Court did 
not declare the direct unconstitutionality of 
the challenged text, but ruled by an “inter-
pretative” decision, Decision n° 614/2016. 
Thus, the Court stated that Article 2151 CCP 
is constitutional only if applied in line with 
the Code’s provisions that ensure the right 
to defense and to the complaint against the 
measure at the moment of extending the 
measure and not only at that moment. 
3. Clarity and Predictability of the Law
One of the favorite themes of the Constitu-
tional Court’s case law in 2016 was the as-
sessment of clarity and predictability of legal 
???????????????????????????????????????????????
law. For example, in Decision n° 23/2016, 
the Court declared that the lack of clarity of 
a text from the Code of Criminal Procedure 
has the effect of infringing the constitutional 
principle of access to justice. Thus, the ex-
pression “absence of a legitimate interest” 
[emphasis added] that, according to Article 
318 CCP, would justify the withdrawal of 
criminal pursuit in case of certain offenses, 
was ambiguous, as it was not expressly de-
???????????? ????? ???????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????-
dictability, imposed by the general principle 
of legality (Article 1 §3 of the Constitution) 
and by the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights. This lack of clarity would en-
tail that the prosecutor substitutes the courts 
because the decision to end the criminal pur-
suit is not judicially reviewable. Therefore, 
the Constitutional Court held that the legal 
provision that allows the withdrawal of crim-
inal pursuit by the prosecution, without any 
review by a court, would equate with the ex-
ercise, by the prosecutor, of the jurisdiction 
that actually belongs to courts, infringing the 
constitutional text according to which “jus-
tice is achieved through the High Court of 
Cassation and Justice and through the other 
courts established by law” (Article 126). 
The most famous decision in this category is 
by far Decision n° 405/2016. The decision 
concerned the Criminal Code, i.e. the crim-
????????????????????????????????????????????
assessed the legal texts that incriminate this 
corruption offense through the lens of the 
standards of the European Court of Human 
Rights that are incorporated into Romanian 
law and also from the perspective of the 
constitutional provisions on the rule of law: 
equality and the right to a fair trial. Thus, 
the Court found that the Criminal Code text 
lacked clarity and predictability, as it pro-
?????? ?????????????????????? ????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????
???????? ???? ??????????? ????????????? ????????
was considered too vague and the Court in-
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?????????????????????????????????????by infring-
ing the law” for clarity. Moreover, the Court 
explained in detail the intended meaning of 
????????????????????????????????????????????
challenged legal text: in order to engage the 
criminal responsibility, “law” must be un-
derstood in the narrow sense of “act of Par-
liament or delegated legislation (ordinances 
adopted by the Government)”. Therefore, in 
the Court’s view, an act infringing any other 
normative act than a piece of primary leg-
islation should not be considered a crimi-
???????????????????????????????????????????
Parliament is free to decide the criminal law 
policy of the state” and that the Court itself 
“does not have the competence to engage 
??? ???????????? ?????????????????? ????????-
inal policy of the state”, the Constitutional 
Court held that this policy must be made ac-
cording to the constitutional principles and 
values, among which is the predictability 
of the law. In the obiter dictum of the same 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
regarding the notion of “criminal act” from 
the point of view of the offense of abuse of 
??????? ???????????????????????????????? ?????
???????????????????????????????????????????-
gal text unconstitutional. It adopted an “in-
terpretative decision” instead by saying that 
the referral of unconstitutionality is admitted 
(a verdict that usually applies for rulings of 
unconstitutionality), but the text is constitu-
tional “as long as is interpreted” as imposed 
by the Court in the obiter dictum. 
 
CONCLUSION
This report shows that in 2016, in the ab-
sence of political turmoil, the constitutional 
debate in Romania shifted to an identitarian 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
the notion of “family”. At the same time, the 
lack of political battles between the parlia-
mentary majority and the technocratic Gov-
ernment led to the absence of requests to 
???????????????????????????????????????????????
of the Court on the constitutionality of leg-
islation and fundamental rights. The Court 
reiterated some of its previous jurispruden-
tial developments of principle, especially as 
regards the quality of the laws: respect of the 
principle of bicameralism, clarity and pre-
dictability, and continued to make extensive 
references to European Human Rights law 
and soft law (ECtHR case law, documents of 
the Venice Commission).
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SINGAPORE
INTRODUCTION 
Constitutional law in Singapore in 2016 was 
????????????????? ?????????????????????-
priate division of powers within government 
and how best to legally ensure minority rep-
resentation in government. One persistent 
framework used to explain and justify judi-
cial caution is the green light versus red light 
approaches to judicial review.1? ????????????-
ly used by Harlow and Rawlings to concep-
tualize administrative law, this framework 
has been extended to constitutional cases in 
Singapore.2 Indeed, one way to understand 
the judiciary’s approach to constitutional law 
is to see it through the lens of the “green-
light” approach whereby the judiciary is not 
seen as the first line of defense in ensuring 
good governance. The public should “seek 
good government through the political pro-
cess and public avenues rather than redress 
bad government through the courts”.3 This 
contrasts with the “red-light” view of public 
???????????????????????????????????????????
relationship with the Executive, functioning 
as a check on the latter’s administrative pow-
ers”.4 
1  See Carol Harlow and Richard Rawlings, Law and Administration (3rd edn, Cambridge University Press 
2009).   
2 See Jeyaretnam Kenneth Andrew v Attorney-General [2014] 1 SLR 345 (“Jeyaretnam”).
3 Ibid, [48].
4 Ibid, [49].
5 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Rep) (“Constitution”), Art 39(1)(c) and the 
Fifth Schedule. 
6 Constitution, Art 39A, which states that the GRC scheme is for the purpose of ensuring “the represen-
tation in Parliament of Members from the Malay, Indian and other minority communities”.
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
COURTS
The Constitution and Singapore’s Political 
System
A former British colony and later a former 
member state of the Federation of Malaysia, 
Singapore became an independent, sovereign 
republic on 9 August 1965, with a political 
???????????????????? ????????????????????-
tary system encapsulated within a written 
constitution containing a bill of rights. Many 
changes have been made to Singapore’s par-
liamentary system since independence. These 
“tailor-making” exercises entailed amending 
the Constitution to introduce two new types 
of parliamentarians – the Non-Constituency 
Members of Parliament  (opposition candi-
dates with the highest percentage of votes 
in their respective constituencies but who 
did not win the plurality); and Nominated 
Members of Parliament (non-partisan par-
liamentarians selected from certain fields of 
interest such as culture, industry, community 
service, and the labour movement).5 In ad-
dition, the Group Representation Constitu-
encies (“GRCs”) were introduced in 1984 to 
ensure a minimum level of minority repre-
sentation in Parliament.6 In contrast to what 
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are now called Single Member Constituen-
cies, where voters return one candidate to 
Parliament, in a GRC, voters cast ballots for 
teams of candidates. At least one member of 
each team must be from a minority commu-
nity. Lastly, the office of the President was 
transformed in 1991 from a purely cere-
monial head of state to an elected one with 
some (but still limited) discretionary powers. 
These discretionary powers include powers 
to veto attempts by the Government to de-
plete the nation’s past financial reserves; 
and to veto unsuitable appointments or dis-
missals of key public officers (e.g., judges, 
the Attorney-General, the Chief of Defence 
Force, and the Commissioner of Police).7 
Constitutional amendments taking effect in 
2017 have, among other things, made the 
qualifications for presidential candidates 
more stringent and introduced the concept 
of “reserved elections”, which are elections 
reserved at first instance for candidates from 
designated minority communities8 – anoth-
er move to secure diversity in institutions of 
governance (see further discussion below).
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
COURTS
Singapore does not have a specialized con-
stitutional court. Like private law matters, 
public law issues are dealt with primarily by 
the High Court and Court of Appeal, respec-
tively the lower and upper divisions of the 
Supreme Court, and to a much more limit-
ed extent by the State Courts (the nation’s 
subordinate courts). Cases are generally first 
brought before the High Court by way of ju-
dicial review, the available remedies being 
 
7 Constitution, Pt XI, Arts 22, 22A and 22C.
8 Constitution, Art 19B.
9 Constitution, Art 95 read with Art 22(1)(a).
10 Constitution, Art 98. 
11 Constitution, Art 100(1).
12 Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General [2012] 4 SLR 476, [103].
13 Constitutional Reference No 1 of 1995 [1995] 1 SLR(R) 803.
14 Constitution, Arts 23, 38 and 93.
15 Law Society of Singapore v Tan Guat Neo Phyllis [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239, [134] (Phyllis Neo).
16 Mohammad Faizal bin Sabtu v PP [2012] 4 SLR 947, [11]-[13] (Mohammad Faizal), most recently cited with approval in Prabagaran a/l Srivijayan v Public 
Prosecutor [2017] 1 SLR 173 (CA) at 200, [56] (Prabagaran). See also Phyllis Neo (n. 15), [134].
17 Lord Woolf et al, De Smith’s Judicial Review (7th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2013), para 11-004. 
18 Ibid.
19 Lee Hsien Loong v Review Publishing Co Ltd [2007] 2 SLR(R) 453, [98].
prerogative orders (mandatory orders, pro-
hibiting orders, quashing orders, and orders 
for the review of detention) and declarations. 
A right of appeal lies from the High Court 
to the Court of Appeal, the highest appellate 
court. Judges are appointed to the Supreme 
Court by the President with the advice of the 
Prime Minister.9 A number of constitution-
al provisions and common law rules seek 
to ensure the independence of the Supreme 
Court.10 For instance, judges hold office till 
the age of 65, may only be removed from of-
fice on proof of misbehaviour or inability to 
properly discharge the functions of the office 
that has been established by an independent 
tribunal, may not have their remuneration 
and other terms of office altered to their dis-
advantage, and have immunity from lawsuits 
in most situations.
Article 100 of the Constitution provides an 
alternative procedure for constitutional is-
sues to be resolved. It provides that the Pres-
ident may refer to a tribunal of at least three 
Supreme Court judges “any question as to 
the effect of any provision of this Constitu-
tion which has arisen or appears to him likely 
to arise”.11 This is a fairly limited procedure 
as the President lacks personal discretion to 
refer constitutional questions to the tribunal 
and is required to act on the Cabinet’s ad-
vice, and it has been suggested by the Court 
of Appeal that the procedure is only intended 
for resolving disputes between constitutional 
organs. However, the Tribunal’s findings do 
not bind the Government.12 The Article 100 
procedure has only been used once since it 
was introduced.13
DEVELOPMENTS AND  
CONTROVERSIES IN 2016  
Separation of Powers
The doctrine of the separation of powers is a 
cornerstone of Singapore’s constitutional ar-
??????????? ????????????????????? ?????????
in the Constitution, the existence of this con-
stitutional principle may be inferred from 
the separate vesting of executive, legislative, 
and judicial power.14 The separation of pow-
???? ???? ????? ????? ??????????? ???????? ??? ???
fundamental doctrine of the Constitution”15 
and as part of the Constitution’s basic struc-
ture.16 It is therefore undisputed that the Con-
stitution is structured upon and incorporates 
the doctrine of the separation of powers. 
The proper division and balance of power 
among the different branches of government 
remains a persistent issue in Singapore’s 
constitutional law. Most cases thus far in-
volve the contentious issue of the proper 
balance between judicial power and execu-
tive power. This is complicated by the fact 
that the cases often involve questions of the 
“appropriate measure of deference, respect, 
restraint, latitude or discretionary area of 
judgment” that courts should give the Exec-
utive.17 Indeed, the task of demarcating the 
boundary between the judicial and executive 
branches has been described as “one of the 
most complex in all of public law and goes 
to the heart of the principle of the separation 
of powers”.18 
Courts have thus far tended to give due re-
gard to executive judgment in what they call 
polycentric decisions.19 For instance, national 
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security is traditionally an area in which the 
courts have undertaken a less intense standard 
of review. This, however, does not mean that 
courts would not scrutinise executive deci-
sions affecting national security. In Tan Seet 
Eng v AttorneyGeneral,20 the Court of Appeal 
held that while Parliament has placed the 
power to impose detention without trial in the 
hands of the Executive which must be satis-
????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????
the Court to determine whether the detention 
is lawful, although the Court cannot substitute 
its view for the Minister’s on how the discre-
tion should be exercised.21? ?????????????? ????
Court held that even for “high policy” matters 
that are typically nonjusticiable, the courts 
can inquire into whether decisions are made 
within the scope of the relevant legal power 
or duty and arrived at in a legal manner.22 This 
case concerned a detention without trial un-
der the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) 
Act (“CLTPA”).23 The Court ordered the re-
lease of the applicant because the grounds 
for his detention did not establish whether or 
????????????????????????????????????????-
lic safety, peace, and good order within Sin-
gapore. According to the Court, the CLTPA 
only permitted detention where the detainee’s 
acts were harmful in Singapore. The applicant 
was re-detained less than a week later with 
an amended order that took into account the 
Court’s judgment. No further challenge has 
been brought on the new order.24
This decision asserts the Court’s position 
as a coequal branch of government25 and 
??????? ?? ???????????? ????? ???? ???? ?????? ???
reviewing legality even in polycentric mat-
ters. Notably, several weeks after the Court 
 
20 [2016] 1 SLR 779 (Tan Seet Eng).
21 Ibid, [97].
22 Tan Seet Eng (n. 16), [106].
23????? ?????????????????? ???????????? ?????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????? ???????????????????????
with activities of a criminal nature if the Minister deems it necessary in the interests of public safety, peace, and good order.
24?????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????? ?????????????????????
dan-tan-re-arrested accessed 17 April 2017.
25 Tan Seet Eng (n. 20), [90]. 
26? ??????????? ???????????????????????????????????? ?????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????
?????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Detention-and-Placed-on-Police-Supervision-Orders.aspx accessed 4 March 2017.
27 [2015] 1 SLR 26 (CA).
28 Ibid, [173] (original emphasis).
29 Siau Ming En, “Next presidential election to be reserved for Malay candidates”, The Straits Times (9 Nov 2016) http://www.todayonline.com/singapore/
next-presidential-election-be-reserved-malay-candidates accessed 18 April 2017. 
of Appeal’s judgment, the Ministry of Home 
Affairs of its own initiative reviewed the de-
tention orders of three other detainees who 
????????????????? ???????????????????????????
in light of the decision, concluded that their 
detention orders ought to be revoked.26 This 
interaction between the judiciary and the 
?????????? ???? ??? ????? ??? ??????? ?? ?????????
approach to upholding the legality of gov-
ernmental action in accordance with the re-
spective roles of each branch of government. 
In comparison, the courts have been cautious 
in not overstepping their self-policed bound-
aries between judicial power and legislative 
power. In Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-Gen-
eral,27 a case concerning the constitution-
ality of a criminal provision against acts of 
“gross indecency” between male persons, 
the Court said it could not have regard to 
“extra-legal” considerations and should not 
attempt to operate as a “mini-legislature”.28 
Certain considerations such as the “tyranny 
of the majority”, the absence of harm, the 
???????????????????? ?????????????????????????
changing one’s sexual orientation, and the 
safeguarding of public health were more ap-
propriate for Parliament to take into account. 
This self-imposed boundary between legal 
and extra-legal arguments delineates judi-
cial competence from what is seen as highly 
contentious and political issues, which the 
?????????????????????????????????????? ????-
er such a distinction can be so neatly made 
is debatable, and indeed constitutional courts 
in some other jurisdictions would generally 
regard such arguments as entirely legitimate 
for judicial consideration.
Protection of Minorities 
A key event in 2016 was the convening of 
a constitutional commission to review and 
recommend changes to the elected presiden-
cy, including how to ensure that minorities 
will be periodically elected to Presidential 
??????? ???? ??????????????? ??????????? ???
only the second to be convened to consid-
er amendments to the Constitution since 
Singapore’s independence. In its report, the 
Commission recommended a model of re-
served elections for the presidency whereby 
particular elections could be reserved for 
??????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????
This move to ensure minority representation 
seeks to reinforce the presidency’s symbol-
???????????????????????????????????????????????
groups. Historically, the presidency has been 
taken to be a symbol of multiracialism and 
the (initially nominated) presidency was ro-
tated among the four major ethnic groups in 
??????????? ??????? ?????????? ???????? ????
Chinese. Majoritarian systems of elections, 
however, do not lead to such a neat distri-
bution. Understandably, this emphasis on the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
with the elected nature of the presidency, as 
reserved elections necessarily restrict politi-
cal choices. The 2017 presidential elections 
will be reserved for candidates from the Ma-
lay community, which has not yet had a rep-
?????????????????????????????????????????????
made an elected one.29 
In line with its broad constitutional aim of 
ensuring minority protection, Singapore 
also signed the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
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crimination (ICERD) in 2015. It expects to 
ratify the convention in 2017. However, any 
domestic effect to the ICERD must be and 
?????????????????????????????????????30 As the 
Court of Appeal has explained, since treaties 
are signed by the Executive without the need 
for prior legislative approval, they cannot be 
self-executing as this would intrude into Par-
liament’s legislative powers.31 
MAJOR CASES 
Rights and Freedoms 
1. Protection from Arbitrary Deprivation of 
Life
2016 featured many constitutional challenges 
arising from amendments to the Penal Code 
and Misuse of Drugs Act (“MDA”), provid-
ing for persons guilty of certain forms of mur-
?????????????????????????????????????????????-
cumstances, sentenced to life imprisonment 
and caning instead of a death sentence. Prior 
to these amendments in 2012, the death sen-
tence was mandatory for these offences. 
In Prabagaran,32 the Court of Appeal up-
held the constitutionality of the amendments 
to the MDA introducing these discretionary 
sentencing powers if the accused drug traf-
?????? ???? ?? ????? ???????? ???? ???? ???????
????????????????????????????????????????????-
?????????????????????????????????????????????-
tivities. The applicants had not been denied 
protection from deprivation of life except 
“in accordance with law” under Article 9(1) 
of the Constitution. The Court observed that 
the applicants had all been given opportuni-
ties to provide information to assist. Natu-
ral justice, entailed in the concept of “law”, 
did not also require that they have a chance 
to address the Public Prosecutor on wheth-
er they had rendered substantive assistance, 
which turned on factors they would be in 
no position to comment on. Further, the re-
quirement for substantive assistance was not 
30 See Yong Vui Kong v PP [2015] 2 SLR 1129, where the Court of Appeal took a strictly dualist view of international law.
31 Ibid, [45]. 
32 Prabagaran (n. 16).
33 [2016] 3 SLR 135.
34 Ibid [50].
35 [2016] 3 SLR 1273.
36?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the community”: PP v Kho Jabing [2015] 2 SLR 112, [44], [86], and [203].
37 [2017] 1 SLR 1.
too absurd or arbitrary to be “law” because 
it bore a rational relation to the purpose of 
the provision, which was to enhance oper-
ational effectiveness. Poignantly, the Court 
of Appeal pointed out that if the applicants 
succeeded in showing that the new provision 
was unconstitutional, their death sentences 
would remain untouched because, apart from 
the new provision, the death penalty would 
have been mandatory. 
2. Death Penalty and Finality
A distinct theme in several cases was the 
???????? ????????????????????? ??? ??? ?????????
aspect of justice, even in capital cases. In 
Kho Jabing v Public Prosecutor33 (“Kho 
Jabing (criminal motion)”), the Court of 
Appeal set a high standard for reopening a 
??????????????????????????? ???????????? ?????
????????????????????????????????????????????
it could be concluded that there had been a 
miscarriage of justice. Notably, raising new 
legal arguments involving constitutional 
points did not automatically entitle an ap-
plicant to a review of his concluded appeal. 
Rather, constitutional arguments also had to 
be based on new and compelling material 
that showed the decision to be demonstra-
bly wrong or tainted by fraud or breach of 
natural justice. The same touchstone applied 
to cases involving the death penalty. It was 
observed that once capital cases received the 
anxious and searching scrutiny they deserve, 
and the avenues of appeal or review have run 
their course, “attention must then shift from 
the legal contest to the search for repose”.34 
The Court’s motivating concern was to pro-
tect the integrity of the judicial process as 
well as to prevent the damage that an endem-
ic “culture of self-doubt” may do to public 
???????????
In subsequent decisions, the Court of Appeal 
strongly discountenanced attempts to delay 
the execution of a death sentence imposed by 
law at the eleventh hour where no real issue 
of merit was raised. Following Kho Jabing 
(criminal motion), the Court of Appeal heard 
and dismissed a second criminal motion 
?????????????????????????????????????????-
ecution date which again sought to set aside 
his death sentence. The same day, two civil 
??????????????????????????????????????????-
tion on account of constitutional challenges, 
although only one proceeded. In Kho Jabing 
v Attorney-General,35 the Court of Appeal 
refused the stay, opining that the fresh civil 
application was an abuse of process because 
it traversed the same ground already deter-
mined in prior criminal motions. Having de-
cided in Kho Jabing (criminal motion) that 
the test for determining if a person convicted 
of murder ought to be sentenced to death36 
was normatively defensible, the Court de-
clined to reopen the inquiry of whether the 
same test was too vague to be considered as 
“law” under Article 9 – the substance of this 
challenge had been addressed. There was 
also no merit to his allegations of retrospec-
tivity and unequal treatment. 
Chijioke Stephen Obioha v Public Prose-
cutor37 dealt with another application to set 
aside a death sentence as a constitutional vi-
????????????????????????????????????????????
date. The Court of Appeal dismissed the ap-
plication on the ground that it was an abuse 
of process; the procedural history showed 
????????????????????????????????????????????-
tions in dribs and drabs to prolong matters 
??????????? when he had ample opportunity 
to present motions based on the arguments 
being advanced. The Court further observed 
that the time taken to review the death penal-
ty regime and time afforded to the applicant 
to avail himself of the new provisions could 
not amount to undue delay that converted 
death row into a form of cruel and inhuman 
punishment in itself.
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Separation of Powers
The principle of separation of powers re-
mains a developing area in Singapore law. 
1. Ouster Clauses and Judicial Power 
Among the issues that remain unresolved is 
whether ouster clauses violate the principle 
of separation of powers and the constitution-
al vesting of judicial power in the courts. 
Under Article 93 of the Constitution, judicial 
power is “vested in a Supreme Court and 
in such subordinate courts as may be pro-
vided by any written law for the time being 
in force”. This question was considered but 
not resolved by the Court of Appeal in Per 
Ah Seng Robin v Housing and Development 
Board.38 The Court noted that the Singapore 
courts have declined to give effect to ouster 
clauses on several occasions, and that there 
is much academic commentary arguing that 
ouster clauses should not be enforced inso-
far as such clauses seek to oust the courts’ 
jurisdiction to review justiciable matters.39 
However, in this case, the court declined to 
???????????????????????????????????????????
did not rely on the ouster clause in question.
2. Demarcating Judicial and Executive 
Power 
????????????????????????????????????????????-
cial in nature to the Executive, this is incon-
sistent with Article 93 of the Constitution. 
However, ascertaining the nature and scope 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
task, particularly since the Constitution does 
???????????????????????????????????????????????
of Mohammad Faizal, the Court described 
several key indicia of judicial power as pre-
mised on the existence of a controversy; en-
?????????????????????? ?????? ???????????????????
as they stand; and entailing the court to apply 
the relevant law to the facts to determine the 
38 [2016] 1 SLR 1020. 
39 Ibid [64]-[66]. 
40 Ibid [27].
41 Ibid [45].
42 Ibid [49]. 
43 Ibid [76].
44 MDA, section 33B(4). As recognised by the Court of Appeal in Muhammad Ridzuan bin Mohd Ali v Attorney-General [2015] 5 SLR 1222 at [76], the Public 
Prosecutor’s decision can also be challenged on grounds of unconstitutionality.
45 [2014] 1 SLR 1047. 
46 Ibid [113].
47 [2016] 3 SLR 598 (“SGB Starkstrom”).
48 Ibid [59].
rights and obligations of the parties concerned 
for the purposes of governing their relation-
ship for the future.40 Mohammad Faizal also 
established that the power to prescribe pun-
ishment is part of legislative power while the 
exercise of such discretion as conferred by 
??????????????????????????????????????????????-
ishments on offenders is a judicial function.41 
Consequently, “no punishment prescribed by 
the legislative branch can intrude into the sen-
tencing function of the courts”.42 
This issue was revisited in Prabagaran (see 
above). The applicants argued that it was a 
breach of the constitutional principle of the 
separation of powers for a statute to prescribe 
an executive decision (ie, the Public Prose-
???????????????????????????????????????????????
Court’s discretion to sentence particular of-
fenders. The contention was that this effec-
tively allows the Executive to select the pun-
?????????????????????????????????????? ?????
the Court of Appeal accepted that some forms 
of legislative allocation of powers to the Ex-
ecutive could be in breach of the principle of 
separation of powers, it did not consider the 
impugned provisions to be the case: the pow-
er to pronounce the sentence remained with 
the court and there were good reasons why the 
Executive was best placed to make an oper-
ational assessment of substantive assistance. 
The Public Prosecutor’s discretion is limit-
ed to the question of whether the prescribed 
????????????????????????????????????????????????
exercise of the Court’s sentencing powers,43 
and is not tailored to the punishment that he 
thinks should be imposed on the offender. 
Consequently, the Court held that the Public 
Prosecutor’s decision on whether to grant a 
??????????????????????????????????????????????
challenged, but only on the grounds of bad 
faith and malice.44
3. Substantive Legitimate Expectations
The emerging doctrine of substantive legiti-
mate expectations also raises issues of sepa-
ration of powers. The doctrine of substantive 
legitimate expectation in essence binds pub-
lic authorities to representations about how 
they will exercise their powers or act in the 
future. In 2014, the High Court held in Chiu 
Teng @ Kallang Pte Ltd v Singapore Land 
Authority (“Chiu Teng”)45 that the upholding 
of legitimate expectations was “eminently 
within the power of the judiciary” and that 
substantive legitimate expectations should 
be recognised as a stand-alone head of judi-
cial review.46 In SGB Starkstrom Pte Ltd v 
Commissioner for Labour,47 the Court of Ap-
?????????????????????????????????????????????
or reject the doctrine as laid down in Chiu 
Teng. However, the Court made important 
remarks about the constitutional foundations 
of judicial scrutiny of administrative deci-
sions. 
First, from the Court’s perspective, the core 
issue was whether the Executive or the ju-
diciary was the appropriate body to decide 
whether one party’s legitimate expectation 
should prevail over the countervailing pub-
lic interests. It recognised that such a deter-
mination would often involve polycentric 
considerations because it would affect third 
???????? ???? ?????? ????? ?????? ??? ???????
from the public authority’s change in posi-
tion. Second, the court expressed concern 
that acceptance of the doctrine could cause 
?? ???????????? ??? ???? ?????????? ??? ???? ???-
trine of separation of powers and the relative 
roles of the judicial and executive branches 
of Government”.48 It suggested that, between 
the extreme poles of enforcing a substantive 
legitimate expectation and completely ig-
noring it, there are intermediate options that 
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may be more suited to the current conception 
of the separation of powers in Singapore.49 
?????????????? ?????? ????????????? ????????
were all procedural protections aimed at en-
suring that due consideration is given to an 
agency’s prior representations, short of in-
terfering with the substance of executive ac-
?????? ????????????????????????????????????????
unsettled, it has the capacity to ensure better 
governance within the executive branch as 
the Executive is likely to exercise caution in 
making representations and to have regard to 
its prior representations in its decision-mak-
ing process. To this extent, the judgment 
may be regarded as encouraging good gov-
ernance in accord with the green light theory 
of judicial review.  
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the year 2016 saw a contin-
uingly evolving relationship between the 
political branches of government and the 
????????? ?????? ??? ?????????????? ???? ???????
?????????? ??????? ?? ??????????? ??????? ???
trust in the political branches, in line with 
the “green-light” approach, they nonethe-
less asserted their judicial power to review 
executive and legislative acts where deemed 
necessary. One may view the judicial pro-
nouncements as the courts coming into their 
own as a coequal branch of government and 
navigating the appropriate scope of their 
powers. Indeed, what is clear is that the 
courts will review executive action to en-
sure legality. As the Court of Appeal aptly 
stressed in Tan Seet Eng, where a matter is 
clearly unlawful, the question of judicial def-
erence “simply does not arise”.50 
49??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????
expectation should be defeated. To this list, one may add a more proactive duty to consult parties to whom representations have been made. To decide when 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Chiu Teng (n. 71), 
[119]). See Sundaresh Menon CJ, “The Rule of Law: The Path to Exceptionalism” (2016) 28 SAcLJ 413 for extra-judicial comment.
50 See Tan Seet Eng (n. 20), [106]. 
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Slovakia
DEVELOPMENTS IN SLOVAK CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????
Professor, Comenius University; Šimon Drugda, LLM Candidate, Nagoya University
SLOVAKIA
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
COURT
Slovakia became independent in 1993, with 
the peaceful dissolution of the Czech and 
Slovak Federal Republic. Its Constitution, 
adopted already in 1992, fashioned a parlia-
mentary model of government and constitu-
tional supremacy. It divides the state powers 
between the National Council (NC), a uni-
cameral legislature composed of 150 MPs; 
the government; the presidency; and the ju-
diciary. 
An amendment to the Constitution in 1999 
introduced direct election of the president to 
the initial design. However, it is the govern-
ment that wields most executive powers and 
bears the responsibility for their exercise to 
the NC. The Constitutional Court of the Slo-
vak Republic (CC) is the principal guardian 
of the Constitution (Art 124). A special body, 
the Court is separate from the general judi-
ciary. 
The Constitution can be amended by a qual-
ified majority of 90 MPs, whereby the NC 
turns into the constitution-maker. The Con-
stitution has already been changed 16 times 
since its adoption (Figure 1), with the last di-
rect amendment adopted on March 30, 2017. 
Most of the amendments were fairly incon-
sequential, but a few managed to stir the 
institutional equilibrium: the introduction 
of the popular presidential election (1999); 
a major pre-EU constitutional overhaul in 
2001; establishment of the Judicial Council 
to enhance the independence of the judiciary 
(2001); or the introduction of Ombudsman. 
1 To paraphrase Aharon Barak, The Judge in Democracy (Princeton University Press 2006). This is ob-
servable in the pattern of constitutional interpretations, which come in periods of amendment dead spots. 
But constitutional interpretation has its limits.
These changes had important knock-on ef-
fects that still resonate within the fabric 
of Slovak constitutional law. The practice 
of constitutional government was not yet 
“liquidated” at the end of the millennium,
 and relationships especially within the exec-
utive, between the directly elected president 
and government of the time, proved to be 
problematic. The CC oft needed to guard and 
?????????????? ???????????????????????????? ????
as mediate between the political branches at 
the same time.
The CC was established to serve as the last 
check in constitutional disputes. It wields 
powers to 21 different types of proceedings 
(the newest one is to review executive par-
dons; March 2017 amendment). The Court 
hears cases in the plenary sessions, or in one 
of its four three-member Senates. The most 
prominent of the Court’s powers is an ab-
stract constitutional review. The Court acts 
as the Kelsenian negative legislator (Art 125) 
to review parliamentary legislation against 
the Constitution and its material principles. 
Second, the CC is the ultimate interpreter of 
the Constitution in interpretive disputes (Art 
128), thereby, perhaps, acting as the “junior” 
partner of the constitution-maker.1 Both con-
stitutional interpretation and review are vest-
ed in the Plenum and enjoy generally binding 
effect (erga omnes). The Senates conduct the 
concrete review in cases of alleged viola-
tion of individuals’ constitutional rights (Art 
127). 
The CC normally seats 13 judges, appointed 
for non-renewable 12-year terms (Art 134). 
The NC nominates a double number of can-
didates for each vacancy on the Court by a 
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simple majority, and the president then se-
lects and appoints one of the two nominees. 
But even this relatively straightforward pro-
cess became a source of serious tension be-
tween the NC and president.2 The ongoing 
?????????????????????? ????????????????????????
Court incomplete for well over two years.
DEVELOPMENTS AND  
CONTROVERSIES IN 2016  
The issue that has continuously “irritat-
ed” Slovak constitutional politics has been 
???? ??????????????????? ????????????????????
???????? ???? ?????? ????????? ??? ???????????
was also acting president in March-Octo-
ber 1998. The Constitution then allowed the 
government to shift almost complete presi-
dential powers to the PM during the vacant 
presidency, including the power to grant par-
???????????????????? ???????? ???? ????????
??????? ????? ???? ?????????? ??????? ?????????
investigations under the pretense of “achiev-
ing civil peace.” They caused major public 
outrage, and further enhanced the perception 
of abuse of state powers by elites.3
????????????????????
?????????? ???? ????? ????????? ??????? ???-
?????? ????? ???? ??????? ??????????? ???????
??????? ??? ????????????? ??????????????????
the German court issued an arrest warrant for 
??????????????????????????????????????????????
alleged 2 million USD fraud.4 But Slovakia 
did not have an extradition agreement with 
Germany at the time, thus, allegedly, the 
Slovak Intelligence Service (SIS) dragged 
??????????????????????????????????????????-
?????? ???????????????????????????????? ?????
?????? ?????????? ??????????? ???? ???? ??????
him to Austria (per prosecutor’s indictment) 
so that he might be later extradited to Ger-
many. It is believed that the abduction was 
orchestrated by the director of SIS, nominat-
??????????????????? ???????????????? ?????????
the very least knew about the operation.
2? ????????????? ????????????????????????????? ??????????????????? ????????? ?????????????????? ?????? ?????????? ???????????????? ??? ?????http://www.iconnectblog.
com/2016/08/constitutional-court-crisis-in-slovakia-still-far-away-from-resolution 
3 The NC tried to abolish the amnesties on eight separate occasions. See also the CC decisions in I. ÚS 30/99, I. ÚS 40/1999; decisions on constitutional 
complaints in II. ÚS 31/1999, II. ÚS 69/1999, II. ÚS 80/1999, I. ÚS 48/99; and the ECtHR decision in  Lexa v. Slovakia, no. 54334/00, 23 September 2008.
4?????????????????????????????????????????????????
5 Senates could interpret the Constitution prior to 2001.
6?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????
??????????????????????????????? ?????????????
two amnesties. On March 3, 1998, he issued 
?????????????????????????????? ???????? ?????
by which he inter alia prohibited to com-
mence or to continue criminal proceedings 
in all cases connected with the abduction of 
?????? ???? ??? ????? ??? ?????? ??????? ???????
the second amnesty (No. 214/1998 Coll. of 
Laws) to clarify the confused wording and 
????????????????????????????????????????????-
duced “suspicion” for the perpetration of the 
concerned criminal offenses into the word-
ing of the original Act. However, a new gov-
ernment emerged from the imminent 1998 
general election. The new PM, Mikuláš Dz-
urinda, still an interim president, abolished 
????? ????????? ?????????? ??? ????????? ???????
This decision was challenged before the CC, 
and one of the Court Senates decided that 
the president could not lawfully revoke an 
amnesty that had been already granted. The 
same rationale applied to other state insti-
tutions.5 The CC further held that the legal 
positions of the amnestied individuals could 
not be lawfully altered (I. ÚS 30/99).
The criminal investigation proceeded not-
withstanding the CC decision, but in 2002 
the competent courts, including the Supreme 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
of the amnesties. The criminal case was dis-
missed as res judicata.
Constitutional Amendment
The NC tried to abolish the controversial 
amnesties, but until March 30, 2017, these 
efforts brought no legal consequences. Fi-
nally, in 2017, the NC amended the Consti-
tution (No. 71/2017 Coll. of Laws) to cre-
ate a unique mechanism for abolishing the 
past and future presidential amnesties and 
pardons. First, the amendment introduces 
the possibility that the NC can abolish, by 
a 3/5 majority, any amnesty or pardon that 
violates the principles of the rule of law and 
democracy. The NC does so by a resolution, 
published in the Collection of Laws. Second, 
such a resolution also annuls all legal effects 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
would ordinarily preclude prosecution.6
Third, the NC decision to abolish an amnes-
2016 Global Review of Constitutional Law | 183
ty or pardon will be ????????? automatically 
sent to the CC for a review. The Plenum must 
review the resolution in 60 calendar days. If 
the Court does not decide by this time, the 
NC’s decision is constitutional by default. 
????????????????????????????????????????????
pending before the CC.
Implications for Practice
A few remarks on the change are necessary. 
The NC has elevated itself above the other 
branches of the government, but especially 
above the executive. The Parliament can re-
view, based on its political and legal judg-
ment, whether the president and the gov-
ernment exercised their powers in comport 
with the Constitution. The amendment thus 
enables the legislature at the expense of the 
executive, and ultimately also to the judicia-
ry. Moreover, the mechanism is also com-
plicated and opaque, since the process now 
involves all major institutions. The presiden-
tial amnesty power was already (1) subject to 
the government countersignature, but can be 
now (2) abolished by the NC, and in the end 
also (3) reviewed by the CC. The amnesty 
power is fettered to the extent that it will not 
often be used.
Second, the possibility to ex-post abolish 
pardons and amnesties leaves the legal situa-
???????????????????????????????????????????-
tain. Theoretically, even amnesties issued in 
1945 are subject to repeal. The constitutional 
practice does not rule this out. International 
?????? ?????????????????????????????? ?????-
nality of decisions (res judicata), the ne bis 
in idem principle, legitimate expectations, or 
the right to have a fair trial can now be pos-
sibly also at stake. The amendment was ad-
opted with an implicit notion that cases will 
likely end up before the ECtHR.7 
7 In Hart’s terms, this might have been a “frankly retrospective law.” HLA Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals” Harv. L. Rev. (1957) 619.
8 As with other plenary decisions per Art 131.1.
9????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
provisions against forced disappearance in Latin American constitutions. Art 27.5(b) of the Constitution of Eritrea prohibits the grant of pardon or amnesty to 
persons who, “acting under the authority of the State, have committed illegal acts.”
10 Pre-2016 pending cases have increased the aggregate number. Press release no. 46/2016 https://www.ustavnysud.sk/documents/10182/1270912/Tl_
info_46_2016/f43f8875-4d04-4a4a-b8d7-f29421c66499.
11 Calculated for the period 1/3/2016- 4/6/2016. The CC was down by one further judge since the end of February. The remaining ten had to divide the re-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????https://www.ustavnysud.sk/documents/10182/1270912/Tl_info_40_2016/07492b21-95a5-449a-
9a64-7398812236ba.
12?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
release no. 41/2016 https://www.ustavnysud.sk/documents/10182/1270912/Tl_info_41_2016_/659bea3c-5f9f-428b-b7ca-36b9a0b87a36.
13???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Third, even though the CC automatically re-
views the NC’s resolution on the amnesties, 
an absolute majority (7) of all 13 judges is 
still necessary to overrule the decision.8 This 
is an unlikely feat with the peculiar situa-
tion on the Court, which consists of only 10 
judges. The quorum for decisions does not 
decrease. This technical hurdle further tips 
the scales in favor of the Parliament.
Fourth, the gravity of the offense pardoned 
??? ?????????????????? ?????????????????????-
tically impinge on the constitutional order. 
Their abolition on the other hand, likely vio-
????????????????????????????????????????????????
non-retroactivity). The abduction of a single 
person, who went missing for several hours 
and was later found unharmed, although 
morally and legally reprehensible, is by no 
??????????????????????????????????????????
by Art. 7 of the Rome Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Court.9 Therefore, the case 
must be distinguished from Barrios Altos, 
Gelman, or Marguš cases, or amnesties after 
the “dirty war” in Argentina. 
COURT DECISIONS IN 2016
The CC has not yet published its annual sta-
tistics for the year 2016 at the time of writing 
this paper, but there is data that might be of 
at least a rough guidance for comparativ-
ists when extrapolated for the whole year. 
The Court received 8 978 applications in 
???? ????? ??????????? ??? ????? ???? ??????????
8978 cases at the same time.10 A single judge 
decided 569 cases per month on average in 
???? ????? ??????????????? ??????? ???????? ????
judicial review cases on merits in 2016.11 
The average length was projected to increase 
last year from the 9,02 months in 2015, and 
8,15 months in 2014, due to vacancies on the 
Court and backlog.12? ??? ?????????????????????
up to date. The oldest pending cases before 
the CC were two petitions from 2013.
Notwithstanding the general salience of ple-
nary decisions, the Court’s primary activity 
???? ????????? ???????? ????? ????? ???? ?????????
The overwhelming majority of cases before 
the CC are constitutional complaints. Since 
??????????????????????????????????????????-
tirely on plenary decisions, we focus on the 
decision-making in the Senates in 2016 to 
compensate for the omission. 
Senate Decisions in the Year 2016
In late December, the CC heard a case of 
two judges that were recalled because they 
reached the age of 65 years (II. ÚS 298/2015). 
The Constitution recognizes two types of a 
judicial recall: obligatory and optional. The 
latter form further distinguished between a 
Judicial Council (JC)13 recommendation to 
the President to recall a judge either due to 
bad health (the inability to work for more 
than a year) or upon reaching the age of 65 
(Art 147.2 of the Constitution). The two for-
mer judges claimed a violation of their right 
??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??????? ????? ????? ??? ????
Constitution). In their view, the JC did not 
explicitly recommend the President to have 
them recalled, and the President did not pro-
?????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????
30.4 since the JC is neither obliged to pres-
ent a list of judges exceeding the age limit 
nor does the President have a constitutional 
obligation to act on such a recommendation. 
?????????????????????????????????????????
???? ?? ???????? ???? ?????????? ???? ????????????
engaged his competences when he explicitly 
referenced to constitutional provisions regu-
lating the recall process.
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The JC was also involved in another interest-
ing case concerning the organizational pow-
ers of its president and the obligation to pro-
vide reasoned decisions (III. ÚS 588/2016). 
A candidate for a vacant seat on the General 
Court of the EU for Slovakia lodged a con-
stitutional complaint against the JC decision 
that denied his application. He was rejected 
in a secret ballot without the Council giving 
reasons for the decision. The applicant also 
claimed that the JC president unlawfully 
postponed, by 15 days, the second round of 
??????? ????????? ??? ???? ????????? ???????????
for the Slovak nomination. The applicant 
was statutorily barred from taking part in 
that call but would be otherwise eligible for 
another run if the selection process failed. It 
was bound to fail since no one was proposed. 
The applicant argued that the postponement 
was arbitrary, ultra vires, and violated his 
right to good administration. 
The CC, however, found the complaint 
ill-founded. The Court reasoned that JC de-
cisions do not constitute individual legal acts 
and as such need not give reasons due to the 
character of the vote (secret ballot) and the 
fact that even non-legal arguments can play 
a role in the election process. Moreover, nei-
ther the Constitution nor any statutory law 
allows an appeal against such decision. The 
election process is otherwise transparent. 
Public hearings are recorded and uploaded 
on-line, decisions are publicized together 
with minute-books from the sessions. As 
for the postponement of the hearing, the CC 
held that even though the statutory law does 
not envisage such power for the president, it 
is still among her implicit powers as it relates 
to organizational competences. But the pres-
ident must not exceed 120 days for holding 
a session.
In the year 2016, a question arose whether 
???????????????????????????????????????????-
???????????????????????????????? ?????????????
reference to suspects (II. ÚS 146/2016). The 
case concerned the infamous Gorilla scandal: 
a political corruption scandal in Slovakia in 
2005-2006. The applicant before the CC 
claimed that the National Council (NC) had 
violated several of his rights (right to private 
life, right to a fair trial, presumption of inno-
cence, etc.) by adopting a declaration on the 
scandal but also when MPs named him the 
primary suspect in the scandal during an ex-
traordinary session of the NC. The applicant 
????? ??????? ????? ????????? ?????? ??????????
charged with any offense, he felt as if he, in 
fact, was “substantively charged” due to the 
conduct of public authorities and parliamen-
tarians’ accusations. The CC dismissed the 
complaint, having found that the applicant 
was not individually and intensely affected 
by the acts and statements of the NC. He 
??????????????????????????????????????????
own conduct. The CC stressed that the main 
function of any parliament – to discuss, parl-
er – constitutes an objective constitution-
al value in itself. The NC may discuss any 
issue of public importance and MPs cannot 
be held civilly liable for making statements 
in session. The declaration issued by the NC 
was of declaratory (political) nature without 
mentioning the applicant. However, the Par-
liament can violate individual human rights 
if it exceeds its competence or arrogates con-
stitutional powers of other branches.      
In the case I. ÚS 689/2014, the CC reviewed 
lower court decisions where the applicant (a 
judge) had a civil action dismissed. The suit 
concerned comments made by an MP on the 
national news: “It is absurd that a criminally 
prosecuted judge is still on the bench. This 
is evidence that in today’s judiciary corrupt-
ed judges triumph.” The CC emphasized the 
dignity and the right to private life of the ap-
plicant:
It is especially human dignity, good 
reputation, and name or personal honor 
that preclude a person to be treated as 
an object in the relevant legal relation. 
Human dignity is a value horizontally 
incomparable with other constitutional 
values or societal norms, and it is irre-
coverable by other goods; less so by val-
???????????????????????????????? ?????
The Senate accented the presumption of 
innocence that protects an individual until 
found guilty and criticized the formalistic 
approach of lower courts, which imposed 
an overly excessive burden of proof on the 
applicant to demonstrate suffered loss and 
limitation of her right to private life.
The application of the EU law to the domes-
tic legal order, namely the extent of compen-
sation in civil liability cases arising from car 
accidents, came before the CC in the case 
III. ÚS 666/2016. An insurance company 
claimed a violation of the right to a fair trial 
and the right to property against lower courts 
because of their extensive interpretation 
of “damage.” Lower courts had found that 
damage includes non-material harm caused 
??? ??????? ??????????? ?????????? ??? ???? ?????
judgment ??????? (C-22/12). The applicant 
had to compensate 26.000 EUR the insured 
person for a violation of personal rights and 
the suffering caused by a loss of a close per-
son in a car accident. The insurer argued for 
a restrictive interpretation of the term dam-
age in the Slovak legislation; the CJEU itself 
refers to national law to determine whether 
a compensation in such civil liability cases 
also covers non-material damage (Haas-
???, para 59). The CC ruled the complaint 
ill-founded. Lower courts constructed dam-
age in an extensive way by a reference to the 
case law of the CJEU and doing justice to 
the interpretation of national law in confor-
mity with the EU law. The CC also referred 
to ??????? (para 58), where the CJEU sub-
??????????? ????????????????? ??? ?????????????
law under civil liability law to which three 
different EU directives on insurance for 
civil liability in respect of the use to motor 
vehicles apply. Moreover, the Slovak Civil 
Code regulates various aspects of damage 
to health that have immaterial connotations. 
???????????????????????????????????????????
this subject remains divergent, the CC up-
held the challenged lower court decisions as 
constitutionally tenable. 
Undue Delays in Proceedings
Constitutional complaints against excessive 
length of proceedings in court have gained 
a steady notoriety in the jurisprudence of the 
Court. These cases have among the highest 
success rate and continue to draw the atten-
tion of the Court and media. 86% of all cases 
before the CC between 2002-2010 were con-
stitutional complaints and of 80,6% of those 
involved the claim that the applicant’s case 
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was not settled within a reasonable time.14 
The Court found a violation of the rights of 
applicants to a fair trial within the reasonable 
time in 263 cases in the year 2016. Twen-
ty-nine of the cases lasted over 16 years 
(“extreme delays”) while in 28 cases the CC 
found repeated violations (the so-called “re-
peat delays”).
The Senate decision II. ÚS 612/2015 may 
work as an illustrative example of this genus 
of cases. This dispute was not the longest but 
was distinct to the extent of the CC’s involve-
ment.15?????????????????????????????????????
years and four CC judgments to close the 
case. The CC considers the totality of cir-
cumstances of a case of excessive length of 
proceedings, but accents three criteria: (1) 
legal, factual, and procedural complexity of 
the case;16 (2) parties’ conduct (which may 
determine the remedy); and (3) conduct of 
the lower court. It is not just an inaction of 
the competent authority that may cause un-
due delays. The CC recognizes that courts 
bear responsibility for an effective and fair 
trial that leads to a successful vindication 
of the winning party’s right. Thus, a court 
needs to instruct experts,17 witnesses, and 
the parties to act expeditiously,18 and deter 
itself from unnecessarily amassing evidence 
in excess. The court must further ensure 
that the publication of a decision follows 
promptly after its oral pronouncement, and 
is quickly delivered to the parties.19 Neither 
do personnel changes on the court that has 
jurisdiction to try the case relieve the state of 
its responsibility for the excessive length of 
14 40 876 complaints in the observed period.
15 See prior decisions: I. ÚS 327/09, I. ÚS 78/2011, III. ÚS 121/2013.
16 This criterion concerns also the (1a) object of a dispute such as a suit for inheritance or property claims.
17???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
18???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????
instructions the court).
19??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
20???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
21 See e.g. I. ÚS 5/2016, I. ÚS 237/2015.
22 Richard Fallon, “Legitimacy and the Constitution,” 118 Harvard Law Review 1787, 1831.
23 Art 6.1 ECtHR; Art 48.2 of the Constitution in domestic law.
24 Press release no. 20/2017 ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????.
25??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????? ????????????????????????????? ????
26 Tomasz Tadeusz Koncewicz, “Polish Constitutional Drama: Of Courts, Democracy, Constitutional Shenanigans and Constitutional Self-Defense,” Int’l 
J. Const. L. Blog, December 6, 2015, http://www.iconnectblog.com/2015/12/polish-constitutional-drama-of-courts-democracy-constitutional-shenani-
gans-and-constitutional-self-defense accessed on April 15, 2017; on Hungary see generally Armin von Bogdandy and Pal Sonnevend, Constitutional Crisis in 
the European Constitutional Area: Theory, Law and Politics in Hungary and Romania (Hart 2015).
27 Mark A. Graber, “A Tale Told by a President,” 28 Yale Law & Policy Review: Inter Alia 13 (2010). 
proceedings.20 Finally, criminal cases consti-
tute a special subset of cases within the ge-
nus, when even a delay of several weeks can 
constitute a violation of the right to fair trial 
within reasonable time.21
The cases on excessive length of proceed-
ings are important because parties to a dis-
??????????????????????????????????????????????
the effective exercise of justice when faced 
with widespread actions and omissions by 
public authorities that contribute or directly 
result in unnecessary delays. The reputation 
of judges dissipates in proportion to the de-
cline of trust in the judiciary. Prof Richard 
Fallon noted in his well-known paper that 
the authoritative legitimacy of judicial pro-
nouncements is not a logical necessity.22 Yet 
the non-compliance of lower courts in the 28 
cases seems to be compelled more by a back-
log and the force of inertia.
??????????????????????????????????????????-
cy of implementation of its decisions on con-
stitutional complaints that should help, in the 
long run, to reduce the number of instances 
??????????????????????????????????????????
of the Convention.23 The Court monitors 
the enforcement of its decisions through re-
?????????????????????????????????????????????
naming and shaming. The Court monthly 
publishes online those lower court decisions 
that had been found in breach of the state’s 
positive obligations, along with the name of 
a presiding judge.24
CONCLUSION
The CC decisions have been broadly respect-
ed. In recent years, however, the friction 
between the representative branches of the 
government and the CC caused disturbances, 
and the Court has been sporadically attacked 
as political, illegitimate, or simply wrong.25 
No decision has been openly disregarded, 
but there have been gestures of resistance 
to the CC’s authority. The counter-majori-
tarian anxieties in Slovakia seem certainly 
less acute than in comparative perspective.26 
Criticism of the Constitutional Court has be-
come, perhaps, a canon of politicians to fo-
cus attention elsewhere, and a way of afford-
able position taking.27 Slovakia starts to pick 
up on the trend, but will hopefully not let the 
fates of Polish and Hungarian Constitutional 
Courts repeat.
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SLOVENIA
INTRODUCTION
The year 2016 was symbolic for the Constitu-
tional Court and the Slovenian constitutional 
order as it marked the celebration of the 25th 
anniversary of the Constitutional Court in 
an independent and democratic state.1  The 
role and the importance of the Constitution-
al Court in the Republic of Slovenia cannot 
be overstated. It is widely considered as one 
of the very few institutions of the Slovenian 
state that has managed to preserve its insti-
tutional integrity and independence.2 It has 
not only lived up closely to the highest rule 
of law standards but it has also succeeded in 
countering many corrosive effects that the 
rule of law and democracy in Slovenia have 
????? ???????? ??? ???? ??? ???? ?????????? ????-
ect of democratic transition combined with 
the contemporary economic crisis. Different 
than several Central and Eastern European 
states which have been in the critical inter-
national spotlight due to their constitutional 
backsliding, Slovenia, despite its many prob-
lems with the failed,3 diminished, corporat-
ist democracy,4 which exhibits a great dis-
crepancy between the rule of law on books 
and that in practice, has escaped almost any 
1 Jadranka Sovdat (ed), Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia – 25 Years, [International Con-
ference, Bled, Slovenia, June 2016, Conference Proceedings] (Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
Slovenia, Ljubljana 2016).
2???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Europe, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 2015, no. 4, vol. 48, str. 273–279.
3 Matej Avbelj, Failed Democracy: The Slovenian Patria Case – (Non)Law in Context (July 4, 2014). 
Originally published in Slovenian in the journal Pravna praksa, as Matej Avbelj, Zadeva Patria – (ne)
pravo v kontekstu, Pravna praksa, No. 26, July 3, 2014. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=2462613 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2462613
4????????????????????????????????????????????????
5???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????
Michal Bobek (ed), ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the EU Revisited (Hart, Oxford 2015).
international attention. The reason for that 
might be also sought in the preserved capaci-
????????????????????????????????????????????????
rule of law bulwark against the pervasive at-
tempts of informal, but not infrequently also 
formal, capture of the state. The Slovenian 
Constitutional Court has thus succeeded in 
preserving the meta-framework of constitu-
tional democracy while many of the sub-sys-
tems inside it have fared much worse.5
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
COURT
The Constitution of the Republic of Slove-
nia was adopted on 23 December 1991, six 
months after Slovenia had declared indepen-
dence. The Constitution, introduced by a pre-
amble, which is followed by the normative 
part, divided into ten chapters, is recognized 
as a modern constitution. It does not only 
guarantee an extensive catalogue of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms but it is 
also based on the principles enshrined in Eu-
ropean constitutional legal orders, such as the 
principle of democracy, the rule of law, the 
principle of a social state, and the principle 
of the separation of powers. Human dignity, 
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as the source and the common expression of 
all human rights, forms the foundation of the 
Slovenian constitutional order.6 The import-
ant milestones were also the integration of 
Slovenia into the Council of Europe in May 
?????? ???? ??????????????? ???????????????????
the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as 
the ECHR), and the accession to the Europe-
an Union in May 2004. 
The role of the guardian of the constitution-
al order is entrusted to the Constitutional 
Court. This Court is the highest (as well as 
autonomous and independent) body of the 
judicial power with a number of compe-
tences intended to ensure the protection of 
constitutionality, legality, human rights, and 
fundamental freedoms. It decides on cer-
tain jurisdictional disputes; on the account-
ability of the President of the Republic, the 
President of the Government, and individual 
ministers; on the unconstitutionality of the 
acts and activities of political parties; and 
??? ???????? ??? ?????????????? ???? ??????????
the election of deputies. The Constitutional 
Court Act adopted in 2013 further vested in 
the Constitutional Court the power to decide 
in disputes on the admissibility of a legisla-
tive referendum. 
However, the two most frequently used pow-
ers of the Constitutional Court are to assess 
the conformity of laws and other regulations 
with the Constitution and to decide on con-
???????????? ???????????? ????? ??????? ??? ????
review of the constitutionality and legality 
of regulations, a subsequent constitutional 
review is established in the Slovenian consti-
tutional order, i.e. the review of constitution-
6 See Decision of the Slovenian Constitutional Court No. U-I-109/10 of 26 September 2011, para. 7.
7 For more on the position and organisation, the jurisdiction and the procedure before the Constitutional Court, see the Constitutional Court Act and the Rules 
of Procedure of the Constitutional Court, available at http://www.us-rs.si/en/. 
8 For more on the cooperation of the Slovenian Constitutional Court with the ECtHR, the Court of Justice of the European Union, and other constitutional 
courts, see, Verfassungsgerichtshof Österreich, XVIth Congress of the Conference of European Constitutional Courts: The Cooperation of Constitutional 
Courts in Europe: Current Situation and Perspectives (Volume II, Verlag Österreich, Wien 2014), pp. 923–942. On the status of the ECHR in the Slovenian legal 
order and on the case law of the ECtHR in relation to Slovenia see Jan Zobec, Slovenia: Just a Glass Bead Game? In: I. Motoc and I. Ziemele (eds), The Im-
pact of the ECHR on Democratic Change in Central and Eastern Europe: Judicial Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2016), pp. 425–456.
9???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
derlined that when assessing the constitutionality of a law it must take into consideration the case law of the ECtHR, regardless of the fact that it was adopted 
in a case in which Slovenia was not involved in proceedings before the ECtHR.
10 Besides cases involving a review of the constitutionality and legality of regulations and general acts issued for the exercise of public authority and cases 
involving constitutional complaints, the Constitutional Court in 2016 also received four cases involving jurisdictional disputes. 
11 Detailed statistical data and graphic representations are presented in the 2016 Annual Report, available at http://www.us-rs.si/media/rsus_letnoporoci-
lo_2016__splet.pdf.
ality of acts that have already entered into 
force. The only exception is the preliminary 
control when assessing whether international 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????
conform with the Constitution. A constitu-
tional complaint may be lodged due to a vi-
olation of human rights or fundamental free-
doms against individual acts by which state 
authorities, local community authorities, or 
bearers of public authority decided on the 
rights, obligations, or legal entitlements of 
individuals or legal entities. The Consti-
tutional Court decides on a constitutional 
complaint, as a general rule, only if all legal 
remedies have been exhausted and if it has 
been lodged within 60 days of the day the 
individual act is served.
In all proceedings, the decisions of the Con-
stitutional Court are binding7 and are con-
stitutive of the Slovenian living Constitu-
?????? ?????????????????????????????????????
whether a law is consistent with the Consti-
tution or whether human rights or fundamen-
tal freedoms of individuals were violated in 
procedures before state authorities, it also 
regularly considers the ECHR and the case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights 
(hereinafter referred to as the ECtHR).8 The 
Constitutional Court can apply the ECHR 
directly as the underlying reason for its de-
cision or, as a general rule, it considers it 
indirectly through the standpoints of the 
ECtHR when interpreting the provisions of 
the Slovenian Constitution.9 The duty of the 
Constitutional Court is also to take account 
of European Union law and to consider the 
case law of the Court of Justice of the Eu-
ropean Union (hereinafter referred to as the 
CJEU). The relevant constitutional founda-
tion for the position of European Union law 
in the Slovenian legal system is Article 3a of 
the Constitution.
DEVELOPMENTS AND  
CONTROVERSIES IN 2016 
In 2016, the Constitutional Court received 
1,092 constitutional complaints and 228 
applications for a review of the constitu-
tionality and legality of regulations.10 The 
year 2016 discontinued the downward trend, 
which started in 2009. The Constitutional 
Court received a total of 1,324 cases, which 
represents an 8.2% increase of the received 
???????????? ??????? ??? ???? ?????? ?????????? ???
should be underlined that in 2016 the Con-
stitutional Court resolved less cases than in 
2015 (1,094 cases compared to 1,197 cas-
es, which entails an 8.6% decrease). There 
were 870 constitutional complaints and 214 
petitions and requests for a review of con-
stitutionality resolved. At the end of 2016, 
the Constitutional Court had a total of 1,219 
unresolved cases remaining. The important 
statistical information remains the number of 
cases that the Constitutional Court resolved 
by a decision on the merits. In 2016, the 
Constitutional Court adopted a substantive 
decision in 42 constitutional complaint pro-
ceedings (out of 870 resolved constitution-
al complaints) and in 38 proceedings for a 
review of constitutionality and legality (out 
of 214 reviews of constitutionality and legal-
ity).11
In the year 2016, Slovenia amended its Con-
?????????? ??? ?????? ??? ??????? ??? ???? ??? ????
????? ????????? ?????????????? ??? ?????????
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water.12 Under newly proclaimed Article 
70a, everyone has the right to drinking wa-
??????????? ?????????? ?????? ??? ?? ??????? ?????
managed by the state and used to supply the 
population with drinking water and water 
for households.13 The discussion and the ex-
change of views in the process of adopting 
this constitutional change and after its proc-
lamation involved some differing opinions as 
to the need for such a constitutional amend-
ment and the reasons behind its adoption.14
 
The year 2016 ended with domestically and 
internationally highly debated proposed leg-
islative amendments to the Slovenian Aliens 
Act, according to which the Slovenian Na-
tional Assembly would be entrusted with the 
power to act if the changed circumstances in 
?????????????? ?????????? ??????? ??????????
due to a threat to public order or national 
security. The adoption of these legislative 
amendments at the beginning of 2017 indi-
cated the possibility to challenge their con-
stitutionality before the Constitutional Court. 
MAJOR CASES
Among those constitutional complaints and 
reviews or petitions of the constitutionality 
and legality of regulations that have been de-
cided in the year 2016, seven decisions are 
mentioned. It is worth adding that only im-
portant parts of these decisions are empha-
sized. These decisions are separated in two 
headings.15 
Rights and Freedoms
1. Decision No. U-I-115/14, Up-218/14 of 21 
January 2016 
????????????????????????????????????????????
– Lawyer’s right to privacy – Proportionality 
In this case, the Constitutional Court re-
viewed the constitutionality of the Criminal 
Procedure Act and the Lawyers Act. The ap-
plicant’s main allegation was that the men-
12 See the Constitutional Act Amending Chapter III of the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia, which was adopted on 25 November 2016 and entered 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
13 Article 70a of the Constitution reads as follows: “Everyone has the right to drinking water. Water resources shall be a public good managed by the state. 
As a priority and in a sustainable manner, water resources shall be used to supply the population with drinking water and water for household use and in 
this respect shall not be a market commodity. The supply of the population with drinking water and water for household use shall be ensured by the state 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
14 See, for more, several articles in the Slovenian journal Pravna praksa:???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Pravna 
praksa???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????Pravna praksa, No. 5, 
Februar 10, 2017, pp. 10–11.
15 For an English translation of mentioned decisions, please, see http://odlocitve.us-rs.si/en/. 
tioned acts do not regulate the search on the 
?????????????? ??????????????????????????????
home, and personal vehicles in a way that 
would guarantee the protection of the right 
????????????????????????????????????????????-
yer-client relationship. 
????????? ????????? ????? ????????? ??????????-
??????????????? ???? ???? ???????????? ??? ??????
the content of the lawyer’s privacy. The role 
of a lawyer is indispensable when providing 
legal assistance to its clients, including rep-
resentation in court proceedings. The right 
to a lawyer is therefore generally regarded 
as a constituent part of the right to a fair tri-
al. The Constitutional Court stressed that the 
constitutional protection of the lawyer’s pri-
vacy is not his privilege. Instead, it is meant 
to protect and safeguard his clients and in the 
end their right to a fair trial. The foundation 
????????????????????????????????????????????????
performance of the lawyer’s work. The Con-
stitutional Court established that the lawyer’s 
right to privacy has several aspects deriving 
???????????????????????????????????? ???????????
aspect of privacy does not protect the space it-
??????????????????????????????? ???????????????-
ty of the lawyer-client relationship also serves 
as an equalizer as it evens out the differenc-
es between, on the one hand, a person who 
does not need  legal assistance and does not 
have a lawyer and, on the other hand, a per-
son who is represented by a lawyer. The Con-
stitutional Court established that, inter alia, 
the challenged regulation disproportionately 
interferes with the lawyer’s privacy, because 
the goal of effective prosecution of criminal 
offences could equally be achieved by a less 
severe interference. The Constitutional Court 
consequently held that the investigative acts 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
were not suspects of a criminal offence were 
carried out on the basis of an unconstitutional 
statutory regulation.
2. Decision No. U-I-289/13 of 10 March 
2016 
Right to strike – Military personnel – Duty 
of national defence
This case deals with the right to strike during 
the performance of military service. The De-
fence Act stipulates that military personnel 
in the performance of military service are 
prohibited from striking. The Constitutional 
Court reviewed the applicants’ allegations of 
an unacceptable interference with the right 
to strike, protected by Article 77 of the Con-
stitution, since the Constitution allows only 
limitations on the right to strike but not a pro-
hibition of strike.  The Constitutional Court 
stressed that the defence of the inviolability 
and integrity of the national territory as well 
??? ?????????? ?????????????? ???????????? ??? ????
????????????????????????????????????????? a 
continuous and unhindered performance of 
military service. The Constitutional Court 
thus held that this constitutional duty to par-
ticipate in the national defence entails that 
the military personnel is excluded from the 
right to strike.
3. Decision No. U-I-68/16, Up-213/15 of 16 
June 2016 
Right to family life – Same-sex partnership 
– Right to non-discriminatory treatment
In the case at issue, there was a fundamental 
question of whether the statutory regulation 
of the position of family members of appli-
?????? ???? ?????????????? ??????????? ?????????
discriminatory treatment, prohibited by the 
???????????????????????????????? ????????????
Constitution. The challenged provision did 
not explicitly cite same-sex partners (reg-
istered partners and same-sex partners who 
live in a long-term partnership with appli-
cants) among persons that can be family 
members. The Constitutional Court made 
abundant references to the case law of the 
ECtHR and   reiterated its previous decision 
(No. U-I-212/10 of 14 March 2013) that it 
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is undisputable that in today’s society, lov-
ing and lasting relationships are established 
by same-sex and different-sex couples alike. 
The partners in an unregistered same-sex 
partnership are bound by similar close per-
sonal ties as common-law spouses. It thus 
follows that the position of same-sex part-
nerships is comparable to the position of 
partnerships between different-sex persons 
(spouses or partners in registered same-sex 
partnerships) in protecting the right to family 
life in procedures for granting international 
protection. 
Given that the provision of the International 
Protection Act did not allow same-sex part-
ners to be included among the persons who 
may be considered as family members of an 
applicant for international protection, the 
Constitutional Court established the incon-
sistency of this provision with the right to 
non-discriminatory treatment in the exercise 
of the right to family life.
4. Decision No. Up-407/14 of 14 December 
2016 
Freedom of expression – Right of honour 
and reputation – Human rights in collision 
The Constitutional Court decided on the 
constitutional complaint of the complainant, 
i.e. the press undertaking, against decisions 
of the Higher Court and the Supreme Court, 
issued in civil proceedings. The complainant 
published an article in the satirical section of 
its weekly periodical, together with a pho-
tograph of a well-known Slovene politician 
(the plaintiff in civil proceedings) and his 
family alongside a photograph of the German 
Nazi propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels 
and his family. The Constitutional Court ex-
amined the admissibility of the standpoints 
on which the Higher Court and the Supreme 
Court based their decisions in the case at 
issue. The Constitutional Court made abun-
dant references to the criteria adopted in its 
previous case law as well as those adopted 
by the ECtHR (see, for example, judgements 
in the cases of Von Hannover v. Germany 
(No. 2), nos. 40660/08 and 60641/08, of 7 
February 2012 and Axel Springer AG v. Ger-
many, no. 39954/08, of 7 February 2012).
The Constitutional Court ruled that the pub-
lication of the photographs did not contrib-
ute to a debate of general interest, instead it 
exceeded the debate. The comparison with 
the symbol of Nazism can undoubtedly 
be regarded as a harsh value judgement. It 
could still be acceptable, yet only if the com-
???????????????????????????????????????????
factual basis for such. The Constitutional 
Court, however, found that the complainant 
did not even mention any factual basis for 
such value judgement emerging from the 
comparison between the two mentioned pho-
?????????? ????????????????????????????????-
stitutional Court dismissed the constitutional 
complaint as unfounded.
5. Decision No. U-I-28/16 of 12 May 2016 
Migrant and refugee crises – Armed forces 
empowered with special (police) pow-
ers – Principle of clarity and precision of 
regulations
In this case, the Constitutional Court re-
viewed the constitutionality of the amend-
ment to the Defence Act. In light of the 
tighter security situation and with a goal of 
mitigating the current EU migrant and refu-
gee crises (that have an impact on Slovenia 
as a Schengen Area member state with an 
external Schengen border with Croatia), the 
provisions of this Act empowered members 
of the Slovene Armed Forces with special 
(police) powers. The applicant challenged 
the consistency of certain statutory provi-
sions with the principle of clarity and preci-
sion of regulations as one of the principles of 
a state governed by the rule of law (Article 2 
of the Slovene Constitution). 
The Constitutional Court reiterated its po-
sition that the invoked principle of clarity 
and precision of regulations requires that 
their content and purpose be determined 
using established methods of interpreta-
tion and the conduct of the authorities who 
have to implement these rules is determin-
able and predictable. As the content of the 
powers and open-textured legal terms from 
the challenged statutory provisions can be 
construed through established methods of 
interpretation, the Constitutional Court did 
not establish an inconsistency of these pro-
visions with the Constitution. It held that it is 
possible to determine the content of powers 
of the members of the Slovene Armed Forces 
granted by the Defence Act in order to coop-
erate with the Slovene Police in the context 
of a wider protection of the state border.
The Constitutional Court further stressed that 
the exercise of certain powers by the mem-
bers of the Slovene Armed Forces under the 
Defence Act does not signify a decision on 
the rights, obligations, or legal entitlements 
of individuals. In fact, such powers are bare 
deeds of the members of the Slovene Armed 
Forces when performing their duties. Article 
25 of the Constitution does, hence, not gua-
rantee the right to appeal against such deeds.
6. Decision No. U-I-295/13 of 19 October 
2016 
Financial crisis – The reference for a pre-
liminary ruling – Right to judicial protec-
tion
In this case, the Constitutional Court for the 
????? ????? ?????????????????????? ?????????????
and the interpretation of European Union 
acts to the Court of Justice of the Europe-
an Union (hereinafter referred to as the 
CJEU) for a preliminary ruling and there-
fore stayed the proceedings until the CJEU 
adopted its judgement in the case of Tadej 
??????? ???? ??????? ??? ???????? ????? ?????-
like Slovenije, C-526/14, on 19 July 2016 
(ECLI:EU:C:2016:570). The assessment 
of the Constitutional Court focused on the 
consistency of the challenged provisions of 
the Banking Act with several constitutional 
principles and rights, namely the prohibition 
of retroactivity (Article 155 of the Constitu-
tion), the principle of trust in the law (Arti-
cle 2 of the Constitution), the right to private 
property (Articles 33 and 67 of the Constitu-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????
paragraph of Article 23 of the Constitution).
Foreign, International and/or Multilateral 
Relations
In its decisions, the Constitutional Court 
very often refers to the ECHR and to the 
ECtHR case law, both in constitutional com-
plaint proceedings and in the procedures for 
the review of the constitutionality of gen-
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eral legal acts.16 Since Slovenia’s accession 
to the European Union in May 2004, the 
Constitutional Court, when exercising its 
competences also respects legal order of the 
European Union and takes into consideration 
the case law of the CJEU. Therefore, during 
its proceedings, the Constitutional Court dil-
igently reviews and studies the case law of 
the ECtHR and/or the CJEU before it adopts 
each of its important decisions, even though 
this may often not be evident from its deci-
sions.17 Many of the decisions mentioned in 
this report, albeit being divided into different 
chapters, referred to the ECHR and to the 
case law of the ECtHR. Moreover, as men-
tioned already, in its case No. U-I-295/13, 
the Constitutional Court referred questions 
on the validity and the interpretation of Eu-
??????????????????? ???? ????????? ?????? ??? ????
CJEU for a preliminary ruling.18 As in previ-
ous years, the Constitutional Court continues 
to stress the obligations of the courts with 
regard to the preliminary ruling procedure 
before the CJEU.
7. Decision No. 384/15 of 18 July 2016 
European arrest warrant – Case law of the 
CJEU – Failure to take a position on the 
motion to submit the case to the CJEU for a 
preliminary ruling 
The Constitutional Court assessed the con-
stitutional complaint of a complainant with 
regard to whom the three-judge panel of the 
District Court allowed his surrender to Ger-
many on the basis of the European arrest 
warrant, and the Higher Court agreed with 
this decision. The important constitution-
al issue involved in this case was the com-
plainant’s allegation that the courts had not 
expressly taken a position on his motion to 
submit the case to the CJEU. 
The Constitutional Court has already empha-
sised in its case law that the CJEU is a court 
in the sense of an independent, impartial 
court constituted by law (as referred to in the 
???????????????????????????????? ????????????
Constitution). This human right also guaran-
16 If a particular right guaranteed by the ECHR is also guaranteed by the Constitution to an equal or greater degree, the Constitutional Court assesses the 
challenged statutory provision or the alleged violation of a human right only from the viewpoint of the provisions of the Constitution. If the Constitution does 
not guarantee a particular human right or it guarantees such to a lower degree than the ECHR, the Constitutional Court conducts the assessment of the 
alleged violation or the disputed legislation from the viewpoint of its consistency with the ECHR.
17 See Verfassungsgerichtshof Österreich, supra note 4, pp. 923–942.
18 See the CJEU case of ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????, C-526/14, on 19 July 2016 (ECLI:EU:C:2016:570). 
tees that in the event a question of the inter-
pretation of European Union law and/or the 
validity of secondary European Union law 
should arise in a dispute, it is the CJEU that 
is competent under Article 267 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union to 
reply thereto. In the case at issue, the courts 
failed to take a position on the complainant’s 
motion to submit the case to the CJEU for a 
preliminary ruling. The Constitutional Court 
therefore abrogated the challenged decisions 
and remanded the case to the District Court 
for new adjudication. 
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the review of the Constitu-
tional Court’s activities in 2016, it can be 
concluded that the Court continues to play 
a central role in laying down and upholding 
the legal foundations of the Slovenian state. 
By regarding the Constitution as a living 
document, the Court has been successful in 
bringing the cases and controversies, some-
times also of a highly political nature, inside 
the valid constitutional framework, contrib-
uting its fair share to the improvement of 
constitutional democracy in Slovenia. In so 
doing, the Court has preserved its status as of 
??????????? ??????????????????????????????????-
venia and has also, following the principle of 
dialectical openness, striven to be an active 
member in the European as well internation-
al judicial dialogue. 
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INTRODUCTION
Since the founding of the Republic of Korea 
in 1948 until the 1980s, Korea was under au-
thoritarian government. Korea democratized 
in 1987, and the Constitutional Court was 
established the following year. The Korean 
Constitutional Court is dedicated to democ-
ratization and the improvement of human 
rights in Korean society, which reflects in the 
character of the Court. The year 2017 is the 
30th anniversary of democratization.
The year 2016 was one of the most important 
years in the history of Korean constitution-
al law. Late in the fall, President Geun-hye 
Park became embroiled in a political scan-
dal, dubbed the “Choi Soon-sil gate,” which 
resulted in a strong backlash from the peo-
ple. The president was suspected of leak-
ing state secrets to her longtime friend and 
private aide, Soon-sil Choi. The people pro-
tested against President Park and demanded 
her resignation. The impeachment bill of 
President Park was approved by the National 
Assembly on December 9, and the Constitu-
tional Court had to decide if Park deserved 
to be impeached within 180 days. All eight 
judges of the court unanimously approved 
the impeachment on March 10 and President 
Park was officially impeached from office.
This article examines the system of consti-
tutional review and the structure of the Ko-
rean Constitutional Court before introducing 
some cases. Subsequently, the major cases 
from 2016 will be introduced. The problems 
and tasks of the Korean Constitutional Court 
and the Constitution will be discussed in 
conclusion.
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
COURT
The political system in the Republic of Korea 
has been changed frequently by presidents 
since its foundation in 1948. The system of 
constitutional review has also changed dras-
tically. For instance, the First Republic, the 
Syng-man Rhee administration, established 
the Constitutional Council for Constitution-
al review. The Second Republic, the only 
parliamentary cabinet system implement-
ed in the history of Korea, planned to build 
the Constitutional Court instead. However, 
the Second Republic was short-lived due to 
the military coup led by General Chung-hee 
Park, who later became president, and the 
Constitutional Court was never established. 
During the Third Republic, the Chung-hee 
Park administration, the Supreme Court con-
ducted the constitutional review. The Fourth 
Republic, during which President Park’s 
power strengthened, and the Fifth Republic, 
the Doo-hwan Chun administration, re-es-
tablished the Constitutional Council from 
the First Republic. However, during the au-
thoritarian regime, the Constitutional review 
was not actively exercised, and only a few 
cases took place during the First and Third 
Republics.
In 1987, Korea was democratized, and the 
Constitution amended. The Constitutional 
Court was established the following year. 
According to the Korean Constitution, the 
Constitutional Court consists of nine Jus-
tices, three nominees each chosen by the 
National Assembly, president, and Supreme 
Court. Choosing three nominees each from 
three different power centers was instituted 
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to maintain the equilibrium of power. Each 
Justice serves a term of six years and can be 
reappointed (Article 112(1)).1 Six Justices’ 
concurrence is required for a decision on 
unconstitutionality, impeachment, dissolu-
tion of a political party, and constitutional 
complaint (Article 113(1)). As of March 20, 
the terms of two Justices expired: President 
Han-chul Park left in January, and Justice 
Jung-me Lee left in March. Although there 
are only seven Justices for now, it is still 
mandatory to obtain the concurrence of six 
Justices to decide on unconstitutionality.
The Korean Constitutional Court has juris-
diction over five matters: the constitutionali-
ty of law, impeachment, dissolution of a po-
litical party, disputes about the jurisdictions, 
and constitutional complaint (Article 111). 
The Court deals with the constitutionality of 
a law and constitutional complaints most fre-
quently. There has been only one major case 
on the dissolution of a political party: the 
dissolution of the Unified Progressive Party 
in December 2014. There were two cases of 
impeachment. The first was against former 
President Moo-hyun Roh in 2004, which 
was overturned. The latter was against for-
mer President Geun-hye Park in 2017.
The design of the Korean Constitution-
al Court seems similar to that of Germany. 
However, there are some structural differ-
ences between the Korean Constitutional 
Court and German Federal Constitutional 
Court. First, unlike the German Federal Con-
stitutional Court, the Korean Constitutional 
Court does not allow initiation of a consti-
tutional complaint regarding decisions made 
by ordinal courts in Korea (Constitutional 
Court Act, Article 68 (1)). Second, the Ko-
rean Constitutional Court does not have the 
authority to decide on the constitutionality 
of the law if there is not a concrete lawsuit. 
1 The English version of the Constitutional Law of the Republic of Korea and the other Acts are available at the website of the Korea Legislation Research 
Institute: http://elaw.klri.re.kr/kor_service/main.do accessed 29 March 2017 
2 Byong-ro Min, “Current State and Tasks of Constitutional Review in Korea” in Hideyuki Ohsawa and Go Koyama (eds) American Constitution in East Asia 
(Keio University Press 2006) p. 84 (in Japanese)
3 The English version of the German Federal Constitutional Court Act is available at the website of the German Federal Constitutional Court: http://www.
bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/Gesetze/BVerfGG.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1 accessed 29 March 2017
4 Leo Mizushima, “Constitution-Compatible Interpretation in Comparative Perspective: Korea” (2017) 78 Comparative Law Journal p.90 (in Japanese)
5 Yong-Sung Kwon, Constitutional Law: A Textbook (Bobmun Sa 2010) p. 115 (in Korean)
6 Although the Korean Constitutional Court considers that decisions of limited constitutionality and unconstitutionality are substantially similar, some schol-
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Rules of Constitutional Litigation (Pakyoung Publishing 2006) pp. 
181-185 (in Korean); Jong-sup Chong, Constitutional Litigation (Pakyoung Publishing 2006) p. 304 (in Korean))
Third, in Korea, plaintiffs can directly initi-
ate a constitutional complaint in the Consti-
tutional Court to decide on the constitution-
ality of the law if the ordinal court does not 
send the case to the Constitutional Court, 
despite the plaintiffs demand to do so.
In the Korean Constitutional Court,“the Prin-
ciple of Proportionality” is entrenched as a 
criterion for Constitutional review in the field 
of fundamental rights.2 This principle was 
derived from Article 37 (2) of the Constitu-
tion, which decrees that “The freedoms and 
rights of citizens may be restricted by the Act 
only when necessary for national security, the 
maintenance of law and order or for public 
welfare.” The Justices examine four points: 
“correctness of purpose,” “appropriateness 
of procedure,” “minimality of damage,” and 
“balance of benefit and protection of law.” 
The Act becomes unconstitutional if the re-
viewed Act violates any one of these points.
DEVELOPMENTS AND  
CONTROVERSIES IN 2016 
There is also a difference in the binding of 
decisions of the Korean Constitutional Court 
and that of Germany. According to Article 
31 (1) of the German Federal Constitutional 
Court Act, “The decisions of the Federal Con-
stitutional Court shall be binding upon federal 
and Land constitutional organs as well as on 
all courts and administrative authorities.”3 On 
the other hand, Article 47 (1) of the Korean 
Constitutional Court Act decrees, “Any de-
cision that an Act is unconstitutional shall be 
binding upon courts, and other state agencies 
and local governments.” Therefore, there are 
controversies with respect to whether “Modi-
fied Form of Decisions,” especially the deci-
sion of limited unconstitutionality described 
later, can be binding for courts and other state 
agencies and local governments.4
The forms of decisions of the Korean Con-
stitutional Court consist of constitutionality 
????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????? ???????????????????-
??????????????????????????????????????????????
given in cases where it is necessary to re-
spect the legislative and prevent disorder by 
giving a decision of unconstitutionality de-
spite recognizing unconstitutionality of the 
law.5???????????????????????????????????????
of decisions by the Korean Constitutional 
Court: “Decision of Limited Constitution-
ality,” “Decisions of Limited Unconstitu-
tionality,” and “Decision of Unconformity.” 
Limited constitutionality is the decision that 
pertains only to certain interpretations as 
constitutional. Limited unconstitutionality is 
the decision that considers that the concern-
ing laws can be unconstitutional depending 
on their interpretation.6 The decision of un-
conformity is similar to the decision of un-
constitutionality but allows the concerning 
act to be valid for a certain period. Currently, 
decisions of limited constitutionality are not 
given.
Since the Constitutional Court was estab-
lished after the Supreme Court, there have 
been disagreements between the two courts. 
For instance, since Article 47 (1) of the Con-
stitutional Court Act decrees that the deci-
sion of unconstitutionality binds courts and 
other state agencies and local governments, 
the Supreme Court insists that the decision 
of limited unconstitutionality by the Consti-
tutional Court cannot bind the ordinal courts 
as the Constitutional Court is only allowed 
to decide whether an act is constitutional and 
?????????????????????????????????????????????-
risdiction of the Supreme Court. Essentially, 
the Supreme Court still often applies the act, 
which was already determined to be limited 
?????????????????? ???????????????????????????-
ations, the Constitutional Court decided that 
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Article 68 (1) of Constitutional Court Act 
will be considered limited unconstitutional if 
plaintiffs are not allowed to initiate a consti-
tutional complaint regarding the decisions of 
the courts in cases where the ordinal court 
adopted the act that has already been inter-
???????????????????????????????????????????
of decisions of the Constitutional Court.
 
MAJOR CASES IN 2016
Separation of Powers
Impeachment of President Geun-hye Park 
(2017. 3. 10. – 2016 Hun-Na 1)
On December 9, the National Assembly 
passed the impeachment bill for President 
Geun-hye Park. Though the National Assem-
bly listed 13 violations of the Constitutions 
and Acts, the Constitutional Court structured 
????? ????????? ??????? ??????? ?????? ????????-
tion: violation of national sovereignty, abuse 
of power as president, violation of criminal 
law such as bribery, violation of the duty 
of the people’s life protection at the Sewol 
ferry disaster, and violation of  freedom of 
?????????????? ??????? ???? ????? ?????? ???????
are related to the interference in state affairs 
by Soon-sil Choi. The Constitutional Court 
dismissed the Sewol ferry disaster and did 
not recognize the violation of freedom of 
speech. Though the Court did not recognize 
the abuse of power on the appointment to 
???????? ?????????? ??????????? ???????????????
Park abused her power because she accom-
modated Choi’s conveniences. All eight Jus-
tices unanimously decided on the impeach-
ment of President Park on March 10, 2017. 
??????? ???? ????? ????? ????? ???????????????????
Court had decided on the impeachment of a 
president.
Rights and Freedoms
Constitutionality of Excluding English Ed-
ucation for First and Second Graders at 
Private Elementary Schools (2016. 2. 25. – 
2013 Hun-Ma 838)
Among the major cases at the Korean Con-
stitutional Court, these are the prominent 
examples of decisions of constitutionality. 
On February 25, the Constitutional Court 
decided that the Ministry of Education, 
7 Improper Solicitation and Graft Act is also called the “Kim Young-ran Act” because the bill was initially introduced by Young-ran Kim, former chairperson of 
the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission.
Science and Technology’s (MEST, current-
ly referred to as the Ministry of Education 
(MOE)) notice 2012-31 II, which excluded 
English classes from the curriculum for the 
????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????-
ond graders are not required to study English 
according to the notice from MEST, 32 of 
76 private elementary schools taught English 
????????????????????????????????????????????
MEST decided to reduce the intensity of 
English education, and the local education 
???????????????????????????????????????????
of Education demanded the cooperation of 
local schools. The parents of pupils attend-
ing private schools insisted that the decision 
violated the children’s right to education. 
The Constitutional Court decided that the 
notice does not violate the parents’ right 
??? ???????? ?????? ????????? ???????? ?????? ????
????????????????????????????????????????????
to learn Korean if they study English at the 
same time.
Constitutionality of Considering Mass Media 
?????????????????????????????????????????
and Prohibiting Them from Being Involved 
in Bribery (2016. 7. 28. – 2015 Hun-Ma 236, 
412, 662, 763 (combined))
On July 28, the Constitutional Court decided 
that Article 2 of the “Improper Solicitation 
and Graft Act”7 is constitutional. Accord-
???????????????????????????????????????????????
etc.” are prohibited from being involved in 
????????? ???? ???????? ??????? ???????? ???-
bers of private schools and mass media pro-
??????????????????????????????????????????????
members of private schools and mass media 
professionals insisted that this violated their 
rights of action and equality. The Consti-
tutional Court, however, rejected this and 
suggested that the social impact of faculty 
members and the mass media were so enor-
mous that they must preserve their integrity 
???????????????????
Constitutionality of the Term “Other Dis-
graceful Conduct” in Military Criminal Act 
(2016. 7. 28. – 2012 Hun-Ba 258)
On July 28, the Constitutional Court decided 
that Article 92-5 of the Military Criminal Act 
??????????????????????????????????????????????-
cer who violated Article 92-5 of the Military 
Criminal Act, was sentenced to six-months’ 
imprisonment; however, the sentence was 
suspended through a stay of execution for 
a year. He was accused of allegedly touch-
???? ???? ??????? ????????? ??????? ??? ???????
According to Article 92-5 of the Military 
Criminal Act, “A person who commits anal 
intercourse with any person prescribed in 
Article 1 (1) through (3) or other disgraceful 
conduct shall be punished by imprisonment 
with labor for not more than two years.” 
The plaintiff insisted that the term, “oth-
er disgraceful conduct” is too vague. The 
Constitutional Court, however, explained 
that the Military Criminal Act was amend-
ed in 2009 and articles on punishment with 
respect to rape and quasi-rape were insert-
ed. Therefore, the Court decided the Article 
was constitutional because the term “other 
disgraceful conduct” can be interpreted as 
“the behavior that public can feel aversion, 
????????????????????? ???????????????????????-
ual satisfaction though not to the extent of 
rape or quasi-rape.” In this case, four of nine 
Justices dissented.
Constitutionality of Limiting the Taking the 
Bar Examination to Only Five Times (2016. 
9. 29. – 2016 Hun-Ma 47)
On September 29, the Constitutional Court 
decided that Article 7 (1) of “National Bar 
Examination Act” is constitutional. The Ar-
ticle decrees that it is possible to take the Bar 
??????????????????????????????????????????-
ing a Juris Doctorate from a law school. One 
of the plaintiffs took the exam from 2012 and 
was not able to pass the exam until 2016, and 
lost the eligibility. The plaintiff insisted that 
the Article violates equal rights because the 
other national examinations, such as for phy-
sicians and pharmacists, do not have a lim-
itation on the number of attempts. The other 
plaintiff earned a Juris Doctorate, but could 
not take the exam in 2016 because she was 
pregnant. Since Article 7 (2) of the Act only 
decrees that “the period of military service 
shall not be included in the period of applica-
tion for the Exam under subparagraph (1),” 
the plaintiff insisted that the Article violates 
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the welfare and rights of women secured by 
Article 34 (3), and violates the protection 
of mothers secured by Article 36 (2). The 
Constitutional Court explained that it takes a 
long time to prepare for the Bar Exam com-
pared to other national exams. Therefore, 
limiting the number of attempts can prevent 
talented people from wasting time and thus, 
the Article can be interpreted as rational and 
constitutional. On the other hand, the Con-
stitutional Court did not decide if Article 7 
(2) is constitutional because the Court men-
tioned that it is too late for the plaintiff to 
initiate a constitutional complaint.
Unconstitutionality of Registration of Per-
sonal Information of Ex-Sexual Offenders 
(2016. 3. 31. – 2015 Hun-Ma 688)
The Constitutional Court decided the follow-
ing cases as unconstitutional. On March 31, 
the Constitutional Court decided that Article 
42 (1) of the “Act on Special Cases Concern-
ing the Punishment, etc. of Sexual Crimes” 
is unconstitutional. According to the Article, 
????????????????????????????????????????????
such as obscene acts by using means of com-
munication shall be subject to registration 
of personal information. The plaintiff was 
prosecuted for allegedly sending an e-mail 
that caused a sense of sexual shame in a 
14-year-old girl. He was declared guilty and 
??????????????????????????????????????????-
??? ????????????????????????????????????????
violence prevention program. The plaintiff 
initiated a constitutional complaint that Ar-
ticle 42 (1) of the Act violated his right of 
self-determination on personal information. 
The Constitutional Court decided that the 
Article exceeded the minimality of the vi-
olation because the Article decrees that all 
persons who are declared guilty are subject 
to registrations regardless of the gravity and 
characteristics of their crimes. The Constitu-
tional Court deemed that plaintiff’s violated 
???????????????????????????????? ?????????????
the Article, are not balanced and decided that 
it was unconstitutional. In this case, howev-
er, three Justices expressed opposition.
Unconstitutionality of Limiting Ex-Sexual 
Offender’s Right to Work at Child or Juve-
nile Related Institutions and Facilities with 
Disabled Persons (2016. 3. 31. – 2013 Hun-
Ma 585 • 786, 2013 Hun-Ba 394, 2015 Hun-
Ma 199 • 1034 • 1107 (combined), 2016. 7. 
28. – 2015 Hun-Ma 915)
On March 31, the Constitutional Court gave 
a decision of unconstitutional in some other 
cases regarding the rights of ex-convicts of 
sexual crimes. According to Article 44 (1) of 
the “Act on the Protection of Children and 
Juveniles against Sexual Abuse,” ex-con-
victs who had committed sexual crimes and 
sexual offenses against children or juveniles 
are prohibited from working at a child or ju-
venile-related institution for 10 years. The 
plaintiffs insisted that the Article violates 
their freedom of occupation. The Constitu-
tional Court recognized “correctness of pur-
pose” and “appropriateness of procedure,” 
and ruled the Article as unconstitutional 
because banning ex-convicts to work for 
10 years based on the assumption that they 
will repeat their offences is a violation of 
the “minimality of damage” and “balance of 
??????????????????????????????
On July 28, the Constitutional Court decided 
????????????????????????????????????? ???????
of Persons with Disabilities,” which prohib-
ited ex-convicts who had committed sexual 
crimes and sexual offenses against children 
and juveniles from working at facilities for 
persons with disabilities for 10 years, was 
unconstitutional.
Unconstitutionality of the Term “Job Detri-
mental to Public Health or Public Order” in 
the Act on the Protection, etc. of Temporary 
Agency Workers (2016. 11. 24. – 2015 Hun-
Ga 23) 
The cases discussed above seem to indicate 
that the Korean Constitutional Court is rel-
atively generous to ex-convicts of sexual 
offenses. The Court, however, did not take 
kindly to foreign, female, temporary work-
ers being involved in the sex industry. On 
November 24, the Constitutional Court ruled 
Article 42 (1) of the “Act on the Protection, 
???????????????????????????????????????-
constitutional. The plaintiff was sentenced to 
?????????????? ????????????? ??? ???? ????? ???-
al for sending a foreign, female, temporary 
agency worker to a nightclub to engage in 
prostitution. Article 42 (1) of the Act decrees 
that “each person, who assigns a worker to 
place him/her in a job detrimental to public 
health or public order, shall be punished by 
????????????? ???? ????????? ????? ???? ??????
???????????????????????????????????????????
The plaintiff insisted that the term “job det-
rimental to the public health of public order” 
is vague. The Constitutional Court ruled the 
Article unconstitutional due to the “Principle 
of Clarity.”
???????????????????????????????????????-
mute as “Accident on Duty” (2016. 9. 29. – 
2014 Hun-Ba 254)
Decisions of unconformity made by the 
Constitutional Court were observed in 2016. 
On September 29, the Constitutional Court 
decided unconformity to the Constitution 
on Article 37 (1) of the “Industrial Accident 
Compensation Insurance Act.” The plaintiff 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
way home by bicycle. Although he applied 
??? ???? ?????? ????????? ????????????? ????
???????? ???????? ???? ???????? ????? ?????????
he was rejected because the accident during 
the commute was not considered an accident 
while on duty. On the other hand, Article 29 
of the “Enforcement Decree of the Industrial 
Accident Compensation Insurance Act” de-
crees that accidents that occur while using 
transportations provided by the employer 
are deemed accidents on duty. The plaintiff, 
therefore, insisted that Article 37 of the Act 
violates the principle of equality secured by 
the Constitution. The Constitutional Court 
decided that the Act is unconstitutional be-
cause there is no relevant reason to separate 
commuters into those taking transportation 
provided by employers and others.
Foreign, International, and Multilateral Re-
lations
Constitutional Complaint on GSOMIA with 
Japan (2016. 12. 6. – 2016 Hun-Ma 1007)
On December 6, the Constitutional Court dis-
missed the Constitutional complaint on the 
“Agreement Between the Government of Ja-
pan and the Government of the Republic of 
????????????????????????????????????? ????????
Information (GSOMIA).” The Court pointed 
out that it is necessary that the violated plain-
tiff’s fundamental rights be violated for the 
plaintiff to initiate a Constitutional complaint. 
Although the plaintiff insisted that some sec-
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tions within the Ministry of National Defense 
are plotting invasive war by concluding the 
GSOMIA, the Court considered that the com-
plaint is too vague to be discussed in terms of 
???????????????????????????
CONCLUSION
The impeachment bill of President Geun-hye 
Park, passed last December, made 2016 one 
of the most prominent years in the history 
of Korea. President Park was impeached 
in March 2017. The impeachment process 
made readily apparent problems in the Con-
stitution, and it is inevitable that these will be 
discussed. I outline three. 
First, it is important to discuss the weak-
ening of the Korean imperial presidency. It 
was convenient for presidents to take strong 
leadership decisions and propel the nation 
towards development in the period of au-
thoritarian governments. Strong presidents, 
it seems, tend to give in to corruption. For 
instance, many of the former presidents were 
unable to spend their retirement peacefully 
as most of them and their families were ac-
cused of bribery. To prevent corruption, the 
parliamentary system may be an alternative 
to the presidential system. Since elections for 
National Assembly members and the pres-
ident occur at different times, the Govern-
ment often faces “cohabitation.” Two of the 
last three Korean administrations have expe-
rienced cohabitation, and the impeachment 
bill against the president was passed during 
both. Adopting a parliamentary government 
????????????????????????????????????????????-
tween the legislative and executive branches, 
and smooth governance.
Second, it is questionable whether the Con-
???????????? ?????? ??? ????????? ??? ??????? ???
the impeachment of a president. Although 
the Justices of the Constitutional Court are 
co-selected by each government branch, they 
are not elected by the people. It might there-
fore seem inappropriate, for the Justices to 
decide on the impeachment of a popularly 
elected president. To optimize the institu-
tional arrangement, the jurisdiction to im-
peach the president should be with a body 
that traces pedigree to the people. 
Third, although not directly related to the im-
???????????????????????????????????????????-
tween the Constitutional Court and Supreme 
?????? ?????? ?? ????????? ???????? ???????????
??????????????? ????? ???? ???????? ??????????
leads to situations where the fundamental 
rights of the people are disregarded. It is im-
perative that both courts learn to cooperate.
REFERENCES 
Chong Jong-Sup, Constitutional Litigation 
(Pakyoung Publishing 2006) (in Korean)
The Federal Constitutional Court, “Law on 
the Federal Constitutional Court” (Federal 
Law Gazette, 31 August 2015)
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.
de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/Gesetze/
BVerfGG.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1  
accessed March 29, 2017 
Huh Young, Rules of Constitutional Lit-
igation (Pakyoung Publishing 2006) (in 
Korean)
Korea Legislation Research Institute http://
elaw.klri.re.kr/kor_service/main.do> ac-
cessed 29 March 2017
Kwon Youngjoon, Constitutional Law: A 
Textbook (Bobmun Sa 2010) (in Korean)
Mizushima Leo, “Constitution-Compatible 
Interpretation in Comparative Perspective: 
Korea” (2017) 78 Comparative Law Journal 
88 (in Japanese)
196 | I•CONnect-Clough Center 
Spain
DEVELOPMENTS IN SPANISH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Encarnacion Roca, Judge and Vice-President of the Constitutional Court; Camino Vidal, 
University of Burgos-Advocate of the Constitutional Court; Argelia Queralt, University 
of Barcelona; Enrique Guillén, University of Granada; Leonardo Álvarez, University of 
Oviedo
SPAIN
INTRODUCTION
The Spanish legal year 2016 was affected 
by two notable political and institutional 
issues: a caretaker government that lasted 
ten months on the one hand; on the other, a 
growing disagreement between the Govern-
ment of Catalonia (the Generalitat) and the 
State Government.
From January 2016 to the end of October 
2016, a caretaker government governed 
Spain. It was presided over by Mariano 
Rajoy. The simple explanation for this new 
phenomenon in modern Spanish democracy 
is the failure of various parliamentary groups 
to reach agreements among themselves. Nei-
ther of the two groups who had traditionally 
been in the majority in Spain, the PP (Par-
tido Popular - Popular Party) or the PSOE 
(Partido Socialista Obrero Español - Spanish 
?????????????????? ??????? ?????????? ????-
cient support to form a government. A more 
detailed explanation and the cause of this sit-
uation is that the makeup of Parliament has 
???????????????????????????????????????????-
rival of two new political forces, Podemos 
???? ????? ???? ??????????? ???????????? ?????
fragmentation of the Parliament has led to 
the formalization in the Constitutional Court 
of practically unprecedented disputes be-
tween constitutional bodies.
???? ?????? ??????????? ?????????? ??????? ???
Spanish political and constitutional life in 
2016 was doubtless the so-called “Catalan 
question.” The tension between the cen-
tral Government and the Generalitat was 
compounded by the latter’s announcement, 
backed by the absolute pro-independence 
majority in the Catalan Parliament, of a ref-
erendum on independence. This announce-
ment implied that the referendum should 
preferably be held with the prior agreement 
of the State; otherwise, the threat was to hold 
a unilateral independence referendum before 
the end of 2017 (no doubt we will be able to 
read about the outcome in next year’s report, 
as whatever the outcome, there will be work 
???????????????????????????????????????????????
of political activities by Catalan institutions 
towards independence on the one hand, and 
on the other, the refusal of the Government 
to enter into a dialogue about the possibili-
ty of a referendum, made the Constitutional 
Court a protagonist in a dispute which, de-
spite being predominantly political, needed 
resolution in the legal arena. Further details 
will follow in this report. 
On similar lines, the Constitutional Court ex-
amined the constitutionality of the Organic 
Law regulating its own functioning, which 
was amended in 2015 with the aim of fos-
tering the effectiveness of its rulings. As will 
be seen below, and despite the questions this 
reform raised in the Venice Commission, the 
Constitutional Court validated the legitima-
cy of the new regulations.
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
COURT
The Spanish Constitution does not prescribe 
a closed model of constitutional law but 
rather grants organic law broad freedoms in 
this area. Recently, Organic Law 15/2015, 
amending Organic Law 2/1979 on the Con-
stitutional Court, introduced significant ad-
ditions related to the power of the Constitu-
tional Court to enforce its own rulings and, 
in 2016, the Constitutional Court looked 
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at the constitutionality of its own Organic 
Law by having to respond to two appeals on 
the grounds of unconstitutionality against 
said Law. It upheld the Law in rulings STC 
185/2016 and 215/2016.
Organic Law 15/2015 explains, in its pre-
amble, that its objective is to regulate new 
instruments aimed at ensuring the effective-
ness of Constitutional Court decisions as an 
essential guarantee of the rule of law princi-
ple. This Law gives the Constitutional Court 
additional powers to ensure its rulings are 
carried out. It establishes the supplementary 
application of Administrative Appeal Courts 
Law and opens the possibility for the Court 
to notify whatever authority or public em-
ployee of its decisions, set down in a specific 
procedure for cases of non-compliance, and 
?????????????????????????????????????????-
pend public employees or authorities respon-
sible for non-compliance. The Court may 
also charge the Government with carrying 
out its rulings.
????? ????????????? ???????? ???? ????????
grants the Constitutional Court the power to:
??? ??????? ?????????????????? ?????? ??? ???????
thousand euros on authorities, public em-
ployees, or private individuals who fail 
to comply with Court rulings, being able 
???????????????????????????????????????????
achieved;
2) Agree on the suspension of authorities or 
public employees of the administration 
responsible for non-compliance for the 
time needed to ensure compliance with 
Court decisions;
3) Subcontract the enforcement of its deci-
sions. In this case, the Court may require 
the collaboration of the central Gov-
ernment in order to adopt appropriate 
measures to ensure compliance with the 
Court’s decisions;
4) Gather appropriate individual testimony 
to assign criminal liability to the appro-
priate party.
1 There had only been two in the history of the Court, rulings 45/1986 and 234/2000.
2 P. CRUZ VILLALÓN, “La estructura del Estado, o la curiosidad del jurista persa”, Revista de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad Complutense nº 4, 
1981, pp. 53 -63.
3???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Revista española de 
derecho constitucional, nº 69, 2003  pp. 69-113.
In ruling STC 185/2016, the Constitutional 
Court upheld these measures, reasoning that 
the Spanish Constitution does not contain 
any provision on the matter of enforcement 
of Constitutional Court decisions. Therefore, 
it is a matter of the Organic Law to design 
a model by which the Court may ensure the 
effectiveness of its rulings, as any judge shall 
be provided with the power to enforce its 
own decisions. Otherwise, the Court would 
lack one of the essential aspects of the ex-
ercise of judicial power and with it, the nec-
essary power to ensure the supremacy of the 
Constitution while being the ultimate consti-
tutional authority and its ultimate guardian. 
At its plenary session on 10-11 March 2017, 
the Venice Commission of the Council of 
Europe issued an evaluation of these pro-
visions. According to the Venice Commis-
sion’s Opinion, the judgments of Consti-
tutional Courts are binding because of the 
supremacy of the Constitution. Any public 
???????? ????????????????????????????????????
the Constitutional Court violates the Consti-
tution, the principle of separation of powers 
and the rule of law. The Opinion aims to con-
???????????????????????????????????????????????
DEVELOPMENTS AND  
CONTROVERSIES IN 2016 
The position of the Constitutional Court 
during the past year was clearly marked 
by two circumstances which called for the 
Court to be involved in unprecedented situ-
?????????????????????????????????????????-
pletely new direct call on the part of legiti-
mate constitutional bodies (the Government, 
the Congress of Deputies, the Senate, and 
the General Council of the Judiciary) for the 
Court to settle disputes between them. Espe-
cially noteworthy, therefore, was the dispute 
raised by the Congress of Deputies follow-
ing the Government’s refusal to submit itself 
to parliamentary control of the lower cham-
?????????? ???????? ???????? ???? ???? ????????
with the investiture of the new Government 
because its unstable parliamentary position 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
of the functions of political management 
conferred to the Government by the Consti-
tution. The same dynamic has already led to a 
dispute with the Congress of Deputies in the 
year 2017. If political fragmentation contin-
?????????????????????????????????????????????
In this way, the Court will consolidate effec-
tively important functions that had always 
remained latent, namely the settlement of 
disputes between constitutional1 bodies and 
the legal resolution of the highest political 
disputes between majority and minority. 
The second circumstance that pushed the 
Court to unexplored constitutional ground 
was a novel coda added to the relation-
ship between the Constitutional Court and 
the Autonomous Communities, especially 
Catalonia, following the new course taken 
since 2012. This development was connect-
ed to the recent incorporation of new sets 
of powers in ordering the execution of its 
rulings (Organic Law 15/2015 ruled to be 
in accordance with our fundamental law in 
rulings STC 185/2016 and 215/2016), the 
???????????????????????????????????????????
reiterated in the previous section. In reality, 
????? ???????????? ??????????? ??? ???????????
step (and a qualitatively substantial innova-
tion) in the long history of the Constitutional 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
territorial distribution of power. It has been 
well outlined how one of the circumstances 
of our fundamental law has been the decon-
stitutionalization of the autonomic2 model. 
This situation has always pushed the Consti-
tutional Court to clarify both the rules of the 
territorial distribution of power and the de-
termination of the jurisdictions of the State 
and the Autonomous Communities in terms 
??? ???????3 activities. One may see, there-
fore, that the territorial model in Spain is 
what the Constitutional Court says it is.
 
?????????????????????????????????????????????-
itations (and puts the Court in the middle of 
unadvisable permanent polemics), although 
there is a robust answer in the legal frame-
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work. The political process unleashed in 
Catalonia since 2012 is a challenge to a le-
gal framework that the Catalonian political 
majority (as resulted from the 2012 region-
al elections) believes to be exhausted. This 
constitutional unfaithfulness automatically 
involves the authority of the legal body that 
protects the settled constitutional frame-
work: the Constitutional Court. The Court 
has therefore been in the eye of the storm 
dealing with the construction of the auto-
nomic State (which has allowed it to gain 
legitimacy for years). It continues to be so 
now that it is responding to a very serious 
political and legal crisis, subject as it is now 
to an explicit attempt of delegitimisation by 
institutions such as the Parliament of Catal-
onia.
The year 2016, principally marked by dif-
????????? ??? ???????? ?? ???????? ????????????
may be seen as the latest chapter of this cri-
sis, characterized up to now by the absence 
of political solutions and recourse to the 
Constitutional Court as the guardian of the 
Constitution to put the brakes on initiatives 
which aim to ignore it.
This is the general context which allows us 
to understand that the dispute with Catalo-
???? ???? ???? ????? ??????????? ????????????
in the 2016 Constitutional Court’s case law. 
It was, without a doubt, the most important 
constitutional controversy, and it reverber-
????? ???????? ????????? ??????????? ??????????
handed down by the Constitutional Court, 
whether deciding on the constitutionality of 
???????????????????????????????????????????-
tal rights, or resolving purely jurisdictional 
disputes. It is important to note that the Court 
has sought to deal with issues starting from 
a paradigm stated in STC 259/2015,4 which 
insists on the impossibility, in a constitution-
al system, of opposing democratic principles 
and the rule of law. Guided by this principle, 
the Court has distinguished cases in which 
the constitutional model itself is in ques-
tion – such as initiatives which explicitly 
deal with a constitutional process or those in 
Catalonia which aim to create what may be 
4 “In the social and democratic rule of law described by the Constitution of 1978 it is not possible to oppose democratic legitimacy and constitutional legality 
to the detriment of the latter: the legitimacy of an act or policy of a public power consists basically of its conformity to the Constitution and legal order. Without 
conformity to the Constitution there can be no argument of legitimacy whatsoever. In a democratic idea of power there is no more legitimacy than that found 
in the Constitution”. STC 259/2015. FJ 5
considered structures of an independent state 
– from cases related to Catalan regulatory 
initiatives which are not explicitly linked to 
the so-called process of disconnection. In the 
former cases, the Constitutional Court unan-
imously declared the unconstitutionality of 
the challenged acts. In the latter cases, the 
Court experienced the greatest internal dis-
sent. Finally, we must not forget to note that 
some judges have roundly rejected the new 
?????????????????? ?????????????????? ???????
Law regulating the Court (dissenting opin-
ions in STC 185/2016), from which one may 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
model of constitutional jurisprudence estab-
lished by our fundamental law.
 
MAJOR CASES
Separation of Powers
1. Criteria for distribution of jurisdiction 
and selection of applicable law
In 2016, the Constitutional Court, in rulings 
102 and 116/2016, made an important deci-
sion related to the applicable laws concern-
ing the distribution of jurisdiction between 
the State and Autonomous Communities. 
The Galician Parliament passed a regional 
law, Law 5/1997, on Local Administration, 
which was a literal copy of the national stat-
ute, Law/1985, regulating the Local Govern-
ment System. Both required municipalities 
willing to merge to adopt the decision to 
merge with 2/3 majority. Later, the nation-
al Government amended Law 7/1985 with 
the passing of Law 57/2003 and lowered the 
majority for such merging of municipalities 
to a simple majority. As a consequence of 
this legislative change, and in the absence 
of agreement between the law in the Au-
tonomous Community of Galicia and cen-
tral Government legislation, various courts 
submitted questions of unconstitutionality to 
the Constitutional Court in order to have the 
legislation in the Autonomous Community 
of Galicia declared invalid.
???? ??????????????? ?????? ???????? ????? ???
the regulations for “local government” there 
are two distinct jurisdictions: the central 
Government regulates basic legislation, and 
Autonomous Communities develop basic 
legislation of the central Government. None-
theless, in the view of the Constitutional 
Court, whenever Autonomous Communities 
limit themselves to a literal reproduction of 
basic central Government legislation in their 
own internal legislations, in case of amend-
ment of the central Government legislation, 
Courts may rule the Autonomous Communi-
ty legislation inapplicable, with no need to 
refer the question to the Constitutional Court. 
In this case, the prevailing clause must be ap-
plied as set out in the Spanish Constitution.
???????????????????????????
In 2016, the Constitutional Court continued 
to dedicate part of its jurisprudence to the 
????????????????????????????????????? ?????-
mous Community of Catalonia and its polit-
ical struggle for independence. Ruling STC 
128/2016 responded to the request for an 
appeal on the grounds of unconstitutionali-
ty raised by the Spanish President regarding 
various precepts of the Catalan parliamenta-
??? ???? ???????? ??? ??????? ?????????? ???? ??-
ministrative measures. The Court declared 
various additional provisions of the law un-
constitutional (e.g. nº 24 which entrusted the 
government of Catalonia with the creation 
of a catalog of strategic infrastructure) as 
they were oriented toward encouraging the 
so-called “process of disconnection from the 
State”.
In judicial ruling ATC 141/2016, the Court 
deemed the activity of the Study Commis-
sion for the Constitutional Process created 
by the Catalan Parliament to be “an attempt 
to give validity to the so-called Catalan con-
stitutional process, whose unconstitutional-
ity was declared in ruling STC 259/2016”. 
Unanimously, the Constitutional Court de-
manded that the Catalan Parliament respect 
the Constitution. A new resolution in the 
Catalan Parliament meant that on 1 August 
2016 the Court announced its suspension 
and initiated the processes for adopting the 
measures in art. 92 LOTC (Organic Law on 
the Constitutional Court) for ensuring com-
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pliance with the Constitution, warning the 
public powers of the possible consequenc-
es they risked, including criminal liability. 
Constitutional Court Order 170/2016 was on 
similar lines.
The Constitutional Court again pronounced 
about Catalonia in its decision 184/2016. In 
this case, the Tribunal considered a request 
of unconstitutionality raised by the Catalan 
governing body regarding various articles in 
Law of State 36/2015, on national security. 
According to the Generalitat, this law does 
not adequately safeguard the participation 
of the Autonomous Communities in deci-
son-making bodies or processes as described 
in the law, considering that Catalonia is an 
Autonomous Community, which has its own 
police force. However, the Court concluded 
that the interpretation and jurisdictional attri-
bution in the Law regarding defence, public 
safety, and civil protection was constitution-
??? ????????? ????????? ???? ???????? ??? ?????
aspects, it does permit the participation of 
Autonomous Communities as it also does in 
the process of declaring a situation a matter 
of national security, a power conferred on the 
President.
Rulings 66, 67, 68, and 84/2016 responded 
??????????????????????????????????????????????
Autonomous Communities against Royal 
Decree-law 14/2012, passed by the central 
Government, providing urgent measures to 
rationalize public spending in education. 
The Autonomous Communities alleged that, 
???????? ???? ??????????? ???? ???? ????????????
the constitutional requirement of “extraor-
dinary and urgent need”. The Court rejected 
this claim, arguing that when the decree-law 
was enacted, there was an exceptional need 
????????????????????????????????????????????-
???? ????? ???????????? ??? ?????????????? ??????
agreements. The Constitutional Court also 
dismissed the second allegation, that the 
State had encroached on the Communities’ 
jurisdiction over non-university education 
by setting teaching hours. For the Court, 
decree-law 14/2012 is supported by the fact 
that the Spanish Constitution gives central 
Government jurisdiction over “basic rules” 
for the development of the right to education.
Ruling STC 41/2016 responded to the ap-
peal on the grounds of unconstitutionality 
raised by the Extremadura Assembly against 
various articles of Law 27/2016, on rational-
ization and sustainability of local adminis-
????????????????????????????????????????????-
???????????? ?????? ??? ????? ??????????? ???????
of local administration. The ruling struck 
down various articles of that law as uncon-
stitutional. In particular, the Court struck 
down provisions imposing centralisation of 
responsibilities that had traditionally been 
given over to local entities, related to social 
services, primary health-care, and abattoirs. 
The Court concluded that these responsi-
bilities might be transferred to the local or 
autonomous-community level, depending on 
what the Autonomous Communities decide, 
as they have jurisdiction in these areas.
Rights and Freedoms
1. Freedom of expression 
Ruling STC 226/2016 was a novel piece of 
case law in the area of freedom of expression 
within political parties. The complainant, a 
militant socialist, had made some very criti-
cal, even offensive, remarks in a newspaper 
following the party’s suspension of elections 
that should have been held to decide the 
candidate for mayor of Oviedo (Asturias). 
The party punished her, and she appealed. 
The Constitutional Court rejected the com-
plainant’s claims, on the consideration that 
the party had exercised its powers of pun-
ishment within the law of associations. The 
???????????????????????????????????????????-
ment for members to be loyal to the party 
and to not, by their expression, produce a 
negative, hostile image of the party, given 
the public nature of the organization. 
Ruling STC 112/2016 was on a particular-
ly relevant matter, which outlines the posi-
tion of freedom of expression in democratic 
Spain. In this case, the Constitutional Court 
ruled on whether the punishment imposed 
for glorifying terrorism due to participation 
in a tribute to a deceased member of the ETA 
terror group violated freedom of expression. 
The Court based its decision on the doctrine 
of hate speech from the European Court of 
Human Rights. The Constitutional Court 
decided that despite Spanish democracy not 
prohibiting demonstrations of anti-demo-
cratic ideologies, the expressions used in 
that case, inciting to violence, met the crite-
ria of hate speech. Consequently, those ex-
pressions were not protected by freedom of 
expression in a democratic state.
2. Participation in public affairs
Rulings STC 107/108 and 109/2016 re-
sponded to various appeals for protection 
of rights raised against the resolution of the 
Mesa (governing body) of the Parliament of 
Catalonia which granted the “proposal of a 
resolution on the initiation of a political pro-
cess in Catalonia as a consequence of elec-
toral results”. This process being initiated 
is tantamount to the beginnings of discon-
nection from the State, and the claimants, 
members of various parliamentary parties, 
believed that said resolution violated their 
right to participate in public events by oblig-
ing them to participate in a parliamentary 
initiative that was manifestly unconstitution-
al, as the Constitutional Court had ruled on 
various previous occasions. The Constitu-
tional Court found that the challenged reso-
lution did not infringe the claimants’ rights, 
as parliamentary governing bodies cannot 
rule on the constitutionality of parliamentary 
initiatives that they are presented with. Only 
in exceptional cases can they rule initiatives 
inapplicable based on unconstitutionality 
when that is evident.
3. Effective legal protection
Ruling 83/2016 responded to an especially 
important question for the control of limita-
tions imposed on fundamental rights when 
states of the exception provided in the Con-
stitution are declared. The Court answered 
an appeal for protection of fundamental 
rights raised against the Supreme Court de-
cision which denied its jurisdiction over test-
ing the validity of Royal Decree 1673/2010. 
Following this Royal Decree, the Spanish 
Government declared a state of alarm, for 
??????????????????????????????????????????????
of essential aerial public transport in re-
sponse to the paralysation of airspace due to 
??? ??????????? ???????????? ??????????????????-
??????????????? ???????? ????????????????????
lack of jurisdiction as, despite Royal Decrees 
being laws with regulatory status passed by 
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the Government, the Royal Decree which 
???????????? ????????? ?? ?????? ??? ??????????
would have the status of a law, as states of 
exception as described in Article 116 of the 
Spanish Constitution suspend and alter the 
application of laws. Because of that, limita-
tions to fundamental rights due to states of 
exception fall under the jurisdiction of the 
Constitutional Court, and not ordinary ad-
ministrative courts.
 
4. The right to health
In ruling 139/2016, the Court responded 
to the appeal on the grounds of unconsti-
tutionality raised by the Parliament of Na-
varra against various articles of Decree-law 
16/2012 on urgent measures to guarantee the 
sustainability of the national health service 
and improve the quality and safety of its 
services. The Court determined that it is not 
unconstitutional for foreigners without resi-
dence permits in Spain to be excluded from 
the free public health service. The Court 
concedes that the legislature can adjust the 
conditions of service provision for the afore-
mentioned medical care.
Foreign, International, and/or Multilateral 
Relations
Ruling 85/2016 responded to an appeal on 
the grounds of unconstitutionality raised by 
the Autonomous Community of the Canary 
Islands against Law 2/2014, on external ac-
tion and services of the State. The challenged 
??????????????????????????????????????????????
as the combined activities of public admin-
istrations undertaken externally, executed in 
agreement with the objectives established 
by central Government. The Autonomous 
Community of the Canary Islands believed 
??????????????????????????????????????????????
action represents a suppression of the auton-
omy of Autonomous Communities, allowing 
central Government to encroach on their ju-
risdiction. The Court considered that Law 
2/2014 is covered by central Government 
???????????????????????????????????????????-
tion in relation to “international relations”; 
????????????? ??? ???? ????????? ???????????????-
dination of central Government, as subject to 
international law, in a territorially decentral-
ized system.
Ruling STC 228/2016 responded to an appeal 
on the grounds of unconstitutionality raised 
by the President against various articles in 
Parliament of Catalonia Law 16/2014, on 
external action and relations with the Euro-
pean Union. In this ruling, the Court, apply-
ing the consolidated constitutional doctrine, 
recognized the possibility that Autonomous 
Communities may undertake activities with 
an external aspect, as long as they respect the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the State in matters 
of international relations. Along these lines, 
the ruling stated that Autonomous Commu-
nities might not sign treaties, represent the 
State abroad, or create international obliga-
tions which compromise the international re-
sponsibilities of the State. Applying this doc-
trine, the Constitutional Court struck down 
articles aimed at promoting the establish-
ment of “bilateral” relations between Catal-
onia and other countries as unconstitutional, 
along with that provision that shaped the so-
called “public diplomacy” of the Generalitat.
CONCLUSION
?????????????????????????????????????????????
in the Constitution has traditionally produced 
many disputes between the State and the Au-
tonomous Communities regarding, amongst 
other things, the interconnection between 
competences allocated to them. Controver-
sies did not spare competences allocated ex-
clusively to the central State by Article 149 
of the Constitution. It was the Constitutional 
?????? ?????? ?????????ad cesium challenged 
vertical divisions of competences. The dis-
pute between the State and Autonomous 
Communities has grown in recent years due 
to two factors: a) the economic crisis, and 
b) the Catalan struggle for independence. In 
2016, the Constitutional Court had the op-
portunity to deal with such matters.
??????????????????????????????????????????????
2016 the Court continued to rule on wheth-
er the measures taken by the State to reduce 
spending as a result of international agree-
ments have encroached on the jurisdiction of 
Autonomous Communities. Different cases 
made it clear that the Court has not always 
been able to come up with clear criteria to 
determine what is a matter for the State and 
what is a matter for the Autonomous Com-
munities in areas of common policy. The 
rather vague wording used by the Consti-
??????? ??? ?????? ?????? ???????????? ????? ???
“general management of the economy”, “ba-
sic legislation”, and “development of funda-
mental rights” allowed the Court to uphold 
State interventions against the Autonomous 
Communities, despite the fact that the Con-
stitution and the Statutes of Autonomy also 
grant them some jurisdiction over economic 
matters and fundamental rights in their own 
territory.
Secondly, the struggle for sovereignty in 
Catalonia has not only caused various juris-
dictional disputes between the Autonomous 
Community of Catalonia and the State but 
has also triggered an important debate in the 
Court concerning the model of constitutional 
jurisdiction provided by the Spanish Consti-
tution. In two of its most important decisions 
(186 and 215/2016), the Court ruled that the 
power to enforce its own decisions is consis-
tent with the Constitution. This power was 
introduced in the Law on the Constitutional 
Court in response to repeated non-compli-
ance with the Court’s rulings by Catalonia. 
However, the dissenting opinions given by 
various judges demonstrate that even the 
Court’s own role in the State is open to dis-
cussion. In short, constitutional jurispru-
dence in 2016 showed that the position of the 
bodies and institutions of the decentralized 
State is contentious, as is the position of the 
body called to rule on it.
In 2016, the Court continued to endorse the 
application of the European Court of Human 
Rights’ doctrine of hate speech. This doc-
trine supported the Constitutional Court’s 
decision determining the position of freedom 
of expression in the democratic State in ap-
plication of the theory of balancing of rights, 
underlining the doctrine of hate speech. 
However, the inclusion of these doctrines 
within the dogma of fundamental rights as-
sumed by the Spanish Constitution may be 
somewhat problematic. It remains to be seen 
how this legal pattern develops in the com-
ing years.
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SWEDEN
INTRODUCTION 
Politically, the migration situation in Eu-
rope played a large role in Swedish politics 
throughout 2016. Several of the measures 
adopted by the Swedish Parliament and Gov-
ernment in order to cope with the situation 
have constitutional implications, touching 
upon, for example, border control and the di-
vision of powers between the state and mu-
nicipalities. The impact of the new EU data 
protection regime on Swedish law has also 
been devoted a lot of attention, most recently 
as a result of the decision by the CJEU on 
December 12, 2016, in the Tele2 case. 
Sweden is a parliamentary democracy, the 
Instrument of Government (IG) (Regerings-
formen), 1:1, 4, 6, and a unitary state with 
a constitutionally protected local self-gov-
ernment. The power and status of local au-
thorities are regulated in the constitution 
(IG 1:1(2), ch. 14), although the legislature 
has explicitly abstained from laying down 
?? ??????????????? ?????????? ??? ???? ?????? ????
meaning of local self-government.1 The local 
authorities’ taxation right (IG 14:4) togeth-
er with the statement in IG 14:2 that local 
authorities are responsible for local and re-
gional matters of public interest based on 
the principle of local self-government, is the 
primary expression of local self-government. 
All matters concerning the competence and 
responsibility of local authorities, including 
principles concerning the organization and 
working procedures of local authorities to-
gether with local taxation, must be regulated 
1 See Kommunallagen 2:1, ???????????????????????????????????
2 Four decisions by the Surpreme Court in 2016 dealt with matters of constitutional law, see NJA 2016 
s. 680, NJA 2016 s. 649, NJA 2016 s. 320, NJA 2016 s. 212.
3??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
by an act of law (IG 14:2, 8:2(3)). An explic-
it reference is made to the principle of pro-
portionality in IG 14:3 which states Any re-
striction in local self-government should not 
exceed what is necessary with regard to the 
purpose of the restriction. Local authorities 
have no regulatory powers based on the con-
stitution; a delegation from the Parliament 
(Riksdag) is necessary. Such a delegation can 
be direct from the Riksdag to local authori-
ties (IG 8:9) or indirect via the Government 
(IG 8:10). 
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
COURTS
The Swedish court system is composed of 
administrative courts and courts of gener-
al jurisdiction. There are also a number of 
specialized courts such as the Labour Court 
and the Patent and Market Courts but they 
will not be dealt with here. Our focus will 
be on the case law of the Supreme Court 
(Högsta Domstolen (HD))2 and the Supreme 
Administrative Court (Högsta förvaltnings-
domstolen (HFD)). Sweden does not have 
a constitutional court. Judicial review is de-
centralized and exercised only in concrete 
cases.3 According to IG ch. 11 art. 14, a court 
?????????????????????????????????????????? ????
a provision of fundamental law or other su-
perior statutes. The same applies if a proce-
dure laid down in law has been set aside in 
any important aspect when a provision was 
??????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????
that particular case. Swedish courts cannot 
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declare a rule null and void. In addition, pub-
lic bodies exercise judicial review, IG 12:10. 
At the latest reform of the Instrument of 
Government (2010), IG 11:14 was changed. 
The former requirement that any violation of 
a statute by, for example, a regulation, had 
to be obvious for the latter to be declared 
non-applicable was removed. The “obvi-
ous-rule” served to protect the prerogative 
of the legislature. The new IG 11:14 para. 2 
states that “In the case of review of an act of 
law under paragraph one, particular attention 
shall be paid to the fact that the Riksdag is 
the foremost representative of the people and 
that fundamental law takes precedence over 
other law”. As a result of Sweden being a 
parliamentary democracy, the role of courts 
and hence their exercise of judicial review 
has been comparatively limited historical-
ly. However, the Swedish EU-membership 
and the European Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR) becoming Swedish law 
in 1995 changed the setting. More than 20 
years later it is clear that the role of Swedish 
courts in both constitutional law issues and 
otherwise has been strengthened in relation 
to the legislature. 
On the issue of constitutional interpretation, 
Swedish courts will usually give greater 
weight to the preparatory works of the con-
stitutional documents, such as the Govern-
ment’s proposal of a bill to Parliament and 
the Parliament’s written report on such a 
proposal. This is still the case in most areas 
of constitutional interpretation. However, 
recent case law has shown willingness for 
a more dynamic approach when it comes 
to issues that touch upon the protection of 
constitutional rights and when there are ob-
vious lacunas in the legislation. For exam-
ple, a violation of a constitutional right has 
been found to give the individual concerned 
a right to economic compensation through 
tort-law even when no clear legal basis for 
such a right exists in the legislation on torts 
4 NJA 2014 s. 323 and NJA 2014 s. 332.
5 HFD 2015 ref. 16. See 2015 ICON-Report on developments in Swedish constitutional law. 
6???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
7 The Swedish Case in the Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15. 
8 DS 2014:23. 
or in the constitution.4 If this extensive ap-
plication of tort-law in connection with con-
stitutional rights is a more general trend or 
more due to the very special circumstances 
in the cases in point remains to been seen. 
One important question concerning methods 
of constitutional interpretation is the status 
of the principle of proportionality within the 
review exercised by administrative courts. 
Recent case law leads to the conclusion that 
the space for reviewing administrative deci-
sions’ proportionality is determined by the 
law.5 If the law leaves no room for propor-
tionality assessments it will not be possible 
to make such an assessment.6 Taken together 
one could argue that this weakens the prin-
ciple of proportionality as a constitutional 
principle to be applied by the courts.
DEVELOPMENTS AND  
CONTROVERSIES IN 2016  
On December 21, 2016, the CJEU delivered 
its preliminary ruling in the Tele2 Sverige 
AB v. Post- och telestyrelsen case.7 The 
ruling set off an intense and lively debate 
in Sweden on the relationship between na-
tional law and EU law, on the one hand, and 
how the ruling of the CJEU in Digital Rights 
Ireland and Others (C293/12 and C594/12) 
should be interpreted, on the other hand. The 
Swedish request for a preliminary ruling 
was made in the proceeding concerning an 
order sent by Post- och telestyrelsen (PTS) 
to Tele2 Sverige requiring the latter to re-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????
subscribers and registered users. The request 
concerned the interpretation of Art. 15(1) of 
Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Par-
liament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 
concerning the processing of personal data 
and the protection of privacy in the electron-
ic communications sector (OJ 2002 L 201, 
p. 37), as amended by Directive 2009/136/
EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 25 November 2009 (OJ 2009 
L 337, p. 11), read in the light of Articles 7 
and 8 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
As a result of the ruling in Digital Rights 
Ireland and Others (C293/12 and C594/12), 
Tele2 Sverige informed the PTS that it would 
cease, as from 14 April 2014, to retain elec-
tronic communications data covered by the 
Electronic Communications Act, and that it 
would erase data retained prior to that date. 
On April 29 the same year, the Ministry of 
Justice appointed a special reporter with the 
main task to assess Swedish data protection 
laws in the aftermath of the Digital Rights 
Ireland and Others decision. The reporter 
found that Swedish legislation on data reten-
tion was in congruence with EU law and the 
ECHR.8 As a result, the PTS ordered Tele2 
Sverige to start the retention of data again in 
accordance with national legislation. Tele2 
was of the opinion that the reporter had mis-
interpreted the Digital Rights Ireland and 
Others decision and that the Swedish leg-
islation was in violation of the EU Charter. 
As a result, Tele2 challenged the PTS-or-
der in the Stockholm Administrative Court. 
The Administrative Court ruled against the 
applicants and Tele2 appealed. The Appeal 
Administrative Court referred the case to the 
CJEU. The main question was whether the 
Swedish legislation (the Electronic Com-
munications Act) was in conformity with 
the derogation from the general prohibition 
against data retention laid down in Art. 15(1) 
of Directive 2002/58, read in the light of 
Digital Rights Ireland and Others and Art. 
7, 8, and 52(1) of the Charter.  After reaching 
the conclusion that the Swedish legislation 
in this particular case falls under the scope 
of the Directive, the Court moved on to inter-
pret Art. 15(1) of the Directive. According to 
the CJEU, the derogation in Art. 15(1) must 
be interpreted strictly and it stated that the 
grounds for derogations listed in it are ex-
haustive (para. 89-90). The CJEU concluded 
that national legislation that provides for a 
general and indiscriminate retention of all 
???????????????????????????????????????????????
and registered users relating to all means of 
?????????????? ???? ???? ???????? ??? ????????
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crime is not in congruence with Art. 15(1) 
of the Directive read in the light of Art. 7, 8, 
11, and 52(1) of the Charter (para. 112).  The 
matter is still to be decided by the Appeal 
Administrative Court in Stockholm.  
The question whether the UN Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (CRC) should be 
incorporated into Swedish law by adopting a 
legal act has been investigated by a State In-
quiry Commission. Its report was submitted 
at the beginning of 2016 and it recommended 
that the CRC together with its two Optional 
Protocols be incorporated into Swedish law.9 
Sweden is already bound by the CRC as a 
matter of international law. If the CRC is to 
be incorporated into Swedish law, the CRC 
will become applicable national law, and not 
only a supportive legal source. It will also 
????????????????????????????????????????????
???? ???? ??????? ?????? ??? ?? ???????? ??? ??????
norms, the CRC will precede lower-ranking 
legislation and provisions. Additional ad-
vantages are, reportedly, that it will send a 
clear political signal; it will stimulate a right-
based approach to issues related to children 
and their well-being, and it will bring peda-
gogical advantages. Sweden is a dualist state 
and by tradition international conventions 
have been transformed, meaning that they 
have been translated and reformulated in or-
der to be, piece by piece, integrated into the 
existing legal system.10 The ECHR is, so far, 
the only exception to this rule. The proposal 
to do the same with the CRD has met heavy 
criticism. Some of the main arguments 
against incorporation are the vague formu-
lations in several of the articles of the CRC, 
the cost it will bring with it to incorporate 
due to, for example, an increased amount of 
complaints, and the special assistance that 
will be required when children to a larger 
extent are expected to be heard as witnesses 
etc. Another concern is how the CRC is to 
be applied in migration law cases involving 
children. Moreover, if compared with the 
9 SOU 2016:19.
10 Iain Cameron, An Introduction to the European Convention on Human Rights, Iustus, Uppsala (2014) 31-32. 
11 Regeringsbeslut 11:13, Ju2015/08659/PO.  
12 Prop. 201516:67 p 25.
13 The Council on Legislation, 7 December 2015, available in prop. 201516:67.
14 “In preparing Government business, the necessary information and opinions shall be obtained from the public authorities concerned. Information and 
opinions shall be obtained from local authorities as necessary. Organisations and individuals shall also be given an opportunity to express an opinion as 
necessary”. IG 7:2. 
15 RIR 2016:26 p 18. 
ECHR, the CRC has no supranational court 
that will guide it in the interpretation of the 
Convention. 
On November 12, 2015, the Swedish Gov-
ernment decided to close the borders tem-
porarily as a result of a request from the 
Migration Board.11 The decision has been 
continuously renewed, at the beginning of 
every month, but since June 2, 2016 these 
decisions are not taken on a monthly basis. 
The legal basis for that is found in Art. 29 
of the Schengen Borders Code. According 
to the latest decision, the Swedish border 
is closed until May 10, 2017. The Swed-
ish constitution is silent on matters of civil 
emergencies that might pose a threat to pub-
lic order and national security. Emergency 
matters are therefore regulated in the form 
of statutes. On December 21, 2015, a tempo-
rary law entered into force (Lag (2015:1073) 
om särskilda åtgärder vid allvarlig fara för 
den allmänna ordningen eller den inre säker-
heten i landet). The law gives the Govern-
ment the powers to adopt temporary mea-
sures in emergency situations in the form of 
identity control on busses, trains, or ships 
entering Sweden from another state (3 §). A 
decision to impose such measures is valid for 
six months. The law will end at December 
?????????? ????????????????????????????????-
ed to the Council on Legislation on Decem-
ber 5, 2015. This draft gave the Government 
broader powers, including the power to close 
roads, bridges, etc., that connect Sweden 
with foreign territory, than the bill that was 
??????? ????????12 The Council on Legisla-
tion, when exercising abstract a prio review 
of the bill, had two major concerns with the 
draft.13?????????? ???????????? ???????? ??? ????
procedural aspects of the legislative process. 
The Council concluded that the bill was put 
together hastily and that it did not serve its 
purpose, i.e. to handle the challenges that the 
increased number of migrants posed to soci-
ety at large and at the same time secure the 
right to asylum. The Council on Legislation 
stated that all concerned parties had not been 
allowed enough time to review the proposed 
bill and its consequences in accordance with 
IG 7:2.14 The second major concern was re-
lated to the scope and content of the bill and 
its impact on individuals’ rights and free-
doms. The Council basically argued that the 
bill gave the Government broad emergency 
??????? ???????? ?????????? ??? ?????? ????? ???
law principles such as the right to judicial 
redress and the protection of privacy rights. 
The Council suggested changes to the bill 
that would limit the emergency powers of 
the Government. These suggestions were ad-
hered to when the law was adopted. In 2016, 
????????????????????? ???????????????????
which is a central part of the Parliament’s 
control power, conducted an audit of the 
enforcement of the Government’s decision 
to impose border control up till the summer 
of 2016. The SNAO found that the purpose 
of the temporary border control and how to 
???????????????????????????????????????????-
scribed in the decision by the Government. 
As a result, the implementation was left to 
the Police, and the Police did not have an 
overall strategy or guideline of how to im-
plement the decision. Therefore it was left to 
???? ??????????? ???????? ???? ?????? ???????-
???????????????????????????????????????????
decision. The main criticism put forward by 
the SNAO was that the delegation chain had 
been direct from the Government to the op-
erative level within the Police without any 
control as to whether the measures taken had 
served their purpose, or whether they were in 
accordance with the law.15 
On March 1, 2016, a new law entered into 
force according to which municipalities were 
required to accept migrants that have been 
granted residence permits (Lagen (2016:38 
om mottagandet av visa nyanlända invandra-
re för bosättning). This created a controversy 
based on different views on the scope of the 
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local self-government. The Council on Leg-
islation concluded that the draft had an ob-
vious impact on the scope of local self-gov-
ernment; that the preparatory works to the 
constitutional rules on local self-government 
require a careful assessment of the measure, 
especially its impact on local self-govern-
ment and whether it is necessary to achieve 
the aspired goals. After reaching the conclu-
sion that such an inquiry and assessment had 
been made by the Government when pre-
senting its draft bill, the Council on Legis-
lation stated that there was nothing that led 
it to conclude that the draft was in violation 
with the principle of proportionality as laid 
down in the constitution.16 
The challenges to the Rule of Law and to 
the independence of the judiciary that sev-
eral EU Member States have experienced 
recently, in particular Poland and Hungary, 
have revitalized the debate on the role and 
independence of the judiciary in Sweden.17 
The question is politically sensitive taking 
into consideration Sweden being a parlia-
mentary democracy and a social welfare 
state, guided primarily by the will of the 
people as expressed in general elections. The 
judiciary is considered a counter-majoritar-
???? ???????????????????????????????????????
need to be kept strict, which also explains the 
dominating methods of interpretation, such 
as a relatively strict adherence to the letter 
of the law and strong emphasis on prepa-
ratory works together with deference to the 
legislature, and a lack of judicial activism in 
Sweden. However, due to the international-
ization, Europeanization, and fragmentation 
??? ???? ????? ????????? ??????????? ??? ????????-
tation, not foreseen by the legislature, end 
up before the courts. The courts have been 
forced to become more active and the scope 
for what could be perceived as value-based 
assessments has become broader. As a result, 
the courts might become positive, instead of 
negative, legislatures. This concern was re-
cently voiced in relation to the incorporation 
of the CRC.  
16 The Council on Legislation, 2015-11-04, available in Swedish at http://lagradet.se/yttranden/Ett%20gemensamt%20ansvar%20for%20mottagande%20
av%20nyanlanda.pdf. Last accessed 2017-04-20. 
17??????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????
18 Nr. 3784-15, 4047-15.
19 HFD 2011 ref. 10.
20 HFD 2011 ref. 22.
MAJOR CASES 
Separation of Powers and Judicial Review 
In HFD 2016 ref 59, the Supreme Adminis-
trative Court ruled on whether a decision by 
an administrative authority (Svenskt Kraft-
nät) to divide Sweden into four districts in 
order to regulate and facilitate trade on Nord 
Pool was to be considered an administrative 
decision in an individual case (förvaltnings-
beslut i ett enskilt fall), or a general legal 
norm (föreskrift). A company had challenged 
the legality of the decision. There is no judi-
cial redress concerning general norms, since 
such decisions according to the preparatory 
works are not suitable for judicial review. 
Therefore the HFD had to answer the ques-
tion whether the decision was a general norm 
or a decision in an individual case before it 
could proceed to assess the legality of the de-
cision. The HFD ruled that the decision was 
a general norm, for the following reasons: 
the decision applies throughout the whole 
Swedish territory, it is binding for all actors 
??????? ????????????????????????????????????????
and unlimited number of transactions every 
day and for an unlimited time period. Since 
Swedish law does not allow for abstract ju-
dicial review, and there is no judicial redress 
against general norms, the legality of the de-
cision could not be challenged.  
Rights and Freedoms
In HFD 2016 ref 8, the question was whether 
a data bank created by a consortium of gas 
stations containing data on cars was legal. 
The data bank was to be managed by em-
ployees at gas stations. Every gas station was 
to be equipped with a camera photograph-
ing all cars. In case of someone not paying 
for the gas their register number would be 
registered in the data bank, and as a result 
they would be denied to buy gas in the future 
without pre-paying. The HFD concluded that 
the data concerned personal data related to 
crimes. According to Swedish law, only ad-
ministrative authorities are allowed to han-
dle such data, if not an explicit exception 
is decided by the Swedish Data Protection 
Agency. In this case privacy rights were at 
stake and the scope for such an exception 
should be limited according to the HFD. The 
HFD concluded that the data bank was to be 
handled and controlled by employees at gas 
stations. Entering data would be done after 
visual observations only and on the basis of 
alleged crimes. Due to the high number of 
actors involved, the apparently wide margin 
of error, and the fact that data banks related 
to crimes as a main rule are to be managed 
by administrative authorities,  the HFD con-
cluded that the obvious risks concerning vio-
lations of privacy rights could not justify an 
exception to the main rule in this particular 
case.  
In two cases, the HFD18 had to decide on what 
constitutes a civil right within the meaning 
??? ???????????????????????????????????????
a decision taken by the Swedish Agency for 
Youth and Civil Society concerning a re-
quest for grants. The Swedish-Turkish Na-
tional Association applied for a state grant. 
The application was denied and in the deci-
sion it was stated that the decision could not 
be appealed. The Association still appealed 
to the Administrative Court, claiming they 
had a right to appeal taking into consider-
ation hat the decision concerned a civil right 
according to Art. 6(1) ECHR. The second 
case raised the question whether decisions 
concerning parking permits for persons with 
disabilities were a civil right for the purpose 
of Art. 6(1) ECHR and hence whether there 
should be a right to judicial review. Accord-
ing to the case law of the HFD, state-funded 
grants fall under Art. 6(1) ECHR if the right 
to such a grant is stipulated by law; the cri-
teria are laid down in the law, thus limiting 
the scope for discretionary assessments; and 
as a main rule all associations are entitled to 
such a grant.19 Moreover, the right to judicial 
review of administrative decisions is con-
sidered a fundamental rule of law principle 
and therefore the presumption is in favor of 
a civil right according to Art. 6(1) ECHR.20 
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In both cases, the HFD found that Art. 6(1) 
????????????????????? ??? ??????????????? ????
Court referred to its case law in HFD 2011 
ref. 10. In the latter case, the HFD equaled 
????????????????????????????????????????????
stated that there were no authoritative rea-
????? ???? ???? ???????????? ???? ??????? ?? ??????
right, taking its case law in HFD 2011 rf. 2 
into consideration.  
On June 10, 2016, the District Court in 
Stockholm21 delivered its ruling in the so-
???????????????????????????????? ????????????
time a court decided on the matter which 
since 2013 has been lively debated in Swe-
den. Several non-judicial control bodies 
have already declared the register to be ille-
gal22 and to be a register primarily based on 
ethnic identity.23 The legal question is wheth-
er the right to not be discriminated against 
on the basis of ethnicity has been violated. 
??????????????????? ?????? ??? ???? ????????????
interpreting the Swedish Law (Polisdatala-
gen 2:10) in conformity with Art. 8 and 14 
ECHR. The Chancellor of Justice (represent-
ing the State) appealed. The position of the 
State is currently that the register is in viola-
tion of Art. 8 and 14 ECHR as the law stands 
after Biao v. Denmark24 but that it is not in 
violation with Swedish law, and the damages 
therefore should be lowered. 
CONCLUSION
Developments in Swedish Constitutional 
???? ???????? ????????? ??????????????????-
tution’s standing in the Swedish legal order. 
Several important political matters related to 
or with an impact on constitutional principles 
took place but these matters were not primar-
ily framed as constitutional issues. The clos-
ing of the Swedish borders as a result of the 
migration situation, the relationship between 
EU law and national law concerning privacy 
rights and data protection, and the incorpora-
tion of the CRC into Swedish law could serve 
as three examples. One explanation could be 
that by tradition, the Swedish constitution 
has had the status as an instrument for the 
21 T 2978-15 et al. 
22 Säkerhets och Integritetsskyddsnämnden (SIN), dnr. 173-2013, 15 november 2013. 
23 Diskrimineringsombudsmannen (DO), GRA 2013/67, 20 februari 2013, Justitieombudsmannen (JO), dnr. 5205-2013. 
24 Biao v. Denmark, no. 3859/10.
government. Rules on the division of pow-
ers and functions between the legislature, 
the executive, the administration, and courts 
have been the main focus of the constitution. 
However, slowly the chapter on rights in the 
Swedish Instrument of Government has in-
creased in importance, due to, for example, 
the Europeanization of national law. 
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DEVELOPMENTS IN TAIWANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Jau-Yuan Hwang, Justice of the Constitutional Court, Taiwan; Ming-Sung Kuo, Associate 
???????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????
??? ??????
TAIWAN
INTRODUCTION
Democratic election is both the fruit of and 
the moving force for Taiwan’s changing con-
stitutional landscape. It has been so since 
Taiwan set out on the metamorphosis from 
the fossilized Republic of China (ROC) re-
gime to the present vibrant democracy in the 
???????? ??????????????? ????????????????????? ??
popular vote in 1996 sowed the seeds of the 
transformational constitutional revision in 
1997, both the presidential elections in 2000 
and 2008 resulted in “party turnover,” setting 
off stormy constitutional politics.  Engaging 
in constitutional politics, reluctantly or not, 
the Taiwan Constitutional Court (TCC) has 
played a crucial role in the development of 
constitutional law in Taiwan.1
2016 was no exception. The election of the 
????? ??????? ??????????? ????? ???????? ??? ????
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), on Jan-
uary 16, 2016, brought about Taiwan’s third 
party turnover. And, the DPP controlled the 
???????????? ????? ?????????????? ???? ???? ?????
????? ??? ?????????????? ???? ????????? ??????? ???
the political landscape, presidential transition, 
transitional justice, same-sex marriage, and 
pension reform, to name just two pairs, were 
all on the reform agenda and may well impact 
constitutional development. Moreover, the 
???????????????????????????????? ?????????????
and the vacancy of seven justices of the TCC 
in 2016 not only changed the TCC’s composi-
tion but also brought it from its ten-year-long 
dormancy back to the center of the new con-
stitutional dynamics set off by the 2016 elec-
tions and the forthcoming reforms.2 
1 Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases (CUP 2003) 
106-57.
2? ???????????????????????????????? ??????? ?????????????? ?????? ???????? ????????????????????????????
Judicial Activism to Constitutional Irrelevance in Taiwan’s Constitutional Politics” (2016) 25 Wash Int’l LJ 
597, 625-34, 640-41.
This paper suggests that the issues aris-
ing from the new constitutional landscape 
opened by the January elections remain 
unsettled, paving the way for the TCC’s in-
tervention in the future.  Apart from the in-
troduction to the Constitution and the TCC, 
Section II notes the constitutional politics 
of judicial appointment in 2016; Section III 
discusses the constitutional controversies 
surrounding transitional justice and same-
sex marriage, especially the interrelationship 
between the politics of judicial appointment 
and same-sex marriage; and Section IV sum-
marizes the TCC case law of 2016.       
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
COURT
Mirroring its convoluted modern history, 
Taiwan has been governed by an ROC Con-
stitution since 1947, soon after it was placed 
under the China-led belligerent occupation 
following Japan’s unconditional surrender to 
???? ??????????????????????????? ????? ?????????
1945. The ROC Constitution was passed by 
a Constituent National Assembly (including a 
small delegation from Taiwan) on December 
25, 1946 in China and came into effect a year 
later. At that time, China was already engulfed 
in a civil war between the Communists and 
the Nationalists (also known as Kuomintang 
????????????????????????????????????????-
munist insurgency, the ruling KMT pushed 
through the “Temporary Provisions” accord-
ing to the provision for constitutional amend-
???????? ???????? ??????????????????????????-
al government was still taking shape. Thus, 
the nascent ROC Constitution was essentially 
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suspended with the add-on counter-insurgen-
cy Temporary Provisions further expanded. 
In the meantime, a decree of regional mar-
tial-law rule was declared for Taiwan in May 
?????????????????????????????????????????
Taiwan.  Despite the continuing wartime sta-
tus, Taiwan was placed under a four-decade-
long quasi-military dictatorship by the ROC 
Government afterwards.3 
Following escalating democratic demonstra-
tions and the parallel political reforms, in-
cluding the lifting of martial law in 1987, the 
dictatorial Temporary Provisions were even-
tually repealed in 1991. A series of constitu-
tional amendments have since been enacted 
in seven rounds of constitutional revision.4 
The Constitution was last amended in 2005. 
Appended to by “Additional Articles,” the 
original Constitution of 1947 has been sub-
???????????????????????????????????????????????
island-nation of Taiwan, only to leave the 
designation ROC unchanged. 
???? ?????????????? ??????? ???? ???????? ???
?????? ????????????? ???????????? ??? ?????
when the ROC Government was seated in 
Nanjing, China.  Under the KMT-dominated 
party-state regime, the role of the TCC was 
substantially limited.  Yet, since the lifting of 
martial law on July 15, 1987, the TCC has 
transformed itself into the guardian of the 
constitutional order.5  Until the end of 2016, 
the TCC rendered 743 Interpretations in to-
tal: 216 Interpretations (including Interpre-
tation Nos. 1 and 2 dated January 6, 1949 
when it was still seated in Nanjing) were 
promulgated during the 1949-87 martial-law 
rule, whereas 527 Interpretations were is-
sued afterwards. Despite the recent decline 
in productivity over the past decade,6 the 
TCC has continued to play an important role 
in constitutional politics. 
According to Articles 78 and 79 of the Con-
stitution, the TCC has two primary func-
tions: to interpret the Constitution and to 
unify the interpretations of statutes and or-
dinances.  As its full designation connotes, 
 
3 Jiunn-rong Yeh, The Constitution of Taiwan: A Contextual Analysis 28-36 (Hart 2016).
4 Ibid 36-48.
5 Ginsburg (n 1).
6 Kuo (n 2) 626.
the TCC gains its recent public recognition 
mainly through its jurisdiction over consti-
tutional interpretation. The Constitutional 
Interpretation Procedure Act of 1993 (CIPA) 
provides that the TCC exercise jurisdiction 
over constitutional interpretation on receiv-
ing petitions from (1) the central or local 
government agencies; (2) at least one-third 
of the Legislators; or (3) the people (indi-
viduals or corporate entities) in relation to 
??????????????? ???????? ???? ????? ???? ?????????
routes are similar to the “abstract norm con-
trol” procedure in the German Federal Con-
stitutional Court Act.  Besides, the TCC rec-
ognizes the German-styled “concrete norm 
control” procedure in Interpretation No. 371 
(1995): any judge sitting in all instances may 
suspend the proceedings before her and refer 
the constitutionality of the statute applicable 
to the pending case to the TCC provided that 
she ascertains that the statute is unconstitu-
tional.
The CIPA requires a two-thirds majority of 
the attending justices with a quorum of two-
thirds of the total membership to decide the 
constitutionality of statutes.  In contrast, a 
simple majority of those present with a quo-
rum of two-thirds of the justices is required 
to declare an administrative regulation or a 
municipal ordinance unconstitutional. As re-
?????? ?????????? ?????????????????? ????????-
cation of the interpretations of statute and or-
dinances (uniform interpretations), the CIPA 
provides that both the government (central 
and local) and the people have standing. 
Uniform interpretations can be rendered by 
a simple majority of the justices present with 
a reduced quorum of half of all the justices. 
Apart from constitutional and uniform in-
terpretations, the Additional Articles of the 
Constitution (AAC) further invest the TCC 
with jurisdiction over the dissolution of an-
ti-constitutional political parties and the trial 
of the impeachment of the President and the 
Vice President. The TCC has never been re-
quested to adjudicate an impeachment case 
or to dissolve a political party to date.
Since its early days, the operation of the TCC 
has been modeled on the continental style of 
judicial review. Despite the distinct referral 
procedures, the TCC renders interpretations 
as advisory opinions on constitutional prin-
ciples or rulings on the question of consti-
tutionality as well as uniform interpretations 
with general effect in the style of “abstract 
review.” The TCC traditionally conducted 
its business in the ambience of a privy coun-
cil without the procedural characteristics of 
judicial proceedings. Although the TCC has 
been granted the discretion to hold public 
oral hearings since 1993, only nine out of 
743 interpretations were rendered following 
oral hearings as of 2016.  
???? ???? ?????????? ?????????? ??????? ???-
tices, two of whom also serve as the Presi-
dent and the Vice President of the Judicial 
Yuan, the administrative body of the whole 
judiciary, respectively. The power to nomi-
nate justices is vested in the President and 
appointments are made with the consent of 
the Legislature.  Each justice is appointed for 
a staggered term of eight years and prohib-
ited from serving consecutive terms (AAC, 
Article 5, Section 2).
???????????????????????????????????????????
May 20, 2016, there has been a substantial 
change in the membership of the TCC. Five 
????????? ????????????????????????????????????
completion of their eight-year term at the end 
of October.  In the meantime, the President 
and the Vice President of the Judicial Yuan 
decided to step down considering increased 
calls for their early resignation. Thus, Pres-
?????? ????? ?????????? ?????? ????????? ??? ????
the vacated seats left by former KMT Presi-
dent Ying-Jeou Ma’s appointees.  During the 
???????????? ?????????? ???? ????????? ?????
pressed by the Legislators to answer the 
highly controversial issues concerning the 
sovereignty of Taiwan and its relations with 
China in the future. More important, a wide 
range of current constitutional issues also 
came to the fore in the legislative vetting.  
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Among them were the contentious issues 
about same-sex marriage and transitional 
???????????????????????????????????????????
by the DDP-controlled Legislature despite 
the KMT caucus’s attempted obstruction. 
Notably, President Tsai nominated a former 
justice, Professor Hsu Tzong-li, who sat on 
the TCC bench from 2003 to 2011, to be the 
President of the Judicial Yuan and the chief 
justice.  From the above-mentioned consti-
tutional ban on justices serving consecutive 
terms, some commentators inferred that this 
nomination was unconstitutional. However, 
doubt about the constitutionality of Hsu’s 
??????????? ???? ??????????? ????????? ??????
that Hsu’s two appointments were not con-
secutive. President Hsu and the other six jus-
?????? ????? ?????? ???????????? ?? ??????????
the legislative consent on October 25.  
DEVELOPMENTS AND  
CONTROVERSIES IN 2016 
As noted in the Introduction, the results of 
the elections in January 2016 created tecton-
ic changes in the Taiwanese political land-
scape, giving rise to further constitutional 
controversies. Two subjects stand out from 
the post-election constitutional controver-
sies: transitional justice and the legalization 
of same-sex marriage (LSSM).  
Transitional Justice
Echoing the experience of those countries 
undergoing democratic transition, transition-
al justice has been one of the central themes 
of the democratic movement in Taiwan.7 
Among the numerous issues surrounding 
transitional justice is the question of the 
so-called “ill-gotten party assets,” which 
is inseparable from the KMT’s privileged 
status under the party-state regime.  As the 
longtime ruling party in a virtually one-par-
ty state,8 the KMT has built a business em-
pire comprising vast real estate, companies, 
investments, and other assets since taking 
control of Taiwan in 1945. Extensive investi-
gations have established that the KMT accu-
7 Jau-Yuan Hwang, “Transitional Justice in Postwar Taiwan” in Gunter Schubert (ed), Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Taiwan (Routledge 2016).
8?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
9???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
seats.
mulated its fortunes either through favorable 
policies under the cover of law or simply by 
other illicit means at the expense of the State, 
especially during its uninterrupted rule from 
1945 to 2000 in Taiwan. There have been 
continuous public calls for the restitution of 
those KMT-owned “ill-gotten” assets to the 
State coffers by special legislation as part of 
transitional justice.  As the KMT continued 
to control the parliament after it lost the pres-
idential election in 2000, the DPP-led legis-
lative effort to divest the KMT of its illicit 
assets was defeated time and again. More-
over, as the KMT was perceived as continu-
??????????????????????????????????????? ???????-
ty assets, the issue of ill-gotten party assets 
became the rallying call for the rival DPP in 
electoral campaigns, including the lead-up to 
the 2016 elections.  
 
???????????????????????????????????????????????-
ary 2016, the majority DPP soon in February 
introduced the legislative bill of “The Settle-
ment of the Ill-Gotten Assets of Political Par-
????????????????????????????????????????????-
sets Act) as part of its grand legislative agenda 
on transitional justice when the KMT still held 
????????????????? ????????? ????????????????
parliamentary obstruction and street demon-
strations, the bill was pushed through in July 
and came into force in August following the 
presidential promulgation.  
The issue of ill-gotten party assets was hard-
ly resolved with the passage of legislation. 
As the KMT is the intended target despite the 
facially neutral provisions, the Ill-Gotten As-
sets Act raises complex constitutional issues 
surrounding transitional justice.  Before the 
“Ill-Gotten Party Assets Settlement Commit-
tee” (Settlement Committee) was inaugurat-
ed, the KMT caucus had made a referral to 
the TCC in regard to the constitutionality of 
the Ill-Gotten Assets Act even if it fell short 
of the CIPA-required procedural threshold 
of one-third of Legislators.9 Notably, in its 
referral, the KMT not only challenged the 
Ill-Gotten Assets Act but also questioned the 
constitutionality of the foregoing threshold 
 
on the grounds of its undue limitation on mi-
nority parties.  The TCC dismissed the refer-
ral on the procedural ground.  Nevertheless, 
with the Settlement Committee expanding 
investigation and the KMT continuing to re-
sist by legal and political means, the issue 
of ill-gotten party assets is likely to work its 
way up the process of appeal, instigating the 
TCC to tackle the constitutional issues sur-
rounding transitional justice before long.
Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage
LSSM is the second front of constitutional 
politics opened by the 2016 elections.  Anti-
discrimination has long been on the agenda 
of the civil rights movement and the petition 
for the LSSM can be traced back to the mid-
1980s when democratization was just setting 
out. Yet, the same-sex marriage question did 
not move up the civil rights agenda until the 
2000s, when several private member bills 
were introduced for its legalization in the 
Legislature.  Besides, individual gay couples 
????????????????????????????????????????????-
nition of marriage in the Civil Code in the 
hope that same-sex marriage would be legal-
ized through statutory or constitutional inter-
pretation, but to no avail.  In the meantime, 
social movement for antidiscrimination and 
gay rights continued to gain momentum 
while concerns about the impact of same-
sex marriage on family values also began 
to surface, calling for the provision for part-
nership instead of marriage for gay couples. 
Afterwards, the progress towards the LSSM 
seemed to have plateaued as the legislative 
effort was stalled in 2014.
Thanks to the unrelenting effort of activists, 
the DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen 
pledged to support “marriage equality” pre-
ceding the 2016 elections.  In contrast to di-
vesting the KMT of its ill-gotten party assets, 
however, the non-partisan LSSM issue was 
not high on the Tsai administration’s agenda 
in terms of the lack of consensus both within 
and without her party. Even so, more Leg-
islators were vociferous about supporting 
the cause of same-sex marriage in the new 
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Legislature than its predecessor.  Against this 
backdrop, the President’s TCC nomination 
in October presented itself as the unexpect-
ed catalyst for breaking the stalemate on the 
LSSM.  
It was no surprise that Legislators would ex-
pect the judicial nominees to not only answer 
legal questions but also address policy issues 
such as the LSSM. Yet, most of the seven 
nominees lent their support for LLSM ex-
????????????????????????????????????????????
dodging it. This was regarded as a strong en-
dorsement, breathing new life into the legis-
lative drive for the LSSM. In the meantime, 
the annual LGBT Pride Parade scheduled 
for October 2016 was expected to become 
a popular demonstration for the LSSM.  In 
light of the shift in public opinion, new pri-
vate member bills were introduced in the 
parliament.  Suddenly the same-sex marriage 
question topped the political agenda.  
On the other hand, this also brought about 
angry homophobic reactions. A series of 
counter-demonstrations were held while ri-
val social forces were mobilized to stem the 
tide of the same-sex marriage movement. 
As the private member bills were under 
scrutiny in early November, public hearings 
turned into violent brawls in the Legislature. 
????? ??????? ???????? ???? ??????????????????
continuing to grow, however, the focus was 
shifting from the question of legalization to 
???????????????????????????????????????????????
would special legislation governing same-
sex marriage vis-à-vis the revision of the 
marriage provision in the Civil Code be an-
other form of statutory discrimination?  
Leaving this issue unsettled, all the private 
member bills cleared the committee stage on 
December 26 and were referred to all party 
caucuses for a one-month-long compulsory 
reconciliation before they proceeded to the 
next stage. Clearing the committee stage 
did not suggest that the LSSM bills would 
muster the support of the majority of Leg-
islators.  It is in the stage of second reading 
at the plenary session that all important leg-
islative issues are resolved. Notably, in the 
10 The TCC announced that a public hearing would be held for the two admitted pending petitions on March 24, 2017. According to the CIPA and the TCC’s 
procedural rules on public hearings, the TCC must make its ruling within sixty days after hearing oral arguments.  
11 Statistics of the new and decided cases before the TCC in 2016 (in Mandarin) www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/P05.asp accessed January 31, 2017.
meantime, two of the petitions challenging 
the constitutionality of the provisions that 
imply the preclusion of same-sex marriage 
in the Civil Code were admitted by the TCC 
in 2016 pending its decision. It remains to be 
watched whether Taiwan will join the coun-
tries that recognize same-sex marriage by 
legislation or those where the judiciary has 
taken the lead invalidating the statutory pre-
clusion of same-sex marriage.10
MAJOR CASES 
Over the past decade, the TCC usually re-
ceived around 450-600 new petitions annu-
ally.  More than 90% of the petitions came 
from the people. In 2016, the TCC handed 
out nine Interpretations and dismissed a to-
tal of 429 petitions. Although the dismissed 
cases are generally done within one year 
of their submission, it would take the TCC 
three years or longer to reach decisions on 
the merits of those admitted cases.  As of the 
end of 2016, there were 375 leftover peti-
tions pending the TCC’s decisions.11 
Among the nine Interpretations rendered in 
2016, two of them are on non-constitution-
al, legal issues. The other seven concern two 
main constitutional issues: judicial remedy 
(or due process of law) and land rights. In-
terpretation Nos. 736, 737, 741, and 742 all 
involve judicial remedy while Nos. 739 and 
742 are on land rights. The only exception to 
the above two categories is No. 738, which is 
on occupational and business freedom.  One 
of the two non-constitutional/uniform Inter-
pretations, No. 743, also concerns the land 
rights issue, which will also be commented 
on below.
Judicial remedy, in light of due process of 
law, has been one of the TCC’s favorite is-
sues over the years. Even under the authori-
tarian era lasting until the late 1980s, the TCC 
had made several early successful strikes by 
mandating judicial remedies for civil ser-
vants, students, and taxpayers, among others. 
By holding on to the procedural due process 
of law, the TCC has carefully and skillfully 
constructed a judicial forum to entertain the 
idea of the rule of law, at least in its formal-
istic sense, which the yet-to-be-tamed State 
?????????????????????????????????????
Evidence
Interpretation No. 737 was petitioned by a 
criminal defense lawyer and his client on 
their access to the evidence and relevant 
documents presented by public prosecutors 
to the court for the writ of pre-trial deten-
tion.  The petitioners attacked the constitu-
tionality of Article 33, paragraph 1 of the 
Criminal Procedural Act, which provides 
for the right of such access for defense attor-
neys during the trial stage only.  Thus, both 
suspects and their defense attorneys are ex-
cluded from such access during the pre-trial 
stage.  During the pre-trial court procedures 
for the writ of detention, both suspects and 
?????? ???????? ?????????? ???? ???????? ??? ????
????????????????????? ??????????? ????????????
grounds of detention.
In Interpretation No. 737, the TCC found 
unconstitutional the said and other related 
provisions of the Criminal Procedural Act, 
but still valid for up to one year or until be-
ing amended by the Legislature, whichever 
?????? ??????????????????????????? ??? ??????-
phasized the importance of physical integrity 
and the right to judicial remedy as guaran-
teed by Articles 8 and 16 of the Constitution. 
Considering the severity of the harm on the 
????????? ???????????? ?????????????????????????
the TCC stipulated that the principle of due 
process of law be strictly followed in the de-
tention process.  Provision of the mere facts 
related to detention’s ground, in the opinion 
of the TCC, is not enough for the proper ex-
ercise of suspects and their attorneys’ rights 
to effective criminal defense.  Even the prin-
ciple of non-publicity concerning criminal 
investigation procedures and the prevention 
of the possible dangers of destroying or forg-
ing evidence and the risks of conspiring with 
co-offenders or witness could only justify 
the partial limitation of, but not the complete 
ban on, suspects and their attorneys’ access 
rights to evidence.
210 | I•CONnect-Clough Center 
Interpretation No. 737 is a decision trying 
to correct a long-disputed legislative defect 
of Taiwan’s criminal procedures. It does 
strengthen the rights of criminal defendants 
and their right to counsel.  In the similar spir-
it of judicial remedy, Interpretation No. 741 
????? ??? ??? ?? ??????????? ????????? ?????????
left by the TCC’s previous decisions.
Judicial Remedies
Interpretation No. 741 originated from sev-
eral petitioners whose motions for retrial 
were denied by the Supreme Administrative 
Court (SAC) on the ground that they were 
not the petitioners of Interpretation No. 725 
??????????????????????????? ??????????????????
In Interpretation No. 725, the TCC ruled un-
constitutional a court precedent of the SAC, 
which denied the motions for retrial for those 
cases whose applicable laws were declared 
“unconstitutional but valid for a certain peri-
od of time” until being amended by the Leg-
islature.  Interpretation No. 725 overrules the 
?????????????????????????????????????????
judicial remedies (including retrial and/or 
extraordinary appeal) be granted to the pe-
titioners.  However, Interpretation No. 725 
???????????????????????????????????????????-
edies to the petitioners of other Interpreta-
???????????????????????????????????????????-
pute “unconstitutional but valid for a certain 
period of time.”  The SAC thus read Inter-
pretation No. 725 in its most restrictive sense 
and allowed motions for retrial to the named 
petitioners of Interpretation No. 725 only.  In 
Interpretation No. 741, the TCC reiterated 
the intention of Interpretation No. 725 is to 
?????? ????? ?????????? ????????? ??? ???? ????-
??????????????????????????????????????????????
relevant applicable laws “unconstitutional 
but valid for a certain period of time.”
?????????????????????????????????????????? ??-
wan: should the courts continue to apply the 
laws found “unconstitutional but valid for a 
certain period of time” before their amend-
ment by the Legislature? The answer is 
clearly NO, after Interpretation Nos. 725 and 
741. On the other hand, Interpretation No. 
741 also illustrates the continuing tension 
between the TCC and the ordinary courts 
????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????? ???????????????????????????
courts have been reluctant and even resistant 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
those winning petitioners of the TCC Inter-
pretations. Over years, the TCC has taken 
?????? ????????? ???????????????? ??????????????
extraordinary remedies while limiting such 
remedies available to those winning petition-
???? ?????? ??????? ??????? ????????? ??? ??????????
their own petitions, of the same or similar 
cases ruled under the same applicable laws 
????? ???? ??? ???????? ???? ??????? ??? ????? ??-
traordinary remedies. In this sense, favorable 
decisions of the TCC will only produce lim-
ited retroactive effect on those parties who 
?????????????????? ?????? ?????????? ???????? ???
the TCC.  Such limited effect remains true 
even after Interpretation Nos. 725 and 741.   
Land Rights
On the part of the land rights cases, Inter-
pretation No. 743 stands out and deserves 
comments too. Despite being a non-constitu-
tional decision, this Interpretation concerns 
a highly controversial legal issue: could a 
private property originally taken by the gov-
ernment for public use (e.g., the construction 
of the subway system) be transferred to an-
other private individual or entity in the name 
of public interest (e.g., economic develop-
ment)? 
Like many other countries, Taiwan govern-
ments, central and local, have been increas-
ingly resorting to a variety of public-private 
joint ventures, such as BOT, BT and PPP, for 
the construction of public transportation and 
other infrastructure. Not surprisingly, the tra-
ditional requirement of taking for public use 
has been relaxed to permit taking for public 
interest, which is often mixed with economic 
development and private interests. 
Article 7 of Taiwan’s Mass Rapid Transit 
Act permits the competent authorities to take 
(expropriate) private lands adjacent to the 
mass rapid transit system for joint-venture 
development, and then transfer such lands 
to private developers.  In a station project 
?????????????????? ???? ??????????????????????
expropriated a large scale of adjacent lands 
from private citizens in the name of build-
ing a subway station.  Although the govern-
ment did make public its intended goal of 
joint-venture development in the future, the 
plan and details of such development were 
???? ????????? ???? ?????????? ??? ?????????????
such information, those affected land owners 
were unable to determine whether to partici-
pate in the then mysterious development plan 
or accept the compensation for the taking of 
their lands. This development plan then grew 
into a monster project disproportionately 
??????? ???? ?????????? ????? ??? ????? ??????????
Those land owners, feeling fooled, sued for 
the revocation of the taking and the damag-
es, among others.  As more details surfaced, 
this project turned out to be a messy political 
scandal.
In Interpretation No. 743, the TCC ruled in 
favor of those land owners, holding that the 
lands taken for public use may not be trans-
ferred to the third party (developers) for 
business purposes, unless expressly autho-
rized by statutes and giving the affected land 
????????????????????????????????????????????
such development purpose. As the taking of 
the lands in dispute occurred more than two 
decades ago, the revocation of the taking 
seems infeasible now, considering the com-
plexity of current land ownership.  It remains 
to be watched how this case will be settled 
in the long run among the local government, 
the developer, and those original land own-
ers.
CONCLUSION
The development of constitutional law in 
2016 was like a multi-act constitutional play 
culminating in the LSSM drive.  Democratic 
election, judicial appointment, and extrajudi-
cial politics set the stage for this constitution-
al play while the President, Legislators, judi-
cial nominees, and activists play the leading 
roles in the unfolding drama.  In this light, 
the TCC appeared to be the bland deuter-
agonist, playing the institutional supporting 
role.  Yet, as suggested above, with the issues 
surrounding various reforms translated into 
constitutional questions, the TCC may well 
????????????????????????????????????? ????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????
constitutional development in 2016 was best 
entitled “The Clouds Are Gathering.”  To be 
continued…  
2016 Global Review of Constitutional Law | 211
Thailand
DEVELOPMENTS IN THAI CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Khemthong Tonsakulrungruang, Ph.D. Candidate at the University of Bristol
THAILAND
INTRODUCTION
Since its reinstatement in 2008, Thailand’s 
Constitutional Court has been operating un-
der immense pressure from political instabil-
ity. Thailand’s ongoing political conflict has 
resulted in a deeply divided society, and the 
Constitutional Court has failed to help sta-
bilize it. It is even considered a contributive 
part of the conflict. Controversial decisions, 
as well as personal scandals, drew heavy 
criticism that eroded public trust. The con-
flict reached its peak in 2014 when a coup 
d’etat broke out. The junta, known as the Na-
tional Council of Peace and Order (NCPO), 
banned all political activities and thus 2014 
to 2016 was the Court’s halcyon period. But 
this hiatus is only the eye of the storm.    
Throughout its 20 years of operation, the 
Constitutional Court has witnessed the rise 
and fall of its credibility.1 In 1997, Thailand 
carried out a major political reform aiming 
to consolidate democracy since the country 
had been stuck in a vicious cycle of elections 
and military interventions for 70 years.2 
Corruption allegations undermined civilian 
governments’ credibility, making Thailand’s 
democracy vulnerable to military interven-
tion. To restore trust, the 1997 Constitution 
designed a stronger checks-and-balances 
system by introducing the Constitutional 
1 Thawinwadee Burikul et al., รายงานผลการสํารวจความคิดเห็นของประชาชนต่อการบริการสาธารณะ และการทํางานของหน่วยงาน
ต่างๆ พ.ศ. ๒๕๕๗ และสรุปผลการสํารวจ พ.ศ. ๒๕๔๖-๒๕๕๗ [King Prajadhipok’s Institute Poll on Public Opinion on Public 
Services 2003-2014] (King Prajadhipok’s Institute 2015) 153.
2 Duncan McCargo, ‘Introduction: Understanding Political Reform in Thailand’ in Duncan McCargo (ed) 
Reforming Thai Politics (NIAS 2002) 1-3.  
3 Reforming Thai Politics 9-10.   
4 Andrew Harding & Peter Leyland, The Constitutional System of Thailand: A Contextual Analysis (Hart 
2011) 176-180.
5 The Constitutional System of Thailand 180-182. 
6 See Pasuk Pongpaichit & Chris Baker, A History of Thailand (CUP 2edn 2014) 262-267; Tom Ginsburg, 
‘Constitutional Afterlife: the Continuing Impact of Thailand’s Postpolitical Constitution’ (2009) 7 ICON 
83, 96-97.
7 Constitutional Afterlife, 93 & 100-101.
Court and other independent watchdog agen-
cies. Together, these bodies scrutinize, in-
vestigate, and prosecute corrupt politicians. 
Thus, the Constitutional Court was assigned 
the duty to guard the constitution and enforce 
the rule of law.3 
The Constitutional Court could be better 
understood as two different courts: a pre-
2006 court and a post-2006 court, separated 
by the 2006 coup. The first Court began in 
1998. Although its impression was that of a 
conservative court, it gave a promising start 
with a few decisions that promoted people’s 
rights and liberties.4 But its attempt to curb 
corruption proved unsuccessful because it 
often deferred to the government.5 This prob-
lem was more acute during the administra-
tion of Thaksin Shinawatra, the tycoon-turn-
prime minister who was accused of human 
rights violations, cronyism, and corruption.6
Eventually, when the 2006 coup took place, 
this unpopular Court was suspended and re-
placed by the ad hoc Constitutional Council. 
The 2007 Constitution redesigned the Con-
stitutional Court to be more politically isolat-
ed and powerful.7 Judges’ personal attitudes 
also seemed to be more skeptical of politi-
cians. The post-2006 Court was thus more 
aggressive in reviewing the government’s 
actions. Although this aggressive scruti-
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ny satisfied the anti-Thaksin faction, others 
voiced concerns that the Court appeared bi-
ased.8 As a result, the Constitutional Court be-
came a highly-polarized institution, enjoying 
praises and at the same time suffering attacks. 
Contrary to the first Court, the anti-Thaksin es-
tablishment considered the Court their friend. 
The NCPO allowed the Court to remain in 
operation. But only a few cases reached the 
Court. Its main task was to participate in the 
juntas political process such as drafting the 
upcoming constitution and relevant laws.     
THE CONSTITUTIONS AND THE 
COURT 
By 2016, the Constitutional Court had lived 
through four constitutions. The 2016 Court 
was the product of the 2007 Constitution, 
which shared the goal of eradicating corrup-
tion with its 1997 predecessor. Undue polit-
ical intervention and insufficient authority of 
the Constitutional Court were identified as 
the culprits of corruption. Therefore, the 2007 
Constitution reduced political oversight and 
broadened jurisdiction into what had former-
ly been considered the executive prerogative, 
such as treaty-making and emergency power.9 
However, despite all efforts to empower the 
Court, Thai democracy quickly descended 
into chaos. The NCPO abolished the 2007 
Constitution. Although the 2014 Interim 
Charter brought no change in its structure 
and jurisdiction, the prohibition to review the 
NCPO severely incapacitated the Court.     
Composition of the Constitutional Court
The Constitutional Court has only one panel 
of nine judges with law and non-law back-
grounds. Unlike the closed system of oth-
8 Duncan McCargo, ‘Peopling Thailand’s 2015 Draft Constitution’ (2015) 37 Contemporary Southeast Asia 329, 335-336; Eugenie Merieau, ‘Thailand’s Deep 
State, Royal Power and the Constitutional Court (1997-2015)’ (2016 46 Journal of Contemporary Asia 445, 459-461.  
9???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
677-678; Constitutional Afterlife, 100-101.
10 Constitution B.E. 2550 (200) s. 204 (2007 Constitution). 
11 2007 Constitution, s. 204. 
12 2007 Constitution, s. 206. 
13 The Constitutional System of Thailand 168.
14 2007 Constitution, s. 205. 
15 2007 Constitution, s. 207.
16 2007 Constitution, s. 208. 
17 2007 Constitution, s. 209. 
18 Constitution B.E. 2560 (2017) s. 200 (2017 Constitution). 
er courts, the recruitment of Constitutional 
Court judges involved representation of 
political branches. Candidates are recruit-
ed through a complicated process. The Su-
preme Court nominates three Supreme Court 
judges while the Supreme Administrative 
Court nominates two of its members.10 The 
nomination commission selects four other 
candidates with two being legal experts and 
the other two political science experts.11 The 
nomination commission is an ad hoc body, 
comprised of the President of the Supreme 
Court, President of the Supreme Administra-
tive Court, Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentatives, Leader of the Opposition, and one 
representative of each watchdog agency.12 
?????? ???? ??????????? ??????????? ????????
to be a combination of the judiciary, legis-
lative, and independent bodies, the overall 
recruitment is tilted in favor of the judiciary. 
Political oversight of the nomination is sig-
nificantly reduced compared with that in the 
1997 Constitution, where members of politi-
cal parties and lay representatives sat on the 
commission.13 The Senate must confirm all 
nine judges before taking office.
The qualification of a nominee is stringent.14 
He or she shall acquire Thai nationality by 
birth and be the age of 45 or more. He or 
she must have been a minister, a nomination 
commissioner for a watchdog agency, a di-
rector-general of a department-level agency 
or its equivalent, a professor, or a practicing 
lawyer of at least three years prior to a nom-
ination. A nominee must have never been 
impeached or imprisoned. Most importantly, 
three years before a nomination, he or she 
shall not be a member of a political party. 
Once appointed, a judge is subject to strict 
prohibitions and requirements to maintain 
his or her integrity.15 But he also enjoys a 
high level of independence. The term lasts 
nine years and is non-renewable.16 Apart 
from retirement at 70, only a few causes 
could remove a judge from his office before 
the term is complete. A judge can be dis-
qualified only if he or she is found to hold a 
position prohibited by the Constitution, im-
peached by three-fifth of the Senate’s vote, 
or sentenced to an imprisonment term.17
The upcoming 2017 Constitution, the Court’s 
????? ?????????????? ????? ?????? ?? ??????? ??? ????
composition as it replaces one law and one 
political science expert with two high-ranking 
civil servants.18 The introduction of bureau-
crats to the bench indicates the NCPO’s desire 
to have more control in electoral politics. 
Jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court
Before 1997, the Court of Justice had a gen-
eral jurisdiction over all disputes. The sys-
tem was considered inadequate to provide 
check-and-balance because judges had not 
been trained to adjudicate public law cases. 
The 1997 Constitution drafters overhauled 
the judicial system to create courts that were 
specialized in constitutional and administra-
tive disputes, the Constitutional Court and 
Administrative Court respectively. The Con-
stitutional Court heard disputes in four main 
areas: reviewing law and law-making, set-
tling jurisdictional disputes, eradicating cor-
ruption, and protecting democratic values. 
First, the Court reviewed the constitution-
ality of law and law-making. It scrutinized 
both content and legislative procedure of 
a statute, an organic law, and an emergen-
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cy decree.19 If the law disproportionately 
encroached upon the rights and liberties of 
Thais, or if the legislative procedure was not 
properly observed, the Constitutional Court 
shall declare that particular section, or the 
whole act, unconstitutional and void. After 
2007, the Court could also decide if an inter-
national treaty into which a cabinet was en-
?????????????????????????????????????????????
national security, economy, or society, and, 
thus, required parliamentary consent.20 
Second, the Constitutional Court was as-
signed to settle intra-agency jurisdictional dis-
putes. The 1997 Constitution created several 
new watchdog agencies that were not under 
the Legislative or Executive branches. The 
dispute involving two or more parties from 
the National Assembly, the Cabinet, and these 
independent agencies, but not courts, may be 
sent for the Court’s consideration.21
??????????????? ???????? ??????????? ???? ????
only area where the Constitutional Court’s 
power was reduced. The Court could dis-
qualify politicians who were found to violate 
???? ???????? ??? ????????? ?????????????22 How-
ever, the Court no longer had the authority to 
hear the asset disclosure case after it acquit-
ted Thaksin Shinawatra in 2001.23 The duty 
was assigned to the Supreme Court instead. 
Finally, the Constitutional Court acted as the 
guardian of the constitution and democracy. 
The Court may order a person or a political 
party to halt an activity that it deems detri-
mental to the government, constitutional 
principles, or democratic values.24 In addi-
19 2007 Constitution, s. 211 & 184. 
20 2007 Constitution, s. 190.  
21 2007 Constitution, s. 214. 
22 2007 Constitution, s. 265-269.
23 See The Constitutional System of Thailand, 181.
24 2007 Constitution, s. 68.
25 2007 Constitution, s. 237. 
26 Kla Samudavanija. ขอบเขตอํานาจหน้าที่ศาลรัฐธรรมนูญเพื่อส่งเสริมการปกครองในระบอบประชาธิปไตยและคุ้มครองสิทธิเสรีภาพของประชาชน [Scope of Power and Duty of the Constitution-
al Court for Promotion of Democratic Rule and Protection of Civil Rights and Liberties] (King Prajadhipok’s Institute 2015) 239-265; see 12/2552 [2009], 
15/2555 [2012], 12/2555 [2012], 17/2555 [2012] Const. Ct. Decision.  
27 See Khemthong Tonsakulrungruang, ‘Thailand: an abuse of judicial review’ in Po Jen Yap (ed) Judicial Review of Elections in Asia (Routledge 2016); 
?????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????
Journal, fourthcoming.      
28 Interim Charter B.E. 2557 (2014), s. 45. 
29 See ‘Thailand: an abuse of judicial review’; Marc Askew, ‘Confrontation and Crisis in Thailand’ in Marc Askew (ed) Legitimacy Crisis in Thailand (King Pra-
jadhipok’s Yearbook Project, Silkworm Books, 2010) 31-43.
30 Entrenching the Minority.      
31 Thailand’s Deep State, 449.
tion to holding such activity, the Constitu-
tional Court may dissolve a political party if 
considered to have attempted to overthrow 
the government or acquire power through 
undemocratic means.25 Executives of the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
from politics.     
The Constitutional Court successfully ex-
ercised its judicial review of law and juris-
dictional disputes, but it failed to restore 
transparency and uphold democracy. Since 
2007, the Constitutional Court has played a 
greater role in promoting rights and liberties 
of Thais by striking down statutes that vio-
late basic civil rights.26 Unfortunately, this 
achievement was overshadowed by sever-
al controversies when it boldly invalidated 
elections and dissolved key political parties 
???????? ??? ???????????? ???????????????? ????
banned hundreds of politicians.27 The para-
doxical performance brings its professional-
ism and neutrality into question. 
Under the 2014 Interim Charter, the Consti-
tutional Court can still hear cases concerning 
judicial review of the law, and jurisdictional 
dispute settlement.28 Nonetheless, the abso-
lute status of the NCPO means only a small 
number of cases has reached the Court.
DEVELOPMENTS AND  
CONTROVERSIES IN 2016  
There was no major controversy over the 
Constitutional Court in 2016 because all 
attention went to the NCPO after having 
seized power from the elected Prime Minis-
ter, Yingluck Shinawatra in 2014. However, 
the Court’s reputation still suffers from years 
of entanglement with politics. Since its rein-
statement in 2008, almost all major decisions 
of the Constitutional Court became cause 
celebre??????????????????????? ???????????? ???
2008 and again in 2012-2014, both periods 
of which coincided with Thaksin’s proxy 
??????????????????? ????????? ???????????????
avoid criticism and accusation that it had sid-
ed with the anti-Thaksin faction. 
In 2008, the Constitutional Court launched a 
???????????????????????????????????????????????
the way for the Democrat Party, Thaksin’s 
political enemy, to become the government.29 
In 2012, the Constitutional Court exercised 
its judicial review vis-à-vis the popular Yin-
gluck Shinawatra, Thaksin’s youngest sister. 
Thrice the Court blocked Yingluck from ful-
??????? ???? ????????? ????????? ??? ?????????
the 2007 Constitution.30 Repeatedly reiter-
ated that a mere election did not equate de-
mocracy, the Court clearly displayed distrust 
in the majority’s wisdom. Critics called these 
decisions “judicial coup.”31
In late 2013, Yingluck introduced an am-
nesty bill that would indiscriminately par-
???????????????? ??? ?????????????? ?????????????
bill proved unpopular to all parties because 
it cleared Thaksin of corruption charges as 
well as terminated an investigation of the 
military’s deadly crackdown on pro-Thaksin 
protestors in 2010. The anti-amnesty bill pro-
test quickly escalated to the anti-Shinawa-
tra protest under the name of the People’s 
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Democratic Reform Council (PDRC). The 
PDRC demanded Yingluck to uncondition-
??????????????????????????????????????????????
and establish the non-partisan government to 
reform the country. Yingluck responded by 
dissolving the House. The Democrat party, 
which was leading the PDRC, boycotted the 
election while the PDRC vowed to obstruct 
it.32 
The Election Commission (EC) was reluctant 
to organize an election so it consulted with 
the Constitutional Court whether an election 
could be postponed. The Court agreed that 
a re-schedule was possible, but only if that 
resolution was made jointly by the govern-
ment and the EC.33 Yingluck resisted, so the 
EC half-heartedly proceeded. Unsuccessful 
in blocking the election, the PDRC succeed-
ed in blocking voting on election day. PDRC 
protesters blocked the venues and assault-
ed voters so voting could not take place in 
some constituencies.34 The Ombudsman, per 
the PDRC’s request, asked the Court to re-
view the election. Blaming the government 
for failing to foresee obstructions, the Court 
invalidated the 2014 election on a technical 
ground of not being able to complete within 
one day.35
By then, Thailand had no functioning parlia-
ment or cabinet. The PDRC occupied several 
?????????????????????????????????????????
discussion on the possibility of another elec-
tion. The Court shortly delivered another 
blow by disqualifying Yingluck from being a 
??????????????????????????????????????????????
charge.36 Thailand reached a constitutional 
deadlock with no functioning government or 
32???????? ???????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
33 2/2557 [2014] Const. Ct. Decision. 
34 Thailand in 2014: The Trouble with Magic Swords, 341-343. 
35 5/2557 [2014] Const. Ct. Decision. 
36 9/2557 [2014] Const. Ct. Decision. 
37 See Judicialisation of Politics or Politicisation of the Judiciary?
38 See Thailand’s Deep State.
39 See Veerayooth Kanchoochat, ‘Reign-seeking and the Rise of the Unelected in Thailand’ (2016) 46 Journal of Contemporary Asia 486. 
40 See ขอบเขตอํานาจหน้าที่ศาลรัฐธรรมนูญเพื่อส่งเสริมการปกครองในระบอบประชาธิปไตยและคุ้มครองสิทธิเสรีภาพของประชาชน; ‘Thailand: an abuse of judicial review’.
41 See the revelation of Suthep, the PDRC leader, that he and the army commander, Prayuth Chan-ocha, had been planning the coup for some time before 
the actual event in Thailand in 2014: The Trouble with Magic Swords, 345.
42 Judge Supoj Kaimook. 
43 2017 Constitution, s. 5. However, King Vajiralongkorn, shortly after ascending the throne in December, refused to approve the new charter. He requested 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ??????????????
Grab’ (The Diplomat ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????
an election within sight. Amidst all confu-
sions, a few days later, the army carried out 
the coup. 
Concerns about the Court’s neutrality arose 
as early as shortly after the 2007 Constitu-
tion came into effect. Bjoern Dressel warned 
that the attempt to assign the judiciary to 
safeguard politics might have ended up po-
liticizing this supposedly neutral arbiter.37 
More recently, Eugenie Merieau saw the 
Court as the key mechanism that drove the 
Deep State, a network of traditional elites 
that operated outside the control of a dem-
ocratically elected government.38 Veer-
ayuth Kanchoochat described this behav-
ior as reign-seeking, a phenomenon where 
non-elected technocratic and bureaucratic 
institutions compete with politicians for con-
trol of power.39 Legal scholars also noticed 
procedural irregularities as well as arbitrary 
reasoning which seemed to depart from their 
usual precedents.40 These studies suggested 
that the Constitutional Court was utilizing its 
judicial power to help the powerful minority 
of technocrats and traditional elites to con-
trol the grassroots majority. The 2013-2014 
crisis that led up to the coup was not coinci-
dental. Events were well coordinated by pro-
testers, the opposition party, watchdog agen-
cies, and the Constitutional Court.41 After 
???? ???????????????????????????????????????-
mized the government, court decisions were 
deliberately delivered to catalyze the coup. 
Perhaps the Constitutional Court in 2016 
was controversial not because of what it did, 
but what it did not do. The Court refrained 
from scrutinizing the NCPO, which op-
pressed the rights and liberties of Thais as 
well as weakened the rule of law. Instead, 
the Court cooperated with the NCPO in 
sustaining the oppressive regime. A retired 
judge was invited by the Constitution Draft-
ing Committee (CDC).42 It delivered a few 
decisions that facilitated the NCPO’s grip 
on power. The 2017 Constitution even ex-
panded the role of the Constitutional Court. 
?????? ?? ??????????????? ???????? ???????? ????
there is no applicable provision, the Consti-
tutional Court President shall convene a pan-
el of the legislative, executive, judiciary, and 
independent watchdog agencies to resolve to 
a “democratic convention” to be applied to 
that case.43 This judicial turnaround fueled 
more criticism and condemnation.
MAJOR CASES
The Constitutional Court heard only six cas-
es in 2016. Two decisions dissolved inactive 
?????????????????? ?????????????????????????-
sumption of innocence. Three of them con-
cerned the constitution-making process, one 
of which caught much public attention be-
cause of its implication in the development 
of Thai politics.  
In August 2016, Thailand was to vote on the 
new constitution draft. The referendum be-
came a symbolic battle between the NCPO, 
who backed the constitution-drafting pro-
cess, and its dissidents who regarded the 
charter the “fruit of the poisonous tree.” 
Moreover, the constitution draft was crit-
icized for its bad design that destabilized 
the party system as well as entrenched the 
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junta’s control of upcoming governments.44 
The junta-appointed Legislative Assembly 
passed the Referendum Act to regulate this 
hotly contested referendum. However, the 
NCPO opponents argued that the Act did 
not neutrally assist the referendum process, 
but rather, helped the junta silence its critics. 
The Referendum Act criminalizes a person 
who distributes materials deemed distorted, 
violent, impolite, threatening, or instigating 
another person to vote one way or the other. 
The ambiguous language of the law made 
campaigning against the draft impossible be-
cause any information that differed from the 
???????? ???????? ??????????? ???? ??????????-
ly considered distorted. Anti-junta activists 
challenged the Act at the Constitutional 
Court for violating their freedom of expres-
sion. 
?????????????????????????????????????????????-
tional Court recognized Thailand’s obliga-
tion under  international law and the demo-
cratic custom to protect all kinds of freedom, 
including freedom of expression. Only when 
the state needed to protect higher values such 
as national security or public order could it 
restrict such freedom. But such restrictions 
must be in accordance with the constitution. 
Namely, the restrictions must be in the form 
of statutes and must be proportional to pub-
lic interest gained from such measure. The 
Court then recognized the importance of the 
referendum as a political process for citizens 
to determine their fates and ruled that discus-
sions should be allowed.   
However, in the second half of its reason-
ing, where the Court discusses the language 
of the Act, it ruled that the restriction of 
freedom of expression in the Act was con-
stitutional.45 The Court acknowledged the 
objective of the law as to hold a free and 
fair referendum. Distorted information must 
????????????????????????????????????????-
stitutional Court admitted that the language 
of the law was vague, but ruled that this 
???????????????????????? ???? ??????????????
44 Leena Rikkilä Tamang, ‘Political Implications of the Draft Constitution of Thailand: A Conversation with Prof. Tom Ginsburg and Mr. Khemthong Tonsakul-
rungruang’ (IDEA 28 July 2016) http://www.idea.int/news-media/news/political-implications-draft-constitution-thailand-conversation-prof-tom-ginsburg 
accessed 2 March 2017.
45 4/2559 [2016] Const. Ct. Decision. 
46 ‘Thailand jails activists for campaigning to reject constitution in referendum’ (The Guardian 25 June 2016) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/
jun/25/thailand-jails-activists-for-campaigning-to-reject-constitution-in-referendum accessed 2 March 2017. 
effective enforcement of the law. The con-
cern of this vagueness was outweighed by 
the negative effect of wrong information on 
an uninformed audience and disruption to 
the harmonious and amicable atmosphere of 
the country. Moreover, because the Act does 
not have minimum punishment, it allows 
a judge to reduce the sentence to as low as 
possible, and a convict would still be eligible 
to redress through an ordinary appeal. Thus, 
the possible negative consequence of the Act 
was mitigated. 
The Constitutional Court’s decision en-
dorsed the NCPO’s position in cracking 
down dissent and contributed to the NCPO’s 
victory.46 The majority of Thai voted for the 
constitution draft, which would come into 
effect in 2017.
CONCLUSION 
By 2016, the Constitutional Court had lost 
its reputation as a neutral arbiter. Fighting 
corruption and restoring the rule of law be-
came hollow mantras to justify its hostil-
ity toward a democratic government as the 
Court actively cooperated with the corrupt 
and opaque regime of NCPO. The Court has 
proved to the public that it was one of the 
most powerful and decisive players in Thai 
politics. Unfortunately, the Court did not 
wish to guard the Constitution or protect the 
already fragile democracy. 
The 2007 Constitution was written upon dis-
trust of elected politicians, so it created an al-
??????????????????????????????????????? ????
the Court became arbitrary, the public had 
no mechanism to hold it accountable. The 
2017 Constitution would do little to address 
this problem, so Thailand’s democracy is in 
greater trouble than ever with corrupt poli-
ticians on one side and the arbitrary Court 
on the other. Once democracy resumes and 
?????????????????????????????????????????????-
??????????????? ???????????????????????????????-
ical whirlwind.
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Turkey
DEVELOPMENTS IN TURKISH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
???????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Istanbul
TURKEY
INTRODUCTION
At the beginning of this century, Turkey was 
a candidate for being a member of the Euro-
pean Union. In the name of harmonization, 
in 2001 and 2004, many laws and some im-
portant parts of the 1982 Constitution, which 
was written and enacted after the military 
intervention, were amended, changed or 
annulled.1? ???? ???? ???????? ??? ?????????
Partisi – Justice and Development Party), a 
brand-new party which has emerged from 
the ashes of the Islamic-rooted RP (Refah 
?????????? ??????????????????????????????????
these two important amendments. They had, 
in the beginning, an agenda which pretend-
ed to combine on the one hand a modern, 
liberal Islam which is respectful of human 
rights and democracy. On the other hand, 
they followed an economic policy towards 
modernization and opening to the global 
economy. Under the charismatic leadership 
??? ????? ??????????????????????????????????
a “Muslim democratic” agenda similar to its 
Christian counterparts in Europe until 2008. 
But since then, this agenda’s “democratic” 
part has been gradually forgotten or ignored, 
and the AKP became a more centralized and 
authoritarian government. The Gezi uprising 
in May-June of 2013 against the authoritar-
ian politics of the government; the judicial 
operations against some ministers and their 
sons for corruption allegations; which are 
described as a coup of the Fethullah Gülen 
Terror Organization (once an ally) by the 
AKP Government, in December of the same 
year; the temporary loss of power in the gen-
eral elections of June 2015 and, as a result, 
1 To have an idea about how important these changes were, please look at this article by Prof. Levent 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
2 Main opposition party CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – Republican People’s Party) and some other 
groups think that it’s a coup “controlled” by the government to create an authoritarian regime after the 
failure. 
the collapse of peace talks with the Kurds in 
2015 strengthened governmental oppression 
in Turkey. 2016, especially after the failed 
coup attempt2 in July, was a year shaped by 
the extended power of the executive organs 
and the political split. Of course, the Consti-
tutional Court of Turkey has also been affect-
ed by this extension and split. 
???? ????????? ??? ???? ?????????? ??? ???????-
stitutional Court has always been a problem 
in Turkey. The Constitution of 1982, which 
created a more powerful presidency than in 
a normal parliamentarian system, accept-
ed this organ as a trustable, independent, 
impartial and “supra-political” referee and 
gave the president the power to appoint, after 
????????????????? ???? ???? ??????????????? ????-
es. But the reality has not been in conformity 
with the theory and presidents’ choices have 
always been criticized for being politically 
motivated instead of being made according 
to judicial competences and merits. This cri-
tique is naturally valid also for the presiden-
???????????????
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
COURT
The 1961 Constitution established the Con-
stitutional Court of Turkey, which started to 
function in 1962. Although that Constitution 
was a product of an anti-democratic military 
intervention, the Court was modeled on the 
European constitutional justice practice as 
a response to the anti-democratic executive 
practices of unstoppable misuse of govern-
mental powers in the 1950-1960 period. Like 
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most European Constitutional Courts, it ex-
ercises a posteriori control over the confor-
mity of laws to the Constitution and, since 
2012, on constitutional complaints brought 
by individuals who argue that state author-
ities violated one or several of their rights 
written in the Constitution and3 the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
The power to review the constitutionality of 
laws was endowed solely to the Constitution-
al Court by the 1961 Constitution. In the be-
ginning, there were no limitations to this re-
view, including constitutional amendments. 
Therefore the Court accepted that it had the 
right to review the substantial and formal 
constitutionality of constitutional amend-
ments. But after the military note to the 
government on 12 March 1971, the right to 
substantial review by the Court was banned. 
During the 1970s, the Court bypassed this 
ban with the aim of protecting unamendable 
articles by saying that “an amendment which 
amends an unamendable article cannot be 
proposed, and this is a formal impossibility. 
I analyze the substance to understand if there 
is such an impossibility but, if yes, I annul 
the amendment due to the formal unconsti-
tutionality.” The response of the constituent 
power of the Constitution of 1982 to this 
jurisprudence was to describe in detail what 
a “formal review of constitutional amend-
ments” is. The Court bowed to this limitation 
until 2008, the year when it annulled the use 
of headscarves by female students in univer-
sities. That decision made the government 
????????????????????????????????????????????
and structure of the Court were changed con-
siderably by a constitutional referendum in 
2010. The number of judges increased from 
11 to 17, and the President had the chance 
to appoint several judges close to him to the 
Court. Since then, the controversy between 
the Court and the executive branches of the 
country has decreased at the expense of the 
independence of the Court.
3 This is an “and”, not “or”.
4 http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/icsayfalar/duyurular/detay/50.html (In Turkish) 
5 It is still not proved by a court decision that there is such a terrorist organization and that organization acted in July 15th by using their members in the 
Turkish military. But since years, it was publicly well known that the government was supported by religious cleric Fethullah Gülen’s movement by human 
?????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
6???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????
no “private university” in Turkey, but instead only “foundation universities”.
In the 1982 Constitution, the Constitutional 
Court, being one of the highest constitutional 
organs, was on a par with the Grand Nation-
al Assembly and the executive and placed 
??? ????????? ???????????????????????????????
Courts”. Articles 146-153 of the Constitu-
tion are dedicated to the composition, duties, 
working methods of the Constitutional Court 
and other issues concerning constitutional 
review. A Law on Establishment and Rules 
of Procedures of the Constitutional Court 
(No. 6216, 30 March 2011), spelling out the 
provisions of the Constitution, stipulates its 
organization, independence, proceedings, 
disciplinary infractions and disciplinary pro-
ceedings. 
DEVELOPMENTS AND  
CONTROVERSIES IN 2016 
2016 was a stressful year for the Turkish 
Constitutional Court. Especially after the 
failed military putsch on July 15th, the bur-
den on the shoulders of the Court to be the 
protector of rights and freedoms and the rule 
??????????????????????????????????? ?????????
say that during and after the turmoil of the 
failed military intervention, the Court did not 
pass the test of being a trustworthy institution 
of a real democracy. One of the reasons for 
this failure is, of course, the removal of two 
members of the Court by its decision.4 In the 
aftermath of the failed coup, the Court an-
nounced that members Alparslan Altan and 
?????? ?????? ????? ???????? ????? ?????? ???
the grounds of their connection with the ter-
rorist organization FETÖ/PDY (“Fethullah 
Gülen” Terror Organization/Parallel State 
???????????? ?????? ?????????????????????
the coup.5 One could justify removing them 
if linked to the anti-democratic movement, 
but this decision had no grounds other than 
a police investigation on these two members. 
??? ???? ???????? ?? ????????? ????????????? ????-
sion, that removal itself meant the principle 
of presumption of innocence was violated by 
the highest court of Turkey, which has the 
duty, besides analyzing the constitutionality 
of laws, to protect the main principles of hu-
man rights and democracy.
Although it was a challenging year, the Court 
gave some important decisions too. You can 
???????? ??????? ?????????????? ??????????????
???? ?????????? ?????????? ?????? ??? ???? ?????
part. And in the second part, you can read an 
important decision the Court made on a con-
stitutional complaint in which a system was 
created that has diminished the number of 
Turkish cases in front of the European Court 
of Human Rights since September 2012. The 
quality of the decisions of the Court on con-
stitutional complaints was developing until 
this year, but it is not so anymore, especially 
after the failed coup attempt. Unfortunately, 
neither the European Court of Human Rights 
nor other European institutions backed hu-
man rights as powerfully as they should have 
against the Turkish Government due to the 
fragile balance between these two sides un-
der the circumstances of the failed coup and 
the emerging problem of illegal immigrants 
escaping from Syria’s civil war.
MAJOR CASES
Applications for Annulments
1) Judgment on application related to law on 
full-day employment
The provisions of the law which amends 
Law no. 2547 and Law no. 2955 and which 
prohibits civil servants and members of the 
Turkish Armed Forces from establishing 
?????? ???? ??????? ?????????? ???? ??????? ???
practice their profession or work self-em-
ployed or from working at a workplace that 
is owned by real persons, private law legal 
entities or professional organizations with 
??????? ?????? ???????? ??? ??????????? ???????
education institutions6 were brought to the 
Constitutional Court by the main opposition 
party, CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – Re-
publican People’s Party), on the grounds of 
the right to life and state’s obligation to en-
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sure that everyone leads a healthy life phys-
ically and mentally as secured under Con-
stitution. The law was criticized especially 
by Faculty of Medicine members with their 
own private surgery practices. In Turkey, it is 
common for Faculty of Medicine members 
to have private practices and attract some of 
their patients who do not want to be treated 
in university campuses with others and who 
can pay for their access to private surgery. 
But of course, it creates some extra burdens 
on them, and it is sometimes heard that some 
of the members ignore their faculty duties 
due to their workloads.
The Constitutional Court declined to annul 
the provisions above by saying that teaching 
staff must primarily carry out the duties of 
educating and carrying out applied studies 
at undergraduate, graduate and postgraduate 
levels based on secondary education, con-
???????? ?????????? ?????????? ???????????????-
tions and training and acting as consultants 
to students. The Court emphasized that the 
legislative organ has the right and power to 
regulate and introduce certain limitations on 
the working conditions of teaching staff by 
taking their titles and status into consider-
ation, intending to provide better education 
and health services at universities.
Meanwhile, the provisions of the same law 
which prescribe that doctors, dentists or the 
instructors at medical schools practicing their 
profession or working self-employed under 
the scope of working restrictions shall termi-
nate such employment within three months 
?????? ?????????????????? ????????????????????-
al Gazette, and those who fail to do so will 
be deemed to have resigned and will be dis-
charged from the university, were annulled 
by the Constitutional Court on the grounds 
of the principle of legal security and certain-
ty. The Court stated that full-time employed 
teaching staff, due to their convictions and ex-
pectations of their self-occupation after such 
judicial decisions, have planned to work free-
ly outside universities and they have planned 
their economic and social lives relying on 
these circumstances. The decision also stated 
that it contradicts equity and justice to force 
7 “…decree laws issued during a state of emergency, martial law or in time of war cannot be brought before the Constitutional Court alleging their unconsti-
tutionality as to form or substance…”
8 Decisions No: E.1990/25, K.1991/1; No: E.1991/6, K.1991/20; No: E.1992/30, K.1992/36 and No: E. 2003/28, K.2003/42.
teaching staff to terminate the activities and 
engagements they had planned relying on 
the expectations and convictions of the con-
tinuation of legal status. Therefore, the Court 
concluded that it was not constitutional to 
impose on them such heavy sanctions as be-
ing deemed resigned and discharged from the 
university, and annulled only that part of the 
amending law.
2) Judgment on application related to the ex-
propriation of intellectual and artistic works 
by issuing a Council of Ministers’ decree
???????????????????????????????????????????
????????????? ??????????????????? ??? ???????? ???
the expropriation of those works, which are 
considered important for the culture of the 
country. Before the amendment, there were 
two conditions to expropriate intellectual and 
artistic works: exhaustion of the examples of 
the work and lack of will of the right holders 
to republish it. After it, the new conditions 
for the expropriation were the death of the 
author and the payment of an appropriate fee 
to the right holders before the expiry of the 
term of protection and a Council of Minis-
ters’ decree. In other words, the amendment 
allowed the government to issue a decree 
expropriating the rights of intellectual and 
artistic works that can be still used or sold by 
the heirs of their creators. 
The main opposition party alleged that there 
is no public interest in the expropriation of 
works, which are available in the market 
and cannot be claimed unavailable, through 
the payment of an appropriate fee to be de-
termined by a single party and that such a 
practice would infringe on the essence of the 
right to property. The petition also alleged 
that a monopolized supply of intellectual 
and artistic works, which can be accessed 
by the public without any obstacle, through 
methods and to the extent prescribed by the 
state contradicts freedom of expression and 
dissemination of thought and the freedom to 
access thought and information.
The Court accepted that the expropriation 
of authors’ rights to intellectual and artistic 
works aimed to ensure the continued pub-
lic supply of the works, which are deemed 
important for the culture of the country. But 
in the decision, it was also stated that the 
expropriation of rights on works which can 
be accessed by the public through heir trans-
actions, thereby depriving the owner of his/
her property, does not constitute a necessary 
means to achieve that aim. The Court also 
mentioned that the criterion “being import-
ant for the culture of the country” is vague 
and can be misused.
Regarding freedom of expression, the Court 
noted that the discretion to determine the 
form, means and extent of publication of an 
intellectual and artistic work shall belong to 
the author’s heirs after his/her death and that 
this is an inseparable aspect of the right to 
disseminate thoughts and opinions, which 
are an essential element of freedom of ex-
pression.
Consequently, the Constitutional Court de-
cided that the amendment was contradictory 
to the right to property, which is regulated by 
Article 35 of the Constitution, and constitut-
ed a disproportionate interference to the free-
dom of expression and freedom of science 
and arts. The Court annulled the amendment.
3) Judgment on application related to the 
decree laws issued under the state of emer-
gency
Five days after the failed putsch, on 20 July 
?????? ?????????? ???????? ???? ???? ????????
of Ministers declared a nationwide state 
of emergency. Article 148 of the Consti-
tution explicitly states that decree laws is-
sued during a state of emergency shall not 
be brought before the Constitutional Court 
alleging their unconstitutionality.7 It seems 
that this regulation gives the executive organ 
an uncontrollable and limitless power during 
the state of emergency.
The Constitutional Court of Turkey, in 1991,8 
decided that the state of emergency is regu-
lated by the Constitution, which means that 
this is a judicial measure and, consequent-
ly, it cannot be out of the scope of judicial 
scrutiny. Therefore, the Court bypassed the 
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explicit ban of Article 148 and declared, in 
several cases, that it has the right to deter-
mine whether the regulations made under 
the title of “decree laws issued under the 
state of emergency” are indeed in the nature 
???????????????????????????????????????????
Constitution and exempted from constitu-
tionality review. Thus, the Court examined 
the constitutionality of those regulations that 
are not considered to be of such nature. That 
jurisprudence determined three conditions to 
bypass the ban and start to do that examina-
tion: 1) The decree law goes beyond to set a 
temporary measure as the nature of the state 
of emergency obliges. 2) It surpasses the 
territory of the state of emergency. 3) It is 
not proportional to the reasons and aims of 
the declared state of emergency. In this case, 
the Court accepted that this would mean a 
misuse of the power to issue  decree laws 
during a state of emergency and reviewed 
their constitutionality on the basis that they 
were in substance ordinary decree laws. 
Consequently, it had accepted the requests 
brought by the main opposition party before 
it and annulled some state of emergency de-
cree laws. 
Some of the decree laws issued after the dec-
laration of a state of emergency in 2016 con-
tained measures related to the structure of 
some institutions and organizations, changes 
in ordinary laws that would continue to have 
effects after the termination of the state of 
emergency, the sacking name-by-name of 
thousands of public workers and academ-
ics, and the closure of some leftist radio and 
television stations and newspapers. There-
fore, CHP, the main opposition party, argued 
that these kinds of provisions of decree laws 
cannot be regarded as decree laws issued in 
respect of matters necessitated by the state of 
emergency and should be subject to judicial 
review. It was accordingly maintained in the 
petition that the mentioned provisions were 
in breach of the preamble and some articles 
of the Constitution. 
The Court, in its actual judgment, accepted 
with no doubt that it had the discretion to 
qualify the legal characterization of a rule 
9 For a critical view of this decision please look at the article (two parts) of Dr. Ali Acar published in ICONnect Blog: 1) http://www.iconnectblog.
com/2017/03/the-hamartia-of-the-constitutional-court-of-turkey-part-i/ and 2) http://www.iconnectblog.com/2017/04/the-hamartia-of-the-constitutional-
court-of-turkey-part-ii/
brought before it as it did in the 1990s but 
?????????? ??? ??????? ????? ???? ?????????????
made must not result in going beyond the 
framework drawn by the Constitution. The 
Constitutional Court judges who thought 
that the previous approach rendered the pro-
hibition of constitutional review of emergen-
cy decree laws as to form and substance set 
out in Article 148 of the Constitution com-
pletely meaningless overruled their jurispru-
dence. For this purpose, they made a very 
positivist interpretation of the Constitution: 
“Having regard to the wording of Article 
148 of the Constitution, the purpose of con-
stitution-maker and the relevant legislation 
documents, it is clear that decree laws issued 
under a state of emergency cannot, under any 
name, be subject to constitutionality review”. 
So, the Court declined to proceed on the ex-
amination of the substance of the impugned 
provisions included in the decree laws issued 
under the state of emergency declared after 
the failed coup attempt of the 15th of July 
and dismissed the request for the annulment 
of them for lack of jurisdiction.9
Constitutional Complaints
Judgment on the right to liberty and se-
curity of person, and freedom of expres-
sion and the press in Erdem Gül and Can 
Dündar application.
Some trucks belonging to the secret securi-
?????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????? ?????? ????? ????????? ????????
had been stopped by gendarmerie in Adana 
(South of Turkey, close to the Syrian border) 
on 19 January 2014. A nationalist newspa-
per named ????????, which is followed by a 
relatively small extremist group, in its issue 
on 21 January 2014, published an article and 
a photograph related to the occurrence. The 
incidents related to the stopping and search-
ing of these trucks and their contents and the 
destination of their freight were a matter of 
debate by the public for a long period. 
Sixteen months later, just ten days before the 
general elections on 7 June 2015, Can Dün-
dar, the director-general of a well-known 
and prestigious newspaper close to CHP 
named Cumhuriyet (The Republic), pub-
lished photographs and information related 
to the weapons and ammunitions found in 
the trucks. The same day, on 29 May 2015, 
???????????????????????????????????????????
press statement and announced that a pros-
ecution had been initiated on the charges of 
“providing documents regarding the security 
of the state, political and military espionage, 
?????????????????????????????? ????????????
public and making propaganda of a terrorist 
organization”. Then, on 1 June 2016, Presi-
????????????????????????????????????????????
TRT (state radio-television), said “I ordered 
my lawyer. The person who made this news 
a special report, I think, he will pay a hard 
price for it”. On 12 June 2016, the Ankara 
representative of Cumhuriyet prepared and 
published another news article on the same 
incident.
In the general election, no party won a ma-
jority in Parliament and negotiations to form 
a coalition collapsed. A new general election 
was organized on the 1st of November and 
that time AKP, which was in power since 
2002, obtained more than half of the seats 
in Turkish Parliament. After the formation 
of the government and approximately six 
months after the press statement of the Chief 
Public Prosecutor, the applicants were de-
tained on charges of “deliberate support for 
organizational objectives of an armed terror-
ist organization FETÖ/PDY”.
???? ??????? ???? ?????? ??? ? ???????? ?????
???????????????????????????????????????????????
which was based only on the news that they 
published, and that no evidence except for 
the news articles was adduced against them. 
Therefore, they alleged that they were 
unlawfully deprived of their liberty, and their 
rights to liberty and security and freedom of 
expression and the press were violated. 
The Court, based on the fact that similar news 
was published with photos approximately 
sixteen months earlier in another newspaper, 
stated that the grounds of the detention mea-
sure did not specify whether the publication 
of the similar news later by the applicants 
220 | I•CONnect-Clough Center 
continued to pose a threat to national securi-
ty. In this context, the Court said, the facts of 
the case and the grounds of the decision on 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
was “necessary” to implement the detention 
measure on the applicants.
Apropos of the freedom of expression and 
????????????????? ?????????????????????????
v. Turkey Case of the ECHR and stated con-
sidering that, the only fact adduced as the 
basis for crimes the applicants were charged 
with was the publishing of the relevant news 
articles. The Court concluded that such a 
severe measure as detention, which did not 
meet the criteria of lawfulness, could not be 
considered proportionate and necessary in a 
democratic society. 
Consequently, the Court ruled that the appli-
cants’ rights had been violated and rendered 
the release of the journalists. Presently, Can 
Dündar lives in exile in Germany and man-
??????????????????????????????????????????
free).
CONCLUSION
In 2016, the imbalance between the legisla-
tive, executive and judicial powers of Turkey 
became more obvious and clear. The execu-
tive’s domination, by the aid of the charis-
matic leadership of President Recep Tayyip 
????????????????????? ??????????????????????
the two other powers. The Constitutional 
Court of Turkey, which is the highest judicial 
organ that should be the supervisor of this 
balance, was also affected by this reposition-
ing. It is clear that the Court, especially after 
the declaration of the state of emergency, was 
not be courageous enough to either annul the 
laws approved by the legislative organ dom-
inated by the AKP Government or to correct 
the violations of human rights of the citizens 
by the executive organ. Particularly through 
the rejection of the control of the constitu-
tionality of the decree laws issued during the 
state of emergency, the Court created an un-
stoppable executive organ. The Court left the 
fundamental human rights and supremacy of 
the constitution unprotected and, ipso facto, 
rejected its raison d’être. The only hope that 
one who believes in democracy and the rule 
of law can have in Turkey, for now, is the end 
of the state of emergency and some normal-
ization shortly. 
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UNITED KINGDOM INTRODUCTION
The idea of ‘union’ was the central constitu-
tional focus for the United Kingdom in 2016. 
The nature of the United Kingdom (UK) as a 
multinational state was radically overhauled 
by the Scotland Act 2016 and by the bill that 
??????? ??????????????????????????????????
surely be best remembered for the referen-
dum held on membership of the European 
Union (EU) and the dramatic decision taken 
by the British people to leave a union that 
????????????????????????????????????????????
the British constitution since 1973. 
??? ????? ??????????? ??????? ????? ?????? ?????-
opments and the interactions between devo-
lution and ‘Brexit’. In light of the radical 
changes to the internal territorial union and 
the UK’s external union with Europe, we can 
surely say that 2016 was a seminal moment 
in the development of the modern Unit-
ed Kingdom constitution to rank alongside 
1885, 1911, 1922, and 1997.
 
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
COURT
The unentrenched nature of the British Con-
stitution, the evanescent boundaries between 
‘constitutional’ law and ordinary law (and 
between law and politics more widely), and 
1 Human Rights Act 1998 ss 3-4.
2 R (Factortame Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport (No 2) [1991] 1 AC 603; (HS2 Action Alliance Ltd) 
v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3.
3 See e.g. G Marshall, ‘The Constitution: Its Theory and Interpretation’ in V Bogdanor (ed.), The British 
Constitution in the Twentieth Century (Oxford University Press, 2003) 33.
the less central role for the courts in a sys-
tem where Parliament is supreme marks the 
United Kingdom as an outlier in a world of 
increasingly detailed and judicially regulated 
constitutions. 
???? ???????? ??????????????? ??? ??????? ???-
stitution is parliamentary supremacy, which 
means that the courts have traditionally tak-
en a back seat in constitutional matters. This 
changed to some extent with the Human 
Rights Act 1998, which gave the courts more 
interpretive discretion without introducing 
the power to strike down statutes.1 Member-
ship of the European Union has proved dif-
?????? ???? ???? ??????? ??? ????????? ????????????
parliamentary supremacy with the self-de-
clared supremacy of EU law.2 But it is nota-
ble that the courts have been very careful not 
to overstep their proper constitutional posi-
tion. This is evident when we look at devo-
lution. The courts have taken a light touch 
to policing the boundaries of competence 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
and Northern Ireland–with few cases coming 
before the courts, and these rarely raising is-
sues of major controversy.   
????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????
of the British constitutional tradition.3 In 
this context, constitutional change has taken 
place through ordinary legislation, supported 
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by a network of prerogative power (the royal 
prerogative power was originally exercised 
by the reigning monarch, but is now general-
ly exercised by Government ministers in the 
name of the Sovereign4), and constitutional 
conventions which are not legally enforce-
able. Since the courts have not been central 
players in constitutional change as they have 
elsewhere, it is therefore particularly notable 
that the major cases which emerged in the 
context of the Brexit referendum have fo-
cused entirely upon the issue of Parliament’s 
supremacy and its interaction with the devo-
lution statutes, the prerogative power, and 
constitutional conventions. 
DEVELOPMENTS AND  
CONTROVERSIES IN 2016 
The main controversy in 2016 was the Brex-
it referendum and its aftermath. But in this 
section we will also discuss changes to the 
devolution settlements for Scotland and 
??????? ?????? ???? ????? ????? ??????????? ????
which have tended to be overlooked in light 
of the EU referendum. 
Brexit
The Conservative Party’s success in the 2015 
general election required it to make good on 
its campaign pledge to hold a referendum on 
the UK’s continued membership of the EU,5 
and the referendum was duly held on 23 June 
2016. The unexpected ‘Leave’ vote – by a 
slim margin of 52% to 48% – has led to the 
resignation of Prime Minister David Cam-
eron and left the next Government, under 
Prime Minister Theresa May, charged with 
the complex task of achieving a divorce from 
the EU that complies with UK constitutional 
4 See generally T Poole, Reason of State: Law, Prerogative and Empire (Cambridge University Press, 2015).
5 See The Conservative Party Manifesto 2015 http://bit.ly/1FPYN2z?????
6 A brief summary of the process is provided in T Lock and TG Daly, Legal Implications of Brexit and the British Bill of Rights (Edinburgh Law School and 
Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law) 20.
7 The request was made by a letter from First Minister Nicola Sturgeon to Prime Minister Theresa May dated 31 March 2017, the text of which is available at 
http://bit.ly/2p1RXb0. See also S Tierney, ‘A Second Independence Referendum in Scotland: The Legal Issues’ U.K. Const. L. Blog (13 March 2017) https://
ukconstitutionallaw.org/. 
8 See e.g. T Reidy, ‘Scottish Independence and a United Ireland: A Brexit Game of Gaelic Games?’ Irish Politics Forum (21 March 2017) http://bit.ly/2oG1vaS. 
9 House of Lords Constitution Committee, ‘Proposals for the devolution of further powers to Scotland’, 18 March, 2015, para 95. http://bit.ly/2oaUEml.   
10 Scotland Act 2016, s.1.
11 M Elliott, ‘The Draft Scotland Bill and the sovereignty of the UK Parliament’, Public Law for Everyone blog, 22 January 2015 http://bit.ly/2p20QBn. 
12 K Campbell, ‘The draft Scotland Bill and limits in constitutional statutes’ U.K. Const. L. Blog (30 January 2015) http://ukconstitutionallaw.org.
13??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????http://bit.ly/1MEnEHC. 
law, EU law, and wider commitments under 
international law (particularly as regards the 
Good Friday Agreement, a bilateral interna-
tional treaty between the UK and Ireland in 
1998, which, with the accompanying North-
ern Ireland Act 1998 passed by the UK Par-
liament, established a peace settlement in 
Northern Ireland). 
The process of withdrawal from the EU 
is governed by Article 50 of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU).6 As the UK is the 
????? ?????? ??? ????? ??? ?????? ???????? ???????-
cise requirements and procedure to be fol-
lowed under Article 50 are unclear and have 
been the subject of much discussion at both 
the national and EU levels. The prospect of 
Brexit has also sparked renewed discussions 
of profound constitutional change within the 
???????????????????????????????????????????
the Scottish Government for the authority to 
hold a second independence referendum,7 
but also in calls for constitutional change for 
Northern Ireland.8 Below, we will return to 
the litigation provoked by the June referen-
dum.
Devolution Developments
Scotland Act 2016
The Scotland Act 2016 provides the Scottish 
Parliament with a set of new powers that 
will make it one of the most autonomous 
sub-state legislatures in the world. It consid-
erably extends the powers already provided 
for in the Scotland Acts of 1998 and 2012. 
The Scottish Parliament acquires a range of 
additional competences in policy areas such 
as taxation, welfare, unemployment ser-
????????????????????????????????????????????-
erty, and onshore oil and gas extraction. It is 
the provisions on taxation that have attracted 
the most attention. In light of the Scotland 
??????????????????? ???????????????? ??????-
cal responsibility.9 In particular, it has been 
given extensive powers in relation to income 
tax raised in Scotland which is important 
in symbolic as well as practical terms. This 
builds upon the more modest tax powers 
which were included in the 2012 Act, a num-
ber of which are still to be implemented. 
The 2016 Act also changes the constitutional 
status of the Scottish Parliament, providing: 
‘The Scottish Parliament and the Scottish 
Government are a permanent part of the 
United Kingdom’s constitutional arrange-
ments’.10????????????????????????????????????-
tional effect this might have, given the UK’s 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty,11 but 
the very statement could be a steer to the 
courts to consider Scottish devolution now 
to be an entrenched arrangement at the level 
of constitutional principle.12
 
English Votes for English Laws (EVEL)
The Scotland Act was the culmination of 
the promise of more powers for the Scottish 
Parliament in light of the independence ref-
erendum in 2014, in which 45% of voters 
opted for independence. From this process 
what also emerged was resentment within 
England at how devolution continued to ex-
pand with no account of the constitutional 
position of England.
This resulted in a change to parliamentary 
procedure known as ‘English Votes for En-
glish Laws’ (EVEL). The system was intro-
duced in 2015 through an amendment to the 
Standing Orders of the House of Commons.13 
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??? ?????? ??? ???????? ???? ??????????????????-
tion’.14????????????????????????????????? ???-
minster MPs from Northern Ireland, Scotland 
???? ???????????????????????????????????????
that affect only England while MPs from En-
gland are unable to vote on matters that have 
been devolved to the devolved legislatures. 
EVEL attempts a procedural solution within 
the law-making process of the UK Parlia-
ment, by giving a veto, respectively, to the 
whole House of Commons and to a Grand 
????????????? ??????????????????????????
Speaker is given a role in deciding which 
Bills or provisions of Bills fall within the 
ambit of the new procedure. In legislation 
affecting only England (or England and 
???????? ???????? ???? ???????? ???? ???????
MPs are offered a vote, although the whole 
House of Commons retains a power to reject 
these votes. Conversely, English (or English 
?????????????????????????????????????????-
volved matters affecting England (or En-
?????? ??????????? ????? ????? ????? ?????????
by the whole House.15       
Reviews of the complex system in operation, 
while raising deep philosophical questions,16 
have broadly noted that it is too early to draw 
??????????????????????????????????????????????
weaknesses, although it will not be long be-
fore the internal territorial implications of 
withdrawing from the European Union will 
pose severe tests for EVEL.17  
Wales Act 2017
The process of making major changes to 
???? ??????????? ??????????? ????????? ??????-
ued throughout 2016, culminating in the 
?????????? ?????18 It introduces a reserved 
14 P Bowers, ‘The West Lothian Question’, House of Commons Library Standard Note SN/PC/2586, 18 January 2012: http://bit.ly/2oywNjd.  
15 M Elliott and S Tierney, ‘House of Lords Constitution Committee Reports on ‘English Votes for English Laws’ U.K. Const. L. Blog (2 November 2016): http://
bit.ly/2p1ZaYB.   
16 See e.g. B Guastaferro, ‘Disowning Edmund Burke? The Constitutional Implications of EVEL on Political Representation’, U.K. Const. L. Blog (2 May 2016): 
http://bit.ly/2pf4BQC.    
17 House of Lords Constitution Committee, ‘English Votes for English Laws’, 6th Report of Session 2016-17, 2 November 2016, HL Paper 61: http://bit.ly/2pz-
K9tf; UK Government, ‘Technical Review of the Standing Orders Related to English Votes for English Laws and the Procedures they Introduced’, March 2017, 
CM9430: http://bit.ly/2oxbz5k.  
18 For background, see Wales Governance Centre and The Constitution Unit, ‘Challenge and Opportunity: The Draft Wales Bill 2015’, February 2016: http://
bit.ly/2oskuDm; A Cogbill, ‘The Wales Bill 2016: A Marked Improvement but there are Fundamental Questions Yet to be Resolved’, The Constitution Unit Blog, 
26 July 2016: http://bit.ly/2os8z8B.   
19 ??????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
20 A Trench, ‘Legislative consent and the Sewel convention’, Devolution Matters Blog, March 2017: http://bit.ly/29o6xTA.  
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 McCord’s (Raymond) Application [2016] NIQB 85: http://bit.ly/2fN1ZXF.  
?????????????????????????????????????19 In 
provisions similar to those in the Scotland 
Act 2016, it provides for the permanence of 
????????????????????????????????????????????
through the requirement of a referendum 
for the abolition of the National Assembly. 
It recognises the convention (‘the Sewel 
convention’20) that the UK Parliament will 
not normally legislate in areas of devolved 
competence, even though it retains the legal 
power to do so (such a provision is also to be 
found in the Scotland Act 2016). It also de-
volves further legislative and executive pow-
???? ????? ?? ?????? ??? ???????????? ??????????
including over elections, onshore petroleum, 
road transport, ports, electricity generation, 
equal opportunities, marine conservation, 
??????????????? ?????????????????????
Another noteworthy feature of the 2017 Act 
is the recognition of a distinctive body of 
?????? ????? ??????? ????????? ???? ?????????
Ireland, which have long had separate judi-
??????????????????????????? ????????????????
the single legal jurisdiction of England and 
???????????????????????????????????????????
to recognise the body of distinctive prima-
ry and secondary legislation enacted by the 
??????????????? ?????? ???? ??????? ??? ????-
lution, which forms part of the laws of the 
???????????????????????????? ?????????? ?????
???????????????? ?????21
 
Constitutional innovations such as the pro-
visions concerning permanence and consent, 
however, have to be understood in the con-
text of the doctrine of parliamentary sover-
eignty, which continues to be the fundamen-
tal rule of the UK constitution.22 This means 
that a future Parliament can legally change 
any existing legislation, including those of 
a constitutional character, through ordinary 
legislative procedure. Nevertheless, the fact 
that Parliament has given a commitment to 
???????????????????????????????????? ???????-
stitutions can no longer be abolished except 
through a referendum in each territory re-
spectively seems to be a form of contingent 
entrenchment that reinforces the political 
limits, and arguably the legal limits, of the 
UK Parliament’s legislative capacity. 
MAJOR CASES
???? ?????????????????? ???????????????????
litigation concerning Brexit. Two separate 
strands of litigation have addressed the issue 
of consent in the initial stage of the process 
of withdrawing from the EU, set out in Ar-
ticle 50 TEU: (i) two cases brought before 
the High Court in Northern Ireland con-
cerned whether, under the existing devolu-
tion framework, the consent of the Northern 
Ireland Assembly was required to trigger the 
UK’s exit (with implications for the devolved 
nations more generally); and (ii) the Miller 
case before the High Court of England and 
??????????????????????????????????????????
required from the UK Parliament to trigger 
Article 50. Both strands of litigation were 
joined for hearing before the Supreme Court 
in December 2016, which issued a judgment 
in January 2017. 
The High Court of Northern Ireland decision 
in McCord’s Application 
The judicial review applications considered 
in the McCord??????????????????????????????
issues for the Court’s consideration.23 First, it 
was argued that the executive prerogative in 
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respect of foreign relations and treaty-mak-
ing had been displaced by the Northern Ire-
land Act 1998, read together with the Bel-
fast Agreement and British-Irish Agreement, 
which not only established the distinctive 
Northern Ireland (NI) power-sharing and 
human rights arrangements, but also did so 
on an irreplaceable assumption of continuing 
UK membership of the EU. In the applicants’ 
view, immediate changes would occur in 
these arrangements, including rights deriv-
ing from EU law, by even the initial step of 
?????????????????????????????????? ??????????
TEU. Since the prerogative cannot be used 
to change domestic law, the applicants con-
tended that the UK Government needed pri-
or parliamentary sanction in the form of an 
Act of Parliament to trigger Article 50.
??????????????????????????????????????????
legal provisions applicable to Northern Ire-
land that expressly or impliedly displaced 
the prerogative in respect of the UK’s rela-
tionship with the EU, even though the fact of 
EU membership was assumed at the time the 
1998 Act and other Agreements were put in 
place. Moreover, the Court did not agree that 
the mere act of triggering Article 50 would 
affect any existing rights; although this may 
well happen in the future, albeit through leg-
islation giving effect to the terms of the UK’s 
eventual withdrawal.24    
If an Act of the UK Parliament was need-
ed for triggering Article 50, the applicants 
argued, secondly, that by convention there 
needed to be a ‘Legislative Consent Mo-
tion’ passed by the NI Assembly before the 
UK Parliament could act. Given the High 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
Government has authority under the prerog-
?????? ??? ????? ????? ???? ???????? ????????????
But it nevertheless considered the question 
24 Ibid: [65] – [108].
25 Ibid: [109] – [122]
26 Ibid: [123] – [136]
27 Ibid: [137] – [146]
28 Ibid: [147] – [157]
29 See also C Harvey, ‘Northern Ireland’s Transition and the Constitution of the UK’, U.K. Const. L. Blog (12 December 2016): http://bit.ly/2nKZ9YZ.  
30 [2016] EWHC 2768 (Admin).
31 ‘Enemies of the people: Fury over  “out of touch” judges who have “declared war on democracy” by defying 17.4m Brexit voters and who could trigger 
constitutional crisis’ Daily Mail 4 November 2016 http://dailym.ai/2et5SQE. 
32 ‘Daily Mail’s “Enemies of the People” front page receives more than 1,000 complaints to IPSO’ Independent 10 November 2016 http://ind.pn/2fAxn9S. 
whether triggering Article 50 would affect 
a devolved matter, and concluded it did 
not; that is, within the scheme of devolved 
(‘transferred’) or reserved (‘excepted’) mat-
ters under the 1998 Act, triggering Article 50 
concerned relations with the EU institutions, 
which is an excepted or UK competence.25
The third argument averred that even if the 
prerogative was available to the UK Govern-
ment, a number of public law restraints would 
apply to its exercise to ensure that the Gov-
ernment took all relevant considerations into 
account – including the unique constitutional 
arrangements of the NI within the UK and 
the need to uphold EU law so long as the UK 
remained a member-state – and that it would 
not give excessive consideration only to the 
referendum result. The Court questioned the 
justiciability of many of the contentions on 
this ground, concluding that triggering Article 
50 would be a decision of high policy taken 
at the highest levels of the state, pursuant to 
a state-wide referendum, that would be inap-
propriate for judicial review.26
The last two of the applicants’ arguments 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
these were that the decision to trigger Article 
50 would be in violation of the 1998 Act’s 
provisions requiring the Secretary of State 
for Northern Ireland to assess the measure’s 
impact on equal opportunities in NI; and that 
the Good Friday Agreement gives rise to a 
substantive legitimate expectation that the 
constitutional status of NI would not be al-
tered without a referendum. The Court found 
that triggering Article 50 was not a matter 
for the NI Secretary but for the Prime Minis-
ter and other members of the UK Cabinet.27 
Similarly, it held that any referendum pro-
vision in the Good Friday Agreement was 
about NI remaining within the UK, rather 
than the UK’s relationship with the EU.28 
These matters were all appealed to the Su-
preme Court (see below).29
The High Court judgment in the Miller case
Parallel to the litigation in Northern Ireland, 
the applicants in R (Miller) v Secretary of 
State for Exiting the European Union argued 
that the UK Government’s plan to trigger 
the process of leaving the EU under Article 
50 TEU through exercise of the royal pre-
rogative power is unacceptable under UK 
constitutional law. They contended that the 
initiation of the process required statutory 
authorisation from Parliament on the basis 
that the prerogative has been displaced by 
the European Communities Act 1972, which 
was enacted to facilitate the UK’s entry 
into the European Economic Community in 
1973. 
??? ????? ?????????? ???? ????? ?????? ??????? ??
judgment of 3 November 201630 holding that 
the triggering of Article 50 TEU does require 
the statutory authorisation of Parliament. 
The judgment was met with fury by the an-
ti-EU press, including the Daily Mail’s now 
infamous front page decrying the High Court 
judges as ‘enemies of the people’.31 The head-
line was widely criticised as failing to respect 
the independence of the judiciary and was the 
subject of over 1,000 complaints to the Inde-
pendent Press Standards Organisation.32
The UK Government appealed the decision 
to the UK Supreme Court, which heard the 
case on 5-8 December 2016, joining it to the 
appeal against the High Court of Northern 
Ireland in the McCord case. 
The Supreme Court judgment
On 24 January 2017, the Supreme Court 
handed down its decision in the joined ap-
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peals against the judgments in Miller and 
McCord.33 In a joint majority decision of 8 
judges (with 3 judges issuing separate dis-
sents), the Supreme Court upheld both judg-
ments.34
Regarding the matters raised in Miller, the 
Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the 
High Court requiring that Parliament must 
pass an act authorising the Government to 
notify the UK’s intention to withdraw from 
the EU under Article 50 TEU. The judgment, 
????????????????????????????????????????????
as an analysis of the constitutional relation-
ship between the Parliament and the Execu-
tive, focused on detailed analysis of the na-
ture of the royal prerogative power exercised 
by Government ministers. 
The main question centred on two foun-
dational rules: (i) the Executive cannot, 
through exercise of the royal prerogative, 
change domestic law;35 and (ii) the making 
and unmaking of international treaties is a 
foreign relations matter that falls within the 
competence of the Executive. The Court 
considered that use of the prerogative power 
to vary the content of EU law (arising from 
new EU legislation) could not be equated 
to the ‘fundamental change in the constitu-
tional arrangements of the UK’36 occasioned 
by exit from the EU, that the absence of any 
express conferral of power to the executive 
to withdraw from the European Community 
(now Union) under the 1972 Act meant that 
such a power did not exist, and that individ-
ual rights enjoyed as a result of EU member-
ship would be affected as soon as Article 50 
was triggered.37 
???????????????????????????????????????????
raised in McCord, the Court dismissed the 
appeal against the judgment of the High 
Court of Northern Ireland (as well as similar 
arguments advanced by the Scottish Govern-
33 [2017] UKSC 5.
34 A useful summary can be found in ‘Robert Craig: Miller Supreme Court Case Summary’ U.K. Const. L. Blog (26 January 2017) http://bit.ly/2oP2BP0. 
35 This includes legislation enacted by Parliament and the common law.
36 [78].
37 [40] – [57].
38 [126] – [135].
39 [194].
40 See in particular [177].
41 See R Greenslade, ‘How the press reacted to the article 50 verdict’ The Guardian 25 January 2017 http://bit.ly/2ofFsHJ. 
ment before the Supreme Court), by holding 
that the consent of the devolved legislatures 
is not required for the triggering of Article 
50. 
The Supreme Court’s analysis centred on 
the constitutional status of the ‘Sewel con-
vention’ (that the UK Parliament would not 
normally legislate with regard to devolved 
matters except with the agreement of the 
devolved legislature), which is referred to 
expressly in the Scotland Act 2016. The 
Supreme Court, while recognising that the 
Sewel Convention can play a fundamental 
role in the constitutional framework con-
cerning devolution, took the view that its 
???????????????? ?? ?????????????????? ??????-
ing the systemic tendency to avoid judicial 
resolution of matters ruled by convention. 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
the Supreme Court dismissed the additional 
argument that the consent of the people of 
Northern Ireland was required to take North-
ern Ireland out of the EU, based on Article 1 
of the Northern Ireland Act 1998, which pro-
vides that Northern Ireland shall not cease to 
be a part of the UK without the consent of 
the people.38
The three dissenting judges (Lords Reed, 
Carnwath, and Hughes) took no issue with 
the majority’s decision on the devolution 
framework, but disagreed fundamentally 
with the majority on the requirement for par-
liamentary authorisation to trigger exit under 
Article 50 TEU. Lord Reed, for instance, 
stressed that the principle that the conduct of 
foreign relations is a matter for the Crown is 
“so fundamental” that it can be overridden 
solely by an express legislative provision or 
by necessary implication,39 and considered 
that the 1972 Act in no way precluded the 
use of the prerogative power to trigger Ar-
ticle 50 TEU, given that the domestic effect 
accorded to EU law by Parliament in enact-
ing the 1972 Act was ‘inherently conditional’ 
on the UK’s membership of the EU, the 1972 
Act itself imposes no requirement of UK 
membership of the EU, and that the 1972 Act 
had not changed in any way the fundamental 
sources of domestic law or the principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty.40 
 The Supreme Court’s judgment was not met 
with the same level of vituperation as the 
High Court judgment, and was hailed (by 
????????? ?????????? ???????????????????????-
al judgment for a generation’ and ‘a triumph 
for Britain’s judicial system and the Supreme 
Court’.41 The pro-Brexit media turned their 
attention to the potential derailing of Brex-
it in Parliament. Nevertheless, the Supreme 
Court’s centrality in resolving this constitu-
tional dispute has brought virtually unprece-
dented scrutiny to an institution that does not 
have the power to strike down statutes. 
CONCLUSION
The decision to leave the European Union 
will put great strain upon Parliament and 
Government as they seek to extricate the 
UK from over 40 years of EU membership 
and the tens of thousands of laws emanating 
from Brussels. It will also put great strain 
upon the territorial constitution, particularly 
as the Brexit decision has served to revital-
ise nationalism in both Northern Ireland and 
Scotland. 
The courts played a role in the Miller case 
where they intervened to clarify the power of 
Parliament in relation to important preroga-
tive powers and constitutional conventions. 
It is likely that they will continue to have in-
????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????? ????????? ???? ????????? ???? ??????
take effect. But the main challenges ahead 
are political. The new devolution settlements 
???? ????????? ?????????? ????? ???????? ?????
them a range of powers that are now shared 
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with the central Government while North-
ern Ireland remains a very delicate situation 
where devolution is both volatile and frag-
ile. The real task facing the UK constitution 
in the coming years is that of intergovern-
mental relations. The UK Government must 
seek to manage Brexit negotiations in a way 
that is attentive to the reality of the UK as 
a multinational state. Otherwise the process 
of leaving one union – the European Union 
– could serve to undermine fatally the UK’s 
own internal unions. 
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Zambia
DEVELOPMENTS IN ZAMBIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Mulela Margaret Munalula, LLB, LLM MA, JSD (AHCZ) 
ZAMBIA
INTRODUCTION: ZAMBIA’S 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT: A 
DIFFICULT BIRTH
On 5th January 2016, the Republican Pres-
ident signed the Constitution of Zambia 
(Amendment) Act No. 2 of 2016 into law. 
The Amendment Act repealed every provi-
sion in the 1991 Constitution (as amended 
in 1996) other than the entrenched Bill of 
Rights and Article 79 (alteration clause), 
which have remained intact since 1991. It 
is not an easy marriage. The Constitution in 
place is the conservative 1991 Constitution 
as a base for the 2016 amendments which are 
much more democratic in outlook. For in-
stance, Zambia’s Constitutional Court is cre-
ated under the 2016 amendments. In terms of 
its basic structure and major principles, the 
amended Constitution is widely feted as the 
best Constitution in the country’s history. Its 
practicality, however, has been widely ques-
tioned. 
Since inception, the new Court has heard a 
????????????????? ????????????????????????-
est in the Court and how it seeks to advance 
democratic values, there is little understand-
ing of how such a court should be constitut-
ed and perform its functions. This weakness 
extends even to members of the Bar and the 
Bench, seriously undermining the potential 
of the Court to succeed.  
The review that follows examines more 
closely a few of the most significant prob-
lems experienced with understanding, ac-
cepting and applying the amended Constitu-
tion in an era that includes a Constitutional 
Court. The problems raised by the review in-
clude the process of enactment of the amend-
ed Constitution; the content of substantive 
provisions in the Constitution; the composi-
tion of the Court Bench; and the efficacy of 
????????????????????????????? ???????????????
the problems are viewed through the lens of 
the Constitutional Court’s own decisions and 
its own words.  
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
COURT
The Constitutional Court of Zambia occu-
pies a central place in the legal and politi-
cal affairs of Zambia. It was created under 
Article 127 of the amended Constitution and 
has wide jurisdiction as stated in Article 128. 
Subject to Article 28, the Court has original 
and final jurisdiction to hear matters relat-
ing to the interpretation of the Constitution; 
matters relating to violations or contraven-
tions of the Constitution; matters relating to 
the President, Vice-President or election of 
the President; appeals relating to election of 
Members of Parliament and councillors; and 
questions as to whether or not a matter falls 
within the jurisdiction of the Court.
Under Article 121, the Court ranks equiv-
alently with the Supreme Court and under 
Article 122 its powers of adjudication are 
subject only to the Constitution and the law. 
However, administratively, the President of 
the Court is ranked below the Chief Justice 
and the Deputy Chief Justice, who both sit 
on the Supreme Court. Article 127 states that 
the Court has an establishment of thirteen 
judges, three of whom constitute a quorum 
and five of whom constitute the full Court 
for purposes of adjudicating. The Consti-
tutional Act No. 8 of 2016 and the Consti-
tutional Court Rules in S.I.35 of 2016 give 
effect to the constitutional provisions.
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Enactment of the Constitution
The fact that the constitutional amendments 
that created the Constitutional Court were not 
holistic led to selective acceptance of the re-
????????? ?????????????????????????????????-
idenced by the cases instituted before it, the 
validity of other provisions was challenged on 
the basis of the process of amendment. In the 
case of Godfrey Miyanda v Attorney General 
2016/CC/0006, questions were raised about 
the validity of the constitutional enactments 
introduced by the 2016 amendments. First, 
???? ?????? ???? ???? ?????????? ??????? ???-
emnly adopt and give ourselves this Constitu-
tion’ in the Preamble were said to be untrue as 
no referendum was held to adopt the Consti-
tution prior to amendment.  
The Petitioner contended that since a ref-
erendum is the mode by which the people 
express their will and since no such refer-
endum was held, the people had in fact not 
expressed their approval and adoption as in-
dicated. The Court found that the only aspect 
of amendment of the Constitution which has 
to be referred to a referendum is the Bill of 
Rights and Article 79 itself. The remainder 
of the Constitution can be amended by the 
people’s duly elected representatives sitting 
?????????????????????????????????????????-
ple…’ encompass legitimate actions taken 
by Parliament on behalf of the people. 
A second claim was that the constitutional 
amendments effected by Act 2 of 2016 as ex-
emplified by various specific provisions that 
the petitioner isolated were unconstitutional. 
The Court found once again that the claim 
had no merit as the alteration clause, Article 
79, permits Parliament to amend any part of 
the Constitution other than the Bill of Rights 
and Article 79 itself provides a specific pro-
cedure which was followed. The Court held 
that ‘[a]n amendment becomes part of the 
Constitution itself upon its passing.’   
The incongruity between the un-amended 
Bill of Rights and the 2016 amendments 
leading to the disempowerment of the Court 
by law is a source of confusion about the 
meaning of certain fundamental principles, 
1 Alec Stone Sweet, ‘Constitutional Courts’ in Michel Rosenfeld and Andras Sajo (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (OUP 2013) 
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namely as to which court has jurisdiction 
over what; and how and by whom a particu-
lar provision of the Constitution is to be in-
terpreted and applied. Thus, at inception the 
Court was inundated with actions relating to 
the Bill of Rights when they are supposed 
to be commenced in the High Court and 
appealed directly to the Supreme Court, by-
passing the new Court of Appeal which lies 
between the High Court and the Supreme 
Court, and the Constitutional Court, which 
ought to hear human rights cases ordinarily.
  
In Murthy Gajula v Attorney General 2016/
CC/0005, Hellen Mwale and Another v 
The Attorney General and Another 2016/
CC/0007 and Gordon White and 5 Others 
v The Attorney General 2016/CC/0026, all 
human rights cases, the Constitutional Court 
had to dismiss the actions for want of ju-
risdiction. There are also obvious errors. In 
Miyanda v Attorney General, the definition 
of ‘discrimination’ given in Article 266 of 
Act 2 of 2016 was found to differ from the 
definition in Article 23 falling within the Bill 
of Rights, forcing the Court to recommend 
deletion of the definition in Article 266.  
DEVELOPMENTS AND  
CONTROVERSIES IN 2016  
Controversies about the Constitution and 
the Constitutional Court have been many 
and varied. Not all have reached the court-
room. Two examples of such un-litigated 
controversies will suffice. The first relates to 
the composition of the Constitutional Court 
Bench and its competence. It began at the 
Court’s inception and has been kept alive by 
a lack of understanding of the special nature 
of a Constitutional Court. The fact that the 
Constitution is also fraught with bad draft-
ing and has to be interpreted in a politically 
charged environment has not helped.  
Under the Constitution, Article 141 requires 
that judges of the Constitutional Court should 
be of proven integrity and be legal practi-
tioners of 15 years standing with specialized 
training or experience in human rights or 
 
constitutional law. Few Zambians are aware 
that constitutional courts are generally com-
posed of a minority of career judges and a 
majority of law professors and former gov-
ernmental officials and elected politicians.1 
Aiming for a Constitutional Court that would 
have more than the usual litigation lawyer in 
its ranks, the Judicial Service Commission 
(JSC) ignored the many applications it re-
ceived from senior members of the Bar and 
decided to head hunt. Its nominees turned 
out to be persons who had not applied for 
the positions but had either spent their ca-
reers on the higher Bench or had pursued an 
academic career building their constitutional 
and human rights expertise.  
Many disappointed applicants criticised the 
JCC’s decision and one legal practitioner 
went so far as to write to the Republican 
President urging him to reject the JCC’s 
nominees on the grounds that they did not 
meet the 15 years of practice, which practice 
in his view had to be at the Bar. He claimed 
that being a legal practitioner did not include 
serving on the Bench or teaching in an ac-
ademic institution. And yet no provision in 
the law says so and no Zambian case pro-
vides such an interpretation. Recklessly, he 
ensured that his erroneous statements were 
widely published in the press, thereby influ-
encing public opinion and causing serious 
and long-lasting damage to the integrity of 
the nominees and public confidence in the 
new Court.   
Although not publicly acknowledged, gen-
der may also have been at play. The fact that 
the nominees were predominantly female 
was cause for criticism in many circles that 
felt that because of the political nature and 
‘maleness’ of many of the cases coming be-
fore the Court, such cases would be more 
competently handled by male judges drawn 
from the predominantly male senior mem-
bers of the Bar. Despite the furor surround-
ing the appointments, the Parliamentary Se-
lect Committee accepted the nominees and 
recommended that Parliament ratify them for 
appointment by the Republican President.  
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The second controversy relates to the effect 
of the 2016 amendments on Zambia’s com-
mon law legacy, which despite the constitu-
tional order remains the foundation of the 
entire legal system. As a former British pro-
tectorate, Zambia falls within what is known 
as the post-colonial constitutional model. 
The most salient feature of such a model is 
the ‘…ongoing struggle between absorption 
and rejection of the former coloniser’s…
identities’.2 Great anxiety therefore arose 
over the meaning of Article 7 and the ratio-
nale behind it, found on pages 12-13 of the 
Report of the Technical Committee on Draft-
ing the Zambian Constitution (TCDZC) 
dated 30th April 2012.  Article 7 states that 
the Laws of Zambia consist of the Constitu-
tion; laws enacted by Parliament; statutory 
instruments; Zambian customary law which 
is consistent with the Constitution; and the 
laws and statutes which apply or extend to 
Zambia, as prescribed.
The rationale states that Article 7 is intended 
to specify what constitutes the Laws of Zam-
bia so that only such specified laws apply in 
Zambia. The TCDZC resolved to exclude 
doctrines of equity and decisions of superior 
courts from the Laws of Zambia for the rea-
son that doctrines of equity are principles of 
law which a country is not obliged to apply. 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
the TCDZC observed that Parliament is the 
only state organ mandated to enact laws in 
Zambia and that the Courts’ mandate is to 
interpret law.   
The issue was widely debated by the legal 
fraternity, including members of the Bench. 
in the months leading up to and in the im-
mediate aftermath of the 2016 constitutional 
enactments. The debate showed that while 
the majority of the legal fraternity do not 
want the Constitution which is the flagship 
of Zambia’s sovereignty, to contain a decla-
ration that they are still subject to the reign 
of English law and English judges, they at 
the same time recognise the practical diffi-
culty of prohibiting its application. Case law, 
including case authorities from England, the 
sub-Region and further afield, therefore re-
2 Michel Rosenfeld, ‘Constitutional Identity’ in Michel Rosenfeld and Andras Sajo (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (OUP 2013)
3 Alec Stone Sweet, ‘Constitutional Courts’ in Michel Rosenfeld and Andras Sajo (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (OUP 2013) 
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main persuasive sources before all the courts 
of record and both courts and legal practi-
tioners have continued to cite them without 
legal challenge. 
   
MAJOR CASES 
As the Constitutional Court is somewhat 
disabled by its exclusion from adjudicating 
on human rights disputes (the most import-
ant function of the modern constitutional 
court3), its most significant work has been in 
the area of separation of powers.  
Separation of Powers
The Court’s first major case in this area arose 
because of changes made by Parliament, on 
the recommendation of the Government, to 
the draft Constitution during the enactment 
of the 2016 amendments. Stephen Katu-
ka (in his capacity as Secretary General of 
the United Party for National Development 
(UPND) and the Law Association of Zambia 
v Attorney General and Ngosa Simbyakula 
and 63 Others 2016/CC/0010/0011 essen-
tially challenged the amendments that justi-
fied continued stay in office and receipt of 
emoluments and other benefits by cabinet 
and provincial ministers after the dissolution 
of Parliament on 12th May 2016.  
According to the cabinet and provincial 
ministers, their continued stay in office was 
based on Articles 116 (3) (e) and 117 (2) 
(d), which provided that one of the ways 
in which a minister vacates office is when 
a new President comes into office. In their 
view, this meant that they could stay in of-
fice until the next Republican President was 
sworn in. The case divided the nation, with 
supporters of the ruling party arguing that 
the continued stay in office of the ministers 
was legal whilst civil society and opposition 
parties considered it to be illegal and unfair 
as it gave the ruling party a campaigning ad-
vantage in the run up to the elections.  
The Court took a purposive approach to the 
relevant provisions. In a unanimous deci-
sion, it found that provisions relating to the 
life of Parliament are applicable to the ten-
ure of the ministers once Parliament made 
appointment to ministerial positions de-
pendent on membership of Parliament. The 
draft Constitution had stated that ministers 
were to be appointed from outside Parlia-
ment, hence the linked provision that they 
could stay in office until another President 
assumed office. In the Court’s own words at 
pages J67-J69:
[T]he literal interpretation of the provi-
sion leads to absurdity because on one 
hand, the Constitution says ministers 
will be appointed from among members 
of Parliament and, yet, on the other, it 
appears to allow for the continuation 
of ministers in their cabinet portfolios 
following the dissolution of Parliament 
when the foundation upon which their 
ministerial positions stand, namely 
membership of Parliament, has been re-
moved…the respondents were appoint-
ed to their portfolios from Parliament 
which has since been dissolved, we find 
that the claim that they should contin-
ue holding their portfolios until another 
person assumes the office of President 
after the dissolution of Parliament is 
clearly not what Parliament could have 
intended. Had that been the intention, 
clear provision could have been made in 
the Constitution to that effect because a 
provision requiring a radical departure 
from the position which prevailed be-
fore the amendment of the Constitution 
where cabinet ministers vacated their 
office upon dissolution of Parliament is 
so important that it could not have been 
left to speculation or conjecture. Parlia-
ment ought to have made express provi-
sion in the two Articles to the effect that, 
notwithstanding the dissolution of the 
National Assembly, the ministers and 
provincial ministers would continue in 
office until the president elect assumed 
office. 
The Court then ordered the ministers to 
vacate their offices and pay back the emol-
uments received after Parliament was dis-
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solved. It was a popular decision. Under the 
leadership of President Lungu, the ruling 
party accepted the decision and it began to 
look as if the Court would be an effective 
check on the Executive and fill in the gaps 
left by Parliament.  
Elections
This quickly changed with the second case 
relating to the presidential election petition 
handled by the Court in August to September 
2016. Hichilema and Another v Lungu and 
Others 2016/CC/0031 proved to be more 
problematic for the Court itself and for the 
country at large.  
Zambia’s general elections, held on 11th Au-
gust 2016, were the first under the amended 
Constitution.  Following the announcement 
of the winner of the presidential election, a 
petition was filed by the losing candidates, 
Mr Hakainde hichilema and his running mate 
Mr Geoffrey Bwalya Mwamba, accusing the 
winners, Mr Edgar Chagwa Lungu and his 
???????? ????????? ?????????????????????
and the Electoral Commission of Zambia of 
manipulating the election results and declar-
ing the wrong person as winner.
The Constitutional Court attempted to hear 
the case but subsequently terminated it 
through a judgment of the majority against 
two dissenters when the constitutional time 
limit ran out before a single witness had been 
heard. The failure of the petition paved the 
way for the swearing into office of Mr Lun-
???? ???????????????????????????????????????
immediate aftermath of the abortive petition 
points to the many substantive and procedur-
al bottlenecks that have dogged the Consti-
tutional Court in its first year of life and it 
necessitates further analysis.
The attack on the competence of the Consti-
tutional Court judges that began with their 
appointment was revived and became a cen-
tral part of charges of incompetence filed 
against the judges by the cadres and busy-
bodies. The hearing of the charges against 
the judges is currently ongoing. However, 
was the Court applying a doable provision 
of the law? Could any court really hear the 
petition within the stipulated 14 days on the 
same facts and law? It is highly unlikely. 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
public record available in the official tran-
script of proceedings) and a review of the 
law proves the Court was faced with an im-
possibility.  
A presidential election petition is provided 
for in Article 101 of the Constitution. The 
relevant parts read:
(4) A person may within seven days of the 
declaration made under clause (2), pe-
tition the Constitutional Court to nulli-
fy the election of a presidential candi-
date who took part in the initial ballot 
?????????????????? (a) the person was 
not validly elected; or (b) a provision of 
this Constitution or other law relating to 
presidential elections was not complied 
with. 
(5) The Constitutional Court shall hear an 
election petition filed in accordance 
with clause (4) within fourteen days of 
the filing of the petition.
(6) The Constitutional Court may, after 
???????? ??? ????????? ?????????(a) de-
clare the election of the presidential 
candidate valid; (b) nullify the election 
of the presidential candidate; or (c) dis-
qualify the presidential candidate from 
being a candidate in the second ballot.
(7) A decision of the Constitutional Court 
made in accordance with clause (6) is 
final.
The Constitutional Court Rules provide for 
a pre-trial process which if fully exploited 
means that the 14 days would expire be-
fore the actual hearing of a petition can be-
gin.   Order 9/1/1 of the Rules states that ‘[e]
xcept as otherwise provided in these Rules, 
the petitioner or applicant shall serve the re-
spondent with the originating process within 
five days of filing or such time as the court 
may direct’. This provision is not ousted by 
the Additional Rules for Presidential Elec-
tion petitions under Order 14/2/1, which 
says ‘[t]he respondent shall within five days 
of service of a petition, respond to the peti-
tion by filing an answer’ and Order 14/1/3 
which says ‘the petitioner may reply to the 
respondent’s answer within two days of be-
ing served with the answer and opposing 
affidavit’. This adds up to 12 days, which 
are yet subject to Article 269 of the Consti-
tution and Order 15/6 on the computation of 
time. Article 269 and Order 15/6 do not in 
the computation of time include the day of 
the happening of an event but include Satur-
days and Sundays except where the period of 
time does not exceed six days. Furthermore, 
Order 15/7 allows the Court to extend time 
set by the Rules or its own decisions but not 
time specifically limited by the Constitution. 
??????????????????????????????????????????????
under the Rules providing for pre-trial pro-
cess comes to 12 working days or 16 cal-
endar days. This does not include the time 
needed for exchange of bundles of pleadings 
and documents or discovery as provided by 
Order 14/3/2. It also does not take into ac-
count the possibility of interlocutory appli-
cations, which are not excluded by Order 
14. The hearing of evidence envisaged by 
the Rules can only begin after the pre-trial 
????????????????????? ??????????????????????
trial. That the said hearing is a full trial is ev-
ident from Orders 14/1/3/b and 14/3/4. The 
ambiguity of the constitutional provision is 
further complicated by the clear disconnect 
between the provision and the Rules.  
??????????????????????????????????????????
the Rules even though the Court tried to 
abridge the time for the pre-trial process in 
order to create more time for the actual tri-
al.  The election petition was filed on Friday 
19th August 2016. The last of the respon-
dents was served on Tuesday 23rd August 
2016. The single judge of the Court directing 
pre-trial proceedings then issued directions 
on 24th August giving the respondents five 
days in which to file and serve and the pe-
titioners two days in which to reply; which 
both parties did, taking the time to the end of 
August 2016.  
An attempt by the Court to have the hearing 
commence on the 1st of September 2016 was 
rejected by the petitioners, leaving the hear-
ing to commence on Friday the 2nd Septem-
ber 2016, which was the 14th day since the 
filing of the petition. On that day, several ap-
plications were made including three major 
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ones renewed by the petitioners before the 
full Court. By the evening of that final day, 
the Court, having ruled on all the motions 
raised, reiterated its call on the petitioners’ 
lawyers to present their first witness.  The 
calling of even one witness would have argu-
ably arrested time-enabling the Court to con-
tinue the hearing into the following week. 
Instead, the petitioners’ lawyers withdrew 
their representation on the grounds that they 
could not effectively prosecute their case 
within the time remaining. The petitioners, 
in person, then made an application for time 
in which to engage fresh counsel. The Court 
had no option but to adjourn the matter to the 
following week.  
On Monday 5th September 2016, the Court 
did not proceed with the trial. In a ruling by 
the majority, it terminated the proceedings 
by interpreting Article 101(5) literally so 
that the provision necessitated that a matter 
be concluded within 14 calendar days. The 
majority Bench ruled that the petitioners 
could not cry foul as their lawyers had per-
sistently delayed the proceedings by failing 
to serve the respondents in time, by making 
numerous interlocutory applications during 
the pre-trial process and then renewing the 
applications before the full Court on the date 
of hearing, and finally by abandoning their 
clients at the last moment.  
The majority Bench acted prudently. The 
Court had before it 68 witnesses, 11 lawyers 
from nine law firms for the two petitioners 
and 20 private and state attorneys for the four 
respondents as well as thousands of pages 
of documents and video recordings. The 
Rules provide for a full trial to take place, 
judgment following which is final, making 
the stakes high enough to entail that each 
witness would likely be cross-examined and 
re-examined by any number of counsel on 
the pre-filed witness statement. The coun-
try was holding its breath as under Article 
105(2) (b) the President-elect can only be 
sworn in after the petition is concluded. No 
meaningful hearing could take place under 
the tense atmosphere prevailing.
Two of the five judges hearing the case 
dissented on the ground that a purposive 
approach would have permitted a more sat-
isfactory result by ensuring that the main 
purpose of Article 101(5), the hearing of an 
election petition, actually took place. Ending 
the matter on a procedural technicality cre-
ated an absurdity preventing the Court from 
rendering one of the conclusive decisions 
spelt out in Article 101(6). In the opinion of 
the dissenting judges, the 14 days enshrined 
in the Constitution was an impossibility 
which should have been tempered by a ho-
listic reading of the Constitution. It is trite 
that the Constitution makes it mandatory in 
Article 267 for the Court to take into account 
the Bill of Rights; to promote its values and 
principles; to permit development of the law; 
and to contribute to good governance. Arti-
cle 118(2) (e) in fact provides a mandatory 
caution against adhering to technicalities 
that result in injustice. And Article 271 em-
powers the Court to use its implied powers 
to ensure that it fulfills its mandate, which 
to the two dissenting judges meant hearing a 
dispute on the merits.  
Although much of the criticism directed at 
the Court accuses it of failing to interpret 
Article 101(5) at the beginning of the pro-
ceedings in order to give clear guidance, the 
Court cannot be faulted. Zambia applies the 
adversarial system. The Court could not pro-
vide such an interpretation without one or 
other of the parties first moving the Court to 
do so. Neither party moved the Court. The 
Court may have powers to move itself but 
that can only happen rarely and certainly not 
in relation to a highly contentious point as 
was the case in the petition before it. Such 
initiative by the Court would have led to ac-
cusations of bias by whichever side the re-
sulting interpretation disappointed.  
The impossibility of the 14 days is con-
firmed when the 2016 petition hearing is 
compared to the 2001 petition, which took 
over three years to conclude. Mazoka and 
Others v Mwanawasa and Others (2005) 
Z.R. 138 did not raise the same levels of 
public anxiety because there was no consti-
tutional time limit to raise false expectations 
and unduly constrain the Court. There was 
no hold placed on the swearing into office 
of the President-elect. There was no addi-
tional pressure in the form of parallel actions 
such as that instituted in 2016 under Article 
104 demanding that the President-elect hand 
over power to the Speaker whilst his election 
was under challenge.  
CONCLUSION 
Zambia’s Constitutional Court faced numer-
ous challenges throughout 2016 because of a 
widespread lack of understanding of the na-
ture and function of such a court. The legal-
ity of the 2016 amendments was challenged 
as well as the Court’s competence.  The 
Constitution itself and its attendant Rules as 
well as misconceived public attacks directed 
at the Court greatly undermined its standing 
and independence. It will be an uphill bat-
tle for the young Court to establish itself as 
a tour de force in promoting the democrat-
ic dispensation promised by the amended 
Constitution. Much will depend on how the 
Court handles itself over the course of 2017.

